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Foreword
I believe that this book will be regarded as a classic in describing the emerging global
energy crises and alternate approaches for addressing them. It will not only serve several purposes in the technology and policy worlds but will also appeal to a broader
audience. As the authors intended, it is an excellent technical source book for engineers
and technologists. It provides a comprehensive review of the history of energy conversion and use; current and emerging technologies to achieve energy sustainability in a
highly stressed planet; and contemporary international efforts to find solutions to the
complex issues involved. Accordingly, it is also a must read for all young individuals of
social consciousness, who see themselves as inheritors of grand challenge world issues
and have a keen desire to contribute to their solution.
The book is organized such that each chapter begins with an abstract of the subject matter and ends with a summary of key points. The language is aimed at a Popular Science level of technical exposition and is relatively jargon-free considering the
wide spectrum of technologies presented. Each chapter includes an extensive list of
references to assist the reader in finding sources and additional details of the referenced content.
However, the most important aspect of the book, which is relatively unique, is the
way the subject matter is organized. Energy sustainability is presented as a complex
issue (or a wicked problem) that is interrelated with other complex issues, such as environmental sustainability, economic sustainability, and in the case of biomass-derived
fuels, water and soil sustainability. For such problems there exists not a single solution
but a multiplicity of solutions, which must then be judged by equally complex interrelationships among technical, social, and economic factors. These in turn vary regionally
throughout the world based on different histories, cultures, social norms, etc. The book
carefully addresses these complexities for each energy policy topic presented.
The editors have carefully selected expert authors to explain the technical, social,
and economic factors for each topic and present alternative approaches to a solution.
The book intentionally avoids advocacy and attempts to be an honest broker to the
readers so that they can draw their own conclusions based on the relative advantages
and disadvantages presented.
xi

xii

foreword

I am exceedingly proud that this book originated in Professor Coyle’s Fulbright
Fellowship at Purdue University’s Global Policy Research Institute. I also applaud the
members of the faculty at Purdue and at the Dublin Institute of Technology who contributed to it, exemplifying a successful trans-Atlantic partnership. This product is a
glowing example of the vision of the GPRI to engage more faculty and students at Purdue and elsewhere to conduct research and careful analysis of grand challenge global
issues to inform the nation’s policy and decision makers.
Arden L. Bement, Jr.

Biographical Sketch
Arden Bement, Jr. retired from his position as the founding Director of the Global Policy
Research Institute at Purdue University in 2013. Prior to that position, he was the Director of the National Science Foundation from 2004 to 2010. He served as a member of
the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO and as the vice-chair of the Commission’s
Natural Sciences and Engineering Committee. He is a member of the U.S. National
Academy of Engineering, a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and
a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

[preface]

Preface
This book brings together experts in energy policy, social science, power systems, solar energy, agronomy, renewable energy technologies, nuclear engineering, transportation, and the built environment from both sides of the Atlantic to explore the future
of energy production and consumption from technological, political, and sociological
perspectives. The volume is not intended to serve as complete in-depth coverage of all
energy sector technologies, nor to cover energy policy comprehensively for all world regions. It is, however, hoped that the topics selected and questions addressed will encourage further engagement and debate among not only students, but anyone with interest
in energy sustainability, climate change, and related challenges.
These issues are multi-dimensional and complex in nature; “wicked problems” with
no easy answers. The book explores issues such as financial outlay and tariff support,
the readiness of emerging technologies such as wave and tidal energy converters, the
degree of wind energy that may be accommodated on national networks, the extent to
which solar energy may be deployed, challenges and uncertainties in the production
of advanced biofuels, concerns about natural gas extraction via hydraulic fracture (hydrofracking), and whether nuclear energy should become more widely used or taken
out of the generation mix.
In many quarters there is a sense of a race against time in trying to undo the current and introduce the new technologies that will help reduce carbon emissions back to
within acceptable levels and, in so doing, offset further increases in global average temperature. It is also important to remain focused and seek agreement on practical steps
that may be taken in both the short term, through research and innovation for renewable technologies and efficiency in energy use, and longer term through replacement
of coal, oil, and gas by commercially viable renewable technologies in much greater
proportions than are achievable today.
We the editors are strong proponents of a growing dialogue between the technology
and policy communities, and attest to the value of a broader exchange among stakeholders. Through our respective participation in programs such as the Fulbright Scholarship and the AAAS Science and Technology Policy Fellowship, we have witnessed
ways in which this dialogue can both inspire and be transformed into action.
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xiv
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Then I say the Earth belongs to each generation during its course, fully and in
its own right . . . [but] no generation can contract debts greater than may be
paid during the course of its own existence.
Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826)

Introduction
Energy is everywhere and drives everything. Our modern lives, both individual and societal, have come to depend on its abundance, convenience, and potential. It is the motive
force within our bodies, propelling our vehicles, lighting our world. Consider a power
outage, or a dead cell phone battery; living without energy, for even ten minutes, demonstrates how indelible its imprint is on daily activities. At the same time, we inhabit an
amazing ecosystem, as resilient as it is fragile. Our energy comes from and returns to a
global environment. The world is in a predicament, yet this is no book of gloom and doom,
but rather of technology and policy. These tools help us not only understand the energy
and climate context of our world, but allow us to begin solving its challenges. History has
shown that when technology and policy are not aligned or well-proportioned, they fail on
their collective promises. But taken together, in an intentional, practical, and coordinated
manner, they can be the stimulus behind a new and far superior energy future. And the
world has never needed that more than it does today.
Planet Earth is facing an energy crisis owing to an escalation in global energy demand, continued dependence on fossil-based fuels for energy generation and transportation, and an increase in world population, exceeding seven billion people and rising
steadily. Excessive burning of fossil fuels is not only depleting natural resources, but is
resulting in a steady increase of carbon dioxide emissions, which experts believe is responsible for increasing average global temperatures. While natural cyclical variations do
occur in regional and global climates, there is now widespread agreement among scientific communities and governments that recent climate change is accelerating as a result
of human intervention and that rapid and profound measures will be required to reduce
harmful impacts. Concentration levels of greenhouse gases are rising steadily and are
now greater than at any time in the past eight hundred thousand years. If concentration
levels are not reversed, major changes to the world climate may result, bringing significant
effects on people, industry, and the world economy. The International Energy Agency
(IEA) has outlined critical steps that, if implemented quickly, can help reduce the upward
trend in atmospheric emissions. To reduce traditional fuel use and CO2 emissions, major
countermeasures include increased energy efficiency and conservation, efforts to advance
alternative energy technologies, and efforts to control future energy demand.
1
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Prior to modern industrialization, concentration levels of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere remained relatively stable at 280 ppm. Over recent decades there has been
a steady rise in emissions, with levels now approaching 400 ppm (a forty percent increase) and rising an average of 2.3 percent per annum. The Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) has coined the now widely accepted “hockey stick graph”
characteristic to describe atmospheric pollutant increase. The graph has been used for
numerous reconstructions of Northern Hemisphere temperatures for the last 600 to
1,000 years. Reconstructions have consistently shown that late 20th century and early
21st century temperatures are rising sharply in tandem with concentrations of greenhouse gases, in particular carbon dioxide (Figure 1).
It is now believed that a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide to 560 ppm, projected by IPCC to occur by mid-century, will yield a global average temperature increase of at least 4°F (2.2°C). To gain an appreciation of world average temperature
statistics it is noted that the twentieth century average global temperature for the month
of June was 60°F (15.5°C).
Even an increase of 2°C over pre-industrial levels may result in significant world
climatic change with detrimental social, human and economic impact. Therefore, to
the extent such temperature increases can be avoided, it behooves governments and
concerned members of civil society to implement appropriate, yet practical policies and
actions in response.
To that end, IEA in 2009 proposed a plan entitled the 450 Scenario with an aggressive timetable of actions that would be required to limit the long-term concentration
of greenhouse gases in Earth’s atmosphere to 450 parts per million of carbon-dioxide

Figure 1. Keeling Curve of Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations, Measured at Mauna Loa
Observatory1
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equivalent, setting a limit on global temperature rise to around 2°C above pre-industrial
levels. The plan outlines a timeline to 2030 with actions that include the introduction of
energy efficient technologies, low-carbon energy technologies, enhanced generation integration through renewable energy resources, increase in nuclear energy as a base load
provider, and incorporation of energy plants fitted with carbon capture and storage
capabilities. In road transportation, the plan advocates a shift from the current balance
of greater than 99 percent combustion-powered vehicles to at least 60 percent hybrid
and electric vehicles.
In addition to the 450 Scenario, IEA proposed a range of policy scenarios in the
2012 World Energy Outlook, which if followed could result in very different outcomes in
global climate.2 In researching projections and likely outcomes it is clear that the grand
challenges presenting in energy and climate are global in nature and require concerted
action and coordination across state, country and continental borders. Commendable
inroads have been achieved through work of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
the Environmental Protection Agency and related organizations. By the end of 2011,
191 countries had become signatories to the Kyoto Protocol, and in so doing committed
to reaching designated national targets for reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.
A study on global climate change, commissioned by the National Research Council
in the United States and conducted by a wide ranging team of experts, resulted in a
comprehensive report etitled America’s Climate Choices in 2011. The world currently
emits upwards to thirty billion tons of CO2 per year from the combustion of fossil fuels. Twenty percent of these emissions are created by the United States. In America’s
Climate Choices it is acknowledged that limiting climate change will necessitate global
participation and contribution, noting that greenhouse gases do not observe national
boundaries:
A molecule of CO2 emitted in India or China has the same effect on the
climate system as a molecule emitted in the United States. There is wide
agreement that limiting the magnitude of climate change will require substantial action on behalf of all major GHG-emitting nations, including
both the industrialized nations and the rapidly developing countries whose
relative share of global emissions is rapidly increasing.3
The report proffers that development of strong credible policies by the US for reducing
emissions will ultimately help advance similar response by individual nations and help
facilitate greater international cooperative engagement.
Western industrialized countries carry a much greater responsibility for past emissions and continue to emit large quantities of carbon dioxide; however many developing countries through rapid expansion and growth are now significant greenhouse gas
polluters. In recent years China has surpassed the US as the world’s largest emitter of
greenhouse gases. China, US, the European Union, Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, and India
account collectively for approximately 60 percent of emissions. This group of countries
also accounts for approximately 55 percent of world population. More than 75 percent
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of carbon dioxide emissions derive from burning of fossil fuels, principally coal, oil and
natural gas.
Aside from concerns about fossil fuel emissions, there is increasing concern regarding global supply to meet market demand for crude-oil. In “Oil’s tipping point has
passed,” Murray and King argue that since 2005 conventional crude oil production has
not risen to match increasing demand. Prior to 2005, production increased in line with
growing demand, however supply has been relatively constant over the ensuing eight
years to the present day:
In 2005, global production of regular crude oil reached about 72 million
barrels per day. From then on, production capacity seems to have hit a ceiling at 75 million barrels per day. Analysis of prices against production from
1998 to today . . . shows this dramatic transition, from a time when supply
could respond elastically to rising prices caused by increased demand, to
when it could not. As a result, prices swing wildly in response to small
changes in demand.4
In a special report entitled “Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas,” IEA explores the
case for exploitation of unconventional gas (in particular shale gas, tight gas, and coalbed methane) and questions whether natural gas is poised to enter a golden age. Some
view wider deployment of natural gas as a way to provide increased energy security,
while others remain concerned about potential environmental damage which may result from hydraulic fracturing (fracking). Additional complexities surrounding availability and supply of crude oil, coal and natural gas will be further addressed in ensuing
chapters.
The authors of this book are primarily engineers, social scientists, and policy specialists and do not claim in-depth expertise in the related sciences of climatology and
greenhouse gas emissions. The book will therefore not attempt to explain the complex
relationship between energy, emissions and climate nor further argue in favor or against
the case for accepting a particular projection. As concerned citizens and educators of
student engineers, scientists, and technologists, this book rather seeks to question how
greenhouse gas emissions can be reduced, address challenges in bringing advanced
technologies to market, and identify steps to be taken that will facilitate more diversified and sustainable global energy systems.
Engineers will need to be engaged in solving these issues to the same extent as
they have, however unwittingly, contributed to their creation. Major steps forward in
the adaptation, development, and use of technology will be required. Greater investment in energy efficient technologies, low carbon technologies, renewable technologies,
nuclear energy, and carbon capture and storage technologies is now needed. In transportation, increased vehicle efficiency along with a gradual shift from conventional petroleum-fueled technology to hybrids and other advanced vehicles promises to extend
fuel and diversify to new sources of energy. Applying biofuels to both air and ground
based transportation, which have notably different fuel specifications, is also of crucial
importance. Greater momentum is now evident in applied research with a focus on
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product-to-market renewable energy technologies including solar photovoltaic, wind,
marine, and geothermal. The future of nuclear energy and the development of smart
grids and super grids are seminal research questions facing today’s engineers and policy
makers. Adaptations to existing residential and commercial buildings to more passive,
energy efficient, less fossil-fuel dependent dwellings is an area of growing concern in
many western countries today. Research on energy distribution and future interconnected grid networks is of growing interest to national energy utilities, with emerging
opportunities for greater cooperation between nations in both energy trading and in
ensuring energy availability and security of supply.
In a modern book discussing the interactions of energy and climate, technology
and policy, an attempt to integrate all aspects of these issues would be daunting at best.
Therefore we have organized the narrative by selecting target technologies, representative policy concepts, and instructive case studies. Specific technologies, policies, and
countries have necessarily been chosen in order to expand the reader’s breadth and
depth of understanding and stimulate additional discussion and investigation. No attempt has been made to introduce every conceivable energy solution, or even to suggest
a priority for those most promising today. Rather, it is believed that technology and policy remain flexible, and that a truly robust energy and climate strategy should be adaptable to achieve multiple objectives in the face of changing variables, evolving economies
and electorates, and new scientific data and discoveries.
In order to achieve solutions of the required scale and magnitude within a limited
timeline, it is essential that engineers, scientists, and technologists be not only technologically adept, but also aware of the wider social and political issues that governmental
policy-makers face. Likewise, it is imperative that policy makers work closely with the
academic community to interpret data and chart the way to achieve bold, timely, and
lasting change. This book is designed to bridge the gap between these two communities.
Central issues in global energy will be discussed through interdisciplinary dialogue and
contribution by a host of experts in their respective fields.

Book Layout
The book is organized in three parts.
Part 1: Global Energy Crisis in Context. Chapter 1 considers man’s dependence on
carbonaceous fuels for survival through time. The technological and economic developments of the industrial revolution are recalled, with a focus on the detrimental effects
resulting from excessive burning of coal to meet energy requirements. This coincides
with emerging scientific awareness in the eighteenth century of the nature of Earth’s
atmosphere and the delicate balance of its constituent elements. The history of society’s
growing dependence on coal, oil, and natural gas, the emergence of new methods of
extraction such as hydraulic fracking, and the introduction of clean technologies and
the proposed capture and storage of carbon are reviewed in context.
Chapter 2 explores current global energy demand and expected demand growth
in the coming decades. Demand has more than doubled in the last four decades; with
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reliance still heavily weighted on the traditional fossil fuels: coal, oil, and natural gas. A
review and comparison of energy policy in the US and the EU is made, including the important 1997 Kyoto Protocol and subsequent UN energy and climate conventions. This
is followed by an exploration of energy policy directives and trends in China, Russia,
Brazil, and India. These nations all have large populations as well as significant energy
demands and resources, and will be critical players in global efforts to align energy and
climate trade and policies.
As educators, our primary objective is to equip graduates with the necessary skill
sets to understand social context and to help them contribute to the solutions of energy’s challenges. Chapter 3 explores social engagement by the engineer, through understanding the social environment and awareness of common authentic values and
principles. Themed case studies are included to address how social environment influences engineering practice.
Part 2: Energy Conversion Technology. In harnessing the forces of nature Chapter
4 reviews a range of renewable energy technologies including wind, hydro, marine wave
and tidal, and geothermal energy. A discussion of recent developments and growth in
both onshore and offshore wind energy is followed by an appraisal of historical developments in hydropower. The case for wave and tidal energy is made with a review
of emerging technologies and the challenges engineers continue to face. The chapter
concludes with an investigation of geothermal energy and its place in the energy mix.
Solar energy is emerging as an important source of renewable energy with potential for increased grid penetration. Developments in nanotechnology have enabled
the study of materials at an atomic level, opening up an exciting frontier in materials science. Applications of nanotechnology to solar energy devices are resulting in
improvements in solar energy conversion efficiency. Emerging technologies are also
enabling improved robustness to thermal variation and environmental degradation of
solar devices. Chapter 5 addresses the current status of research in nanotechnology in
association with solar photovoltaic, solar concentration, and thermoelectric devices.
The chapter also explores future opportunities for nanotechnology in energy conversion and storage.
Bioenergy is a forefront research frontier. Chapter 6 provides a history of first and
second-generation biofuel production, and explores policy which has enabled developments in biofuels in the US, Brazil, and the EU. Feedstocks, conversion processes, and
end products in advanced biofuel technologies are explored. An examination is made
of five uncertainties associated with the industrial development of biofuels and other
challenges and opportunities facing the industry are explored. The chapter includes
with a technology update of advanced biofuel conversion projects.
In chapter 7 we shift focus from renewable energy technologies, to consider the
role of nuclear engineering. We examine the social, environmental, technological, and
power capacity capability of nuclear fission reactors. An exploration of the historical
development of nuclear engineering, the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear energy as a provider of baseload generation is followed by a review of nuclear energy safety. Nuclear
accidents and their effect on public perception are explored through scenario discus-
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sions of Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima. Challenges in handling waste
with current policy, including disposal or storage of nuclear fuel stockpile, are explored
and quantified. The chapters closes with a brief discussion on nuclear fusion and where
it might lead.
Part 3: Energy Distribution and Use. Chapter 8 explores policy perspectives and
challenges presenting in taking emerging renewable energies to market. The chapter
first explores a range of influential factors including economic, political, social, environmental, and maintainability. A brief appraisal is then made of the economics of
energy together with a study of levelized costs of new generation energy resources, both
dispatchable (including coal, gas, nuclear, and biomass) and non-dispatchable (such as
wind, solar, and hydro). An exemplar study of challenges for emerging wave energy
technologies concludes the chapter.
In chapter 9, attention turns to consideration of energy used for transportation, noting the sector’s disproportionate reliance on oil. The resulting geopolitical, economic,
and environmental consequences present difficult near and long-term challenges. The
chapter is divided into three parts; part 1 is an introduction and overview of current
transportation energy issues. Part 2 explores the specific challenges facing the automotive transportation sector. A brief history of automotive technology is followed by a
classification of modern vehicle configurations, including internal combustion engine
and hybrid electric driveline configuration developments. In Part 3, we turn our attention to the aviation transportation sector by exploring aviation fuels and regulations,
followed by a discussion of challenges to the development and production of alternative
aviation fuels and fuel emissions.
Noting that energy use in the built environment accounts for approximately
40% of the energy consumed in developed countries, chapter 10 is devoted to this
highly important sector. In 2004, the emissions resulting from direct energy use in
the built environment were estimated at close on 9 Gt of CO2 per year. There is general agreement that through the use of mature technologies, building energy usage
can be reduced substantially. The chapter begins with a thorough introduction to the
magnitude of energy consumed by existing buildings in the developed world. Practical and currently available retrofit technologies with long-term potential for building
energy reduction are described along with variables that influence the choice and
effectiveness of these technologies. A discussion ensues of the challenges and barriers
to implementing these technologies. This is followed by an exploration of policy challenges that confront energy efficient retrofits. A review of building energy reduction
programs employed in the US and EU is followed with recommendations and opportunities for future solutions.

Epilogue
The epilogue provides a pivotal synthesis of questions posed, lessons learned, and insights gained, and of the continued challenges in both meeting future energy demands
and helping reduce manmade carbon emissions.

8

introduction

Notes
1.

2.
3.

4.

The Keeling curve, available from the Scripps Institution of Oceanography at http://keelingcurve.
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Part 1
the global energy crisis in context

Chapter 1
Reflections on Energy, Greenhouse Gases,
and Carbonaceous Fuels
Eugene d. Coyle, William Grimson,
Biswajit Basu, and Mike Murphy

Abstract
In this chapter, we review the history of man’s dependence on carbonaceous fuels for
survival, beginning with pre-industrial civilizations, during which charcoal was processed for thousands of years to smelt iron and copper. In the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, however, coke and coal became prime energy resources which powered the
engine rooms of the industrial revolution. Accompanying the economic and societal
benefits of this period was the recognition of the damage resulting from smog owing
to excessive burning of coal, which affected both human health and the natural environment. These pivotal centuries laid the foundation for the advancement of scientific
knowledge and discovery which underpinned both engineering developments and the
sciences of the natural world, including earth science, atmospheric science, and meteorology. These developments in turn led to our modern understanding of climate change
and the effect of greenhouse gases.
Today coal, petroleum, and natural gas still play a vital role in our global energy mix.
While scientists and engineers have developed clean coal technologies such as carbon
capture and storage, it is important to question whether such technologies can offset
the growing carbon footprint caused by the use of carbonaceous fuels. This challenge
is complicated by the growth in scale of total global world energy demand, the scale of
economic investment required to implement such technologies, and the race against
time to minimize the damage resulting from continued use of fossil fuel energy.
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Coyle, Grimson, Basu, and Murphy

1.1. Introduction: Man’s Quest for Energy
Humankind has always needed energy, and while the source and usage of energy have
changed over time some patterns have remained constant. In earlier times food was the
key source of energy for people and their livestock. This form of energy not only allowed
our race to survive but dictated in part how civilization developed. Societies worldwide
focused on developing new and sustainable food sources. The storage of food and its
distribution was a factor in how groups learned to organize themselves communally,
best survive periods of shortage, and also benefit from occasional abundances. The discovery of methods of processing and preserving food meant that new sources of food
could be used with increased efficiency and increasingly less waste. People migrated
across continents, seas, and oceans in response to sometimes complex social pressures,
but certainly the search for food and reliable sources of food was a common factor in
their movements. There may be a greater urgency today than heretofore to identifying
sustainable sources of energy, increasing the efficiency of energy usage, and finding new
sources of energy due to expanding world population, depletion of energy resources,
and growing environmental concerns; but there is no question that similar patterns
have been in evidence for thousands of years. And there is something timeless and circular about modern society growing crops that once would have been considered food,
but now are solely intended to produce energy as biofuels.
The history of how energy is and was used illustrates how competing usages dictate
the exploitation of resources, often to the detriment of the original but less powerful first
adopters. Charcoal as fuel for cooking has a long history and is still in demand today for
use in barbecues. Yet more than five thousand years ago, people found that it was useful
in smelting of iron and in the Bronze Age applied it to the production of copper and
more valuably, bronze. These and subsequent developments caused the clearing of woodlands and competed with land once intended only for agricultural purposes. The use of
banks to divide land facilitated the retention of some trees which were then coppiced to
provide a source of charcoal. By the thirteenth century Europeans had learned of the
Chinese explosive gunpowder, which created a new demand for charcoal yet again. The
military use of gunpowder necessitated the casting of cannons, requiring a considerable
amount of charcoal. These factors put pressure on supplies of wood suitable for charcoal
production, leading to the introduction of restrictions in certain countries. By the eighteenth century the demand for charcoal to support the iron industry was so high that an
alternative was desirable, and this was found in the form of coke. Not only could coke
replace charcoal for many industrial purposes, but a byproduct of coke production was
a combustible gas that could be used in households. Not surprisingly coal and coke producers encouraged the use of their products, further reducing the demand for charcoal.
The historical relationship between coke and charcoal demonstrate how a single energy
source can have many interacting uses and drivers for its exploitation, and that the resultant interrelationships between users and suppliers are complex.
During World Wars I and II and their aftermath, the world witnessed both the horror
of the destructive power of nuclear energy and the potential promise of an efficient, reliable
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and clean source of electrical energy. The debate on the future mix of nuclear power in
global energy provision, which had to address such issues as nuclear waste disposal, nuclear
power plant accidents and their environmental and social consequence, and the continued
development and dependence on nuclear energy from an armaments perspective, continues
today (these issues are explored further in chapter 7). Furthermore, the general argument
that environmental factors are not the only ones that influence decisions on energy production also applies to what might be called green or clean technologies. Lobby groups pushing
their own agendas have not always supported their stances with high quality economic and
environmental data. As a result, the informed public has rightly become more robust in
questioning the latest projects to harness power through renewable and sustainable sources,
whether those involve estuary barrages, wave power, offshore wind, solar power, or bioenergy. Apart from searching for new solutions and developing new methods of production,
energy engineers have a clear responsibility to help inform policy makers and the general
public of the pros and cons of each means of energy production.
The world has truly become a global village. The challenges to achieving global
economic security and sustainable living—in a world of increasing population and multivariable levels of wealth and social inequality—are complex and vast. The relationship between man and machine, productivity and industrial development, marches on.
Whether in cities of the so-called developed nations or in the rapidly expanding urban
population centers of the developing world, concern for the atmosphere that sustains
Earth’s ecosystem is of growing importance. Air pollution affects the overall balance
and ultimate health of the ecosystem. It is instructive to briefly review the nature and
composition of Earth’s atmosphere and to explore the important role played by carbonaceous fuels throughout human history.

1.2. Earth’s Atmosphere and Greenhouse Gases
1.2.1. Climate Variability
Climate variability is one of the great discussion points and climate change one of the
great concerns of humankind today. Research in climate science and meteorology is long
established and it is therefore fitting to briefly review the writings of a selected band of
pioneering thought leaders of the nineteenth century in their contemplations of Earth’s
atmosphere and its makeup.
In the 1820s, Jean Baptiste Joseph Fourier calculated that, based on its size and
distance from the sun, planet Earth should be considerably cooler than it actually is,
assuming it is warmed only by the effects of incoming solar radiation. He examined
various possible sources of the additional observed heat, and ultimately concluded that
the Earth’s atmosphere acts in some way as an insulator, thus retaining quantities of
incoming solar heat. This observation may be considered the earliest scientific contribution to what today is commonly known as the greenhouse effect.1
Forty years later John Tyndall identified the radiative properties of water vapor
and CO2 in controlling surface temperatures. In 1861, after two years of painstaking
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experiments, Tyndall published a lengthy paper packed with results. Among the findings, he reported that moist air absorbs thirteen times more heat than dry, purified
air.2 Tyndall observed that:
The waves of heat speed from our earth through our atmosphere towards
space. These waves dash in their passage against the atoms of oxygen and
nitrogen, and against the molecules of aqueous vapor. Thinly scattered as
these latter are, we might naturally think meanly of them as barriers to the
waves of heat.3
In the early twentieth century, Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius asked whether the mean
temperature of the ground was in any way influenced by the presence of the heat-absorbing gases in the atmosphere. This question was debated throughout the early part of the
twentieth century and is still a main concern of earth scientists today. Arrhenius went on
to become the first person to investigate the effect that doubling atmospheric carbon dioxide would have on global climate and was awarded the 1903 Nobel Prize for Chemistry.4
It is well understood that Earth’s atmosphere comprises a layer of gases surrounding the
planet and retained by gravity.5 Extending from Earth’s surface, the atmosphere protects
life on Earth by absorbing ultraviolet solar radiation, warming the surface through heat
retention (the greenhouse effect), and reducing temperature extremes between day and night
through a process called diurnal variation. The air we breathe contains approximately 78.1%
nitrogen, 20.9% oxygen, 0.9% argon, 0.04% carbon and small amounts of other gases. These
other gases, often referred to as trace gases, also comprise the greenhouse gases.
An atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) can absorb and emit radiation within the
thermal infrared (IR) range of the electromagnetic spectrum of light.6 The primary
greenhouse gases of Earth’s atmosphere are water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and tropospheric ozone.7 Solar radiation passing through the atmosphere
heats the surface of the Earth. Some of the energy returns to the atmosphere as longwave heat energy radiation, some energy is captured by the layer of gases that surrounds
the Earth, and the remainder passes into space. The concentration and proportional mix
of these gases in the atmosphere influence climate stability and changes in composition
can result in climate change. Since the commencement of the industrial revolution, human activity such as the burning of fossil fuels, the release of industrial chemicals, the
removal of forests that would otherwise absorb carbon dioxide, and their replacement
with intensive livestock ranching, has changed the types and quantities of gases in the
atmosphere. This in turn has substantially increased the capacity of the atmosphere
to absorb heat energy and emit it back to Earth. Some greenhouse gases stay in the
atmosphere for only a few hours or days, while others remain for decades, centuries, or
even millennia. Greenhouse gases emitted today will drive climate change long into the
future, and the process cannot be quickly reversed.8

1.2.2. Carbonaceous Fuels
Carbon dioxide emissions come from combustion of carbonaceous fuels such as coal,
oil and natural gas. Carbon dioxide has an atmospheric lifetime of about one hundred
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years; methane, twelve years; and nitrous oxide, one hundred fourteen years. Methane
is up to twenty-five times more effective than carbon dioxide in the capture of heat in
the atmosphere and its radiative effect is approximately seventy times larger, however it
exists in much smaller concentrations and therefore its overall environmental impact
is significantly less. In addition to its production through farming livestock, rice cultivation, and coal mining, there are large quantities of methane in arctic permafrost ice9
and below ocean sediments. Release of such gas could result in major environmental
damage; large-scale release has not occurred in recent history, but remains a point of
genuine concern.
Isn’t it ironic that the natural elements of coal, gas, and oil, having sustained human
life over thousands of years, are now viewed to a certain degree as offenders, responsible
for the pollution that has upset the balance of nature? It is, of course, mankind that has
created the current instability through insatiable exploitation of Earth’s resources. It is
therefore mankind’s responsibility to ensure every effort be made to redress the damage
done and to work toward a more sustainable eco-environment.

1.2.3. Fossil Fuels Through History
Fossil fuels are formed by natural processes such as the anaerobic decomposition of
buried dead organisms, through exposure to heat and pressure in the Earth’s crust over
time periods of typically millions of years. Containing high percentages of carbon, fossil fuels include coal, petroleum, and gas. They range from volatile materials with low
carbon to hydrogen ratios, such as methane (CH4), to liquid petroleum, to nonvolatile
materials composed of almost pure carbon, such as anthracite coal.10 George Agricola
is credited as the first scientist to have articulated the biogenic of fossil fuel creation.
His most famous work, the De re metallica libri xii, a treatise on mining and extractive
metallurgy, was published in 1556. Agricola described and illustrated how ore veins
occur in and on the ground, making the work an early contribution to the developing
science of geology.11
In 2011, fossil fuel consumption in the United States totaled eighty quadrillion British thermal units (Btu). The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimated
that 80% of that energy was derived from fossil fuels, specifically 35.3% from petroleum,
19.6% from coal, and 26.8% from natural gas. Nuclear energy and renewable energy
accounted for 8.3% and 9.1%, respectively.12
Fossil fuels are non-renewable resources because they take millions of years to
form, and reserves are being depleted much faster than new ones are being made. The
burning of fossil fuels produces over twenty-two billion tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2)
per year, but it is estimated that natural processes can only absorb about half of that
amount. This causes a net increase of eleven billion tonnes of atmospheric carbon dioxide per year.

1.2.3.1. Coal
One of Earth’s most valued natural resources, coal has been a provider of warmth and
energy to humankind for hundreds, if not thousands of years. Resulting from decaying
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woodland vegetation, compressed by rain water and repeatedly added to through further additional mineral vegetation deposit over hundreds of thousands of years, peat
was formed which over time hardened to lignite (brown coal) and then to coal, a dark
colored sedimentary rock made of both inorganic and organic matter. With many different classifications of grade and composition, also referred to as coal rank, coal is
primarily composed of carbon, while also containing elements of hydrogen, oxygen,
nitrogen, aluminum, silicon, iron, sulfur and calcium. Coal can in fact contain as many
as one hundred twenty inorganic compound trace elements with over seventy of the
naturally occurring elements of the periodic table. Designated coal types range from
lignite to flame coal, sub-bituminous, bituminous through to nonbaking coal and anthracite, classified in accordance with percentage element composition. The particles of
organic matter in coal are referred to as macerals, indicative of plants or parts of plants
including bark, roots, spores and seeds, which originally contributed to a particular
coal formation. Coal rank is determined by the percentage of fixed carbon, moisture,
volatile matter, and calorific value in British thermal units after the sulfur and mineral-matter content have been subtracted.13
Coal is the world’s most abundant and widely distributed fossil fuel, accounting for
more than one quarter of global primary energy demand. With global proven reserves
totaling nearly one trillion tonnes it remains one of the most important sources of energy for the world, particularly for power generation.16 Coal fuels high percentages of
electricity to the United States (49%), India (69%), China (79%), Poland (92%), and South
Africa (97%), and supplies in excess of forty percent of the global electricity generation
requirements, including Germany and much of central Europe. More than twenty-three
percent of total world energy and thirty-six percent of world electricity is produced by
coal, with a projected growth of 2.4% annually in the consumption of electricity between
2005 and 2030. Over the last decade demand for coal has outpaced that for gas, oil, nuclear power, and renewable energy sources. North America, the former Soviet Union,
and Pacific Asia combined account for more than eighty percent of proven coal reserves.
Global coal production in 2009 topped 6.9 billion tonnes, with China producing approximately 46 percent, the United States 16 percent, and Australia and India equal producers
at roughly 6 percent. Bituminous coal dominates world production, followed by lignite
and coking coal. Sixty percent of coal is produced through underground mining. Australia and Indonesia are the two main coal exporting countries. Most coal-producing
nations produce for their home markets exclusively, and import the balance required to
meet national demand. In spite of environmental concerns, coal is expected to continue
to be the second greatest global source of energy through 2030.17
Coal-fired power plants, however, are facing new challenges owing to increased
competition from natural gas and new air pollutant regulations advanced by the EPA
in 2011, requiring in particular reduced emissions of mercury, acid gases, and soot.18
Average CO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants are roughly double those from natural gas plants, approximately 2,250 and 1,135 pounds per megawatt hour, respectively.
Coal-fired plant retirements are projected to rise to nine thousand megawatts by 2014,
with a reduction in generating capacity from coal of well in excess of ten percent.19
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Carbon and the Industrial Revolution
Socio-techno-economic factors all played their part in how industrial revolutions
originated, developed, transformed and then eventually evolved to a post-revolution
industrial society. One of the key factors undoubtedly was the availability of energy
and invariably that source of energy was coal. In Great Britain Matt Ridley noted that
it was not just the availability of coal but that for other and existing sources “there
was never going to be enough wind, water or wood in England to power the factories,
let alone in the right place.”14 Of course this comment has to be qualified in that we
now know that there was and is sufficient energy available from wind and water, but
the technology and know-how did not exist to harness the levels of energy required
by industries such as iron and transport. Ridley refers exclusively to windmills, water mills, and charcoal. Another point Ridley makes is that the widespread use of
horses required a huge amount of food (itself an energy source) that required up to
one-third of the available arable land—land required to feed a growing population.
It was therefore necessary to abandon renewable sources of energy if the Industrial
Revolution was to take off. But the picture was complex, as technological innovation
was required in order to exploit coal at an economic advantage. Effective water pumps
were required for mining, and new transport solutions were needed to deliver coal
to where it was to be used. Steam engines for both pumps and early trains, as well as
the rapidly expanding rail network, required machines to manufacture and shape the
necessary parts, and it was coal that ultimately provided the power.
Coal as it was used during the Industrial Revolution came at an additional cost
in terms of a set of disadvantages. First, it was dirty, resulting in huge amounts of
ash. Second, it produced a range of toxic flue gases as well as carbon dioxide. Third,
the production of coal left its mark on the landscape and more importantly on the
men and their families who carried out the mining. And because coal was abundant,
there were few incentives to investigate alternatives or even to be much concerned
with efficiency. A plentiful supply of coal replaced a number of largely clean energy
sources, but this was not considered an issue as long as profits were increasing. Of
course today clean—or more correctly cleaner—coal technology (such as flue gas
scrubbing) has been developed, but the long-term damage cannot be undone.
Some of the problems that accompany coal mining include:
• Acid mine drainage results when coal beds and surrounding strata containing medium to high amounts of sulfur (sulphide compounds) are disrupted
by mining, thereby exposing sulphides to air and water.
• Atmospheric sulfur oxides (SOx) and subsequent acid decomposition, such
as acid rain, result from the burning of medium to high-sulfur coal.
• The quality of surface and ground water may be adversely affected by the disposal of the ash and sludge that result from the burning of coal and flue gases.
• Environmental greenhouse gas emissions result from the release of carbon
dioxide (CO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) through the burning of coal.
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• Additional trace elements are released through burning of coal.
Developments both during and subsequent to the Industrial Revolution also
resulted in great benefits to society. The Enlightenment provided the stimulus for
creative development and innovation, an increased interchange of knowledge coupled with a new entrepreneurial vigour.15

1.2.3.2. Petroleum 20
Petroleum, also termed crude oil, contains hydrocarbons and other organic compounds. It is found in natural formations beneath the Earth’s surface. It is derived from
ancient organic materials such as zooplankton and algae. Petroleum is recovered mostly
through oil drilling. Colonel Edwin Laurentine Drake is credited as the first person to
have successfully drilled for oil in the United States. Employed by the Seneca Oil Company in 1858 to investigate oil deposits in Pennsylvania, Drake devised a 10-foot long
cast-iron drive pipe which struck bedrock at 32 feet. The following morning crude oil
was seen to be rising up and oil was brought to the surface using a hand-pitcher pump.21
The discovery of oil triggered an oil rush in America, fueled by an American law
which conferred ownership of underground resources to the landowner. During this
period, crude oil was refined into kerosene and was used to light homes and businesses.
In 1863 John D. Rockefeller entered the fray and concentrated his business on the refining, transportation, and distribution of petroleum. After founding the Standard Oil
Company in 1870, Rockefeller became the dominant figure in the late nineteenth century petroleum industry. Exploration in other parts of the United States, in particular Texas, and in countries including Russia, Dutch East Indies, Indonesia, Venezuela,
Trinidad, and Mexico opened up the market with competition from companies including the Royal Dutch Company and Shell. It wasn’t until around 1910 that oil began to
overtake coal as the primary global energy driver. This was largely due to the rapid
growth of the automobile industry and the necessity for widespread availability and
supply of gasoline.22
Today, petroleum is refined and separated into a range of consumer products, including gasoline (petrol), kerosene (paraffin), asphalt (bitumen), and chemical reagents
used to make plastics and pharmaceuticals. Petroleum is used in manufacturing a wide
variety of materials, and it is estimated that the world consumes up to eighty-eight
million barrels per day. The term petroleum strictly refers to crude oil, however in common usage it includes all liquid, gaseous, and solid hydrocarbons. Under certain surface
pressure and temperature conditions, lighter hydrocarbons including methane, ethane,
propane, and butane exist as gases, while pentane (C5H12) and heavier organic compounds exist in the form of liquids or solids.23
An oil well produces predominantly crude oil, with some natural gas dissolved in
it. Because the pressure is lower at the surface than underground, some of the gas will
come out of solution and be recovered (or burned) as associated gas or solution gas.
A gas well produces predominantly natural gas, however because the underground
temperature and pressure are higher than at the surface, the gas may contain heavier
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hydrocarbons such as pentane, hexane, and heptane in the gaseous state. At surface
conditions these will condense out of the gas to form natural gas condensate. The proportion of light hydrocarbons in the petroleum mixture varies greatly among different
oil fields, ranging from as much as 97 percent by weight in the lighter oils to as little as
50 percent in the heavier oils and bitumens.
Within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the five
Middle Eastern countries Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates
accounted for seventy percent of oil reserves in 2009, with Saudi Arabia alone accounting for twenty-six percent of total OPEC reserves.24 Non-OPEC production accounts
for about sixty percent of current global oil supply. China has emerged as the largest oil
consuming country in the world with annual growth rate of about seven percent.
Global crude oil consumption grew by 0.6 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2012,
reaching 88 million b/d. OECD consumption actually declined by 1.2% in line with
trends over recent years. Non-OECD consumption grew by 2.8%. China had the largest
consumption growth at 5.5% (505,000 b/d).

1.2.3.3. Natural Gas
Natural gas is found in deep underground natural rock formations or associated with
other hydrocarbon reservoirs in coal beds and as methane clathrates. As discussed
above, petroleum is also found in proximity to and with natural gas. Most natural gas
was created over time by either a biogenic or thermogenic mechanism. Biogenic gas is
created by methanogenic organisms (microorganisms that produce methane as a metabolic byproduct in anoxic conditions) in marshes, bogs, landfills, and shallow sediments. Deeper in the earth, at greater temperature and pressure, thermogenic gas is
created from buried organic material.25
Natural gas is often informally referred to simply as gas, especially when compared
to other energy sources such as oil or coal. In the nineteenth century, natural gas was obtained as a byproduct of producing oil, since the small, light gas carbon chains came out
of solution as the extracted fluids underwent pressure reduction from the reservoir to the
surface. If unwanted, natural gas was burned off at source in the oil field. Today, unwanted
gas may be returned to the reservoir through injection wells. Where economical, gas may
be transported using a network of pipelines. By converting gas into a form of liquid gasoline or diesel, it may also be exported as a liquid, commonly referred as gas to liquid (GTL),
or to a jet fuel by applying the Fischer-Tropsch process (a collection of chemical reactions
that converts a mixture of carbon monoxide and hydrogen into liquid hydrocarbons).
Before natural gas can be used as a fuel, it must undergo processing to remove
impurities, including water, to meet the specifications of marketable natural gas. The
byproducts of processing include ethane, propane, butanes, pentanes, and higher molecular weight hydrocarbons, hydrogen sulfide (which may be converted into pure sulfur), carbon dioxide, water vapor, and sometimes helium and nitrogen.
Natural gas extracted from oil wells is called casinghead gas or associated gas. The
natural gas industry is extracting an increasing quantity of gas from challenging resource types, including sour gas, tight gas, shale gas, and coalbed methane.
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The world’s largest proven gas reserves are located in Russia, at approximately 48
terra (1012) cubic meters. Russia is frequently the world’s largest natural gas extractor.
Other major proven resources (in billion cubic meters) exist in Iran (26,370 in 2006),
Qatar (25,790 in 2007), Saudi Arabia (6,568 in 2006) and the United Arab Emirates
(5,823 in 2006).
The world’s largest gas field is Qatar’s offshore North Field, estimated to have twenty-five trillion cubic meters of gas in place.26 The second largest natural gas field is the
South Pars Gas Field in Iranian waters in the Persian Gulf. Located next to Qatar’s
North Field, it has an estimated reserve of eight to fourteen trillion cubic meters of gas.

1.2.3.4. Shale Gas
Shale is a fine-grained, clastic sedimentary rock composed of mud that is a mix of flakes
of clay minerals and tiny fragments of other minerals, notably quartz, calcite, feldspar,
and dolomite. The ratio of clay to other minerals is variable. Shale is characterized by
breaks along thin laminae or parallel layering or bedding less than one centimeter in
thickness, called fissility.27 Shale is easy to break or split, slate-like, into smaller planar
sheets. Oil shale occurs where organic material is present in the process of producing
the sedimentary rock. Extraction of gas and oil is carried out by heating the shale to
temperatures in the region of 475°C. It is estimated that there are about nine hundred
trillion cubic meters of unconventional gas such as shale gas, of which one hundred
eighty trillion may be recoverable.28
Shale gas was first extracted as a resource in Fredonia, New York in 1821, in shallow,
low-pressure fractures.29 In the mid-1800s James Young, a Scottish chemist, devised a
method of extracting from shale an oil product which he then distilled to yield kerosene, naphtha, heavier lubricating oils, and paraffin wax. Fuel (kerosene) to provide
lighting was an important use of the shale oil at the end of the industrial revolution. The
shale residue gave rise to shale bings (small hills or tips) which are still a feature of the
landscape today in West Lothian, Scotland.
Horizontal drilling began in the 1930s, and in 1947 a well was first fracked30 in the
United States. Work on industrial-scale shale gas production did not begin until the 1970s,
when declining production potential from conventional gas deposits in the United States
spurred the federal government to invest in research, development, and demonstration
projects that ultimately led to directional and horizontal drilling, microseismic imaging,
and massive hydraulic fracturing. Up until the public and private demonstration projects
of the 1970s and 1980s, drilling in shale was not considered to be commercially viable.
Approximately thirty countries have oil shale in quantities that are economically
extractable and they include Brazil, China, Germany, Russia, Sweden, and the United
States. Worldwide peak production occurred in the 1980s (forty-six million metric
tons).31 Allix et al. note that “current estimates of the volumes recoverable from shale
oil deposits are in the trillions of barrels, but recovery methods are complicated and
expensive . . . but may soon become economically viable.”32
As with many sources of energy, the use of shale gives rise to environmental
issues. Two major disadvantages of oil recovery from shale is the huge amounts of

Energy, Greenhouse Gases, and Carbonaceous Fuels

21

waste rock (spent shale) and the requirement for large quantities of water in the postextraction treatment. To mitigate the waste problem, one company, Shell, has investigated in situ extraction of oil based on a method first developed in Sweden using
electric heaters. Trials have also investigated the use of high temperature injected
steam. As the United States has the largest oil shale deposits in the world and bearing
in mind its policy of being as independent as possible of other oil suppliers, it is likely
that the exploitation of these deposits and the development of extraction methods
will intensify.
There are growing fears among concerned citizens about the social and environmental impacts of hydrofracking, not least in the United States. The New York Marcellus Shale formation extends from West Virginia to southern New York. Lobby groups
such as the Nature Conservancy33 point out that high volume horizontal fracturing
(hydrofracking) would necessitate use of millions of gallons of water per fracking treatment. The water used also contains oil, grease, and small amounts of other chemicals
and it is estimated that up to forty percent of this water will return to the surface, resulting in various degrees of environmental pollution.

1.2.4 Clean Fossil Fuels: Future Challenges and Prospects
1.2.4.1. Overview
While there has been a substantial growth in generation of power from renewable and
green sources, coal will remain a significant source of fuel for power generation due to
the requirements of availability, security and diversity of supply. It is therefore important to review the state of the art in the field of Clean Coal Technologies (CCTs) and how
such technologies may help reduce carbon emissions going forward.
The primary drawback associated with the use of traditional coal is that modern
coal-fired power plants operate at low efficiencies and emit large amounts of pollutants.
This drawback can be circumvented by instead using clean coal. CCT is a product of
several generations of technological advances. Since the process of combustion is the
key for energy generation, CCT has led to more efficient combustion of coal with reduced emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), including carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide,
and nitrogen oxide. The market for CCT is steadily growing owing to the imminent
need to reduce GHGs and improve upon power plant efficiency.
One of the biggest challenges in the implementation of CCT is that the quality of
coal is extremely variable and that coal combustion structurally produces more pollutants than other fossil fuels. Coal is also a major ingredient in the production of steel. A
further concern is China; the world’s largest and fastest growing economy ranks number one in coal production, accounting for more than forty percent of global production. The extensive use of coal worldwide, coupled with a large number of old, inefficient
power plants lacking proper emission control equipment, adds to the pollution generated through burning coal.
Given the likelihood that coal will continue to feature prominently in the energy
mix for decades to come, adaptation and deployment of CCT in both new and existing
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plants, where possible, is essential. Power plants being built today are more efficient and
emit ninety percent less pollutants (SO2, NOx, particulates and mercury) than plants
built in the 1970s. There are three stages to achieving clean coal:
1. Controlling and reducing pollutants (excluding CO2),
2. Deploying advanced technologies, and
3. Installing CO2 capture and storage.

1.2.4.2. Advanced Technologies
To control and reduce pollutants it is necessary to remove the source of pollution before burning, avoid production of pollutions during combustion, and remove pollutants
prior to stack emission.
Plant efficiency and pollutant emission reduction can be improved upon by deploying advanced technologies and improving the thermodynamic cycle of power generation. For example, there is a modern shift from steam-cycle plants to gas-cycle plants.
Advanced ultra-supercritical (USC) parameters for steam are used in some plants. Further to the use of these parameters for steam conditions, other advanced technologies
incorporated include several clean air technologies; innovative design of burners, new
schemes for combustion in the boiler furnace, new design of steam superheaters and
systems for gas cleaning.
In fluidized bed combustion technology, limestone and dolomite are added during
the coal combustion process to mitigate sulfur dioxide formation.
An integrated gasifier combined cycle uses heat and pressure in the thermodynamic
cycle to convert coal into a gas/liquid phase. The coal in this transformed phase can be
further refined, resulting in reduced environmental impact. The heat energy from the
gas turbine is also used to power a steam turbine. This technology has the potential to
improve the thermodynamic system efficiency of a coal plant to fifty percent.
Flue gas desulfurization, or scrubber technology, removes large quantities of sulfur, particulate matter, and other impurities from the emissions. Low Nitrogen Oxide
(NOx) burners help reduce the generation of NOx, a set of gases which contribute
to ground-level ozone. This is achieved by restricting oxygen and manipulating the
combustion process. Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) achieves NOx reductions of
between eighty and ninety percent. Electrostatic Precipitators remove particulates
from emissions by electrically charging particles and then capturing them on collection plates.

1.2.4.3. Carbon Capture and Storage
There is a long term view toward achieving effective capture and storage of carbon dioxide.
CO2 emissions from burning of coal are calculated based on the emission factor, EFC, where
EFC = (CR × CC × CE × 44)/(HV × 12)
HV is the heating value of the fuel (12–32 MJ/kg), CC is the carbon content of the coal
(60–90%), CE is the combustion efficiency (0.9–0.95), and CR is an opportune conversion rate (0.2778 in the case of kWh).34
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Carbon capture and storage requires capturing CO2 emissions and then storing
them either in geologic formations or deep in the ocean bed where the gas is then dissolved under pressure. CCS technologies under development include:
• Post-combustion capture: This involves capture from the flue gases and necessitates use of an amine as solvent and chilled ammonia.
• Pre-combustion capture: Here, integrated gasifier combined cycling is used to
isolate and capture CO2 before it is released to the atmosphere.
• Oxy-Coal combustion process: This is an improved combustion process using
pure oxygen in the boiler, resulting in significant reduction in the dilution of
CO2 in the exhaust gas stream.
Improved efficiency of power plants will reduce the levels of CO2 emissions, however, carbon capture and storage would be a more effective solution. Unfortunately,
CCS technologies require energy to implement and operate, reducing overall plant performance. Other pollutant emissions are also created in the CCS process, including
limestone and ammonia. This technology is still at an early stage of development and
can be considered as a future technology.
The development of CCT is growing worldwide with active research and development in both the US and Europe. If successful, CCT will play a vital role in allowing the
continued worldwide use of abundant coal resources, in an affordable and sustainable
manner. Such advanced technologies can contribute significantly to the areas of mercury control and carbon capture and storage, while also assisting in the reduction of
SO2 and NOx emissions. Zero emissions through carbon sequestration, is a long-term
objective.
While developments in clean coal technologies mark a welcome phase in the history of coal as a power fuel, there are considerable challenges relating to economic cost,
plant refurbishment, effective utilization, and wide scale global deployment of such
technologies. There is a sense of a race against time in the proposition that clean coal
technologies may significantly offset the damaging effects of carbon emissions or that
deployment will justify the further and continued exploitation of coal as a principal
source of energy going forward. Even if CCT doesn’t allow current levels of coal utilization to be sustainable, effective development of clean technologies could result in
justification for the use of coal in reduced quantities in the energy mix until such time
that carbon free renewable technologies reach mature status and can be shown to be
effective for deployment. The future for nuclear energy, debated in chapter 7, will also
influence the viability for significant investment in clean coal and related technologies.
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Chapter 2
Global Energy Policy Perspectives
Richard A. Simmons, Eugene D. Coyle,
AND Bert Chapman

Abstract
The global demand for energy and the enhanced quality of life it affords is strong
and growing. In this chapter a review is made of developments and interactions of
energy, environment and climate policy in the United States, Europe and globally.
Contemporary demand for energy as well as initiatives promoting diversity of energy
supplies, efficiency, and policies aimed at curbing emissions are reviewed. Legislation
for energy and the environment is explored along with a discussion of challenges
facing the world’s most developed nations and regions. Viable technology and policy
solutions adapted for introduction throughout the world are investigated. Through
this dialogue the authors sense that cross-discipline partnerships of a global nature,
social conscience, and compelling market factors will be critical in driving tomorrow’s energy and climate trends.
Through exploration of in-depth perspectives for national energy and environment
policy mechanisms a review and comparison of energy policy in the US and the EU is
made, with inclusion of major historical milestones, the seminal 1997 Kyoto Protocol,
and subsequent UN energy and climate conventions. The chapter concludes with analysis of energy and climate policy directives and trends in several of the world’s largest
economies including China, Russia, Brazil and India. All have large populations, significant energy demands and resources, and will be critical players in global efforts to
align energy and climate trade and policies.
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2.1. Introduction: Energy Demand and Expected Growth
Richard A. Simmons
Energy has been an enabling driver of unprecedented levels of economic growth, prosperity, and globalization, particularly during the past century. Throughout this period,
a variety of primary energy sources have enjoyed eras of popularity, including traditional biomass, coal, oil, and natural gas. Due to a complex combination of factors,
including the prospects of resource constraint, security of supply, and heightened environmental concern, a host of alternatives to traditional fossil fuels including renewable
and unconventional sources of energy have been introduced to the global energy matrix
in recent decades. However, the demand for energy and the enhanced quality of life it
affords is strong and growing. Appropriately managing this global reality is the primary
motivation of numerous energy and climate policy measures that are being analyzed,
developed, and implemented across the globe.
In this chapter we review the interaction of energy, environment, and climate policy
in the United States, Europe, and other major energy markets. We consider the current
demand for energy and review initiatives developed to promote diversity of energy supplies, efficiency, and policies and regulations aimed at curbing emissions. We explore
reasons why comprehensive energy and environment legislation has presented major
challenges in the world’s most developed regions, review global perspectives on energy
and environment policies, and discuss mechanisms being used to promote broader dialogue on energy policy issues.
A brief glance at history provides insight into the link between energy and economic growth. Critical eras such as the Industrial Revolution, the post-WWII boom,
and the oil crisis of the mid 1970s come quickly to mind. More recently, the economic
crisis that began in 2007 has has resulted in intense volatility and price fluctuations for
oil and natural gas, renewed concerns over the use of nuclear energy for power generation, as well as polarization over the near-term promise of many renewable energy
technologies. Since the dawn of the industrial revolution some 250 years ago, historical evidence indicates that major energy transitions take longer, are more complicated,
and often cost more than initially expected.1 Power, heat, and electricity produced from
traditional biomass gave way to coal, which has given way to oil, natural gas, and even
nuclear fuels, albeit over intervals closer to fifty years, not ten or twenty. Like a massive mechanical flywheel, once major energy infrastructure has been adopted and integrated, it has great inertia owing to its cost and complexity. This makes it difficult to
adapt quickly to new fuels and technologies. Now we are equipped with more advanced
data, tools, and resources than at any previous point in history, and we aspire to understand how new transitions will be implemented over the coming decades. The future
will likely bring periods of uncertainty, including growth and recession, but continued
economic progress will hinge upon sustainable supplies of energy. It is vital to both
understand these challenges and develop a plan to address them.
The wealth and economic status that has been amassed by much of the developed
world is now available in varying degrees to developing countries and emerging econ-
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omies. Some of the opportunities arising from globalization can be a double-edged
sword. Individuals have benefited tremendously from increased quality of life, medical services, and opportunities for social mobility as developing economies boom; yet
many countries are confounded in their attempts to keep pace with growing resource
demands by rapid population expansion. Frequently, the infrastructure for energy and
other critical resource services associated with clean air and water, waste management,
and the transportation of people and goods is taxed beyond intended design limits; initial assumptions and conventional approaches can be ill-equipped to address projected
population growth trends. Undesirable side effects include congestion, harmful air
quality, price gouging, and electrical blackouts. Methodical approaches will be required
to optimize resources, improve efficiency, encourage conservation, and reduce waste.
Given appropriate implementation, such actions may enable the delivery of critical services, alleviate the risks of scarcity, and sustain trends toward a greater quality of life.
Energy is at the nexus of people, environment, and economic development, and
energy supply and management requires careful implementation in order to navigate
many of these challenges. This is not an issue to be delegated to or solved exclusively by
policy makers or by any single group of stakeholders. Globally, more than eighty percent of the world’s energy requirement is derived from fossil fuels, with oil (thirty-three
percent), coal (twenty-eight percent), and natural gas (twenty-one percent) the principal
constituents.2 Combustion of these fossil fuels releases greenhouse gases directly into
Earth’s atmosphere. Scientific and economic experts are in increasing agreement that
our current energy paradigm is no longer tenable, not least due to reserve and supply
uncertainties, price volatility, and fiscal and environmental strains on the world’s major markets and ecosystems. Numerous studies on this topic highlight aspects of the
present challenges and discuss a range of viable technology and policy solutions, often
concurring there is no one-size-fits-all model. Furthermore, it is unlikely a single technology or a single country will swing the needle entirely by itself. More likely, combined
efforts such as global public and private partnerships, increased social conscience, and
compelling market factors will continue to drive tomorrow’s energy and climate trends.
Prior to delving into potential solutions to this problem, it is important to assess the
current reality, including energy demand and scenarios of expected growth, in addition
to the social, economic, and environmental impacts such growth may have.
In addition to monitoring major energy supply disruptions and advising member
countries regarding appropriate and timely responses, a primary mission of the International Energy Agency (IEA) is to compile and analyze historical energy data. This
data is used to estimate future supply and demand scenarios and to develop policy advice based in part upon these projected trends. The IEA provides a series of outlook
scenarios based on assumptions including the availability and reliability of the energy
supply, energy consumption, growth, and the uptake of alternative energy sources.
While an exhaustive review of this data is not the intent of this text, an overview of key
global demands and trends is certainly revealing and instructive. Comparing energy
data between countries is not a trivial task, given the obvious differences in energy infrastructure, modernization, and regulatory policies, let alone variances in the quality
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and reliability of the data itself. Despite this, the IEA’s publically available assessment of
energy supply and consumption is a robust database that conveys a sense of gravity and
context for the energy challenge. Consider the following snap-shot in Table 2.1 of major
energy indices, indicating gross domestic product, total primary energy supply, and estimated carbon dioxide emissions for countries and regions inclusive of US, EU, China,
Russia, Brazil, India. Summed totals for world figures are also provided, indicating the
aforementioned countries are responsible for approximately sixty-six percent of global
energy-related CO2 emissions.
In many ways, this type of data speaks for itself and is useful to help frame the
global energy situation at a particular instant in time. That said, such summaries do not
adequately capture either the strategic agendas of individual countries or the trends in
these key indicators. Important questions are therefore raised: where is energy demand
growing, at what rates, with what resources and technologies, and why? This text will
explore the technical and geopolitical aspects of some of these urgent questions.
Data for both energy and climate has been collected since before utilities began electrifying the world. In terms of tracking energy metrics, analysis has progressed with
greater rigor since the 1970s and the Arab oil embargo. From a climate perspective, attempts to understand and quantify the links and potential impacts between emissions and
the combustion of fossil fuels are more recent, with research commencing in the 1980s
and evolving quickly over the past two decades. It would appear that trends have motivated growing research interest: annual greenhouse gas emissions from the combustion
of fuel between 1971 and 2012 have more than doubled from about fourteen to thirty-one
Gt CO2e (billion metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent).4 Recent transitions of fuel
source from coal to natural gas and more stringent regulations on aging coal power plants
have helped mitigate emissions to some degree; however, these have been largely outpaced
by increased overall energy growth rates. In 2010, total global primary energy supply was
estimated to be in excess of 12,700 Mtoe (million tonnes of oil equivalent), with an expected increase of at least one hundred percent by the year 2035. These figures are largely
based on anticipated population growth in the developing world. Even in an optimistic
Country Population
or Region
(million)

Gross
Total Primary
Domestic
Energy SupProduct (GDP)
ply (TPES)
(2005 USD)

(Mtoe)

TPES
per capita

CO2
Emissions

CO2 per
capita

(toe/capita)

(Mt)

(t/capita)

USA

312

13,226

2,191

7.02

5,287

16.94

EU*

503

12,626

1,654

3.29

3,543

7.04

China

1,344

4,195

2,728

2.03

7,955

5.92

Russia

142

947

731

5.15

1,653

11.65

Brazil

197

1,127

270

1.37

408

2.07

India

1,241

1,317

749

0.60

1,745

1.41

World

6,958

52,486

13,113

1.88

31,342

4.50

Table 2.1. Key World Energy Statistics for 2011.3
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scenario in which leading world economies implement aggressive new policies aimed at
limiting carbon dioxide emissions to 450 parts per million (PPM) (believed to correlate to
a temperature rise of two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels) by 2035, energy consumption is still projected to increase by at least twenty percent with respect to 2010 levels.
A less aggressive scenario, allowing an approximate temperature rise of 3.5°C, projects energy consumption to increase thirty-six percent over this same period.5 The global share of
renewable-based energy consumption is projected to increase from about eighteen percent
of total energy use in 2010 to between twenty and thirty-five percent by 2035. While this
transition from fossil to non-fossil fuel energy resources will constitute a step in the right
direction for Earth’s climate, fossil fuel energy sources may still constitute a sizable majority of world energy supply by mid-century unless significant shifts in policy, increases in
alternative technology uptake, and large scale capital investments are implemented.
Public awareness of the negative impacts of greenhouse gas emissions has grown
significantly in recent years and this concern is beginning to translate into effective policy action. While the potential positive impact of large scale countermeasures and low
carbon energy deployment may still be decades away, there is cause for hope. Through
climate science research and dissemination, the links between energy consumption
and associated environmental impacts are becoming more widely accepted and understood. In the twenty-five years from the inception of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 to the present, researchers have acquired new evidence complemented by powerful new modeling capabilities. This obviously provides
decision makers a greater database of reliable information. Unfortunately, during this
same twenty-five year period, the global community has consumed more exajoules (EJ)
of fossil fuels than in the previous forty years (1948–1988).6 These accelerating trends
combined with the sobering message depicted in recent energy and climate data has
given stakeholders ample reason for pause. It has also served to sound an alarm. Public
opinion, far from unanimous on either energy or environmental policy, is beginning
to reflect a growing sensitivity to select issues. Whether this has been driven home by
higher oil or gasoline prices, volatile heating bills, or a more nuanced reading of energy
and climate trends, it is occurring. This may usher in an era no less complicated but
characterized by critical focus on meaningful long term strategic action and enabled
by the clear interpretation of science-based climate and energy data. Such action may
include a range of steps, including individual consumer behavioral shifts, industrial responses to economic and market factors, commercialization of innovative technologies,
and broad policy measures taken by state and federal governments.
Understanding these issues for developing countries becomes exponentially more
complex, as are efforts to expand real time learning of energy and climate in a perpetually evolving, increasingly globalized world. The age of two-way trade between major
superpowers has given way to a global matrix of producers and consumers, the models
for which, be they economic, environmental, societal or geopolitical, are in constant
flux. In a January 2013 speech, then-US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explained the
energy and climate change balance succinctly: “Managing the world’s energy supplies
in a way that minimizes conflict and supports economic growth while protecting the
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future of our planet is one of the greatest challenges of our time.”7 Consider the implications of energy and climate policy for a few of the world’s most rapidly growing
economies: China, Russia, Brazil, and India. The significance and complexity of energy
and climate issues in these regions are markedly different than they are in the more
developed and established domains of the United States and the European Union.
Two differences, in particular, stand out. First, increased global trade and urbanization throughout the world (fueled primarily by fossil fuels) are now hitting
full stride in several of the world’s most populous countries. By contrast, energy
consumption in the developed world has more or less plateaued, been augmented by
larger shares of cleaner energy (including nuclear, natural gas, and hydropower), and
stabilized on a per capita basis.

Figure 2.1. (a) Total Energy Emissions for Selected Countries, 2011; (b) Energy Emissions Per Capita for Selected Countries, 2011.8
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Second, from the standpoint of industry and emissions, the light regulation and inexpensive supply typical of the past have set precedents that weigh heavily in economic
and business modeling. Not surprisingly, developing countries commonly rely upon
these precedents in strategic planning and public policy. It is argued that the rates of
growth for energy and emissions should not be subject to sudden change or regulation,
as the developed world fueled much of its own growth relatively unchecked by environmental constraints or international opinions. For example, China has argued that
developing states should be afforded some leniency in emissions as they are currently in
critical stages of economic development.8
Consider, for example, the two energy emissions charts shown as Figure 2.1. Is it
more appropriate to measure CO2 emissions by country or per capita? The answer obviously depends on your perspective. China and India can leverage their large populations in this debate to argue that their CO2 intensity per capita is much lower than the
developed world, yet China as a nation leads in overall emissions. India has formally
announced during climate negotiations that their per capita CO2 emissions will not exceed that of developed countries, falling far short of negotiators’ aspirations but sending
a salient and sobering message to the West.
In terms of recent trends, total energy-related CO2 emissions have actually continued to fall slightly for the US and EU, for example between 2010 and 2011, but continued
to increase between 4% and 8% for Brazil, Russia, Indian and China over the same one
year period.9 These emission trajectories are qualitatively consistent with a recent sixyear period between 2005 and 2011 as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Leading economies of the world recognize their future will be in part defined by how
they create a sustainable balance between the supply of energy, its environmental impact, and the prevailing pursuit of economic prosperity and growth. Like other monumental challenges of our times, this is much more easily stated than solved. To achieve
the greatest global impact in a world of increasing globalization and population, national

Figure 2.2. Energy Emissions Trends, 2005–2011.10
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efforts should not occur in a vacuum but rather, to the extent possible, in a coordinated,
informed manner. Major consumer nations are reminded frequently and acutely that the
world has finite resources, and there will be increasing competition for them.
It is upon this energy and climate backdrop that members of productive society will
strive to confront epic challenges and sustain recent positive trends in health, economic
development, and quality of life. Lasting solutions will require not just revolutionary
technology, but also an understanding of some very disparate perspectives, productive
global discourses about the nature of the problem, and effective and pragmatic policy
implementation on an unprecedented scale.

2.2. United States Energy and Climate Policy
Bert Chapman
2.2.1. United States Energy Policy
Although the United States’ federal government has been engaged in energy and climatic policymaking for many decades, the emergence of modern US energy policy
commenced with the 1973 Arab oil embargo. The embargo was a reaction by many petroleum producing countries against US military support for Israel during the October
1973 Yom Kippur war. It was a vivid illustration of the dangers of increasing US dependence on oil imports. This embargo included reductions in oil output by five to ten
percent per month, and a total ban on oil exports to the United States which resulted in
significant energy supply shortages. It also increased retail gasoline prices in the United
States by approximately fifty percent from $0.37 per gallon in 1973 to nearly $0.57 per
gallon in 1975. Crude oil prices rose from $3.18 per barrel in 1970 to $7.67 in 1975.11
The embargo caught the United States and other governments unprepared, leading
to a variety of policy responses as western countries became more fully aware of their
vulnerability to abrupt energy supply disruptions.12
The eventual creation of a centralized Department of Energy (DOE) in 1977 from
existing energy policymaking entities, including the Federal Power Commission, was a
direct result of these developments. The DOE would have multiple policymaking arms
with responsibility for overseeing the domestic US energy agenda, including fossil and
renewable resources; conducting energy policy research through its national laboratories; managing the US nuclear weapons arsenal; and analyzing energy sector trends and
developments both domestically and internationally.13
Another federal response was the establishment of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in 1975 to create a store of up to one billion barrels of petroleum to meet
domestic economic needs in the event of another supply disruption. The SPR is located
in salt caverns on the Louisiana and Texas coasts and had an inventory of about 695
million barrels at the end of 2012. This equates to approximately sixty days of import
protection, and more than one hundred days’ supply if private stocks are included.
Presidential administrations of both parties have generally resisted calls to tap into
the SPR as a response to rising domestic energy prices, though releases occurred in
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1991, 2005, and 2011, usually to mitigate short term supply disruptions from global
conflicts or natural disasters.14
Through a cooperative effort between the United States and other member countries of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Energy Agency (IEA) was also formed in response to the 1973 oil crisis.
The IEA’s initial role was to help countries coordinate a collective response to major
disruptions in oil supply through the release of emergency oil stocks to the markets. The
IEA has since broadened its charter to encompass energy analyses, technology surveys,
projections, and policy recommendations, but remains a primary international mechanism for monitoring national petroleum reserves against global oil supply and demand
and coordinating multi-lateral policy responses to international supply disruptions.15
Inflation in the late 1970s combined with geopolitical tension arising from the Iranian revolution and the Iranian seizure of US diplomats as hostages resulted in subsequent energy price increases. US retail gasoline prices nearly doubled to $1.19 per gallon
between 1978 and 1980, while crude oil prices more than tripled from $9.00 to $31.77
per barrel between 1978 and 1981. 16
Another seminal event affecting US energy policy was the partial meltdown of a
reactor at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in
March 1979. This incident was contained and various regulatory reforms were instigated
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) including enhanced safety and training
protocols and reactor design modifications at US nuclear power plants. However, the
accident damaged the then-burgeoning nuclear industry’s reputation and resulted in an
effective moratorium on US nuclear power plant construction that persisted for more
than three decades. Although the number of operating nuclear units has increased from
70 in 1979 to 103 in 2013, the NRC issued its first new construction permits in thirty-three years in 2012 for new generation reactors slated to be constructed in Georgia
and South Carolina.17 These two separate projects, administered by regional utilities,
are underway with the construction of Westinghouse AP1000 pressurized water reactors. Two such reactors at each site, of 1100 MW nameplate capacity, are expected to
come online by 2018.18 When the construction permit was issued, the NRC Commissioner stated, “If they are built as proposed and in accordance with NRC requirements,
[the reactors] will represent a new era of enhanced nuclear safety.”19 Prior to the recent
construction permit issuances, less than forty percent of nuclear power plant operating
licenses had been issued since 1979, with the last of these licenses issued in 1996.20
Key similarities in US energy policy response can be observed by comparing the
1970s with a multi-year period beginning in about 2007. Not surprisingly, both eras were
characterized by dramatic spikes in oil price, global economic stress, and geopolitical instability. During both periods, efforts were made to improve energy security, increase
US domestic energy production, and institutionalize efficiency and conservation measures. For example, the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program, inaugurated
in 1975, set standards for increasing car and light truck fuel efficiency. Actual regulatory
standards experienced no change between 1992 and 2011, but CAFE has returned as a significant piece of recent energy policy, and new rules strive to double fuel economy in new
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vehicles (between 2011 and 2025) while exploiting efficiency benefits such as reduced oil
consumption and emissions (Please see chapter 9 for more on CAFE). Similarly, measures
have been enacted to increase the use of alternative fuels, for example via the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA 2007) and the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS 2005
and annual updates), which mandate the use of increasing quantities of alternative fuels
such as cellulosic ethanol and other advanced biofuels through 2022.
Natural gas prices were decontrolled by the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and this
process was completed in 1985. Oil prices were decontrolled upon issuance of an Executive Order by President Reagan (Order 12287) on January 28, 1981. These events would
produce significant increases in natural gas and oil supplies and associated reductions
in energy commodity prices. Retail gasoline would fall from $1.35 per gallon in 1981 to
$0.96 in 1988 and industrial natural gas would fall from $6.98 per thousand cubic feet
in 1982 to $3.32 by 1995.21
More recently, natural gas has re-emerged as a central issue in US energy policy.
The so-called shale gas revolution has been made possible by hydraulic fracturing techniques, which allow access to and retrieval of gas trapped in source rock via horizontal
drilling. Just as conventional on- and offshore gas wells began a slow decline in the
United States, these new technologies reached commercial scale around 2005. The potential is astounding. The US Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (DOE-EIA) predicts that the share of shale gas as a percentage of all natural gas will
grow from five percent to about forty-five percent between 2005 and 2020. This turns
an otherwise declining natural resource into one projected to grow approximately fifty
percent to an annualized twenty-seven trillion cubic feet of gas by 2020.22
The flood of shale gas is on; and the abundant supplies caused commodity prices
to drop two to threefold in US markets between 2008 and 2012, creating a host of opportunities, challenges and unexpected consequences. On the positive side, natural gas,
with about half the carbon content of coal, can truly be a bridge fuel as high carbon
alternatives are phased out and carbon neutral options get deployed, reducing the environmental impact of energy generation. In addition to adding jobs in the energy sector,
cheap natural gas has rekindled the competitiveness of US manufacturing, enabling
key industries to regain global market share. Unfortunately, many fear a reliance on
another, albeit cleaner, fossil fuel, may significantly impair the commercial viability and
deployment of renewable energy technologies. Others fear loose state-controlled regulation and weak oversight may result in unintended environmental risks such as water
contamination or un-combusted emissions of methane during extraction and transport. The debate will continue, as the economic benefits appear compelling and the environmental benefits and risks, thus far at least, relatively manageable. A new decision
impacting foreign policy may be on the near horizon as well, as the United States grapples with whether to leverage newfound energy abundance strictly for domestic gain,
or to begin exporting lower carbon energy resources to a willing global marketplace.
By way of advising policymakers about technical implications relevant to future
energy trends in the United States, EIA summarizes key analysis in its Annual Energy
Outlook. In its 2013 projection to 2040, EIA predicts:
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Growth in energy production will outstrip consumption growth;
Crude oil production will rise sharply over the next decade;
Motor gasoline consumption will reflect more stringent fuel economy standards;
Renewable fuel use will grow at a much faster rate than fossil fuel use;
The United States will become a net exporter of natural gas by the early 2020s; and
US energy-related carbon dioxide emissions will remain below their 2005 level
through 2040.23

2.2.2. United States Policy and Climate Change
An important emerging strand affecting US energy policy is that of global warming and
climate change. The idea that human-created emissions are responsible for warming
temperatures remains controversial in the United States. The phrase global warming
first appeared in a January 1986 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) stratospheric
ozone protection plan, when it was proposed that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are infrared-absorbing gases acting like carbon dioxide which can result in raised global surface temperatures.24 The remainder of the 1980s and early 1990s would see analysis,
controversy, policy proposals, and scrutiny of this polarizing issue play out in literature
produced by many federal agencies and the Congress.25
Climate change has become a critical aspect of US foreign policy as other nations have
sought to coordinate plans and perspectives as well as to propose multi-lateral action to
address it. These efforts culminated in a 1992 United Nations sponsored Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED), informally titled Earth Summit, that was held
in Rio de Janeiro and drew one hundred twenty heads of state, accompanied by numerous
government officials. Topics addressed included personal energy consumption, energy
resource availability, forest production and deforestation, population impact on energy,
and various commitments to addressing climate change. The Summit’s message—“that
nothing less than a transformation of our attitudes and behaviour would bring about
the necessary changes”—was transmitted by almost ten thousand on-site journalists and
heard by millions around the world. The message reflected the complexity of the problems
facing us: that poverty as well as excessive consumption by affluent populations place
damaging stress on the environment. Governments recognized the need to redirect international and national efforts to ensure that economic decisions account for environmental impacts.26 President George H. W. Bush, however, refused to sign the Convention on
Biodiversity due to compensation requirements for countries providing animal and plant
sources for biotechnology inventions. Summit efforts also faltered due to wide differences
of opinion between developed and developing countries over emission reduction targets
and financial liability for enforcing climate change countermeasures.27
During the Clinton administration, the United States participated in the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol Conference in Japan as a member of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. In the Kyoto agreement, signatory countries agreed to emission reductions of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
and sulfur hexafluoride. Although most countries have signed Kyoto, the US Senate did
not ratify this agreement due to concerns that it would negatively impact US economic
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growth and weaken national sovereignty. The United States has also expressed concern
that the Protocol’s loose emission restrictions on China and India would not achieve
significant global emissions reductions, and that it would increase US dependence on
foreign oil and adversely impact US fuel and energy prices.
On March 28, 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the US would not
implement Kyoto, and on December 12, 2011 Canada, an initial Kyoto signatory, withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol to avoid monetary penalties for failure to comply with
its emission targets and its promotion of domestic energy industries such as Alberta’s
oil sands.28
The 2005 Energy Policy Act was a significant piece of energy legislation that mirrored widespread sentiment in the United States, European Union, and globally, in
response to climate and energy related issues. It coincided with the introduction in
the European Union by the European Council of a Mandatory Energy Policy which is
expounded upon in the next section. General statute provisions of the 2005 US Energy
Policy Act encompassed a broad remit including energy efficiency, renewable energy
such as hydro and geothermal power, alternative fuels such as ethanol and hydrogen, oil
and gas, coal, nuclear power, energy tax incentives, and climate change technology. Specific provisions include sustainable design principles in new federal buildings, tax credits for improved energy efficiency in homes and to help meet Energy Star requirements,
provisions to increase domestic energy production and reduce dependence on foreign
energy, expansion of unconventional fuel resources such as oil sands; implementation
of new regulatory tools, and the development initiatives to promote alternative fuels
and new vehicle technologies.29
The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) was signed into law in February 2009 in response to the global financial crisis, and included significant federal
investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy. Under ARRA, the Obama administration allocated more than ninety billion dollars (of nearly eight hundred billion
dollars total) in grants and tax incentives for a host of clean energy programs. It is of
particular note that nearly half of the award grants went to energy efficiency initiatives,
such as programs to assist in the weatherization of homes and buildings. Efficiency improvements under ARRA would utilize available technologies, be deployed rapidly, and
could therefore result in the greatest economic and environmental benefits in the near
term. The balance of energy investments and provisions were spread across a wide suite
of programs including renewable energy pilot projects, alternative fuels, smart grid, environmental clean-up, and carbon capture and storage. Some ventures failed on either
technical or financial grounds, for example Beacon Power, Solar Trust, and Solyndra,
which resulted in hundreds of millions of federally funded losses. Critics cite such failures as evidence of political cronyism and add that poor business performance by these
companies can cast doubts on the financial viability of certain clean tech ventures and
worthiness of government support.30 Amidst failures, other successful projects continue to achieve stated objectives. Most energy projects by nature are longer-term, and
by dispatching funds quickly, the administration may have created an unreasonable
expectation that all funded programs would succeed and/or generate immediate and

Global Energy Policy Perspectives

39

measurable impacts. This situation led to controversy over whether the federal government should pick economic winners and losers, with complaints that investment had
not yielded sufficient returns.31 Though the intent to stimulate the energy economy was
genuine, even the most successful projects may progress at a deliberate pace and achieving “positive” outcomes may be challenging in the short term.
Political controversy has also ensued over the Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) intent to regulate carbon dioxide emissions as a public health threat contributing
to global warning. In 2009, the outgoing Bush administration resisted this on economic
grounds, but the April 2007 US Supreme Court decision Massachusetts v. EPA ruled
by a 5–4 margin that the EPA could promote the development of auto tailpipe greenhouse gas emissions standards under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act (CAA). This decision was reinforced by the Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling in American Electric Power v.
Connecticut and the EPA has since worked to promote various standards for reducing
CO2 emissions such as capture and sequestration.
In March 27, 2012 the EPA issued proposed carbon pollution standards for new
power plants which would limit the amount of carbon pollution these plants can emit
and ensure that these facilities adopt new cleaning technologies. The fate of the proposed regulations is uncertain.32 Among the objections are that possible geographic
costs and benefits from climate change do not align with Congressional intent under
the CAA, that the Court was forcing the EPA to regulate these emissions under a law
never intended to cover climate change, and that unilateral US emission limits will be
ineffective and may become a disincentive for China and other countries to reduce their
emissions. Another critique of EPA’s policy in this area maintains that the proposed
rule has not monetized costs or benefits to the electric power sector nor by extension to
electric power consumers.33
The Obama administration sought to use the December 2009 Copenhagen Summit
to recognize the acute global environmental challenge resulting from climate change
by limiting temperature increases to two degrees Celsius. The administration also committed the United States to reducing its emissions seventeen percent by 2020. The 2009
draft document was not legally binding and contained no enforcement mechanisms for
reducing CO2 emissions. However, UN climate negotiation efforts are ongoing, with
a 2015 goal to formalize a climate agreement that would take effect in 2020 (for more,
please see the section on EU climate policy). Despite this, consensus has been elusive
within the US government and among the international community over exactly how
to proceed in reducing emissions and combating climate change. As one of the more
complicated issues of our times, the future of US participation in international climate
change initiatives remains uncertain.34
Energy and climate change factors heavily into US national security policymaking.
The outgoing Bush administration issued a policymaking document stressing the Arctic’s
importance on a range of grounds including US national and homeland security, as
well as natural resource management, environmental protection and economic development with other Arctic nations.35 The Obama administration’s May 2010 National
Security Strategy stressed the importance of developing new energy sources to reduce
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dependence on foreign oil as critical to national security as are efforts to transition to
low carbon energy sources and combat climate change.36 Recent trends would indicate selected policies are taking hold, as the share of US oil imports in 2013 fell below
fifty percent for the first time since 1995. Furthermore, Canada has become the largest
oil importer to the United States, and along with Mexico and Venezuela, the western
hemisphere presently accounts for a majority of US imports.37 In 2009, the Central Intelligence Agency established a Center on Climate Change and National Security whose
missions include examining the national security impact of desertification, natural resources competition, population shifts, and rising sea levels to policymakers and the
scientific community through imagery and other means.38 Resources describing national security implications resulting from climate change are produced by multiple
military and civilian agencies.39
In 2011, the Obama administration issued the Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future
with proposed solutions to major US energy problems. It outlined means of developing
and securing America’s energy supplies; providing consumers with choices to reduce
costs and save energy; and innovating the nation’s way to a clean energy future. In 2013
the President’s Climate Action Plan was released. These objectives included specific policies supporting the responsible and safe expansion of domestic oil and gas development
and production; more fuel and energy efficient cars, trucks, homes, and buildings; and
the promotion of clean energy research and development.40
A 2012 supplement to the Blueprint contended that 2011 saw US domestic oil and
natural gas production reach their highest levels since 2003. Meanwhile, the Interior
Department announced a proposed expansion of the Outer Continental Shelf Oil and
Gas Leasing Program, and light duty vehicle fuel economy standards increased to
54.5 miles per gallon by 2025 through advanced and clean energy vehicles.41 Some
energy policy critics assert, however, that the administration has been slow to issue
drilling leases and permits and to promote drilling expansion in areas of potential
promise. Following an extensive review of economic and environmental impacts,
the administration deferred a permit for the Keystone XL Pipeline that would bring
crude oil from Alberta, Canada, to Nebraska and, eventually, to refineries in Texas.
In 2013, the State Department issued a supplemental environmental impact statement
for a new permit with an alternate, lower impact route, but final authorization of national interest is still pending.
The need for low carbon solutions combined with increasing fuel prices and controversy over the Obama administration’s green energy programs have renewed interest in nuclear power as an important element of a diverse US energy strategy. Nuclear
energy accounts for about nineteen percent of US electricity generation, and the industry has been boosted by 2005 Energy Policy Act incentives such as construction loan
guarantees, which are helping underwrite the aforementioned new generation projects.
The EIA expects nuclear power output to increase at approximately half the rate of total electricity generation.42 Despite its aging nuclear facility infrastructure, the United
States remains the world’s leading nuclear power producer in total capacity with 101
GW, though France leads in nuclear as a share of total electrical generation at seventy-
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five percent.43 However, there is still significant public skepticism about nuclear energy,
which has been exacerbated by the 2011 tsunami which caused the nuclear accident at
Japan’s Fukushima Dai-ichi plant. Polarization on the issue was reflected in a March
2012 Gallup opinion poll, in which fifty-seven percent of respondents said they strongly
or somewhat favored using nuclear energy to provide electricity, with forty percent
strongly or somewhat opposed to using nuclear energy for this purpose.44
The Obama administration has also sought to promote expanded international
energy cooperation through multilateral initiatives such as the UN’s Sustainable Energy for All campaign, which was delineated at the “Rio+20” Summit in June 2012.
This initiative calls on the international community to reach three aspirational goals
by 2030: providing universal access to modern energy services, doubling the global
rate of improvement in energy efficiency, and doubling the share of renewable energy
in the global energy mix.45 If implemented, the US would provide nearly two billion
dollars worth of grants, loans, and loan guarantee resources to help developing countries create sustainable energy development, participate in clean energy technology
partnerships, promote US energy technology exports, and finance and mobilize private capital to help developing world investors through debt financing, risk insurance,
and new coverage for power purchases. Critics of the Rio+20 Summit contend that its
policymaking objectives create expanded and unaccountable global international energy bureaucracies, as well as enhance international control over energy development
and other economic activities.46
US energy policymaking involves the complex and continually evolving interaction
of federal, state, and local government authorities with civil society, the private sector,
non-governmental organizations, and independent agencies. A diverse array of congressional and state legislative committees are also involved in this process, adding to
its merit, but also its complexity, inefficiency, and cost. Regulatory authority may fall
under federal or state jurisdiction, and certain differences between states have been
known to complicate regional alignment. With such a diverse array of authorities and
affected stakeholders from both the public and private sectors, the open and democratic
US energy policy process is charged with the daunting task of equitably weighing and
integrating all manner of input, optimizing effectiveness, while controlling costs. Policymaking efforts can be understandably more complex in the international domain, as
US energy policy objectives intersect those of foreign governments and stakeholders.

2.2.3. Conclusion
Ideological differences on energy between the two largest political parties in the United
States have been a source of uncertainty and tension, not least for the American voter.
While some cite scientific evidence for human-caused global warming, skeptics cite
leaked emails from East Anglia University’s climate unit as justifying their charges of
fraudulent scientific behavior by global warming proponents. These critics express concern that some proposed climate change solutions could injure the US economy and
limit US national sovereignty. As mentioned, other critics take issue with direct government financial support of clean energy companies.47
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The questions and responses surrounding the extraction of oil, natural gas and
unconventional fossil fuels have sharply divided US national interests. Environmental
implications, energy demand growth, economic development, climate change and strategies to reduce the carbon footprint of the domestic energy matrix demand appropriate consideration and integration into the national energy dialogue. Common-ground
outcomes must be agreed upon and pursued, despite traditional polarization of certain
issues. While some contend that government energy policies are intrusive and counterproductive for both individuals and the private sector, others feel that government policies are excessively solicitous of individual and private sector interests. Nevertheless,
the proper roles of fossil energy and renewable energy, protracted federal budget deficits, and public resistance to higher energy prices or reductions in energy consumption
are hallmark issues of recent US energy policy and will remain part of the US energy
policymaking landscape for the foreseeable future.48
It is clear that the process of optimizing energy resources and developing effective policies can be complicated, costly and time consuming. Throughout its history, the United
States has pioneered significant technical, commercial, and even political energy innovations. Along the way, it has had to navigate major uncertainties, disasters, and challenges.
As we look forward, accompanying unprecedented levels of globalization and economic
growth looms the unknown risk of climate change. And while no system yet devised is
perfect, the United States has both the responsibility and the privilege as the world’s largest economy to contribute productively to global progress in the new energy era.

2.3. Energy and Climate Policy in the European Union
Eugene D. Coyle
2.3.1. Underpinnings of Modern European Energy Policy
The seeds of the European Union share a rich and interwoven history with energy,
and the multi-national stage upon which energy related events have unfolded. Twentieth century energy policy legislation among European nations formally commenced
during a post World War II period that coincided with the establishment of the Council
of Europe in 194949 alongside efforts to reconstruct the economy and establish a lasting period of peace. In May 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman made his
Schuman Declaration at the Quai d’Orsay, where he proposed that “Franco-German
production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority,
within the framework of an organization open to participation of other countries of
Europe.”50 This led to the pooling of Franco-German coal and steel production and the
formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The treaty was entered
into force in July 1952, bringing France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands together in a community with the aim of organizing free movement of
coal and steel and free access to sources of production. This set a significant precedent:
a common high authority supervised the market, with the aim of respecting and ensuring rules for competition and price transparency.
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In similar fashion, the Messina Conference, held at Messina, Sicily in May 1955, was
charged with preparation of a report on the creation of a common European market.
The resulting Spaak Report was presented at the Intergovernmental Conference on the
Common Market and EURATOM, at Val Duchesse, Brussels. It was agreed that two
new communities would be established, the European Economic Community (EEC)
and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The two new high authorities (Commissions) would be separate to the ECSC’s Council of High Authority.
In March 1957, the Treaties of Rome were signed, with the new authorities coming into
force on January 1, 1958. EURATOM was founded with the purpose of creating a specific market for nuclear power in Europe. Although legally distinct from the European
Union (EU), EURATOM has nevertheless the same membership and is governed by the
EU’s institutions.51
Long before these developments, the strategic hundred-mile-long Suez Canal
opened in 1869. Financed jointly by the French and Egyptian governments, it created
a much needed shipping route and land bridge between Africa and Asia, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, and enabled trade between Asia, the Middle East,
Europe and the United States.52 Owing to financial difficulties, Egypt was forced to sell
its shares in ownership of the Suez Canal to the United Kingdom in 1875. However, an
international convention in 1888 opened the Canal to all shipping from any nation. In
1956 tensions arose when the newly inaugurated Head of Government in Egypt, Gamal
Abdel Nasser, declared his intent to place the Suez Canal under Egyptian control. The
United States and United Kingdom withdrew previously committed financial support
for the construction of the Aswan High Dam in the Nile, and in retaliation, Egypt
nationalized the Canal. This became the Suez Crisis, also referred to as the Tripartite
Aggression, Suez War, or Second Arab-Israeli War. The crisis became a diplomatic and
military confrontation pitting Egypt against the combined interests of Britain, France
and Israel. Intervention by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations
brought the occupation to an end by late December 1956.53 The fight over the canal also
sowed the seeds for the eventual outbreak of the Six Day War in 1967 due to an inadequate peace settlement following the 1956 war.
The conflict is significant in that it lead to a severe oil shortage and financial crisis in
the United Kingdom and Western Europe. Prior to the conflict approximately 1.5 million barrels of oil per day transited the canal, of which 1.2 million barrels were destined
for Western Europe, equating to two thirds of total oil supplies. A third of the ships
that passed through the Canal at the time were British, and three-quarters belonged to
NATO countries.
In the aftermath of the turbulence surrounding the Suez Crisis, the Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a permanent intergovernmental organization, was created at the Baghdad Conference on September 10–14, 1960, representing oil
producing nations Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. The five founding
members were later joined by nine other members: Qatar (1961–present); Indonesia (1962–
2009); Libya (1962–present); United Arab Emirates (1967–present); Algeria (1969–present);
Nigeria (1971–present); Ecuador (1973–1992, 2007–present); Angola (2007–present);
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and Gabon (1975–1994). Originally headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, OPEC has
been based in Vienna, Austria, since 1965.54 OPEC’s stated principal objective is to “coordinate and unify petroleum policies among Member Countries, in order to secure fair
and stable prices for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply of
petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on capital to those investing in the
industry.”55
The October 1973 Yom Kippur War and subsequent oil embargo had a profound
impact on Europe as well as the United States. The Organization of Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OAPEC), comprising the Arab members of OPEC in addition
to Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia, were the dominant supplier of crude oil to the European
Union member states. When OAPEC proclaimed an oil embargo in October 1973, economic turmoil in the European Union ensued. The first effect of the crisis was a shortage of oil, which led to a number of measures to restrict consumption. As shortage fears
diminished, increasing oil prices and their resulting financial consequences became
the paramount concern. Prices for crude oil rose for many years, reaching twelve times
their pre-crisis level (thirty-six dollars per barrel compared to three) after a second
oil shock provoked by the Iran-Iraq war of 1980. This exorbitant increase in crude oil
prices over the span of six years dealt a serious blow to the economies in several regions
of the world, including Europe. The community member states, accustomed to trade
surpluses, were now in a weakened position. Recession began to bite in nearly all the
European countries.56 In addition to the economic consequences, the 1973 crisis created a sense of insecurity among European countries, exposing the vulnerability of EU
economies to their dependence on abundant supplies of cost-competitive oil. As noted
earlier, such insecurity led to the formation of the Paris-based International Energy
Agency (IEA) to help coordinate member country responses, track markets, and eventually advise on energy technologies and global policies.
The automotive industry was one of western Europe’s most affected industries in
the wake of the 1973 oil crisis. After the second World War most west European countries applied heavy taxes to imported automobiles and related accessories, and as a result most cars made in Europe were small and hence more economical to both purchase
and operate. However, by the late 1960s, as individual wealth increased, vehicles and
engines began to increase in size. The oil crisis reversed this trend in Europe, and convinced many people to revert to smaller and more efficient hatchback vehicles. This trend
continued until the late 1980s, by which time hatchbacks dominated most European
small and medium car markets and gained a substantial share of the larger family car
market as well.

2.3.2. Energy Policy in Twenty-First-Century Europe
In meeting its current energy demands, the European Union is heavily dependent on
imports of fossil fuels, with up to eighty percent imports of oil and sixty percent natural gas. Almost ninety-seven percent of uranium used in European nuclear reactors
is imported from countries including Russia, Canada, Australia, Niger, and Kazakhstan, with only three percent mined in Europe.57 The basic principles of European en-
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ergy policy were laid down in 2006 with the release of the Commission’s green paper A
European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy.58 In launching the
strategy it was noted that Europe requires the importation of fifty percent of its energy
for fuel and that global hydrocarbon reserves are being depleted. Investment of one trillion euros is required by 2020 in order to meet the expected energy demand and replace
aging infrastructure. It was also accepted that global warming has already made the
world 0.6°C hotter.
Intent on limiting global average temperature increase to less than two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, key proposals of the European strategy include:
1. A cut of at least twenty percent in greenhouse gas emissions from all primary
energy sources by 2020 (compared to 1990 levels), while pushing for an international agreement to succeed the Kyoto Protocol aimed at achieving a thirty
percent cut by all developed nations by 2020.
2. A cut of up to ninety-five percent in carbon emissions from primary energy
sources by 2050, compared to 1990 levels.
3. A minimum target of ten percent for the use of biofuels by 2020.
4. Unbundling of the energy supply and generation activities of energy companies
from their distribution networks to further increase market competition.
5. Improving energy relations with the European Union’s neighbors, including Russia.
6. The development of a European Strategic Energy Technology Plan to develop
technologies in areas including renewable energy, energy conservation, low-energy buildings, fourth generation nuclear power, clean coal, and carbon capture.
7. Developing an Africa-Europe Energy partnership, to help Africa leap-frog to
low-carbon technologies and to help develop the continent as a sustainable energy supplier.
While these goals were considered ambitious, subsequent developments have set
the scene for change and have imparted responsibility to individual EU member states
to advance, implement and achieve targets. Mechanisms for doing so include regular
strategic energy reviews, introduction of a European Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS, endeavoring to achieve cost-effective carbon dioxide emissions reductions), and
the pursuit of targets to be achieved initially by year 2020. Among these are efforts to:
1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions by twenty percent, 2) increase energy efficiency to
achieve a twenty percent savings in energy consumption, 3) achieve integration of renewable energy sources for twenty percent of total energy consumption, and 4) achieve
ten percent integration of biofuels into the total consumption of vehicle fuels by 2020.

2.3.3. EU Policy and Climate Change
European policy strategies with respect to energy are arguably more closely linked to climate policy and international dialogue than perhaps the energy policy approaches that
have traditionally been taken in the United States. As evidenced by the implementation
of market-based emissions trading in the European Union, the motivation and nature
of policy action can be quite different among developed countries. Here, we will explore
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SET-Plan: The European Strategic Energy Technology Plan
The European Commission presented a strategic energy technology plan (SET Plan)
on 22 November 2008, to accelerate the development and deployment of cost-effective
low carbon technologies. The plan comprises measures relating to planning, implementation, resources and international cooperation in the field of energy technology. Set-Plan was introduced through communication from the Commission to the
Council of the European Parliament on 22 November 2007, entitled: “A European
strategic energy technology plan (SET-Plan)—Towards a low carbon future.”59
Adopted in 2008, the aim through SET-Plan was to establish an energy technology
policy for Europe. It is the principal decision-making support tool for European energy
policy, with a goal of accelerating knowledge development, technology transfer and uptake, providing industrial leadership on low-carbon energy technologies, fostering science
for transforming energy technologies to achieve the 2020 Energy and Climate Change
goals, and contributing to the worldwide transition to a low carbon economy by 2050.
Implementation of the SET-Plan commenced with the establishment of the
European Industrial Initiatives (EIIs) which bring together industry, the research
community, the member states, and the Commission in risk-sharing, publicprivate partnerships aimed at the rapid development of key energy technologies at the
European level. In parallel, the European Energy Research Alliance (EERA) has
been working since 2008 to align the research and development activities of individual research organizations to the needs of the SET-Plan priorities, and to establish a joint programming framework in the European Union. A projected budget
for the SET-Plan was estimated in excess of seventy billion euros.60
Six EIIs in total were established with a focus on data exchange on low-carbon energy technologies, including the European Industrial Bioenergy Initiative, European
CO2 Capture, Transport and Storage Initiative, European Electricity Grid Initiative,
Sustainable Nuclear Initiative, Solar Europe Initiative, and European Wind Initiative.
European Technology Platforms (ETPs) were also established to liaise with SETIS
and to examine how to reach Europe’s energy targets through major technological
advances. The ETPs, led by industry, help define research and development objectives and lay down concrete goals for achieving them. The ETPs in fields covered by
the SET-Plan are aligned with the EIIs.
In some sectors of strategic importance to Europe, public-private funded
European Joint Technology Initiatives (JTIs) were also established under the Seventh Framework Program (FP7) for large-scale initiatives. One such JTI, Fuel Cells
and Hydrogen (FCH) was created to deliver hydrogen energy and fuel cell technologies developed to the point of commercial take-off.
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more fully the role and involvement of the European Union following the adoption of the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1994.61 As mentioned, the
Kyoto Protocol was adopted at the third conference of the parties to the UNFCCC in Kyoto,
Japan in December 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 2005.62 The detailed rules
for the implementation of the Protocol were adopted at COP 7 (Conference of Parties) in
Marrakesh in 2001, and are also called the Marrakesh Accords.63 A major distinction between the convention and the protocol is that the convention encouraged developed countries to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions, while the protocol committed them to do so.
The major feature of the Protocol is that it sets binding targets for signatory countries and the European Community for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. To
be considered compliant, signatory countries had to reduce national greenhouse gas
emissions an average of five percent compared to a 1990 baseline over the five year
period from 2008 to 2012. Calculated estimates of GHG emissions in Mt CO2e (million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent) would establish the baselines for participating
countries. As of September 2011, 191 states had signed and ratified the Protocol. Individual countries in the European Union are responsible for developing annual national
emission projections for greenhouse gases for all key sectors of their economy and for
complying with EU reporting obligations and projections. Official submissions to the
European Commission are required under Council Decision 280/2004.64
Under the Treaty, countries were encouraged to meet their targets primarily through
national measures. This, incidentally, has interesting implications for the European Union,
which is obviously comprised of member states that exhibit significant national diversity
with respect to energy and emissions. The Protocol also offered additional means of meeting
national targets by way of three market-based mechanisms. The Kyoto mechanisms are: 1)
emissions trading, known as the carbon market, 2) clean development mechanism (CDM),
and 3) joint implementation (JI). These mechanisms were proposed to help stimulate green
investment and help Parties meet their emission targets in a cost-effective way.65
Participating countries were obliged to monitor and maintain precise records of
emissions. Emission targets for industrialized Parties to the Protocol were expressed as
levels of allowed emissions, or assigned amounts, over the 2008–2012 commitment time
period. Such assigned amounts, denominated in tonnes (of CO2 equivalent emissions),
are known informally as Kyoto units. Parties may add to their holdings of Kyoto units
through credits for clean development mechanisms (CDM) such as land use, land-use
change and forestry (LULUCF) or by moving units from one country to another, for
example through emissions trading.
The Kyoto Protocol was generally seen as an important first step toward a truly
global emission reduction regime with intent on stabilizing GHG emissions, and
providing the essential architecture for ensuing international agreements on climate
change. The Protocol’s stringent emission reductions were devised to align with findings and recommendations of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
The December 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen did
not result in a new global climate protocol, however, a decision was taken to “take note” of
an accord drawn up by a core group of heads of state (including the United States, China,
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India, South Africa, Brazil, and the European Union). The accord (which is not legally
binding) included a recognition to limit temperature rises to less than two degrees Celsius
and to aid developing nations through financial support in achieving reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.66 Discussions took place in tandem with the International Energy
Agency whose proposed plan, entitled the 450 Scenario, includes an aggressive timetable
of actions that would be required to limit the long-term concentration of greenhouse gases
in Earth’s atmosphere to 450 parts per million of carbon-dioxide equivalent; the concentration level commonly associated with a global temperature rise of around two degrees
Celsius above pre-industrial levels. The plan outlined a timeline to 2030 with actions to
achieve this objective including a fifty percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions
through implementation of energy efficient technologies and the use of low-carbon energy technologies to produce sixty percent of global electricity, comprised of thirty-seven
percent renewables energy, eighteen percent nuclear energy, and five percent using power
plants capable of CCS. The plan also calls for substantial deployment of advanced vehicle
technology and a resultant shift from current combustion technology, with sixty percent
of new sales attributable to hybrid, plug-in hybrid, and electric vehicles.67 In 2013, these
vehicles comprised about three percent of new car sales.
A further 2010 UN Climate Change Conference, held in Cancún, Mexico, adopted
a number of proposals termed the Cancún Agreements. The Agreements acknowledged
the goal of reducing emissions from industrialized countries by twenty-five to forty percent (relative to 1990) by 2020, and also supported enhanced action on climate change
in the developing world.68 At a UN climate meeting held in Durban, South Africa in
November 2011, agreement was reached to begin work on a new climate deal that would
have legal force and require both developed and developing countries to cut their carbon emissions. Attendees set targets to reach agreement on terms by 2015 and bring the
agreement into effect in 2020.69
The Doha COP 18 UN Climate Change Conference served as the eighth meeting
of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol in late November and early December, 2012, in
Doha, Qatar.70 Countries launched a new commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, agreeing to a firm timetable to adopt a universal climate agreement by 2015 and a
path to raise necessary ambition to respond to climate change. They also endorsed the
completion of new institutions and agreed on ways and means to deliver scaled-up climate finance and technology to developing countries. The following Amendment to the
Kyoto Protocol was agreed:

2.3.3.1. Amendment of the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol, as the only existing and binding agreement under which developed
countries commit to cutting greenhouse gases, has been amended so that it would continue as of 1 January 2013.
• Governments have decided that the length of the second commitment period
will be eight years.
• The legal requirements that will allow a smooth continuation of the Protocol
have been agreed.
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The valuable accounting rules of the protocol have been preserved.
Countries that are taking on further commitments under the Kyoto Protocol
have agreed to review their emission reduction commitments at the latest by
2014, with a view to increasing their respective levels of ambition.
The Kyoto Protocol’s Market Mechanisms—the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and International Emissions Trading
(IET)—can continue as of 2013.
Access to the mechanisms will be uninterrupted for all developed countries
that have accepted targets for the second commitment period.
JI will continue to operate, with the agreed technical rules allowing the issuance
of credits, once a host country’s emissions target has been formally established.
Australia, the EU, Japan, Lichtenstein, Monaco, and Switzerland have declared
that they will not carry over any surplus emissions trading credits (Assigned
Amounts) into the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.

2.3.4. EU Emissions Trading System (ETS)
The first and biggest international scheme for market-based trading of greenhouse gas
emission allowances, the EU ETS works on the cap and trade principle. It covers approximately eleven thousand power stations and industrial plants in thirty-one countries, including the twenty-eight member states as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. It
covers CO2 emissions from power stations, combustion plants, oil refineries and iron and
steel works, as well as factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper
and board. Nitrous oxide emissions are also covered by the scheme. In 2020, emissions
from sectors covered by the ETS will be twenty-one percent lower than in 2005. The aviation sector was brought into the system at the start of 2012; however, in November 2012 the
European Commission deferred application of the scheme to flights operated to and from
countries outside the European Union to allow more time to reach a global agreement
addressing aviation emissions (please see Chapter 9 for more on EU-ETS in aviation). 71

2.3.5. Conclusion
A sense of urgency has defined EU energy and climate policy in recent years. Key efforts
are motivated by analyses of required technological and financial actions through 2050
that will help achieve required greenhouse gas reduction targets. Increased energy funding has resulted, for example through the 2007–2013 EU Framework 7 (FP7) research
funding platform and is extended to Horizon 2020, with roll-out from January 2014. The
Strategic Energy Technology (SET) Plan was introduced, providing a blueprint for rebalancing of supply-side energy, including a range of low carbon energy initiatives. Organizations contributing to energy policy include the European Energy Research Alliance
(EERA), the International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC), and
Electricity Liberalization consortia focused on regulation to support competition in energy generation and distribution. Energy and climate in the European Union, like many
other cross-cutting policy issues, rely heavily on the cooperation of individual member
states and on the close coordination of stakeholders from across public and private sectors.
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A variety of tangible strides have been made across the European Union, as evidenced by
creative German and Spanish policies to commercialize solar technologies, French global
leadership in nuclear power generation and safety, and pioneering efforts by the Dutch in
wind energy, to name just a few examples. To an even greater extent in the coming decades, Europe will be required to leverage practical technologies and effective policies in
order to realize its aggressive national and international energy and climate aspirations.

2.4. China Energy and Climate Change Policy
China is an increasingly important player in twenty-first century global energy policy. China ranks second in the world in energy consumption and first in fuel-related
emissions. It also has significant domestic energy resources and infrastructure and, as a
permanent UN Security Council member and major world power, has elevated the role
of energy and climate in its foreign and national security policies.
China’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew by an estimated 9.2% in 2011 and by
7.8% in 2012. This ongoing high growth rate has, whether by cause or by effect, drastically increased Chinese energy consumption and, according to IEA, Beijing now ranks
as the world’s second largest oil consumer. Oil consumption growth in China accounted
for a whopping fifty percent of global growth in 2011.
Chinese proven oil reserves were estimated at 20.4 billion barrels in January 2012,
concentrated in China’s northeast. Beijing started importing oil in 1993, and by 2009
had become the world’s second largest oil importer. By 2011 its total net imports reached
5.5 million barrels per day, delivered from regions as diverse as the Persian Gulf, Sudan,
Angola, and Venezuela. China is active in developing domestic oil resources in northwestern regions of the mainland as well as potential offshore energy resources in the
East and South China Seas. Development and claim to resources in these regions may
prove contentious, as neighboring energy-hungry powers—including Japan, Malaysia,
the Philippines, and Vietnam—share similar interests. Estimates of these resources
range from 28 billion barrels of oil according to the US Geological Survey (USGS) to
over 105 billion barrels from Chinese sources. Natural gas resources are abundant as
well, but like oil, estimates by USGS and Chinese sources vary.72
Chinese government energy policy is administered by the National Development
and Reform Commission, which serves as the energy sector’s primary policymaking and
regulatory entity. A National Energy Commission established in January 2010 seeks to
consolidate Chinese government energy policy, as well as formalize a more comprehensive energy agenda which incorporates new and lower carbon technologies as an element
of national energy planning. Numerous national oil companies, such as the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation
(Sinopec), and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), are major players
in Chinese domestic and international production and policymaking.73
In 2009, coal accounted for approximately seventy percent of Chinese energy consumption.74 That same year, China was responsible for nearly half of global coal, thus
having tremendous influence on the future of the coal market. In its ambitious Twelfth
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Five-Year Plan, 2011–2015, China intends to reduce energy and carbon intensity via enhanced energy efficiency and diversification of the energy mix.75 In addition to coal, natural gas and its accompanying pipeline infrastructure is of increasing interest within
China. The Chinese electricity sector is dominated by five state-owned holding companies
including China Huaneng Group and China Datang Group. The Three Gorges Dam is the
world’s largest hydroelectric power station in terms of installed capacity (22,500 MW).
Furthermore, China is the world’s largest hydropower producer, and is seeking to increase
its nuclear power generation from its 2010 level of two percent of net generation. Modest
but growing steps are being taken to increase the use of renewable energy resources, notably with wind power. Furthermore, Beijing hopes to increase its solar production from
two gigawatts in 2011 to twenty-five gigawatts by 2020.76 Other policies are being introduced at the national and sub-national level to encourage the purchase of new energy
vehicles, a term China uses to describe alternatives to the internal combustion engine.77
Despite aggressive targets, such technologies are expensive and demand within China is
relatively weak. In the near term, it is therefore possible that China may be more interested
in innovating and manufacturing such renewable technologies for a world marketplace,
as they are demonstrating in the export of solar PV panels, wind energy components, and
advanced electronics comprising rare-earth metals.
Environmental pollution and climate change are significant problems confronting
China. China emitted an estimated 6,666 million tons of CO2 in 2008, an annual figure
that ballooned twenty percent in just three years to an estimated 8,000 million tons in
2011, according to IEA and US DOE analysis. At such a pace, it is not difficult to understand that China became the world’s largest CO2 emitter in 2007. A 2009 conference
report prepared for the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) noted that two-thirds
of 338 Chinese cities for which air-quality data is available are considered polluted, that
industrial pollution has occurred in more than seventy percent of Chinese rivers and
lakes, and that underground water in ninety percent of Chinese cities is also polluted.78
Other findings from this report include the following:
1. China’s average temperature has risen by 1.1°C between 1908 and 2007.
2. Sea level and sea surface temperature have increased by 90 mm and 0.9°C respectively, over the past thirty years.
3. Extreme weather events such as floods, drought, and storms have caused annual direct economic losses of between $25 and $37.5 billion per year.
4. Water resource scarcity, fast-growing urbanization and industrialization, and
severe pollution may lead to a water crisis that could result in social unrest.
5. China’s coastal regions are vulnerable to storms, floods, and sea-level rise due
to their low and flat landscape.79
China is taking some steps on the domestic front to reduce its emissions and address climate change. It conducts bilateral dialogues with Australia, the European Union,
Japan, and the United States while also participating in international climate change forums such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.80 China’s participation in
international forums is of critical import. It is a large developing country, with pockets of
considerable wealth that have achieved a high level of development as measured by any
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global metrics. A primary challenge for China and the international community is to appropriately reconcile and balance the energy and climate goals associated with a manufacturing powerhouse of tremendous global influence against the urgent necessity associated
with improving basic needs and quality of life for the world’s most populous nation.

2.4.1. Conclusion
China’s role as a major player in international energy and climate change policy must
not be understated. Its growing dependence on foreign oil imports has even resulted in
Beijing’s use of warships to address international antipiracy patrols off the Gulf of Aden
in 2008. China has also developed a chain of bases called strings of pearls in locales such
as Chittagong, Bangladesh; Sittwe, Myanmar; Gwadar, Pakistan; Colombo, Sri Lanka;
and other areas in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean to maintain sea lines of
communication with its oil imports from the Middle East and to increase its geopolitical influence in these areas.81 China’s increasing reliance on imported, largely fossil,
energy resources and maritime security to protect its international trade may make it
an increasingly assertive power throughout the world. Sustaining recent growth rates in
China will require massive new energy supplies from both sides of its borders, and have
significant impacts on the global climate.

2.5. Russia Energy and Climate Change Policy
Russia possesses the world’s largest conventional natural gas reserves, second largest
coal reserves, and the ninth largest crude oil reserves; and not surprisingly, its economy
depends heavily on energy exports. It was the world’s second largest oil producer (after
Saudi Arabia), and the second largest natural gas producer (after the United States) in
2011. In 2012, Russian oil production, averaging slightly over ten million barrels per
day, actually surpassed Saudi oil production.82
Russia exports a significant portion of its energy resources to European countries,
which affords it coercive leverage over these nations, such as Ukraine which receives
51.6% of its domestic natural gas supplies from Russia. Moscow has used this leverage
in both January 2006 and January 2009 when it raised natural gas prices and threatened
to cut off delivery to Ukraine. This led to the eventual toppling of the Kiev government
and replacement by a more pro-Moscow government. Empirical evidence of Russian
export leverage over European countries can be witnessed in the following statistics
that show the distribution of Moscow’s natural gas exports in 2010:
• Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, made of selected former Soviet
Republics): 37%
• Eastern Europe: 31%
• Germany: 27%
• Turkey: 14%
• Italy: 10%
• Other Western European Countries: 10%
• France: 8%
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While Moscow allows some foreign energy companies to invest and operate in
Russia, preferential treatment is given to Russian energy companies such as Gazprom
(natural gas) and Transneft (oil pipeline).83 Its oil production is heaviest in Western
Siberia and occurs in areas as diverse as Sakhalin Island and the Urals-Volga. There
are significant untapped oil and natural gas resources in Eastern Siberia, the Arctic,
and the Northern Caspian Sea, all of which interest not only Russia but other regional
neighbors, and carry the potential for increased conflict. A quick glance at the numbers
make it evident why: Arctic Ocean reserves are estimated at 90 billion barrels of oil,
1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids. Estimated North Sakhalin Island oil reserves are 5.3 billion barrels, 43.8 trillion cubic feet
of natural gas, and 0.8 billion barrels of natural gas liquids.84
Oversight for Russian energy policy is charged to the Ministry of Energy, yet multiple
agencies participate in the implementation of the national energy policy. The Ministry of
Natural Resources is responsible for issuing field licenses, monitoring compliance with license agreements, and levying fines for violating environmental regulations. The Finance
Ministry administers energy sector tax policy, and the Ministry of Economic Development influences tariff regulation and energy sector reforms. Within these ministries the
Federal Energy Commission administers oil transportation tariffs, the Commission for
State Policy on the Oil Market regulates oil and oil product markets, the Commission on
Protective Measures in Foreign Trade and Customs and Tariff Policy sets crude oil export
tariffs, the Regional Energy Commission regulates retail gas prices, and the State Atomic
Energy Corporation (Rosatom) administers Russian nuclear energy.85
Like China, Russia is also confronting significant climatic and environmental challenges which will impact not only its own energy and climate policies, but those of neighboring countries as well. Russia ranked fourth in the world in energy-related emissions
with about 1.65 billion metric tons in 2011. A 2009 NIC report noted that a warming
climate may lead to mixed impacts, including reduced energy and increased hydroelectricity production. At the same time, potential permafrost thaw could negatively
affect energy infrastructure and increase river crossing hazards. While water supply
may increase in Siberia, North, and Northwest Russia, water shortages are possible in
southern European Russia increasing economic and social strains. Russian agricultural
production may experience mixed impacts, with northern localities potentially benefitting from increased CO2 levels and shifted rainfall, while southern Russia may grapple
with reduced productivity and become more vulnerable to drought. Russia will also
experience increased migration pressure from Central Asia, the Caucasus, Mongolia,
and northeastern China due to water shortages in these areas. Climate change may
even impact international maritime trade in the Arctic Ocean potentially resulting in
positive economic and negative environmental impacts.86
Additional NIC report findings include the following:
1. Prediction of significant winter temperature increases in regions of the Arctic,
averaging 4–5°C by 2050.
2. Projected summer temperature increases in the northern Caucasus, Volga, and
southern Western Siberia projected at 2–3°C.
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3. Projected snow mass decrease in European Russia of 10–15% by 2015.
4. Increased risk of fire and flooding; and outbreaks of disease carrying insects in
northern Russia.
5. Concerns about government management of potential climate change induced
infrastructure collapse.87

2.5.1. Conclusion
Russia is a critical nation in global energy and climate change policy. Its substantial
energy resources generate significant export earnings, which in turn, enhance domestic
economic growth and prosperity. Through these same energy resources, Russia has opportunity to gain economic and geopolitical leverage in the Arctic Ocean, Europe, the
Caspian Sea region, and other former Soviet states. In one particularly acute example,
Russia has protested western attempts to build a Trans-Caspian pipeline that would
bypass Russia in delivering oil and natural gas to Europe. An emerging area of concern
to players in the international energy arena is Russia’s sparsely populated but energy
rich east Asian region, and countries such as China, Japan, South Korea, and the United
States would be interested in seeing its resources developed.
Of particular interest from a geopolitical perspective is the China-Russia energy relationship. Between 2000 and 2010, Russian crude oil exports to China increased nearly
tenfold from 1.3 million to 12.8 million tons.88 Moscow is particularly concerned about
Chinese attempts to increase economic and energy investment in northeast Russia and
about regional demographic trends.89
As Russia confronts the opportunities and challenges associated with energy and
climate, recent history has shown that it may be tempted to leverage extensive energy
resources at the expense of regional neighbors. Given the reliance and increasing inter-dependence of energy consuming states in the region, Russian leadership has a
timely opportunity to balance its objectives with strategies that help optimize not only
domestic but international economic, environmental, and security outcomes.

2.6. Brazil Energy and Climate Change Policy
Brazil’s energy matrix is one of the cleanest in the world, owing primarily to abundant
hydroelectric power, electricity generated from biomass, and ethanol derived from sugarcane. Whereas the global average for renewable energy is about 12.6%, Brazil’s 45%
domestic share ranks it first among the world’s ten most populous nations in carbon
neutral energy supply.90 At the same time, Brazil has expertise in conventional oil development and is poised to emerge as a significant fossil energy player over the coming
decades, due largely to discoveries of significant offshore oil and natural gas reserves
in 2007. Meanwhile, the Amazon rainforest, sixty percent of it in Brazil, is well known
for its ecological value to earth’s biosphere, acting as a carbon sink with far reaching
benefits for the global climate. Depletion through deforestation and loss of biodiversity since the 1960s carries significant implications for Brazil, South America, and the
world. Upon the backdrop of these disparate realities, the Brazilian economy has surged
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in recent years, creating new challenges for a state that seeks to balance the rate of economic growth with appropriate social, industrial, and environmental policy. Brazil has
been a strong voice on the global stage concerning sustainability and climate change,
playing host in 2012 to the UN Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development, and
has been a prominent figure in many of the Conferences of Parties (COP).
Authority over the issues surrounding energy and climate policy is shared by several
executive branch agencies, the Casa Civil and relevant legislative committees. Brazil has
developed a long range planning framework for both the public and private sectors that
includes the National Energy Plan 2030 (PNE 2030) and the National Energy Matrix
2030. The stated objective of these documents is to devise strategies and develop policies that ensure the security and quality of energy supply for decades to come.91 Key
areas of focus for Brazilian energy policy include: security of energy supply, a policy of
reasonable tariffs, and aspirations to expand energy services to a greater share of the
population.
The lead for implementation of energy coordination and policy making is the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), which has oversight for energy planning and development, electricity, oil and natural gas, renewable fuels, geology, mining and materials
processing. MME leads a multi-stakeholder mechanism known as the National Energy
Policy Council (CNPE) which includes participation by key ministries including: Planning, Treasury, Environment, Development/Industry/Foreign Trade, and Agriculture,
as well as representatives from the states, civil society, and Brazilian universities. CNPE
advises the presidency of the republic for the electricity sector and is the principal forum for long term energy policy issues. The National Agency for Petroleum, Natural
Gas, and Biofuels (ANP) was created in 1998 to provide regulatory authority and supervision for the production and distribution of fuels in Brazil. While an independent
agency, it maintains links to MME, and has a diverse charter including the execution of
geological and resource assessments, management of the tender process for exploration,
development and production of oil and gas, calculation of revenues for various government entities, monitoring of prices, regulation and oversight of activities related to the
supply chains for all types of fuels (including ethanol).92
Propelled by broad economic expansion, electricity consumption is expected to
grow by five percent per year over the next ten years. Whereas hydropower currently
provides about seventy-five percent of Brazil’s electricity, a combination of concerns
about over-reliance on a single source, risk of drought and environmental and cultural
opposition to new projects will likely reduce this share as total electricity demand increases. Nuclear generation capacity is planned to grow in order to keep pace at a two
percent share of a larger total base, natural gas will increasingly displace coal for thermal generation (a net one percent increase to fifteen percent overall), and a suite of
alternative energy sources are planned including small hydro, wind, and biomass, doubling their composite share from eight to sixteen percent.93
Two significant Brazilian companies heavily influence the country’s energy sector: Eletrobras and Petrobras. Eletrobras is Latin America’s largest power utility with
a generating capacity of forty-three gigawatts. The Brazilian federal government owns
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a fifty-two percent stake in the company, with the remaining shares publically traded
on various international markets.94 Petrobras is the largest company in Latin America
by revenue, and again, the Brazilian federal government is the largest shareholder and
maintains voting control.95
In oil and natural gas, a headline story not only for Brazil, but the energy world,
is the 2007 discovery of extensive pre-salt layer continental shelf reserves estimated
to contain over fifty billion barrels of oil equivalent (boe). Following initial resource
assessment and exploration, a pilot project in the Tupi Lula fields began production
in October 2010 at an output of approximately one hundred thousand barrels per day
(bpd). Brazil is already a net oil exporter, and the pre-salt assets have the potential to
increase domestic production from about 2.7 million bpd nearly twofold over the coming decades. Formidable technical challenges surround the extraction of these reserves,
given the depth and pressures involved, associated freezing temperatures, and distance
offshore. In addition, the fields have the potential to include large volumes of associated
natural gas for which major infrastructure would be required to either transport it to
markets via pipeline or liquefy it at sea, both of which introduce additional technical,
logistical, economic, and safety considerations. Pre-salt resources have raised legislative
questions at the federal level to ensure the distribution of royalty income is equitable
and undergirds socio-economic development for all Brazilian states, including many
not endowed with fossil fuels.96
Brazil is renowned for its ethanol industry, ranking second to the United States
in total production. Sugarcane juice is fermented to produce the ethanol, while the residual biomass, or bagasse, is burned to produce process steam for distillation and the
generation of surplus green energy for the local electrical grid. In all, the process is
extremely efficient with an energy ratio that yields between five and nine parts energy
output for every one part of energy input (please see chapter 6). When combusted in
motor vehicle engines, sugarcane ethanol has lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions that
are approximately sixty percent lower than standard gasoline, according to US EPA
estimates. This qualifies it as a so-called advanced biofuel. Sugarcane ethanol is a very
sustainable form of bioenergy, and has provided opportunities to de-carbonize the
Brazilian vehicle fleet, in which more than ninety percent of vehicles can operate as flexfuel. Brazilian statute mandates a minimum ethanol blend level on a quarterly basis,
which typically varies between eighteen and twenty-five percent. Though the commodity is freely traded, the sugarcane industry has received indirect government support in
the past, and recent policies are aimed at providing favorable loan terms for upgrading
infrastructure, optimizing agricultural practices, and incentivizing research and development for advanced biofuels. Gasoline as a commodity has been kept artificially
low in recent years in efforts to stem inflation. Though prices are adjusted periodically,
this policy has been known to make ethanol less competitive and has unintentionally
created supply shortages for gasoline and inventory imbalances for ethanol. Ethanol as
a share of Brazilian transport fuel declined from fifty-five to thirty-five percent between
2008 and 2012.97 Ironically, during part of 2011, Brazil increased imports of US corn
ethanol to help meet statutory blend levels, while exporting sugarcane ethanol to sev-
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eral US states, including California, where local policies favor advanced biofuels. In the
long term, Brazil is coordinating its energy, agricultural, and environmental policies to
optimize the value that sugarcane delivers across the sectors of food, fiber, and energy.
Connecting energy policy with sustainable development and environmental policy has been a priority for Brazil, both domestically and internationally. While Brazil
ranks fourth in the world in total greenhouse gas emissions, a small percentage of these
emissions are attributable to the conversion of energy (please refer to Table 2.1). This is
principally because fifty-five percent of total Brazilian emissions derive from land use,
land-use change, and forestry , twenty-five percent from agriculture and livestock; and
the industrial and energy sectors account for only twenty percent. Brazil’s clean energy
matrix and modest per capita energy intensity result in very low energy-specific emissions for the nation as a whole.
Brazil’s position in the context of international climate change negotiations has
generally focused on three issues, namely:
1. Insistence upon each country’s individual sovereign right to national development;
2. Strong opposition to any suggestion that the Amazon rainforest be put under
international control for its protection;
3. Insistence of acceptance of obligations by industrialized countries for their
emissions to date.98
Since 2008, Brazil has made some policy adjustments with regard to international
agreements about forests, and importantly, introduced policies aimed at identifying
CO2 reduction targets by sector. For example, under a 2009 law, Brazil would target a
thirty-six to thirty-nine percent reduction in CO2 by 2020; which, if implemented, will
keep total emissions at the 2005 level of 2.0 Gt CO2e in lieu of the business as usual projection level of 3.2 Gt CO2e. Though energy would be a minor component of these strategies, given the dominant share of non-energy emissions, the Brazilian energy sector
has suggested ways to assess and monitor energy performance and emissions, fiscal incentives, and energy efficiency projects. Brazil established, in 2009, a National Climate
Change Fund, in order to assist in formalizing emission reductions across all sectors.99

2.6.1. Conclusion
Brazil has been blessed with considerable natural resources with respect to both energy
and the environment. The country has postured itself well by responsibly leveraging
both renewable and fossil energy sources to promote social development and economic
growth in a global market. In the coming decade, Brazil will confront new challenges
associated with rapid growth in electricity demand and delicate decisions about benefits and risks associated with the development of large-scale hydropower and, significantly, deepwater oil and natural gas. Land use change and market optimization
questions surrounding sugarcane will continue to require careful policy vision. With
respect to the environment and climate change, the international community can benefit from the contributions of Brazil, recognizing that large segments of developing
countries will increasingly enjoy the benefits of industrialization and energy access
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in the coming decades. As that occurs, it will remain imperative that Brazil balance
the complicated forces between increased economic growth, supply of services, social
reform, increased output of fossil and renewable energy, and environmental impacts.
It is clear that whether the context is demand growth, renewables, oil, environmental
impacts, or global collaboration, Brazilian energy and climate policy will be of critical
global importance.

2.7. India Energy and Climate Change Policy
Though India is the world’s fourth largest energy consumer, it has the lowest per capita
energy consumption of the countries discussed in this section. Yet India’s energy and
climate footprint is bifurcated—large urban centers are responsible for high levels of
coal-based emissions; and rural areas have little or no energy access. Economic growth
in India has been steady over the past decade and more than half of India’s economic
output is attributable to the service industry.100 Annual GDP growth based upon purchasing power parity (PPP) for the period 2015–2030 is estimated to be 5.9% in India.
This rate is notably greater than other major economies, including China. Should these
projections prove accurate, Indian economic growth would likely be less energy intensive than in neighboring China, where manufacturing and construction constitute a
larger share.
First and foremost, Indian energy policy is focused on securing energy sources to
sustain economic development. Much of this has come from coal which accounts for
about fifty-five percent of the country’s commercial energy supply. Though India ranks
fourth in coal reserves with about seven percent of proven global totals, demand growth
has outstripped domestic supply for coal, forcing India to increase coal imports by more
than thirteen percent per year since 2001.101
Similar to China, India’s energy planning is coordinated within the central government’s revolving five year plans. The current Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012–2016) emphasizes energy and climate initiatives, yet conveys a candid outlook of the critical realities:
A GDP growth rate of about 8 per cent requires growth rate of about 6 per
cent in total energy use from all sources. Unfortunately, the capacity of
the economy to expand domestic energy supplies to meet this demand is
severely limited. The country is not well-endowed with energy resources,
except coal, and the existence of policy distortions makes management of
demand and supply more difficult.102
India has recently made significant strides to re-align energy prices notably for coal
and liquid petroleum products. Despite near term price increases, these policy adjustments are nevertheless expected to have positive long term impacts on conservation and
efficient use.103
A serious issue confronting India in the midst of its emergence as a major global
economy is poverty. Though many have entered a rising middle class, the rural poor
have been largely bypassed. A 2012 IEA report estimated that nearly twenty-five percent
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of the Indian population lacks basic access to electricity, while electrified areas suffer
from intermittent service.104 The government of India launched a rural electrification
initiative in 2005 known as the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY)
aimed at increasing rural household access by creating additional electricity infrastructure. Capital subsidies and preferential policies specifically target below poverty line
households in un-electrified villages and rural communities.105
Oil reserves in India are extremely limited, and reliance on foreign petroleum is
perhaps the country’s weakest energy link. In its twelfth and provisional thirteenth Five
Year Plans, India anticipates meeting approximately seventy percent of its expected
energy consumption with domestic resources,106 however growing imported oil demands will preclude greater levels of near term energy self-sufficiency. In 2013, India’s
petroleum minister announced that the ministry would work toward energy independence by 2030 through a series of steps aimed at increasing supply or reducing demand.
Among them are the following: Increased hydrocarbon production; unconventional resources such as coalbed methane and shale gas; foreign acquisitions by domestic Indian
companies; and reduced subsidies on motor fuels.107
India has increased its development offshore, where about half its oil and threefourths of its natural gas is known to reside. India’s New Exploration Licensing Policy
(1999) was successful in attracting largely domestic private investment and in identifying new oil and natural gas finds. Despite this, India is a net importer of all fossil fuels.
Over the last four decades, energy supply from imported sources has increased from
ten to more than thirty percent, a sobering statistic for a country poised for sustained
economic expansion.
Traditional biomass and waste are thermally converted to provide nearly a quarter
of India’s energy supply. Much of this is used to provide for the energy requirements
of buildings, heating and cooling, and other industrial needs. In rural areas, firewood,
animal dung and agricultural residue are used as fuel for cooking, heating and lighting
due to a lack of grid connectivity or access to alternate energy services. According to the
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE), India has 288 biomass power and cogeneration plants that generate 2.7 GW of installed capacity with the potential to reach
18 GW in total generating capacity.108
India generates about three percent of the world’s hydropower with 113 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) generated in 2010 (ranked seventh in the world).109 Due to the tropical climate, India has identified opportunities to increase its hydroelectric generating
capacity from 39.3 GW to more than 100 GW if all projects currently under survey and
investigation are approved and constructed.110 India currently has six nuclear power
plants in total with a combined 4.4 GW of generating capacity. As part of its energy
growth strategy, the government has indicated that it plans to increase the share of
nuclear power from four percent in 2011 to twenty-five percent over the long term.111
The country’s energy sector is administered and managed via a multi-ministerial
structure that includes the Ministries of Power, Coal, Petroleum and Natural Gas, New
and Renewable Energy, Environments and Forests, the Department of Atomic Energy,
and the Planning Commission, among others.
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Several national policies have been implemented to ensure a smooth functioning
framework for the power sector, open access to transmission and distribution networks,
regulation of tariffs, and to improve rural electrification. The government established
the Power Grid Corporation of India (POWERGRID) to operate five regional electricity
grids, while states and private companies operate transmission/distribution segments.
Other policies have liberalized the hydrocarbon market and encouraged private sector
investment throughout the energy supply chain. This advocacy applies both to investment within India, as well as to Indian investment in foreign energy projects that will
accrue value in India, such as from imports of oil or natural gas.112 One such example
is in liquefied natural gas (LNG), in which the government of India began an import
arrangement with Qatar in 2004. Indian firms, such as Petronet, have established trading relationships with foreign and domestic partners to ensure a stable supply to Indian
markets. Due to increasing demand, India is an attractive trading partner, and LNG is
now being acquired on the spot market from the Middle East and Africa.
IEA has noted that strategic technologies may enable India to sustain social-economic growth while developing increased energy resources including: clean coal technologies; nuclear power through a three stage nuclear program; energy efficiency in
industry and buildings through such approaches as audits, trading schemes and labeling; increased use of biodiesel and ethanol in transportation fuels; and improved
transmission and distribution networks.113
India has taken some critical steps domestically to reduce the environmental footprint associated with energy production and use. For example, the Ministry of New
and Renewable Energy aims to increase the share of renewable energy to six percent of
India’s total energy matrix and to ten percent of the electricity mix by 2022.
India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) identified eight priority
national missions to address climate change mitigation and adaptation. Among these,
the National Mission on Enhanced Energy Efficiency (NMEEE) seeks to create a regulatory and policy framework that is conducive to sustainable business models and innovation. Fuel savings, avoided capacity additions, and emissions reductions are among
the benefits. Other campaigns are directed at increasing the contribution of solar energy and accelerating the adoption and use of sustainable biofuels, setting an indicative
target of 20% blending of biodiesel or bioethanol by 2017.114
In December 2009, India voluntarily agreed to a twenty to twenty-five percent reduction in emission intensity by 2020 from 2005 levels, exclusive of agricultural emissions. The government projects that its per capita emission in 2030 (< 4 t CO2e) will
remain lower than the 2005 global average (4.22 t CO2e).115 As revealed in the details of
its recent policy plans, India has made significant progress in outlining steps required
to align and implement its energy and climate agendas to continue strong economic
growth in a sustainable manner.

2.7.1. Conclusion
India’s economic growth is projected to outpace other developing countries as well as
its capability to procure domestic energy resources. Going forward, it must grapple with
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major increases in energy demand while balancing imports against the development
of domestic supplies. Energy analysts warn than India must manage its energy growth
“without locking in high emissions.”116 Thus, environmentally sound solutions will be
imperative from more efficient use of coal to increasing shares of natural gas, nuclear
and biomass. The Indian energy and climate agenda includes some familiar essentials:
improving access and reliability, increasing exploration and capacity, implementing regulatory and pricing reform, reducing petroleum reliance, increasing energy diversity
with lower carbon sources, and increasing efficiency. Effective implementation will raise
countless millions more to a higher quality of life while controlling the modest per capita
energy intensities that typify the country today. India has made significant investments
in foreign partnerships, and encouraged private interests, both foreign and domestic, to
participate in Indian projects. This inclusive and global vision may come by necessity, but
it may bring creative new solutions to the global energy and climate dialogue.
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Chapter 3
Social Engagement by the Engineer
Melissa Dark, Ida Ngambeki,
Dennis Depew, and Rylan Chong

Abstract
The American Engineers’ Council for Professional Development, the precursor institution of the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET), defined
engineering as the “creative application of scientific principles to design or develop
structures, machines, apparatus, or manufacturing processes, or works utilizing them
singly or in combination; or to construct or operate the same with full cognizance of
their design; or to forecast their behavior under specific operating conditions; all as
respects an intended function, economics of operation or safety to life and property.”1
In light of this definition, engineers must have a working familiarity beyond the scope
of their technical work. They must be able to identify and understand the social environments and its interactions in order to develop solutions to global engineering challenges. Chapter 3 endeavors to provide a necessary social and global framework for the
more detailed examination of specific energy topics undertaken in later chapters. The
chapter describes systems within the social environment; introduces theories, concepts,
and ideas to help students understand the social context and engineering’s place within
it; and addresses the necessity for social engagement among engineers. The chapter also
provides two energy themed case studies as examples of how the social environment
affects engineering practice. Case Study 1 is designed to complement chapters 4 and 7
and Case Study 2 is designed to demonstrate how political, social, and economic forces
may emerge in the energy sector.
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3.1. Introduction
Questions of energy use and distribution and the global energy crisis must be considered in the context of energy producers, users, and the social environment that shapes
energy use. To do so it is necessary to understand the social environment. A social
environment is a context; it is a set of circumstances in which an event occurs; a time
or place in which people live or in which something happens or develops. In the largest
sense, the social environment is the milieu developed by humans (as opposed to the
natural environment): it is society as a whole. Social environments are dynamic and
multidimensional with many different aims, qualities, and aspects.
Social environments are comprised of economic, political, and social systems.
Within each of these systems there are other systems; for example, the political system contains executive, legislative, and judicial systems. The economic system contains
systems of production, distribution, property rights, and labor, among others. We can
think of these systems as “nested” (Figure 3.1); each of these systems is an integrated
whole and at the same time is part of larger systems. Changes within a system can affect the systems that are nested within it as well as the larger system or systems within

Figure 3.1. The Social Environment.
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which it exists. Energy production, distribution and consumption exists within this
social environment and therefore is fully integrated within, affected by, and in fact comprises these systems. For example, energy production, distribution, and consumption is
an economic system with considerations of property rights and labor.
As individuals, we all experience social environments. We are shaped by the culture
that we are educated or live in, or the people and institutions with whom we interact. Persons within the same social environment often develop a sense of social cohesion based
on shared experiences. Solidarity produces trust, reciprocity, and a sense of belonging,
which can be desirable characteristics in a society. Taken too far though, cohesion can
become collectivism and unquestioning allegiance—undesirable characteristics in a society. The opposite extreme, rational self-interest, can be equally undesirable.
The global scope and temporal magnitude of the energy challenge requires that
those whose work and calling is energy-related understand social environments in ways
that helps them see beyond their own lived experiences, customs, and self-interest. The
social environment of today’s global energy crisis is a complex and dynamic environment where the political, economic, and social systems are both intra- and interacting;
the same issue is different in different places not only because of geographic differences,
but as a consequence of political, economic and social factors constituting the context.
Consider for example nuclear power generation. As described in Case Study 1, nuclear
power generation in Germany, which accounts for just over fifteen percent of that nation’s power generation, is being phased out as a result of public fears over safety. On the
other hand, in neighboring France, where nuclear power accounts for over seventy-five
percent of power generation, nuclear power generation is increasing. The drivers for
these different directions in energy policy differ in the two contexts and include social
factors such as public opposition in Germany, economic considerations such as the revenue from energy export in France, and political will. The safety of nuclear energy is
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.
This chapter begins by briefly describing foundational concepts of social systems,
then focuses more specifically on political systems as an important type of social system,
including interactions and dynamics within and among these systems and variations in
political systems across the globe, discussing the implications of these interactions and
variations on the issue of energy. Then, the chapter addresses common authentic values,
examining how values and belief systems result in behavior, how common values impact the common good, and the relationship between the common good and individual
rights. Finally, we review the effect of globalization on social systems and discuss the
implications for energy policy.

3.2. Social Systems
Social systems are all around us; neighborhoods, workplaces, class systems, traffic systems, families, marriage traditions, cities, and political systems are all examples of social systems. Social systems are comprised of individuals and groups. The most essential
characteristic of any social system is interaction. Social systems are enduring, patterned
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interrelationships between individuals, groups, and institutions. These enduring behavior patterns become embedded and shape the choices, opportunities, and actions
of agents within the social system. Social systems supervene on individuals, influencing us through a variety of mechanisms. Social systems organize the behavior of large
numbers of actors, coerce individual and group behavior, assign roles and power to
individual agents, and have distributive consequences for individuals and groups. They
are embodied in the actions, thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, and durable dispositions of
individual human beings. Social systems are autopoietic; they exist only by reproducing
the events that serve as components of the system. The characteristic patterns of interaction within a social system define it and differentiate it from other social systems. The
mechanisms for control and influence are context specific; the mechanisms that one
particular social entity uses for influence may fail in another context.

3.2.1. Political Systems
One of the most influential social systems is a political system. A political system is a
manmade structure that regulates the processes and activities of human co-existence;
specifically it is the social structure and methods used to manage a community, government, or state. The outputs from the political system can be broadly categorized as
policies: the rules, understandings, and institutions that organize and direct human
action. A political system can refer to either a particular form/system of government,
for example, democracy, totalitarianism, or authoritarianism, or to a singular state or
one of its subordinate authorities, such as a district or province, county, or city. A state
is generally understood to be a sovereign entity with a government, defined territory,
permanent population, and the capacity to enter into relations with other sovereign
states. A political system is comprised of various political entities and their functions.
This includes the political and legal structures manifested in governmental, civil society, and private sector domains. A democracy has different political entities than a
totalitarian or authoritarian political system. Not only do the entities and functions of
the different political systems vary, so do the interactions among the entities, and this
has implications for how decisions are made regarding energy generation and distribution. For example, the Three Gorges Dam built on the Yangtze River in China was
completed in 2012 despite widespread opposition from the local population because of
the environmental impact and the necessity of relocating over one million residents of
the flood plain. The political system in China allowed these decisions to be made, while
in a different political context the project may have been stalled.
A political system is nested in a larger social environment that includes other social systems, such as the economic systems, and the values system. A political system
interacts with these other systems. The legal structures and laws of a political system
are made by the individuals and groups in the society or state, and they are influenced
by the values and relationships of those actors. In turn, the political system influences
the economic and value systems and, therefore, the actors—both group and individual. The process by which this occurs is manifest and perceivable in specific contexts.
Later chapters explore specific contexts looking at different energy technologies and
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policies in different geographical locations and in so doing, provide snapshots that capture, compare and contrast particular social environments and their effects on energy
production, distribution and use. There is value in understanding a particular energy
technology in a particular locale at a particular point in time. There is even more value
in understanding various technologies in various locales across various times, as this
helps us to better understand the global energy crisis. Any movement toward shared
solutions requires more robust understanding of the complex and emergent nature of
the systems responsible for and impacted by the global energy crisis. We present an
overview of structuration theory as a tool for thinking beyond surface features to the
more deeply embedded understanding of the roles of policy in problems of human action, such as energy.

3.2.2. Structuration
Structuration is useful for thinking about “problems of human action,” such as the
global energy crisis, and policy solutions to these problems. A basic tenet of structuration is that public policy is a multi-layered system, which means that we cannot look
simply at policy actions (laws, regulations), we need to look more deeply into the systems that produce the policy actions. According to structuration theory, systems are
made up of both agents and structures.2 Agents are individuals and collectives who
act with purpose, intention, and motive. Structures are social properties that make it
possible for social practices to exist. Structures can be thought of as the “rules of social
life” that are applied in the enactment and reproduction of social life. All social states
need agents and social practices to help them survive in a recognizably similar form.
Structuration looks at how humans exert agency within structural contexts. More specifically, structuration looks at how social practices are ordered across time and space;
how agents continuously reproduce these practices in the process of expressing themselves as actors; how actors reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible;
and patterns of social outcomes resulting from these enacted social practices. Figure 3.2
presents these ideas more concretely.

Figure 3.2. Theory of Structuration.3
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Policy action can be, and often is, explained by choice and preference. The relationship between choice and preference, and policy action is labeled as teleological, which
means that there is perception of purposeful development toward an end; that is, the
choice or preference set logically leads to the given policy action. Explanations solely
from the intentional dimension are often used in instrumental and rational theories
of policy making. However, the analyst can go deeper by chaining back to look at perceptions and values making up the dispositional dimension, suggesting a causal determination for given choice or preference sets. The distinction between levels one and
two can be described as an in order to rather than a because of relationshiip, with the
former referring to the intentional sphere and the latter constituting the link between
this intention and the basis for it (the disposition): how a particular actor’s intention
has come to be.4 The two constructs, perception and values, which Carlsnaes suggests
as belonging to the dispositional dimension, fit Giddens’ model of structuration as the
motives or purposes for action. Lastly, Figure 3.2 depicts a third level, the structural
dimension, which represents the interaction between the dispositional and intentional
dimensions. Structural factors include the contextual structures and institutions and
their functions, and the manner and extent to which they enable and constrain conditions under which contingent actors (the only causal entities) necessarily have to operate. Differences at all three levels result in differences in policy action.
Take the case of the renewable energies discussed in Chapter 4. The European Union
(EU) is an example of a nested system. It comprises twenty-seven member states, each
with their own political, social, and economic systems. However, the EU as a whole also
shares common economic and governing political systems. The European Union set a
goal that twenty percent of energy consumption should come from renewable sources
by 2020. However, member states have the discretion to decide how this goal will be
attained. There are actors in each of these states—such as companies, politicians, and
individuals—all acting to influence the choices made in the national political, social,
and economic systems about what technologies are used to generate power. Therefore,
these systems are influenced by the agents within them. However, the agents are also influenced by the systems; they choose their actions and responses based on recognitions
of how the systems work and how they can be influenced. Case Study 1 gives an example
of how political and social issues can have an impact on energy generation.
While understanding differences is important, it is not the entire story. As important as it is that students understand differences in social environments, we also
believe it essential that students understand commonalities that all humans share.
The next section discusses how common beliefs and values are formed and how goals
are negotiated.

3.3. Common Authentic Values and Principles
Societies regularly develop a set of commonly accepted values arising from a common
belief system. These values arise from common needs and desires and include those
things seen as being good for the society as a whole, or for the common good. In a trea-
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Case Study 1
Energy is a global necessity. However, societies struggle to find answers to address
the wicked problems of energy sustainability, environmental/climate concerns, and
health. A potential alternative would be the increased usage of nuclear power. It provides significant benefits, such as clean emissions, cost effectiveness (that is, there is
not a high demand to develop newer technologies or purchase additional technologies to reduce the carbon footprint), and it is reliable and provides a predictable
base-load. Moreover, nuclear power plants do not have to refuel often. Although
nuclear power plants present benefits, Chancellor Merkel of Germany announced a
plan to phase out their nuclear power plants by the year 2022.
To understand the reasoning for phasing out nuclear power plants, it is essential to
understand the history that led up to the decision. Germany’s first nuclear plant went
online in 1957, which represented the political and economic movements of the time.5
In 1960, Germany introduced the Atomic Energy Act with the primary aim of encouraging nuclear energy. However, not every actor was on board with the nuclear program. An anti-nuclear interest group made up of environmentalists and peace activists
believed there should be policy changes regarding the military usage of nuclear power
and nuclear waste disposal. The oil crisis in the 1970s promoted the idea that energy
diversity and therefore nuclear energy was good for the state, but the 1986 Chernobyl
incident revitalized the anti-nuclear movement and discouraged public support for
nuclear power plants.6 However, it was not until 2002 that Chancellor Schroeder, with
the support of the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party, passed the first nuclear phase out deal to end all nuclear energy production by 2021.7 The phase-out deal
modified the Atomic Energy Act of 1959 by including a section that no new licensing would be distributed, which prohibited the building and operation of new nuclear
power plants and other nuclear facilities.8 Schroeder provided three reasons for the
phase-out: a) there was growing concern about how to handle nuclear waste, b) nuclear
power was a social problem, and c) nuclear power had no economic purpose.9
In 2010 Chancellor Merkel, the Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union, and the Free Democratic Party expressed their disagreement with
Chancellor Schroeder and his supporting parties’ phase out deal, because of
Germany’s commitment toward the European Union’s 2020 energy strategy requiring twenty percent use of renewable energy, energy supply, and steady energy
prices.10 Merkel developed a new strategy that gave all nuclear plants that were constructed before 1980 an eight year license extension and those plants constructed
after 1980 a fourteen year license extension.11 In 2011, twenty-three percent of
Germany’s electricity was generated through nuclear power.12 On March 11, 2011,
an earthquake and tsunami struck Japan, resulting in a meltdown at the Fukushima
Nuclear Plant. Days after the event, Merkel formed the Ethics Commission on Safe
Energy Supply that evaluated Germany’s seventeen nuclear power plants. Months
later, in light of Japan’s nuclear disaster and public opposition, the Ethics Commission
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on Safe Energy Supply took a deontological position and recommended Merkel to
shut down eight of the seventeen nuclear plants and return to Schroeder’s phase out
deal, in order to protect the country from future threats of nuclear disasters.13

Guiding Questions
1. What are the social, economic, and political implications of phasing out
Germany’s nuclear program? Who will be impacted by this decision and
to what extent?
2. Using the theory of planned behavior model, analyze Germany’s Green
Party’s conflicting views on nuclear energy and clean energy?
3. What are the social, political, and economic differences that made Germany
consider the tragic events in Japan as a reason to phase out their nuclear program while France did not?
4. Germany is a leader in the renewable energy sector and plays a huge role in
the European Union 2020 energy strategy. What are some alternatives that
could replace and improve the energy lost by the phase out deal, without
increasing the carbon footprint and cost?
5. Evaluate the environmental policies and regulations (that is, the cost and benefits, liability, human health protection, and environmental security) regarding nuclear energy in Germany. Compare the results to Japan’s and the United
States’ environmental policies and regulations regarding nuclear energy.
tise on the common good, V. Bradley Lewis brings up arguments first voiced by Aristotle
and St. Thomas Aquinas. The common good has been described as a specific good that
is shared and beneficial for all (or most) members of a given community; a good that
is both end and means; and any action or behavior that promotes the good of the state
and, by doing so, promotes the good of all its citizens.14 The concept of Common goods
is grounded in morality and ethics. Central to morality, ethics, and the concept of the
common good is the notion that human beings are both rational and political beings.
Unlike the rest of the animal kingdom, humans can trace their actions as resulting from
a series of thoughts and reasons; it is this capacity to reason that allows us to behave
individually and collectively in a manner supporting the common good. However, man
acts not only for himself, but for the larger group; he recognizes that the success of the
group benefits the individual. Man utilizes not only individual work for the benefit of
the many, but also aspires to function in a manner that ensures that a society’s work is
for the benefit of the many. While it is important for people to understand the aspects
that differentiate social environments, it is equally, if not more, important that we appreciate these unifying common authentic values and principles.

3.3.1. Values, Beliefs, and Behavior
Social systems are the result of groups of people acting with and on each other; individuals are nested within and make up the social structure. In order to understand social
structures we must first consider the human being as an individual. Individual behavior
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can be seen as the result of an individual’s values, belief system, and attitudes. Values
refer to individually held, socially constructed ideals of desire and preference based on
what the individual holds to be true or false. Belief systems are the total collection of
what one holds to be true about the world, both physical and social, and about oneself.15
One model of the interaction of these attributes is the Theory of Planned Behavior (Figure 3.3) proposed by Ajzen.16 In this model the individual’s behavior is influenced by
their attitude, which is their positive or negative feeling about the behavior. Attitude
is a result of the individual’s belief about the consequences of the behavior and how
desirable those consequences are judged to be. Behavior is also influenced by the individual’s belief about other people’s evaluation of the behavior and whether it should be
performed, called the subjective norm. Finally, behavior is influenced by the individual’s perception of the difficulty inherent in performing the behavior, measured in terms
of effort, resources, and ability and weighed against the perceived value of the behavior
to the individual. This is called perceived behavioral control. In this way an individual’s
desires, attitudes, and beliefs about the world around them and values together influence their behavior.
As demonstrated by this theory, since the individual is nested within the social
structure, individual action is heavily influenced by social norms. Evaluations of both
the desirability and the consequences of an action are weighed based on perceptions of
social judgment. Therefore, while the society is made up of individuals, individuals are
the product of society and are heavily influenced by relationships, history, and tradition. So a society’s values are the product of the values of the individuals within it, and
an individual’s values are the product of the society in which they are embedded.

3.3.2. The Common Good and Individual Rights
This complex relationship between the individual and society finds expression in the
notion of the common good. Though values differ across individuals, communities,
societies and cultures, there are certain values shared across these groups. These common values, such as food, shelter, development, and happiness, can be thought of as a
conception of the common good. However, individuals and indeed societies differ in
the extent and the manner in which they value these goods. It is therefore difficult to
define the concept of the common good and to agree on what those goods may be. The

Figure 3.3. Theory of Planned Behavior.17
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utilitarian definition of the common good is the greatest good for the greatest number. This is the simplest definition of the common good and therefore the most easily
translated into action. However, this definition has two major failings. First, it falters
in its conception of common because the greatest number is often only a section of the
population (usually demographically or historically powerful groups). The utilitarian
approach values the benefit or happiness of this sector at the expense of the remainder
of the population. In practice this often results in some members of a society being
used as a means to ensure the well-being of the rest. Second, this approach fails in its
definition of good. The measures of good or happiness in this visualization are often
narrowly defined and reduced to a particular set of measurable goods such as material
wealth. These goods are often limited to a sector of the population and even within
this sector may disregard other desirable goods such as education. In this definition
the individual rights of certain members of the population are limited for the benefit
of other members of the society. An example from the energy sector is the appropriation of land for building dams. Dam construction is generally viewed as being for
the common good by providing power to communities, providing employment, and
reducing the carbon footprint by providing renewable energy. However, those people
displaced—in some cases forcibly—are disproportionately negatively affected by the
loss of their land.
Since common goods are grounded in ethics and morality, another way to conceptualize them is through the prism of religion. In this context the common good
is defined as a responsibility to care for others and support the general welfare,
sacrificing some personal freedoms for that which is seen to benefit society. These
principles of self-sacrifice and generosity can be a powerful way to support and
protect struggling sectors of the populace. However, this approach to the common
good also has certain pitfalls; for example often a narrow section of the population,
usually religious leaders or the theologically influenced elite, is responsible for deciding what benefits society and what can be reasonably sacrificed for these benefits. In this case these espoused benefits are strongly influenced by the particular
religious doctrine, making religious tradition the arbiter of individual freedoms
and restricting other freedoms, especially for nonmembers of that particular religion. This is especially problematic in societies with diverse populations belonging
to varying religious traditions. This approach can also be problematic in societies
like the United States which value the separation of powers. In these societies, arguments rooted in religious doctrine may be derided as not belonging in the public
sphere and ignored regardless of their merit.
The common good can also be defined as that state which supports the individual in the fulfillment of their potential.18 In this conception, each individual pursues
personal fulfillment to the greatest extent possible. However because individual fulfillment is limited by time, energy, and resources, individuals also value benefits arising from others’ pursuit of fulfillment. Because of this, individuals come together to
create a society that uses fairness as the basis to support individual fulfillment. In this
conception both the participation in the society to support others and the benefits of
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the society to the individual are considered common goods. However, this conception
is naively optimistic, assuming mutual supportiveness and individual’s activities will
benefit the group.19
In all of these discussions of the common good, there are three primary difficulties.
One is the conception of the common. The number and diversity of individuals within
a society make it impossible to cater to everyone, so a choice has to be made as to what
portion of the society will be considered as the common. Another is the conception of
good. Societies are made up of individuals who may not have the same values, belief
systems, or needs. Therefore, deciding whose needs and values will be considered is a
constant challenge. A third is the tension between the common good and individual
rights. Considerations and responsibility for the good of others would seem to require
sacrificing some individual freedoms. However, Tocqueville argues that the common
good and individual rights are not in conflict. In a society where one’s rights are recognized as paramount, individuals realize that the protection of their rights depends
on the extent of the protection of others’ rights, and define these as the common good.
Therefore active and engaged participation in support of good citizenship is the best
way to support individual rights.20
Inherent in all three of these difficulties is another important question namely,
who gets to decide. A decision has to be made by the individuals within a society as
to what will be valued, who will benefit, how they will benefit, and who will bear the
cost. By necessity, this decision is made by a section rather than the whole population.
The determination of who will have the power to make these decisions and how they
will act is the essence of a political system, one of the foundational elements of the
social environment.

3.3.3. The Tragedy of the Commons
One example of the tension between individual rights and social responsibilities is the
notion of the tragedy of the commons. The commons are shared resources in a community, such as a public park or a lake which can be used by all. If this shared resource
is destroyed by the cumulative action of individuals acting exclusively for their own
benefit, the situation can be referred to as a tragedy of the commons.21 Take for example
a local lake used by fishermen. Since the resource belongs to no one, each fisherman has
the right to remove as many fish as they desire from the lake. Each fisherman therefore
removes as many fish as possible in order to maximize their individual profit, resulting in overfishing of the lake and the consequent destruction of the resource. In this
case the common good, continued access to the fishery, was sacrificed for individual
rights, pursuit of a livelihood. The converse of this would be the seizing of the lake by a
local government which could, for example, mandate that it could only be used by certain fishermen or for occasional sport fishing, thus preserving it for the common good.
However, this would deprive the local fishermen of the right to make a living through
fishing. Other examples of the tragedy of the commons include greenhouse gas emissions and pollution from car exhaust.

84

Dark, Ngambeki, Depew, and Chong

Though the pursuit of the common good can seem impossible—given both the difficulties in defining both common and good and the tensions between individual and
communal rights—the pursuit is not impossible. This is evidenced by other examples of
the use of common resources. There are many examples all over the world where local
communities have evolved systems that maximize both common access to resources
and individual rights to pursue beneficial economic and entertainment objectives.

3.4. Globalization and the Common Good
Historically, interpersonal and inter-group interactions through migration, exploration, trade, and war has stimulated human development and fostered the adoption and
propagation of technologies, values, and beliefs. These interactions generally result in
changes in social systems for both groups, with values and beliefs altered or adopted
in response to changing contexts, information, and desires. Globalization has not only
significantly increased knowledge of and interactions among societies, but has also
created interconnected production and consumption systems linking the fortunes of
various societies. More than ever before, events in one part of the world can be felt in
geographically separate places. This interconnectedness has required the development
of new social, political, and economic systems spanning the globe, as well as a new
understanding of the common good and individual rights. Achieving this understanding requires the identification of and agreement on common values across societies.
Globalization has had the dual effect of both distributing or magnifying the negatives
in the social environment (such as the manipulation of differing values to maximize
benefits for certain sectors of the population) and empowering actors to positively influence social systems by leveraging global connections. For example, globalization and
its contributions to the development of transnational social movements have affected
hydroelectric power generation. Between 1900 and 1950 the number of dams globally
increased from approximately six hundred to nearly five thousand, by 2000 the number of dams approached forty-five thousand. However, the rate of dam building has
declined significantly from about one thousand dams built per year in the mid 1960s
to about twenty-five per year in the 1990s. This decrease can be partly attributed to the
growth of transnational non-governmental organizations and the development of communication systems that allow local people to mobilize worldwide opposition to large
dam projects which would displace hundreds or millions of people.
Decisions about energy production and use must be made in the context of the
political, social, and economic systems in which they exist. In order to make these decisions it is important to understand the interplay between these systems, how they affect
and are affected by the agents within them and by individual and societal values, and
the necessity of balancing individual and communal needs. Case Study 2 illustrates how
these differing forces may manifest in the energy sector.
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Case Study 2
Eco-Energy Systems owns an ethanol plant in the heart of the United States midwest. The plant has a production capability for producing twenty million gallons of
ethanol per year and employs thirty production workers. By comparison, most of
the ethanol plants in the United States can produce sixty million gallons or more
each year. In 2012, ethanol production dropped for the first time in sixteen years.
This was primarily due to the reduced demand for gasoline since 2008 (most gasoline in the United States is blended with ethanol). The current production ceiling
requires approximately thirteen billion gallons of ethanol to be blended with gasoline at ten percent (E10), as determined by a government mandate. Also, future
projections by the Department of Energy show an increase in demand to fifteen
billion gallons by 2015, which is the target date established by the RFS (Renewable Fuel Standards). However, the cost of biomaterials has increased substantially,
undercutting profits by thirty percent. You have been assigned to lead a team of
managers, engineers and scientists from Eco-Energy Systems to conduct a review
of the facility and make recommendations to the company president and CEO on
the future of the operation. You are expected to be sensitive to environmental and
societal concerns in developing your final report.
There are some environmental and economic issues to be considered in any
decisions on the future of the ethanol plant.
1. Ethanol production requires using large volumes of water. When in full
production, the plant pumps approximately six million gallons of water a
day from a wetland, which helps some local residents in low lying areas by
keeping the water table low and basements dry. However, environmental
groups are threatening legal action because they view tampering with the
water levels as detrimental to local wildlife and the natural ecosystem. If
these lawsuits are successful, the company would have to pay millions of
dollars for remediation, leading to the closure of the plant.
2. If the plant is closed, approximately ninety jobs will be lost from the community with a population of 1200. The economic impact of closing the production facility is quite significant to a small community.
3. Any decision to dismantle the operation will require an environmental impact study which will be expensive and time consuming. There could also
be issues associated with hazardous materials.
4. Based on projections of increased demand for ethanol, the President of
Eco-Energy is willing to consider expanding the facility to increase production capacity to one hundred fifty million gallons per year. The expansion could also include focusing production on second-generation biofuels
using cellulosic feedstocks such as corn stover or other energy crops such as
miscanthus, switchgrass, and tree plantations. However, these projections
of demand are uncertain.
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Some guiding questions for your team to consider are:
1. How do notions of the common good play out in this case study?
2. How do you reconcile the competing interests of being a profitable business
serving the interests of shareholders with being socially responsible to the
community and future generations?
3. What are some of the potential financial consequences of closing the facility? What recommendations would you offer to the president?
4. What are two alternatives you would recommend to upper management?
What are the consequences? Which alternative would you recommend?
5. In chapter 6, the author suggests using a “reverse auction” as one possible
policy mechanism to make the production of biofuels more economically
viable. Would this be a good alternative?
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Harnessing Nature:
Wind, Hydro, Wave, Tidal, and Geothermal Energy
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Jonathan Blackledge, and William Grimson

Abstract
The chapter commences with a short appraisal of current shares of generating capacity
from a range of renewable energies, before proceeding to a review of selected renewable
energy sources. We discuss wind, hydroelectric, wave, tidal, and geothermal energy
sources, examining the history of each technology, current developments, and environmental impact. The chapter concludes with a look to the future grid, considering the
impact of large scale renewable technologies on grid development.

4.1. Introduction
Given both the proven market position of fossil fuels in world energy supply and the
difficulties associated with continued or increasing demand and use of coal, petroleum, and natural gas, we need to consider the current status and future potential for
a range of renewable technologies: onshore and offshore wind, hydroelectric energy,
wave and tidal energy, and geothermal energy. Chapters five and six will go further,
exploring developments in solar energy underpinned by nanotechnology and biofuels, respectively.
Hydrogeneration remains the world’s largest carbon-neutral renewable electricity
resource, with global installed capacity of approximately 3.4 GWh (gigawatt hours
per year). Wind installation is on a rapid growth curve, with current installation in
excess of 230 TWh (terawatt hours per year). Installed wind capacity in the United
States exceeded 43 GW (gigawatt) by the third quarter of 2011, making it second only
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Figure 4.1. Estimated Renewable Energy Share of Global Energy Consumption, 2011.1
to China. The majority of wind installations to date globally have been onshore and
that technology, although still developing, has reached a relatively mature status. Offshore wind farms offer greater power (watts/square meter), but such installations are
more technically challenging and costly to install and maintain. Globally, biomass
accounts for in excess of 200 TWh, geothermal energy for 65 TWh, solar photovoltaic
energy for 12 TWh, solar thermal energy for 1 TWh, and tidal energy for 0.5 TWh.
Estimated renewable energy by type is shown as a percentage of global energy consumption in Figure 4.1.

4.2. Wind Energy
Growth trends for installed wind energy capacity are on the rise around the world.
Total global cumulative capacity in December 2012 stood at 282.6 GW; China tops the
table at 75 GW, with USA second at 60 GW, Germany third at 31 GW; followed by Spain
(23 MW), India (18.5 MW), UK (8.5 MW), Italy (8 MW), France (7.5 MW), Canada
(6 MW), Portugal (4.5 MW), and the rest of the world (40 MW).

4.2.1. Historical Overview
Wind turbines, traditionally known as windmills, have been around for at least three
thousand years. The main use of early machines was either for pumping water or grinding grain. Wind has been the key source of power in sailing for even longer. In the early
part of the last century, wind turbines were used for electricity generation, primarily to
charge batteries and facilitate the supply of power to remote locations. However, the attractiveness of these systems declined with the advent of an expanding electricity grid.
An exceptional case worth noting was a fifty-three meter rotor-diameter steel wind
turbine constructed in the USA in 1941.2 This 1.25 MW Smith-Putnam machine had a
full-span pitch control—much like modern machines—and had flapping blades for load
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control. This operated as the largest wind turbine ever constructed for a period of about
four years until it suffered catastrophic failure in 1945.
A record of the historical development of wind turbines recalls a 100 kW 30 m diameter Balaclava wind turbine and an Andrea Enfield 100 kW 24m diameter pneumatic
design, built in the former USSR in 1931 and in the UK in the early 1950s, respectively.3
The design of the latter turbine was based on the use of hollow blades with openings at the
tip. The air was drawn up from the opening and through the tower to subsequently drive
another turbine which was connected to the generator to produce electrical power. Other
developments include the 200 kW 24 m diameter Gedser machine built in Denmark in
1956; testing of a 1.1 MW 35 m diameter turbine in 1963 by Electricité de France; advances
made by Golding at the Electrical Research Association in the UK; and the construction
of a number of lightweight turbines in Germany in the 1950s and 1960s, by Hotter.4
Despite this general enthusiasm and the achievement of several technical milestones,
activity in the wind energy industry did not gather momentum until the dramatic surge
in oil prices in 1973. This made wind energy competitive with traditional fossil fuels.
It also created the necessary push for the further advancement of wind energy science
and technology, helping to reduce the cost of energy (COE). This in turn stimulated
a number of substantial Government-funded programmes of research, development,
and demonstration both in the USA and in Europe (specifically, in the UK, Germany,
Sweden and Denmark). Denmark became a pioneering nation in the development of
wind turbines, a far sighted stance which placed them ahead of neighboring European
countries in the ensuing decades. A series of prototype turbines were constructed in the
USA. Power generation capacity of the turbines grew from 100 kW for Mod-O built in
1975 (38 m diameter) to the 2.5 MW Mod-5B built in 1987 (97.5 m diameter). A 4 MW
vertical axis Darrieus wind turbine was also constructed in Canada. A similar concept
34 m diameter turbine was tested in the Sandia Vertical Axis Test Facility in the USA.
Other initiatives with regard to vertical axis design involved the use of straight blades
giving rise to an ‘H’ type rotor proposed by Peter Musgrove, resulting in a 500 kW prototype. In 1981, a 3MW horizontal axis wind turbine was developed and tested in the
USA with hydraulic transmission and gear system. The entire structure was orientated
into the wind instead of using a yaw controller. The optimal choices of the number of
blades to be considered remained an open issue at that time and turbines with varying
number of blades (one, two, or three) were constructed.

4.2.2. Wind Characteristics
The amount of energy that can be extracted from wind was eloquently determined by
German physicist Albert Betz. Published in 1919, Betz’s Law calculates the maximum
power that can be extracted from the wind in open flow. The law reveals that energy
created is proportional to the cube of wind speed:
P = 0.5cρAV3
where P is the power (watts), c is the coefficient of performance, ρ is the density of air
(kg/m3), A is the area of the turbine (m3), and V is wind speed (m/s).
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According to Betz’s Law no turbine can capture more than 59.3% of the kinetic energy in wind. Modern wind turbines are designed to achieve as much as eighty percent
of the Betz limit.5
Since the power generated from wind is highly sensitive to wind speed, an assessment of the characteristics of the wind resource is vitally important. Information on the
characteristics of wind forms the basis of investigations on wind energy exploitation,
including decisions on site selection, design optimization, and the best choice of turbine for a particular setting. Wind characteristics are also critical to the understanding
of the effect of wind energy penetration to the electricity grid network. This is very
important in the emerging context of smart grids and the ease of connectivity to local
distribution or transmission networks.
Wind speed is highly variable in nature, both spatially (geographically) and temporally. Scale dependency of this variability over a wide range (both spatial and temporal) adds to the complexity. Variability or fluctuations in available energy from wind is
amplified due to the consequence of the cubic relationship to speed. On a global scale,
spatial variability refers to varying climatic conditions in different regions of the world,
with some locations more windy than others; such fluctuations are caused by the difference in solar insolation at different latitude. Within any particular climatic region,
wind speed variation will also occur due to variability in physical geography. Wind
speeds are affected by the proportion of landmass and sea, the size of the land mass, the
presence of mountains or plains, and the type of vegetation in the area, which governs
the amount of solar reflection and radiation and, in turn, the surface temperature and
humidity. On a local scale, wind speed fluctuations are affected by local topography:
for example, wind speed is higher on the top of hills than on the leeward side or in a
sheltered valley. Finally, at any given location wind speed is dictated by the presence of
buildings, trees, or open, unobstructed land.
At any particular site, the wind speed also varies temporally. On a long term temporal scale, there may be an underlying trend in the variation of the wind speed over
years or decades, but such variation is not well understood and is rather difficult to
predict. On time scales shorter than one year, fluctuations can often be attributed to
seasonal variations. These are better understood, however large variability can occur
over short time scales and accurate prediction may not be possible beyond a few days
forward. There are considerable local specific variations possible during the day (diurnal) and these can be predicted more accurately. The understanding and forecasting
of these fluctuations plays a major role in the context of energy management for the
grid, as they give an indication of how much can be produced from the renewable
wind and hence enable decisions regarding production from other types of power
plant feeding the grid. Even further refined temporal scales (on the order of minutes
or seconds) indicate several aerodynamic phenomena which can contribute to fluctuations in wind speed. One such phenomenon, turbulence, can have a significant
impact on the design, performance, and fatigue life of individual turbines and their
components, and can also impact on the quality of the power produced and its effect
on customers.
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The total velocity of wind flow passing through the turbine rotor may be decomposed into a height dependent mean component and a stochastic (turbulent) fluctuating component. Attention to understanding turbulence in wind flow is an important
field of research. One approach to tackling stochastic problems in wind turbulence is
through application of power spectral density functions (PSDF).6 A rotating blade is
subject to an atypical fluctuating wind velocity spectrum, known as a rotationally sampled spectrum. Rotationally sampled spectra are used to quantify the kinetic energy as a
function of frequency for rotor blades. Due to the rotation of the blades, the spectral energy distribution is altered, with variance shifting from the lower frequencies to peaks
located at integer multiples of the rotational frequency.

4.2.3. Modern Wind Turbines and the Power Grid
Wind turbines can be mainly classified into two types based on the alignment of
the rotor shaft: the vertical axis wind turbine (VAWT) and the horizontal axis wind
turbine (HAWT), which is most widely observed today. Typical wind turbine components include turbine blades, nacelle housing, a low speed shaft, gearbox, generator,
brake assembly, support tower, a cable drop to a converter and switchgear, and a local
transformer for connection to the power grid. Either alternating or direct current
generators, with related accompanying power electronic circuitry, may be found in
turbines in operation today.
Direct drive grid connected generators are considered candidates for future
wind generation, as they would eliminate the need for gear boxes and power conversion. Generator designs for wind turbines include the permanent magnet synchronous generator (PMSG), field excited synchronous generator (FESG), and the
induction generator (IG). IGs may be of fixed speed (FSIG) or double fed (DFIG)
design. The DFIG has a wound rotor, enabling the transfer of power from both the
rotor and stator windings. The stator winding is connected directly to the threephase electrical grid and the three-phase rotor winding is fed from the grid through
a frequency converter.
With the significant penetration of wind energy into the grid, wind turbines are
now integrated into the mainstream source of generating power. Commercially installed wind turbine machines of megawatt capacity have been successfully operating for a number of years. On-shore and offshore wind farms in operation in many
countries around the world typically comprise ten to one hundred turbines, with
some large on-shore farms containing several hundred units. On-shore wind farms
are suitable for open landmass areas which have average wind speeds greater than six
meters per second at a height of ten meters. An example of a wind speed power curve
is shown in Figure 4.2, with an indicative cut-in speed of 3.5 m/s and a rated speed of
12.5 m/s.
Aside from the increased incremental power output, there are several beneficial
effects to grouping turbines in a farm, including savings in construction costs, grid
connection costs, and lower operation and maintenance (O&M) costs due to integrated
management and maintenance.
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Figure 4.2. Typical Wind Speed Power Curve Characteristic: Output Power Versus
Wind Speed, Indicating Cut-in Speed, Rated Speed, and Cut-out Speed.

4.2.4. Future Offshore Wind Energy Potential
Figure 4.3 provides an indication of the growth in the size of wind turbines from 1985
to the present day. Referring again to Betz’s Law (P = 0.5cρAV2), we see that the power
generated by a wind turbine is linearly proportional to the swept area, and we know
that area is proportional to the square of the radius (r2 or d2/4). Thus, holding other
conditions constant, a doubling of the radius will increase power output fourfold. A
significant increase in turbine rotor diameters is possible by locating farms offshore.
In this way rotor diameters as large as 160 meters can be installed, since restriction
due to aesthetic pollution or noise is not an issue. Stronger offshore wind speeds combined with less turbulence away from the shore result in increased efficiency and greater
power production, especially since the size of onshore wind generators are nearing their
upper limits due to social concerns.
Offshore wind turbines have greatly reduced visual impacts and lower noise constraints, allowing higher rotor speeds. However, offshore hardware and installation costs
tend to be expensive, largely on account of water depth and distance from shore. Nevertheless, offshore farms can produce up to fifty percent more electricity than onshore
equivalent farms. In 2006, offshore wind energy accounted for 1.8% of total installed capacity, but produced 3.3% of total wind electricity. A significant database has been established through worldwide wind atlas records data, with some eight thousand locations
registering wind speeds at a standard height of eighty meters above sea level. Indications
are that moving offshore is considered a likely growth area for wind technology, with
potential for development in near-shore deep water zones in countries and locations including the USA, the western coast of South America, Spain, Norway, China, Japan, India,
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and the eastern coast of Australia. Land-based wind farm capacity is limited to fifty megawatts while offshore farms of more than one hundred megawatt capacities are possible.
Offshore construction is nevertheless challenging, not least in terms of installing deep
water foundations, achieving connectivity to grid and carrying out maintenance following installation of plant.
The cost of fixed mounted offshore wind turbines increases with water depth, rendering them uncompetitive in certain locations. In deep water areas, floating wind turbines may be the most cost-effective and reasonable solution.7 Experience and expertise
acquired through the offshore oil platform industry means that there is a wealth of
relevant technology available for adaptation to floating offshore wind turbine platforms
(FOWT). As a large platform is preferable in order to minimize ocean motion response,
and the weight of a wind turbine is small compared to that of the floating platform, it is
possible to install larger wind turbines with capacities of five to ten megawatts. This will
enable a reduction in power generation cost.8
One major challenge is to design and optimize an appropriate support structure,
which can contribute almost forty percent of the total cost. Ongoing research and development is essential in all areas, including assembly, installation, and decommissioning;
electrical infrastructure including power transmission and HVDC; power electronic
converters; monitoring of power quality; enhanced design of turbines; and operations
and maintenance protocols for offshore systems, in order to reduce COE and minimize
environmental impact.
FOWT systems may be divided into two groups, single turbine and multi-turbine
systems.9 Several initial concepts considered floaters supporting multiple turbines, in an
attempt to reduce floater motion due to smaller thrust height to floater span ratio and to
improve economy by employing a single mooring system.10 However, such systems are
subjected to high current and wave loads and their turbines suffer wake effects. The floaters

Figure 4.3. Wind Turbine Developments: Blade Span and Power Rating.
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supporting a single wind turbine were considered to be more suitable for offshore wind
energy.11 Single turbine system platforms include spar (S), tension-leg platform (TLP) and
barge (B) concepts as indicated in Figure 4.4.12 The spar concept uses a long-draft spar
moored by catenary or taut lines and achieves stability using ballast to lower the center
of mass below the center of buoyancy. The TLP concept achieves stability through the
equilibrium of tensioned taut mooring-lines and the excess buoyancy of the platform. The
barge is generally moored by catenary lines and stabilized by its water-plane area. Hybrid
models using features of those concepts also have potential for further development.

4.2.5 Environmental Concerns and Social Acceptance
Wind farm installation continues to grow annually in most regions, including Europe,
the United States, China, and India. The EU added ten thousand megawatts of new
capacity in 2010, approximately ten percent of which was offshore. Germany alone increased power capacity by two thousand megawatts in 2011, setting the mark as the
leading EU member state in installation of wind energy. The United Kingdom is currently the largest market for offshore wind, with installed capacity of two thousand
megawatts, fifty percent of total EU offshore installations.
Although wind turbines emit no carbon emissions and are generally positively received by local communities, they are seldom greeted with universal support. Principal
objections to farm installations tend to be visual or noise related. Wind turbine noise
can result owing to the passage of wind across the blade surface. Although the blades
appear to move slowly, the blade tips can move at speeds in excess of one hundred miles
per hour, which in turn can generate a pulsing noise. In addition, complaints sometimes
reference the shadows cast by the rotation of the blades; which may be more or less pronounced depending on location and prevailing weather conditions. Objections mostly
concern farms with large arrays of turbines. On the beneficial side landowners may
generate income by contractually agreeing land lease for utility installation.
The International Energy Agency Task 28 working group incorporated contributions by
representatives from USA, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, and the Netherlands to create “an interdisciplinary and cross-cultural exchange platform with goal to support the successful development of wind energy in the participating

Figure 4.4. Single FOWT Systems: (a) S-FOWT, (b) TLP-FOWT, and (c) B-FOWT.13
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countries.”14 In the context of supporting development of wind projects and understanding
the opposition that can arise, social acceptance is defined as “societal consensus on the planning, construction, and operation of wind projects.”15 The group’s recommendations are
aimed at planners, policymakers, and practitioners of wind power development.
• Sites with potentially high conflicts, such as those close to dwellings or in protected areas, should be avoided.
• It is important to anticipate and minimize potential adverse project impacts by
choosing an appropriate turbine model or by adapting to the behavior of wildlife such as migrating birds.
• Wind farm installations should maximize benefits for local communities by means
of an equitable distribution of the positive and adverse impacts of a project.
Research in wind energy supported through the EU Framework program includes projects for the design of very large wind turbines (producing eight to ten megawatts) for
both onshore and offshore applications.16
Development of wind energy has grown exponentially over recent years and many
countries have surpassed expectations of the percentage wind capacity that may be safely
deployed on network grids. Attention to power quality, intermittency, and strength of distribution and transmission grids have been tackled, enabling connectivity of renewable at
levels well in excess of what was previously thought possible. The case for wind energy is
now well established; however it is a maturing rather than a mature science and will have
an important role to play in reducing carbon emissions to 2020 and beyond.

4.3. Hydroelectric Energy
4.3.1. Historical Perspective on Hydropower and Hydroelectricity
Water as a source of energy, or hydropower, has a long history stretching back to, and
probably beyond, recorded history. In ancient times water wheels were used in milling
to produce flour from wheat grain. Another use was in agriculture in the form of irrigation where some form of waterwheel was deployed to pump and feed water into distribution channels. In Mesopotamia, the use of irrigation and drainage for agriculture
dates back to 5000 BC. Cities were built along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, forming
the northeastern portion of the Fertile Crescent, which also included the Jordan River
Valley and the Valley of the Nile.17 Mesopotamian innovations also included construction of water dams and the use of aqueducts.
Undoubtedly water in the form of rivers was the chief source of power during the
early stages of the industrial revolution and this largely accounts for the development of
various types of mills and factories in places that otherwise would be rustic, charming
and idyllic. Developed in Greece, the earliest evidence of a water-driven wheel is considered to be the Perachora wheel, dating to the third century BC.18 The Romans and
Greeks were the first to operate overshot, undershot and breastshot waterwheel mills.19
The third century AD Hierapolis water-powered stone sawmill is the earliest known
machine to incorporate a crank and connecting rod mechanism.20
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Early contributors to both the study of hydraulics and the practical realization of water
wheels included Bernard Forest de Bélidor (1693–1761), who published Architecture Hydraulique which described vertical- and horizontal-axis hydraulic machines; Jean Victor
Poncelet (1788–1867), who improved the design of turbines and waterwheels; Daniel
Bernoulli (1700–1782) who wrote the theory for the conversion of water power into other
forms of energy in his book Hydrodynamica; and mathematician and physicist Leonard
Euler (1707–1783) who wrote his theory of hydraulic machines in 1750.
As the 1800s progressed a number of technological innovations such as the development of turbines led to increased efficiencies. And in general a more scientific approach
was in evidence by which the energy extracted from a headrace could be maximized.
With the development of the electric generator in the latter part of the 19th century,
through hydraulic coupling, hydroelectric power could be produced.21 The first operational use of water (hydro) in the generation of electricity in the United States is attributed
to Wisconsin in 1882. At the beginning of the 20th century, many small hydroelectric
power plants were being constructed by commercial companies in mountains near metropolitan areas. India’s first hydropower plant with a capacity of 130 kW was commissioned
in 1897 at Darjeeling in West Bengal.22 By 1920 forty percent of the power produced in the
United States was hydroelectric. With the development of extensive electricity networks
distribution problems in respect of waterwheel power were solved in that the location of
the power generation did not have to coincide with, say, the site of the end use factory.
For this and other reasons worldwide investment in hydroelectric schemes increased
dramatically. For small and less technically advanced countries that were energy poor,
hydroelectric was an attractive option. For example in Ireland the waters of the Shannon
(the major river in the country) were harnessed at the Ardnacrusha hydroelectric power
plant and became operational under the control of the Electricity Supply Board (ESB)
in the late 1920s. The Ardnacrusha hydroelectric power plant was the largest in the
world until it was overtaken by the Hoover Dam, built in 1936 with power rating 1,345
MW. The economic and social impact of Ardnacrusha to Ireland was immense. The
Hoover Dam was eclipsed by the 6,809 MW Grand Coulee Dam in 1942. The Itaipu
Dam opened in 1984 in South America as the largest, producing 14,000 MW but was
surpassed in 2008 by the Three Gorges Dam in China at 22,500 MW. Hydroelectricity eventually supplied countries including the Newfoundland-Labrador schemes
(Churchill Falls) in Canada; Norway, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Paraguay
and Brazil, catering for more than eighty-five percent of their electricity needs. The
United States currently has more than two thousand hydroelectric power plants which
supply forty-nine percent of its renewable electricity.23 Although some countries owing
to natural topography are considered to have reached their viable potential for hydro
installations, hydro remains a very important and indeed natural source of electricity
generation. Examples abound throughout the world.
As the most widely used form of renewable energy, hydroelectricity accounted for
sixteen percent of global generation (3,400 terawatt-hours) in 2010, and is expected to
increase about three percent per year over the ensuing twenty-five years. Hydropower
is produced in 150 countries, with the Asia-Pacific region generating thirty-two percent
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of global hydropower in 2010. It is noteworthy that China is the largest hydroelectricity
producer, with 721 terawatt-hours of production in 2010, representing around seventeen
percent of domestic electricity use. There are now three hydroelectricity plants larger
than ten gigawatts: the Three Gorges Dam in China, Itaipu Dam across the Brazil/
Paraguay border, and Guri Dam in Venezuela.

4.3.2. Hydroelectric Power Generation
The parameters governing the amount of electrical energy that may be generated using
a hydropower source are the height from which the water falls and the quantity of water
flowing (flow rate).
The power equation may be expressed as:
P = ηphqg
where P refers to the electric power output in KW, η equals a coefficient of efficiency
(typically around 0.8), q is the flow rate in cubic meters per second, p equals the density
or specific weight of water (1000 kg/m3), h equals the head in meters, and g refers to the
gravitational constant, 9.81 m/s2.
In a water turbine, blades are attached to the shaft and when flowing water passes
against the blades of the turbine, the shaft rotates. After transferring energy to the turbine, water is discharged via a drainage channel called the tailrace of the hydropower
plant. The shaft is coupled with an electrical generator to produce energy.
An essential component of hydraulic power generation is the availability of a continuous source of water, providing a large amount of hydraulic energy. While the vertical
fall (head) of water remains fairly constant once the plant has been designed, the flow rate
can vary depending upon the intensity, distribution and duration of rainfall. The head of
water may be available by local terrain or may be created artificially by construction of
a dam. If available and adequately controlled, ‘water energy’ from rivers, streams, canal
systems or reservoirs, can provide hydropower plant with efficiency far exceeding that of
a conventional thermal power plant. As no heat is involved during hydroelectric power
generation, component parts, if well maintained, can last for up to 40 years.
Water turbines may be classified based on a number of functional and operational
characteristics. On the basis of head and quantity of water required, turbines can be
classified as high-head (with heads ranging from several hundred meters to a few thousand meters), medium-head (with heads ranging from about 60 to 250 meters), and
low-head (with heads of less than 60 meters). Francis turbines are medium-head, while
Kaplan and propeller turbines are low-head. Depending on the type of flow, turbines
are classified as tangential flow, axial flow, radial flow, and mixed-flow. Turbine shafts
may be either of horizontal (Pelton turbine) or vertical axis alignment.

4.3.3. Social, Environmental, and Economic Impact of Hydroelectricity
There are significant advantages to the use of hydroelectric power. Based on appropriate
site selection, water is a dependable source of energy which is both non-polluting and
reliable. It can also be an effective source of power for remote areas. Efficiency of up to
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eighty percent may be achievable in transferring stored water to electrical energy. When
storage facilities are effectively used, flood water may be retained and used for agricultural production, river regulation, and wildlife protection.
There can also be adverse effects to the deployment of hydropower. Over the summer months water reservoirs may have limited natural flow, diminishing the power
available to the local community. There have been occasions where large numbers of
people have been evacuated from their homes to enable the construction and installation of hydro power plants. Landscape clearing may also result in soil erosion and
in extreme circumstances, landslides. Moreover, in normal circumstances silt may be
naturally transported downstream by the flow of the river. If it is captured by the reservoir this may result in a decrease in fertility of downstream plains. Aquatic and other
animal life may be adversely affected owing to reduction in dissolved oxygen levels. If
not carefully monitored fish may be trapped and killed in passing through the turbine.

4.4. Wave and Tidal Energy
4.4.1. Extracting Energy from the Sea
The use of wave and tidal power has a longer history than many would suspect. The
Romans built tide mills and much later tide mills were a feature to be found on the
North Atlantic coast, particularly in France, Great Britain, Canada and the United
States. Électricité de France (EDF) operates the largest tidal power station in the world
located on the estuary of the Rance River in Brittany. Its annual output is of the order
of 0.6 TWh and produces electricity at a cost nearly thirty percent below that of nuclear
power. The Severn Barrage Tidal Power system in the Bristol Channel has long been
talked about as a candidate for a large barrage system particularly as the River Severn
has a tidal range of fourteen meters (one of the highest in the world). But like most such
schemes environmental issues have prevailed to date.
This is one of the reasons why open water (especially in noted ecologically sensitive
estuary environments) exploitation of tidal and wave power is dominating current considerations. It has been estimated globally that 180 TWh of economically accessible tidal
energy is available. And the corresponding figure for wave energy is of the order of 500
TWh. In the 1970s Stephen Salter was one of the early advocates and developer of systems
to extract energy from waves and achieved a 90–90 efficiency in tests of prototypes (i.e.,
ninety percent absorption of the power available in a wave and ninety percent conversion
of that power into electricity). Interest in these systems waned with falling oil prices. But
with current high costs of energy and concerns about climate change attention has returned to the quest of extracting energy from waves. Waves of course are a result of wind
and therefore wave power systems are intermittent sources of power. In contrast the tidal
system, due to a well-established earth-moon mechanism, provides a regular flow of water
(stream) largely independent of the wind and thus is an attractive option for energy generation. Tidal stream generators operating in open sea situations are not without environmental challenges but they are less serious than for estuary based systems.
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4.4.2. Wave Energy
4.4.2.1. Overview
The energy derived from sea waves is one of the most spectacular forms of ocean energy.
Often, it leads to severe destructive effects. The waves are produced by wind action and
are therefore in turn indirectly generated from solar energy. The motion of sea surface
waves is principally determined by wind speed and, in particular, the gradient of the
wind velocity which induces a force. Thus understanding the temporal and spatial variations of the wind force regulated through different angles of incidence upon the sea
surface is a fundamental issue. Another issue is the characteristic spectrum over which
the wind force is converted into wave motion. Because it is not possible to uniquely simulate such complex interactions on an entirely deterministic basis through the application of computational fluid dynamics over large scales (that is, the wind velocity cannot
be known precisely as a function of time), stochastic models are required to investigate
correlations between the energy associated with a sea surface wave stream and the wind
velocity time series.
Yoshio Masuda is regarded as the father of modern wave energy since his research
began in Japan in the 1940s. He developed a navigation system powered by wave energy
and equipped with an air turbine. This device, later called an oscillating water column
(OWC), was commercialized in Japan in 1965, and subsequently in the United States.
In Europe there has been a research thrust in wave energy since the early 1990s
stimulated by the European Commission’s inclusion of wave energy as a theme in their
research and development programs on renewable energies. Since the start in 1992 there
have been a large number of projects funded by the European Commission. The IEAOES 2008 Annual Report provides a survey of the ongoing activities in wave energy
worldwide.24 In the recent past, there has been growing interest in wave energy in North
America (USA and Canada), involving the national and regional administrations, research institutions and several companies. This has resulted in frequent meetings and
conferences on ocean energy.25

4.4.2.2. Nature of Waves
Waves are generated from wind. Hence, as with wind, variability is the main drawback
for energy generation from waves. The variation can occur over different time scales:
from wave to wave, with sea state, and from month to month. There are also seasonal
fluctuations in wave height. Winds generated by the differential heating of the earth
pass over open bodies of water and push surface water particles along with it (whose initial conditions are established by the incident radiation) setting up a rolling motion in
the water and moving the water particles in a vertical and circular path. The energy and
power densities of a wave are proportional to the square of the wave amplitude and to
wave period; hence knowledge of the average wave height is therefore important when
considering where to place a wave farm.
Assessment of wave energy resource at a site is crucial for the purpose of design of
wave energy converters and also for planning and management, in similar fashion to
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that described for wind.26 For the purpose of site classification, the level of available wave
energy is usually expressed as power per unit length (along the wave crest or along the
shoreline direction). A good offshore location should offer the availability of an annual
average ranging between 20 and 70 kW/m. These locations are mostly in areas of moderate
to high latitude. Seasonal variations are less pronounced in the Southern hemisphere and
hence southern coasts of South America, Africa and Australia are particularly attractive
for wave energy exploitation.27 The northern hemisphere (that is, the northern Atlantic
and Pacific oceans) has large average wave heights. Further, in terms of the proximity of
these waves to coast lines, there are two principal regions that stand out: the Aleutian Islands and the west coasts of Ireland and Scotland. That latter case is due to the fact that the
Atlantic Ocean is characterized by prevailing winds from west to east—the Atlantic Trade
Winds—and these coasts are regions with a higher population density and easier access
to the infrastructure required to exploit wave energy technology. Indeed, the world’s first
commercial 0.5 MW wave energy plant, developed by WaveGen, is located in the Isle of
Islay in Scotland and, on the west coast of Ireland, wave heights can vary from two to
twelve meters over a week depending on seasonal changes.
The Energy Density E (energy in Joules per unit area) of a continuous sea surface
wave may be approximated by
E = 1– ρgH2 ≈ 1.23H2 kJm-2
8
where ρ is the density of (sea) water, g is the acceleration due to gravity and H is the
wave height. This is the energy associated with the oscillation of a wave on the sea
surface. For a wave period of T seconds the associated power (in watts per unit area)
is given by
E Wm-2
P = —
T
Thus for an average wave height of 1 meter and an average period of 1 second the
wave energy is 1.23 kJ/m2 and the wave power is 1.23 kW/m2. These metrics apply to
wave energy conversion devices that exploit the energy of the wave at right angles to
the plane of the sea surface. However, some devices exploit the power associated with
the propagation of the wave front itself. In this case, the Energy Flux F (also known as
the Power Density) is given by multiplying the energy density of a wave with the group
velocity to give
F = 0.5 H2T kWm-1
In all cases the metrics are proportional to the square of the wave amplitude and
open water waves are generated whenever wind speeds exceed ~0.5 meters per second.
Large amplitude (~2 m), long period (~7–10 s) waves have power densities commonly
exceeding 40–50 kW/m.
Conventional wave spectrum models are linear, and assume that the distance
over which the waves develop and the duration over which the wind blows are sufficient for the waves to achieve their maximum energy for the given wind speed. It is
assumed that waves can be represented by sinusoidal forms. This relies on the following: (i) waves vary in a regular way around an average wave height; (ii) there are no
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energy losses due to friction or turbulence, for example; and (iii) the wave height is
much smaller than the wavelength. These principal assumptions provide the basis for
predicting wave amplitudes on a statistical basis and it is upon this basis that many
wave energy converters are designed in which the wave amplitude is taken to conform
to a Rayleigh distribution. However, this distribution is known to be inaccurate which
is primarily due to a lack of understanding of how, on a statistical basis, wind energy
is converted into wave energy.
From a statistical point of view, what is required is a physical model that can accurately predict the distribution of sea surface waves and sea types given knowledge on
the distribution of the wind velocity. A solution to this problem could then be used to
estimate the ‘quality of power’ from a wave farm given statistical parameters that reflect
the environmental conditions in which the wave farm is operating.
A common measure of the Wave Spectral Density S(T) as a function of the wave
period T is
S(T) = AT3e−bT
where
10−3 g2
a = 8.10 × 2π × 104
And,
g 4
b = 0.74 × (2πv )
the wind velocity v being measured at 19.5 m above the still water level.28 However,
this model does not take into account ‘split spectra’ as can sometimes be observed
on the west coast of Ireland; that is, spectra consisting of two distinct peaks. Neither
does the model, which is based on linear wave theory, take into account freak waves,
which are an essentially nonlinear effect. Furthermore the model provides an estimate of the spectrum of periods of sea waves rather than a model that can be used
to simulate a time series representing the vertical oscillation of a wave energy device
at a location on the sea surface. The spectrum of the wave period is a measure of the
power density and energy flux, but the square of the wave height is arguably a more
fundamental measure, that is, the wave energy. However, the wave spectral density
does at least provide a qualitative relationship between the wave properties and the
wind velocity.
Another important product of the linear wave theory relates to the distribution of
wave heights which is taken to conform to a Rayleigh distribution
H exp (− H )
P(H) = —
σ2
2σ2
where H is the wave crest height and σ is the most probable wave height.29 This distribution is used to define the significant wave height (SWH) which is an average of one third
of the maximum wave height. High storm conditions can give wave heights of around
fifteen meters and the probability of waves with twice the SWH is 0.00001. This leads to
the conclusion that freak waves with heights greater than fifteen meters are effectively
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impossible. However, this conclusion is wrong, as freak waves are now a well known and
well documented phenomenon although the reasons for their existence (especially deep
water freak waves) is still a matter for debate.30 Events of this type can cause serious
damage to any wave energy conversion device and/or a wave farm that duplicates such
a device unless it has been engineered to withstand such rare but extreme conditions.

4.4.2.3. Wave Energy Resources and Developments
In 2011, the UK Carbon Trust estimated that the global marine energy sector could
be worth 760 billion in United States dollars by 2050. Industry estimates put annual
marine energy revenues at nearly 100 billion dollars by 2025. A detailed assessment of
Ireland’s wave energy resource undertaken in 2005, for example, looked at the theoretical and accessible levels of wave energy in Irish waters.31 The study indicated that a
theoretical wave energy resource of up to 525 TWh exists within the total limit of Irish
waters. For comparison, in 2006, the total electricity requirement for the Republic of
Ireland was only 27.8 TWh of electricity.
The wave energy sector is not as far advanced as other renewable energy sectors
such as wind or solar, but the concept of harnessing energy from ocean waves is not
new. The first ideas were patented as far back as 1799.32 Between 1855 and 1973, 340
patents for wave energy devices were placed. Modern research into wave energy was
greatly stimulated by the oil crisis of the early 1970s, which led to a dramatic increase in
oil prices. Figure 4.5 compares oil prices with the number of wave energy patents filed
from 1960 to 2005.
The increasing oil prices panicked governments into stepping up research into alternative forms of power generation. Several research programs with government and
private support were started mainly in the UK, Portugal, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and
Denmark. In the 1980s, however, the price of oil returned to more affordable levels and
the interest in wave energy research dwindled. Funding was withdrawn from many

Figure 4.5. Oil Prices and Wave Energy Patents.
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projects. Since the mid 1990s, the increasing levels of carbon dioxide emissions and climate change awareness has captured the attention of governments and people the world
over, and, in turn, the generation of electricity from renewable sources has once again
become an important area of research. In the last ten years, there has been a resurgent
interest in the wave energy, particularly in Europe, as seen in the growing the number
of patents illustrated in Figure 4.5 since that time. Today there are over one thousand
patents relating to wave energy worldwide and an installed capacity of approximately
two megawatts.

4.4.2.4. Wave Device Technology
There are a variety of devices and technologies available for the extraction of energy from
waves, in contrast with the limited choices available for large wind turbines. The difference in technologies stem from different ways energy can be absorbed from waves and are
also dependent on water depth and on location (shoreline, near-shore, or offshore).
There are certain differences in the way hydrodynamics affects floating wave energy converters and other similar types of bodies such as ships subjected to waves at
sea. Though results and experiences from previous studies on hydrodynamics of ships
carried out prior to the mid 1970s can be borrowed for application, the presence of a
power takeoff mechanism (PTO) and the necessity to optimize power production are
additional features which need to be considered in depth.
The obvious initial approach for dealing with theoretical developments of wave energy converters was to address the energy extraction from a regular sinusoidal wave
by a floating body oscillating with a single degree of freedom with a linear PTO. The
wave amplitudes were assumed to be small, enabling linearized equations of motion
which facilitated the use of frequency domain analysis technique. The oscillating water
columns were the first wave energy converters of their kind and were developed to full
prototype stage for the purpose of energy extraction from sea waves, even prior to performance modeling and analysis studies.33 This was primarily because the techniques
from ship hydrodynamics were not applicable or easily transferrable to the study of
oscillating body converters.
An oscillating water column (OWC) is made up of a chamber with an opening
to the sea below the waterline. When waves approach the device, water is forced into
the chamber which applies pressure to the water within the chamber. The wave action
results in the captured water column within the device moving up and down like a
piston which alternatively compresses and depressurizes the chamber forcing the air
through an opening connected to a turbine. A low pressure Wells turbine is often
used in this device as it rotates in the same direction regardless of the air flow direction. One of the main advantages of the OWC device is its relative simplicity in design
and robust construction. An example is the W Limpet Device by WaveGen which is a
shore mounted OWC.34
An oscillating wave surge converter usually comprises a hinged deflector positioned
perpendicular to the wave direction that moves back and forth exploiting the horizontal
velocity of the wave. A well-known example of such a convertor is the Oyster device
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developed by Aquamarine Power, which is an oscillating device for deployment near
shore on the seabed in water depth of ten to twelve meters with approximately 2 meters
of the device exposed above the sea surface. The system uses multiple piston pumps to
pump high-pressure seawater to the shore through subsea pipelines. The water is then
used to generate electricity through a hydroelectric turbine. The cost of the pipe line is
low because the device is deployed near shore. However, this decreases the efficiency of
the device because a lot of the energy in the waves is depleted due to friction when the
wave reaches shallow water.35
Point absorber devices have a small horizontal dimension comparative to the longer wavelength in which they operate. Point absorber devices utilize the rise and fall of
the wave height at a single point. The devices can be floating structures that heave up
and down on the sea surface or are submerged below the sea surface using the pressure differential. These devices are generally quite small and as such are not reliant on
wave direction. For example, the PowerBuoy, developed by Ocean Power Technologies,
involves a floating structure with one component relatively immobile, and a second
component with movement driven by the wave motion. In essence it is a floating buoy
contained within a fixed cylinder. The relative motion is used to drive an electrical generator through Faraday induction directly.36 Many such units can easily be used in parallel to develop a wave farm.
Attenuators are long multi-segment floating structures oriented parallel to the direction of the wave front. The differing heights and force of the oncoming waves along
the length of the device causes a flexing motion where the segments connect. This flexing is directly connected to hydraulic pumps or other converters. Attenuator devices
have a relatively small area exposed to the face of the waves, enabling them to reduce
the hydrodynamic forces of inertia, drag and slamming that have the potential to inflict
significant damage to offshore devices. The Pelamis, designed by Ocean Power Delivery,
is made up of four floating cylindrical pontoons connected via three hinged joints. The
wave induced motion of these joints is resisted by hydraulic rams which pump high
pressure oil through hydraulic motors via smoothing accumulators. The hydraulic motors drive electrical generators to produce electricity. Several devices can be connected
together and linked to shore through a single seabed cable with a typical thirty megawatt installation. Such an installation would occupy a square kilometer of ocean and
provide sufficient electricity for
20,000 homes (Figure 4.6).37
Overtopping devices have
reservoirs that are used to capture sea water by impinging
waves to levels above and have
been tested for both onshore
and floating offshore applications. The Wave Dragon, for
example, is an offshore overFigure 4.6. The Pelamis by Ocean Power Delivery, Ltd. topping device. This device
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uses a pair of large curved deflectors that concentrate the waves toward a central
raised reservoir which raises the effective wave height. Kaplan turbines are used to
convert the low head of the water into mechanical energy. The turbines drive permanent magnet generators, thereby generating electricity on the same principal as
conventional land based hydropower plants.38

4.4.2.5. Arrays, Model Testing, and Control
Generating power to feed the electricity grid from one single device will not be adequate
and it is therefore preferable to have an array of devices. Hence, the hydrodynamic
interaction between arrays of devices is crucially important. Studies were first made
for systems of oscillating bodies.39 Subsequent studies by Evans extended to systems of
OWCs, however, as the number of devices in an array becomes large, the interaction
becomes complex and approximate techniques such as multiple-scattering or the plane
wave method may be applied.
For design and development of wave converters, either numerical modeling approaches or alternative physical modeling approaches, with wave tank testing, can
be followed. Since the early pioneering model testing of wave energy converters
in 1974 at the University of Edinburgh by Stephen Salter, significant progress has
been made in experimental test studies.40 More recently, experimental studies have
progressed to the prototype development stage which has facilitated the need for
larger-scale testing facilities.
As with wind and tidal energy, the extraction of energy using wave energy converters involves a number of conversion processes. It is essential that each of these processes
is optimized under certain constraints in order to ensure that overall efficiency is optimized. Of particular significance in converter control is the hydrodynamic process
of power absorption. Several phase-control research strategies have been proposed for
simple PTO including device analysis when acted upon by irregular waves.41

4.4.2.6. Benefits and Disadvantages of Wave Power
The benefits of wave energy are undeniable but as with any technology at such an early
stage of development there are a number of technical challenges that need to be overcome to fully realize the potential of, and most importantly, the commercial competiveness of wave power devices. Waves produce a slow (less than one hertz), random, and
high-density oscillatory motion. Converting these characteristics into a useful motion
to drive a generator capable of producing a quality output that will be accepted by the
utility provider presents a considerable challenge. As waves vary in height and period,
so does their respective energy level. In offshore locations, wave direction is highly variable and so wave devices have to be aligned accordingly. For point absorber devices
such as the PowerBuoy this is less of an issue and in general becomes less of an issue the
closer to the shoreline a device is installed. This is because the direction of wave travel
becomes more uniformly predictable due to the refraction and reflection experienced as
the water depth shallows and is in essence funneled toward the shoreline.
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One of the principal disadvantages to the effective operation of wave energy converters is the environment in which they are placed. The irregular and highly unpredictable
nature of the sea surface has an impact on the design of all devices. To operate efficiently,
each device must be designed to operate for the most common wave levels. The device also
has to be capable of withstanding the stresses induced by freak weather conditions and in
the case of wave energy converters, freak waves. These conditions only occur very rarely
but when they do, can deliver levels of power greater than 200 kW/m. This design requirement throws a very costly barrier in the way of developing wave energy converters as the
device itself may only be rated to capture the energy from the most commonly occurring
waves but has to be engineered to withstand the very high and destructive levels of power
produced, albeit infrequently, by extreme weather events.
The capture of wave energy for electrical power generation is generally considered
to have negligible environmental impacts. The exact nature and extent of any potential
impact however remains uncertain as the technology is still in its infancy. The marine habitat could potentially be impacted depending on the nature of the device being installed, be they totally submerged structures, above sea level platforms or seabed
mounted devices. Above sea floating platforms could potentially provide a resting platform for sea mammals as well as a nesting area for birds. The underwater surfaces of
wave energy devices could provide for substrates or various biological systems. Changes
made to the seabed for mounting devices and for the provision of submarine cables
could also impose potentially negative effects on the local marine habitat. Offshore
wave energy devices may be a source of conflict with commercial shipping and recreational boating. Careful consideration needs to be taken when selecting potential areas
for the sitting of wave energy devices. Near shore devices have the potential to interfere
with recreational activities as well as having a negative visual impact on the coastline.
Any impact that may occur would also be very site specific and it is only with the development of large scale wave farms that the devices impact will become better defined.
As with any emerging technology, the goal is to eventually reduce the cost of wave
energy generation. The barriers listed herein may largely be technical, but every time
a barrier is overcome, wave energy generation becomes increasing economically viable
and subsequently moves a step closer to widespread commercialization. Due to its variability, a ‘wave climate’ is difficult to measure. Wave buoys can give good estimates of
the sea state but are expensive to maintain for long periods of wave climate estimation.42
Resource assessment studies are essential when evaluating possible locations for a wave
energy project, and site specific measurements and surveys are necessary before deciding on the final location for any wave farm.
In addition to the technical advantages/disadvantages, there are a number of legal
incentives associated with wave energy which include the Public Utility Regulatory Policy
Act (PURPA), state goals for renewable energy, renewable portfolio standards (RPS), and
system benefit charges. In this context, research and development efforts are being sponsored by government agencies in Europe and Scandinavia. In the US there is little research
due to lack of funding; although the US Navy, through its Office of Naval Research program, does provide some research funds. However, in general, funding levels are not cur-
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rently adequate for commercially realizable projects. Although wave energy conversion
technologies have significantly advanced during recent years, especially in Europe, most
devices are still in the prototype-phase and there is need of technology improvements. In
particular, the survivability and reliability of devices for offshore operation has still to be
demonstrated. However, the combination of offshore wind, wave, and tidal energy devices
which can use a common transport infrastructure provides a viable developmental route
with the lead being taken by the construction of offshore wind farms.

4.4.3. Tidal Energy
4.4.3.1. Overview
Tidal energy is one of the more predictable and reliable renewable energy sources. The
main objective with tidal energy is obviously to harness energy from the rise and fall of
recurring tides. This may be achieved through design of tidal barrage systems. In recent
years, innovative designs by companies such as Open Hydro have resulted in successful
extraction of kinetic energy in tidal currents following the principles used in wind energy generation; and despite promise, this method is not yet mature.
Tidal movements are generated from the gravitational and centrifugal forces between the earth, moon and sun.43 This results in regular rise and fall of the surface of
the ocean. The causal forces are the gravitational force of the sun and moon on the
earth and the centrifugal force produced by the rotation of the earth and moon about
each other.44 Because of the proximity of the moon to the earth, the gravitational force
of the moon is 2.2 times larger than that of the sun. A heaving motion of water is
created by the gravitational pull of the moon, which is greater on the side of the earth
nearest the moon. In addition to this, the rotation of the earth-moon system, producing a centrifugal force, causes another heaving of water mass on the side of the earth
furthest away from the moon. When a landmass is aligned with this earth-moon system, the water around the landmass is at high tide. Similarly, when the landmass is at
ninety degrees to the earth-moon system, the water around it is at low tide. Therefore,
each landmass is exposed to two high tides and two low tides during each period of
rotation of the earth.45 Since, in addition to earth spinning about its own axis, the
moon also rotates around the earth; the resultant timing of the tides at a spatial point
on the earth’s surface varies, occurring approximately fifty minutes later each day.46
Tidal variations not only result in rise and fall of the ocean surface but can also
lead to tidal currents. As is well known, tidal currents are experienced in coastal areas and in places where the seabed forces the water to flow through narrow channels.
These currents flow in two directions; the current moving in the direction of the coast
is known as the flood current and the current receding from the coast is known as the
ebb current. These currents can also be used to generate electricity.
Tidal power generation facilities can be classified into two types: tidal barrages and
tidal current turbines, using the potential and kinetic energy of the tides respectively.47
Power generated from tidal barrages and tidal currents are also called tidal range power
and tidal stream power, respectively.
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4.4.3.2. Tidal Range Power
Tidal range power or tidal barrages utilize the potential energy of the tides. A tidal
barrage is typically a dam, built across a bay or estuary that experiences a tidal range in
excess of five meters.48 Electricity generation from tidal barrages uses the same principles applying to hydroelectric generation, with the exception that tidal currents flow in
both directions. A typical tidal barrage consists of turbines, sluice gates, embankments,
and ship locks,and can have either a single-basin or double-basin system.
Technologies relating to generation of power using tidal barrages are both well developed and reliable. Historically, small mechanical devices were powered by tidal energy in medieval England and China. There are several sites around the world which
can be considered suitable for tidal range power generation and exploitation. Among
these, the 240 MWe La Rance system at an estuary in the Gulf of St Malo in Brittany,
France, has operated reliably since 1967. This project has demonstrated the feasibility
of tidal range power for large scale operation. Other notable sites include the Severn
estuary in the UK, the Bay of Fundy on the eastern boundary between Canada and the
United States; Mezeh Bay and Tugar Bay in Russia; and the Wash, the Mersey, the Solway
Firth, Morecambe Bay, and the Humber Estuary in the UK. In addition, a number
of smaller sites with potential include Garlolim Bay in Korea, the Gulf of Kachchh in
India, Secure Bay in Australia, and Sao Luis in Brazil. It should also be noted, however,
that environmental restrictions have limited the number of developments of tidal range
power technology.
The total potential contribution of tidal water to the generation of energy is roughly
3000 GW. This quantity includes approximately 1000 GW available from shallow water
depths which are accessible for large civil engineering works, with estimated generation
potential of 120 GW (about twelve percent of near-shoreline and ten percent of the
total world hydropower). This should be of significant interest to many countries, including the UK where the potential exists to provide twenty-five percent of total power
requirements through the harnessing of tidal energy. In Canada, the Bay of Fundy (New
Brunswick to Nova Scotia) is considered capable of producing 30 GW of tidal power.
Unfortunately, not many tidal power plants have been constructed to this point, primarily owing of high construction cost, relatively short-term financial benefits, and
the need for engagement by all stakeholders in developing long-term renewable energy
strategies for tidal energy. The high cost of construction of tidal barrages is a restrictive
barrier to the development of tidal range power. A high initial investment is required
owing to the scale of large tidal barrage construction projects and ensuring the dam can
sustain the tidal water load it will be subjected to. Nevertheless, design of tidal turbines
has reached mature status and the maintenance costs accruing to existing barrages
during lifetime operation, is not excessive.

4.4.3.3. Tidal Current Turbines
Like wind, tidal current technology utilizes the kinetic energy in flowing water to generate electricity; in contrast, there are differences in the operating conditions of the two.
A striking difference is in the density of air and water; at typical ambient conditions,
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water is about 832 times denser than air. Water flow speed on the other hand is generally
much slower to that of air.49
The two most common methods of extraction of tidal energy are based on the type
of turbine used, whether horizontal or vertical.50
• Horizontal axis tidal current turbines: The turbine blades rotate about a horizontal axis which is parallel to the direction of the flow of water.
• Vertical axis tidal current turbines: The turbine blades rotate about a vertical
axis which is perpendicular to the direction of the flow of water.51
Several sites worldwide offer potential for the exploitation of energy from tidal
current. However, factors such as technology status, water depth, wave exposure and
seabed exposure require consideration in assessing the practical energy resource
availability at a particular site location. In general, tidal current sites with water flow
speed greater than 2.5 m/s are considered to have significant practical energy resource
and are economically viable.52 The ideal locations for harnessing tidal energy from
currents are where narrow straits occur between land masses or are adjacent to headlands. Locations with major potential include the Arctic Ocean, the English Channel,
the Irish Sea, Skagerrak-Kattegat, the Hebrides, the Gulf of Mexico, the Gulf of St.
Lawrence, the Bay of Fundy, the Amazon River, the Rio de la Plata, the Straits of
Magellan, Gibraltar, Messina, Sicily, and the Bosporus/Istanbul Strait.53 Indeed, a significant resource of tidal energy is situated in the Irish Sea, other regions of significance being off the west coast of Canada and the African East coast. In each case, a
large increase in an accessible resource can be expected when slower current velocities can be exploited.
Tidal turbine technology is still at an early stage of development. The focus of recent
developments has been on reliability with developments of both scaled-down models and
full-scale prototypes.54 The first dedicated test center, the European Marine Energy Centre
(EMEC), based in Orkney, Scotland has been operational since May 2005, with a principal
focus on the testing of tidal current turbines. Challenges presenting include installation
issues, maintenance, electricity transmission, loading conditions and environmental impact. Installation and deployment challenges center on installation and foundation design,
mooring systems design, and
corrosion prevention strategies.
These challenges are not unique
to tidal energy installations and
experience gained from other
offshore marine projects will be
invaluable.
Successful projects in recent
years include the Open Hydro
tidal energy turbine. A version of
the Open Hydro device is illustrated in Figure 4.7, in which the
turbine is mounted on the sea bed. Figure 4.7. The Open Hydro Tidal Device.
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This innovative design incorporates a stator and a shaftless rotor
housed for rotation within the stator, with the stator defining a channel in which the rotor is retained.
A further example of a competitive technology is the Kite Device
illustrated in Figure 4.8 which uses
a wing to support a turbine that is
tied to the sea bed. As the tidal current flows, the wing generates lift
allowing the same current to drive
the turbine. The first sea going proFigure 4.8. Illustration of the Kite Device.
totype of this device was prototyped in 2011 and trialed off the coast off Northern Ireland with funding by the UK
Carbon Trust with the vision of producing a 10 MW array to follow in 2015.

4.4.3.4. Future Potential of Tidal Current Turbines
Extraction of marine energy using tidal current turbines has genuine potential. Several companies in the recent past have developed operational demonstration models,
in both full-scale and down-scale prototype designs. Examples of scale-models include
Nereus and Solon Tidal Turbines, Evopod Tidal Turbine, Gorlov Helical Turbine, TidEl
Stream Generator and Stingray Tidal Energy Converter. Most devices installed are currently under test and it is expected that on continued successful testing and operation,
full-scale tidal farms will soon become a commercial reality. Some prototypes have
been built and tested in harsh climatic conditions.
The SeaGen and Seaflow, Open Centre Turbine, Tidal Stream Turbine and Free
Flow Turbines are examples of full-scale operational tidal current turbines which are
successfully generating electricity. All demonstration units operate with a horizontal
axis rotor shaft. With the rapid advancement of technology, promising sites have the
potential to become economically viable.

4.5. Geothermal Energy
4.5.1 Overview
Geothermal energy is the energy contained in the earth’s interior in the form of
heat. The inner core of the earth reaches a maximum temperature of about 4000°C.
The origin of this heat is associated with the internal structure of planet Earth and
the physical processes occurring therein. To extract this large quantity of heat it is
necessary to have some carrier to transfer the heat to an accessible depth below the
earth’s surface. Generally, the heat is transferred from depth to sub-surface regions
mostly through the solid submarine and land surface mainly by conduction (geother-
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mal heat) and occasionally by active convective currents of carrier geothermal fluids
such as molten magma or heated water. The heated water is essentially rainwater that
has penetrated into the earth’s crust from the recharge areas. The water gets heated
through contact with hot rocks, and accumulates in aquifers, occasionally at high
pressures and temperatures of up to above 300°C. These aquifers (reservoirs) are the
essential parts of most geothermal fields.55
The average geothermal heat flow at the earth’s surface is just 0.06 W/m2 and hence
it is not generally noticeable. This is because the temperature of rocks increases with
depth, with a geothermal temperature gradient of 30°C/km. This continuous heat current is trivial when compared to other renewable supplies in the above-surface environment, that in total average about 500 W/m2. Also, geothermal energy is unevenly
distributed, seldom concentrated, and often at depths too great to be exploited industrially. However, at certain specific locations, increased temperature gradients occur,
indicating significant geothermal resources. These may be commercially exploited if
available within depths of approximately 5 km at fluxes of 10–20 W/m2. Production is
expected to be about 100 MW thermal km2 in commercial supplies sustained over a
period of twenty years of operation.
There are areas in earth’s crust not far from the surface, that is, at a depth from
the surface on the order of a few kilometers, where magma bodies present in fluid state
or are undergoing cooling in the process of solidification, resulting in release of heat.
Also, there may be other areas where magma is not present but due to certain geologic
conditions the thermal gradient has reached an anomalously high value. In such cases,
if the areas are accessible by drilling boreholes from the surface it may be commercially
feasible for extracting energy.
The use of geothermal energy for electric power generation from turbines requires
heat energy with higher temperature. This is occasionally the case for available geothermal energy with temperatures over 150°C. However, in general geothermal heat is of low
grade and typically possesses temperatures around 50–70°C. Under such circumstances,
it may better suit to directly heat buildings or it can also be used for preheating of other
conventional high temperature energy facilities. For example, heat from near-surface
ground or lakes is frequently used for heat pumps. Several countries have established geothermal electric power projects, including Italy, New Zealand, and the US.
Geothermal energy was first harnessed on a large scale basis in the early years of
the twentieth century, with applications ranging from space heating to electricity generation. Examples include electric power generation initiated in Prince Piero Ginori
Conti in 1904; geothermal steam at Larderello, Tuscany in 1913; and the first large scale
municipal district heating service in Iceland in 1930. Despite the relative rarity of hydrothermal sites, it is estimated that up to six GWe in the US and seventy-two GWe
worldwide could be produced with current technologies at known hydrothermal sites.56
Hot dry rock (HDR) is another geologic resource which, unlike hydrothermal energy,
is found in abundance. These geologic structures occur beneath a large proportion of
the world’s landmass and exist at temperatures of 200°C. Hence, these structures will be
suitable for electricity generation if energy can be extracted through use of appropriate
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technologies. Should more advanced extraction technologies be developed, it is estimated that energy available from HDR resources could result in electricity generation
capacity of 19 GWe in the US and 138 GWe worldwide. Such technology, however, is not
currently available.
Geothermal mapping has been the key to the development of geothermal energy
generation worldwide. This information has been obtained through mining, oil exploration and geological surveys. Though deep drill surveys are commonly carried out
reaching to a depth of six kilometers, technologies to drill boreholes to depths of fifteen
kilometers or more are currently available, and will likely be exploited going forward.
Energy production on the scale of hundreds of megawatts has been possible over recent
decades and the use of geothermal energy for both the heating of buildings and for electric power production, is rapidly increasing.

4.5.2. Demand and Supply Management
One of the restrictions of energy produced from geothermal sources relates to the fact
that heat cannot be transported easily from one point to another. In fact, distribution of
heat over distances greater than about thirty kilometers is difficult. Hence, it is preferable to consume the energy generated close to the point of generation. Such concentrated
usage is possible; for example in cold climates, household and business district heating
schemes generate sufficient loads in regions of high population density. By way of an
example, for a region with a population density greater than 350 people per square kilometer (equating to more 100 premises per square kilometer), a 100 MWth geothermal
plant might serve a twenty kilometer square area with energy of approximately two
kilowatts per premise.57 Such geothermal facilities are operational in Iceland and on a
smaller scale in New Zealand. Other applications are for glasshouse heating (one example is an installation in northern Europe at 60 MWth/km2), fish farming, food drying,
and factory processes.58
Geothermal electricity generation becomes feasible with source temperatures approaching 150°C and becomes more attractive still if the temperature from the geothermal source is in excess of 300°C. If it is feasible to generate electricity then it can be
supplied to the grid, complementing energy supply on a more regional or even global
scale. Heat rejected from electricity generation could be used in a combined heat and
power (CHP) mode.

4.5.3. Cost of Geothermal Energy
The primary cost in a geothermal energy project is capital cost, principally for drilling
of boreholes. Costs of drilling increase exponentially with depth. Since temperature
increases with depth, and the value of the energy increases with temperature, there exists an economic optimum borehole depth of approximately 5 km. As a result, the scale
of the energy supply output is usually greater than 100 MW (supply of electricity and
heat for high temperatures; heat only for low temperatures). Reinjection of the partially
cooled water from the heat exchanger can be used as a mechanism to increase the total
amount of heat extracted from the geothermal source. This has the added benefit of dis-
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posing of water with increased solutes concentration (of about 25 kg/m3) and other pollutants that may be present. However, there is an extra cost associated with this process.

4.5.4. Social and Environmental Impacts
Geothermal energy is safe, reliable and competitive in terms of cost as compared to
other conventional sources. Security of supply is an added value as power can be supplied continuously at full rating without any intermittency. In addition, Operating and
Maintenance (O&M) costs are moderate.
The extraction of geothermal energy may have certain drawbacks with respect to
its environmental impact. First, is the possibility of subsidence affecting local buildings
due to removal of the hot water from the ground. Some incidents have occurred in association with the operation of the 140 MWe Wairakei power station in New Zealand.59
This problem can be addressed by re-injecting some of the output water flow into the
area. Other effects relate to the impact the geothermal plant may have on the intensity of
some of the natural geysers in the vicinity of the plant, though most may not be affected
significantly. These negative impacts have hindered the growth of geothermal power
in Japan. Geothermal systems also emit carbon dioxide, however the level is much less
than that associated with a conventional thermal power plant.

4.6. Impact of Renewable Technologies on Electricity Grid Developments
The large-scale integration of power from newly emerging sources such as wind, marine and solar on national and cross-national networks presents key technical, financial
and regulatory challenges. In meeting future energy requirements it is expected there
will be unprecedented increases on power demand, for instance due to electrification
of transport and growth in information systems. Consumers will likely have higher
expectations for both quality and quantity of service.
The European Technology Platform for Electricity Networks of the Future, also
called SmartGrids ETP, is the key European forum for the crystallization of policy and
technology research and development pathways for the smart grids sector. In the US,
the Energy Independence and Security Act established a framework which enabled
support for matching programs to states, utilities, and consumers to build smart grid
capabilities, and to create a Grid Modernization Commission to assess the benefits of
demand response and to recommend required protocol standards.
With the emergence of advanced power systems (smart grids), renewable energy,
smart meters and novel storage technologies, accelerated modernization of the electricity infrastructure has commenced. It is difficult to predict what the power infrastructure of the future will look like. What is acknowledged is that it will likely be not
a single network, but a network of networks, a network of smart grids. This result will
present difficult network challenges with requirement to manage uncertainty on both
the demand and generation side. As with existing power networks, the advanced power
networks will be required to balance efficiency and reliability and maintain quality of
power to customers.
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Smart energy may be considered a structure where energy is part of an information
vector that includes, but is not limited to, energy quantity, unit price, and exogenous
costs such as emissions, and, a variety of generation and load characteristics. If energy
denotes the capacity for mechanical work, smart energy may be thought of as the capacity for decision-making regarding energy. Smart energy ‘agents’ may have attributes that
pertain not only to physical quantities of energy (e.g. kilowatt-hours) but also economic,
environmental, geographic and temporal characteristics such as price and emissions.60
Smart energy connectivity promises to substantially undergird regional trade and
development. One such political initiative, “Connecting the Americas 2022,” was announced in 2012 by leaders of the Western Hemisphere and aims to increase access
to reliable, clean, and affordable electricity as well as to provide new opportunities for
regions with electricity surplus to exchange with regions experiencing deficit.61
High voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission will feature prominently in the
creation of future grids. HVDC results in lower transmission losses to alternating current networks. HVDC links are long established and well proven in transmission system island grids such as between Norway and Netherlands (NorNed); a 700 MW link
installed in 2008. Plans for further offshore links in the North Sea are well advanced.
Under target specific need 4 of the Union of the Mediterranean chapter of cooperation,
Alternative Energies: Solar Plan, a pathway for facilitation of a new European Supergrid
was drawn.62 The intent is to facilitate importation of large amounts of concentrating
power into Europe from North Africa and the Middle East. Organizations such as the
German based DESERTEC Foundation (formed in 2009) aim to create a global renewable energy plan by harnessing energy from locations where renewable energy is plentiful and transferring this energy through HVDV transmission lines, for example solar
energy from North African and Middle Eastern desert locations.
There is enormous potential for countries of the Middle Eastern region to develop
such solar network grids which will benefit internal economies through exportation
of clean energy to Europe and beyond. Saudi Arabia is planning to install 40 GW of
solar energy capacity by 2030. Masdar City in the UAE is a planned city under development which will rely entirely on solar energy and other renewable energy resources.
Other countries in the region are also exploring possibilities for energy provision by
solar, wind, and ocean power. In the Sultanate of Oman, the national Power and Water
Procurement Company is carrying out preliminary research in solar data acquisition
in preparation for a planned 200 MW concentrated solar plant which is expected to be
operational by 2018. These initiatives demonstrate the seedlings for emergence of a cultural shift toward green energy projects in the region. A future scenario may result in a
move from excessive reliance on oil and gas to widespread deployments in solar energy.
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Mediterranean Basin (27 EU member states and 16 partner countries from North Africa, the Middle
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Socio-Cultural, and Justice and Interior Affairs, six projects which target specific needs to the region
include 1) De-pollution of the Mediterranean, 2) Maritime and Land Highways, 3) Civil Protection, 4) Alternative Energies: Mediterranean Solar Plan, 5) Higher Education and Research: EuroMediterranean University, and 6) The Mediterranean Business Development Initiative.
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Chapter 5
Solar Power and the Enabling Role of Nanotechnology
aLI sHAKOURI, bRIAN nORTON, AND hELEN mCnALLY

Abstract
Solar power has become the world’s fastest growing renewable energy source in terms
of new installations in recent years. This chapter provides a brief overview of enabling
solar power technologies and policies in the context of recent world markets, and
factors that are likely to influence future trends. We then explore the role of nanotechnology and its significant implications for energy conversion technologies in the
future. Differences between information and energy devices are highlighted followed
by a more in-depth focus on solar photovoltaic and thermoelectric devices. A review
is carried out of advances in nano-engineered thermoelectric materials, module designs, and topping cycle applications that can offer significant cost reductions. The
chapter concludes with a brief discussion of future opportunities for nanotechnology
in energy conversion, storage, and conservation such as biofuels, artificial photosynthesis, and electrochemical batteries.

5.1. Introduction
Electricity derived directly from solar and thermal sources is experiencing dramatic
growth in clean energy markets, while emerging research in nanotechnology is helping
to underpin broader development efforts. Solar power, including photovoltaic and solar
thermal technologies, has become the world’s fastest growing renewable energy source in
terms of new installations in recent years. Thermoelectric conversion is enjoying growth
as well, particularly in niche applications such as off-grid or mobile electricity generated
from waste heat or small scale cooling via applied electrical input when run in reverse.
Nanotechnology enables the manipulation of matter and the fabrication of devices
with atomic dimensions. New material properties emerge from large surface to volume
125
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ratios and the quantum mechanical nature of electrons. On a nanometer length scale,
physics, chemistry, and biology converge. Precise control of a material’s physical and
structural properties has huge implications for energy conversion devices. Nanoscale
morphologies, surface areas, and quantum scale behaviors have led to a new generation
of photovoltaic devices. Improved understanding of these phenomena is being applied
to generate electrical potential differences and thereby optimize conversion performance. Photovoltaic device durability aspects are discussed and how device life may
be extended with nanoscale self-assembly. Currently eighty-eight percent of the world’s
primary energy consumed is wasted in the form of heat. To reduce the consumption
of fossil fuels, it will be necessary to improve future conversion of heat into electricity.

5.2. Solar Power Overview
Before delving into the atomic scale, let’s go the other direction and consider the sun for
a moment. It not only represents the largest entity and namesake of our solar system, but
also the direct or indirect source behind almost all forms of energy we use on earth today.
It is, one way or another, lighting the words on this page right now. Electricity generated
from solar photovoltaic (PV) and concentrated solar power (CSP) therefore has the potential to allay resource constraint and emissions concerns associated with the combustion
of fossil fuels, and introduce more environmentally sustainable Watts to the global energy
supply of tomorrow. At the end of 2012, Solar PV reached a significant milestone, exceeding one hundred gigawatts of installed capacity worldwide (Figure 5.1). Moreover, a staggering three-fourths of all new capacity has been added since 2009.1 PV devices convert
sunlight directly into electricity, whereas CSP collects the thermal energy from focused
sunlight via a working fluid that subsequently provides heat or electricity.
In recent years, aggressive policy incentives in Europe have translated into a leadership role for the region in PV installations, now home to seventy percent of the global

Figure 5.1. Cumulative Capacity of Global Solar PV Installations, 2003–2012.2
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share. Asia is next at twenty percent, led by China and Japan with eight and seven percent of global shares respectively; followed by the Americas, where the United States
has an eight percent global share. This has helped earn Solar PV the distinction of the
fastest growing renewable energy resource in recent years as measured by new capacity
additions. In 2013, solar electricity accounted for less than half a percent of the global
share of electricity, whereas one recent prediction indicates US solar generation capacity could increase by one thousand percent between 2011 and 2040.3 A similar analysis
estimates solar PV could account for eleven percent of global electricity generation by
2050.4 While recent trends have helped directly avoid CO2 emissions and pleased many
advocates of solar energy, there are three disconcerting realities confronting future
prospects. The three concerns align loosely with categorical themes of our text: policy,
technology, and economics.
Global policy, through a combination of clean energy capital grants and Feed-inTariffs, has been effective in jump-starting the nascent solar industry, but political and
financial stimulus supports have begun to wane.5 Some forecasts suggest the next five
years could be relatively flat, while optimistic scenarios predict stable growth could
re-emerge toward the end of the decade. A near term shift from the EU to markets elsewhere, likely in Asia and the Americas is expected. National targets, clean energy standards and emissions policies could obviously heavily influence longer term predictions.
Meanwhile, technology has made great advances in the efficiency of both individual
cells and solar collection systems. Record setting cells are now exceeding 44.7% in the
lab, while commensurate strides have been made to increase mass production level efficiencies which, in real-world solar panel environments, can lag world record levels by
half or more. Efforts aimed at optimizing of performance specifications in view of cost
for evolving technologies are helping undergird promising growth potential. Despite
this, grid and market integration challenges may pose technological barriers to greater
adoption. Solar and wind are intermittent renewable resources, and electrical infrastructure has not generally been designed for their seamless integration. A related issue
is that the capacity factor (or effective capacity) of a solar PV or CSP plant is much lower
than its nameplate rating, due to varying levels of solar incidence, geographic latitude,
clouds, and night time. For example, ten gigawatts of installed PV capacity may provide
only one or two gigawatts of equivalent baseload power to the marketplace;6 whereas ten
gigawatts of rated nuclear power can deliver about nine gigawatts of baseload electricity.7 Thus, caution is advised when comparing various sources of electrical generation
on a nameplate capacity basis. That said, break-through technological advances in energy storage, efficiency, and systems optimization are well within the realm of possibility to improve the overall value proposition of solar power.
The biggest economic challenge solar PV faces is to achieve grid parity, or competitiveness with retail electricity prices on a per kilowatt-hour basis. Current solar cell technology and installation costs result in levelized costs for PV generated electricity that are
generally more costly, but can vary greatly from nearly one to more than three times
market rates. This is heavily dependent on prevailing market rates, competing sources of
electrical generation, incentives and subsidies, and state and local policies. Feed-in-Tariffs
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and subsidies have helped reduce the gap and spawn growth, but absent emissions charges
or carbon-related taxes on conventional coal or natural gas generated electricity, economics will largely need to improve autonomously to be compelling. The Sun-Shot program of
the US DOE’s Solar Energy Technologies Office is aimed at leveraging technologies that
can bring the cost of solar to grid parity by the end of the decade.8
Other significant solar contributions to clean energy are made by more mature but
ever-evolving solar thermal technologies, such as the rooftop solar water heaters used
extensively in Asia. Much of the success of these devices is attributable to the application of low-cost technology in amenable urban centers and climates, and their ease of
integration with existing building infrastructure. In 2012, the equivalent energy saved
and emissions avoided worldwide from this family of technologies was actually greater
than that attributable to solar PV and CSP combined.9 While long term predictions
suggest PV trends will surpass passive solar thermal heating systems in deployment,
it remains a salient reminder to consider local context and approach technology and
policy holistically.
It is not the intent of this chapter to provide a comprehensive review of solar technologies, nor to cover all of the economic and policy considerations influencing their
greater adoption. Instead, the overview is meant to convey a broader situational awareness and greater appreciation for the need to accelerate technological advances and policy dialogue. It is especially important to understand the role of nanotechnology in
helping address some of these critical needs.

5.3. Nanotechnology
5.3.1. What Is Nanotechnology?
By definition, nanotechnology is simply the skill, art, or knowledge of devices or systems that manipulate phenomena at an approximate 10−9 m scale. In practice nanotechnology can have enormous implications; as nature operates on a nanoscale level,10
nanotechnology provides unique opportunities for energy conversion,11 medicine,12
clean water,13 food safety,14 and environmental cleanup.15 It has been argued that the one
to one hundred nanometer length scale is the most efficient size to fabricate new materials and new devices because it is comparable to the size of atoms and molecules, the
building blocks of chemistry and all materials around us. This is also the same length
scale for biological building blocks such as DNA, RNA, and the various proteins inside
a cell and at similar energy scales to manipulate quantum mechanics. As early as 1959,
Richard Feynman described nanotechnology as a field which “might tell us much of
great interest about the strange phenomena that occur in complex situations.”16 However the nanotechnology revolution did not begin until the mid 1990s,17 and it was not
until 2000 that the United States provided funding for the National Nanotechnology
Initiative.18 While nanoscale electronic and optoelectronic devices are available commercially, nanotechnology remains a relatively new area of research with much current
work more aptly described as precursory nanoscience.
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Nano is a multidisciplinary science and technology involving biologists, chemists
and physicists, each of whom have been working at the nanoscale level for hundreds of
years. At this scale, these disciplines converge with engineers and material scientists
eager to exploit newly discovered properties. New material properties emerge due to the
quantum mechanical nature of electrons when we approach atomic scales. High surface
to volume ratios of micro- and nanoscale devices result in new electromagnetic, mechanical, chemical, thermal, and optical material properties. Recent advances in atomic
and nanoscale modifications of materials and devices have enabled unprecedented control over these material properties, and are the basis for many new devices and systems
used in our computing and communication infrastructure. These advances are made
possible with the emergence of reliable top-down lithography,19 bottom-up self assembly fabrication techniques,20 nanoscale characterization of materials using techniques
such as scanning probe microscopy21 and electron microscopy.22
Nanoscience will continue to drive profound and broad-ranging changes to the selection of the most suitable materials, underlying functional mechanisms, and processes
of manufacture for devices used for solar energy conversion applications. New materials
are being conceived and well-known materials are being arranged, configured, combined,
and/or coated in order to yield useful properties arising from quantum physics phenomena at a nanoscale level. A general classification of nanomaterials in applications as varied
as supercapacitors and electrochromic glazings is provided in Figure 5.2.
For very small nanoparticles, all of the energy levels may be separated by finite gaps;
electronically they behave as artificial molecules. However for “larger” particle sizes,
the energy levels form the bands seen in a normal solid. In metals and semiconductors,
the transition from finite gaps to bands occurs usually between two and six nanometers
with materials such as gold and silver showing this transition at the lower end of the
range, from two to three nanometers. Semiconductors such as cadmium sulphide are at

Figure 5.2. A Broad Classification of Dimensionality in Generic Nanomaterials.
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the upper end of the band-gap range having energy-level schema that alter seamlessly
with particle dimensions up to six nanometers. This variation leads to different wavelengths being absorbed, so as the sizes of cadmium sulphide particles change, so does
their color. These properties have been employed in a range of sensor and biomarker
applications. Such artificial three-dimensional structures whose properties give rise to
tunable optoelectronic properties are referred to as quantum dots. They have been used
to realize wavelength-selective luminescent solar energy concentrators.23 Nanoparticles formed from good bulk electrical conductors are also of particular interest; their
outermost-occupied energy levels convey charge conduction while being shielded by
intervening electron change distributions from atomic nuclei. Electrons at these outermost levels thus move much more readily in response to an electrical potential. Such
nanoparticles are normally less than two nanometers in diameter.
Equally as important as the nanoscale dimensions of particles are the volumes of
the voids between them. Large voids expose an internal surface area that is several magnitudes larger than the external bulk surface area. Heavily voided assemblies thus obviously demonstrate enhanced performance with respect to many surface-area dependent
properties. Highly nanovoided geometries can exhibit high structural strength but have
little weight. These properties have evolved in nature in, for example, the nanostructures
of the wings of butterflies and moths24 and have found applications in supercapacitors.
Longer path lengths and greater collision losses are associated with electrons traveling
under an electric field through a heavily nanovoided medium. This can be employed to
create nanoporous metals with metallic properties but high electrical resistance. The
geometries and topologies possible at the nanoscale include combining metal or semiconductor nanoparticles with organic molecules leading to different charge transport
and photoelectric phenomena.

5.3.2. Microelectronic and Photonic Revolutions
The microelectronic revolution started after World War II, when we first learned to
make semiconductors. Semiconductors’ electrical transport properties could be changed
by six to nine orders of magnitude by doping or via the application of an external electrical field. This led to the invention of the transistor, a solid-state amplifier/switch, with
great performance and scalability. With the invention of monolithic integrated circuits,
thousands and, ultimately, millions of transistors could be fabricated on the same chip
and mass produced. Nanotechnology research had a rebirth in the 1990s when microelectronic fabrication techniques were used to further modify other properties of
matter (such as light absorption and mechanical strength) by precise control of at least
one dimension of the material below ten to one hundred nanometeres. The first demonstrations, more than forty years ago, were quantum wells, achieved by confining electrons in a two dimensional sheet which resulted in electron energy quantization and
enhanced electron transport and optoelectronic properties. Now quantum well lasers
are used in every CD and DVD player. In the last twenty to thirty years, Quantum
wires, dots, and ever more complex nanostructures have emerged. Nanotechnology has
enabled exponential growth in microelectronics and optoelectronics in the second half
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of the twentieth century. Smaller information processing devices lead to higher integration (more transistors per chip), lower power consumption per computing operation,
and faster operations due to smaller distances for charge transport. This is the basis
for Moore’s law, which states that the number of transistors per chip is doubled every
eighteen to twenty-four months.25
In addition to the progress in information processing devices, we have had exponential growth in information transfer, especially in fiber optic applications. These have
also benefited from miniaturization, which has enabled faster optoelectronic components (semiconductor lasers, detectors, wavelength multiplexers, and so on) as well as
the development of low loss optical fibers. A corollary to Moore’s Law is that the data
rate for long-haul communications has doubled almost every five years between 1850
and 1950 and, since fiber optics were introduced in the late 1970s, continued to double
every one or two years. Recent experiments have demonstrated the capacity to transmit
one thousand terabits per second over a single twelve-core optical fiber fifty-eight kilometers long.26
Precise control of a material’s electrical, thermal, optical, magnetic, and structural
properties has huge implications for energy conversion devices such as photovoltaic
devices which convert light to electricity and thermoelectric devices which convert heat
to electricity. Nanotechnology is also vital to energy-related applications such as solid-state cooling applications, batteries, supercapacitors, power electronics devices, solar
fuels, and many more. However, we should also be aware of major differences between
information devices and energy devices. The former can be as small as possible since a
bit does not have a minimum size. A property of a single electron or a single photon can
define a bit. On the other hand, energy applications have a required cumulative length
scale that matches human consumption (that is, the energy needed to keep the temperature of a house constant or energy needed to transport one kilogram of material by one
hundred kilometeres). This distinction is important and is one of the reasons why some
of the early industrial innovations of the twentieth century no longer exhibit exponential growth. For example, the speed of airplanes and the energy efficiency for transport
increased almost exponentially from their advent until the middle part of last century,
but in the last fifty years the speed of commercial airplanes has stayed constant and fuel
efficiency has improved at more gradual rates.
A key enabling factor for the microelectronics industry has been the emergence
of CAD (computer aided design) tools which enable the design of extremely complex
systems with billions of building blocks. The computing power has now increased to a
point that we can do first principle calculation of many material properties. This opens
up the opportunity to design new materials and predict their properties. The new Materials Genome Initiative for Global Competitiveness in the US could pave the way for
major applications in the energy field. For example, one could design a photovoltaic device with appropriate optical absorption and electronic transport properties from first
principles and thus minimize the trial and error often used to make existing devices.
The remainder of this chapter will introduce the opportunities and challenges of nanotechnology as it can be applied to energy. A detailed overview of solar photovoltaics and
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thermoelectrics for direct conversion of heat into electricity will be presented as well as a
discussion about opportunities for nanotechnology in energy storage and biofuels.

5.4. Solar Photovoltaics
Nanostructures are employed in many different aspects of solar energy, harnessing devices by tailoring properties through nano-morphology to produce novel
meta-materials. This can lead to new paradigms for device functionality while still
employing currently-used materials. For example in all-silicon tandem solar cells,
nanostructures can be introduced that alter band-gaps exhibited by silicon/insulator
combinations to be closer to those required to achieve optimal solar energy conversion efficiency. Such silicon nanostructures have been made by annealing sputtered
silicon-rich silicon dioxide layers. The connection of fluorescent dye molecules with
appropriate nanoparticles has led to new organic photovoltaic devices27 and organic
light emitting diodes.28
The high initial cost of wafer-based silicon solar cells has led to cost-reduction efforts to reduce required quantities of material or substitute less expensive but still suitable material combinations. For example, thin-film silicon solar cells can achieve very
high open-circuit voltages.29 The few-micron-thick layer of silicon in such cells can be
realized by either etching or polymer transfer techniques.
The principal advantages of organic photovoltaic devices include wide, though
presently low-efficiency, solar spectral response and low-cost manufacture via highthroughput solution processing. In contrast their disadvantages include low solar energy conversion efficiency and unproven long-term durability.
Combining a suitable lower band-gap polymer organic material and an electronaccepting inorganic material ensures broad adsorption of the solar spectrum while maximizing the short circuit current obtained. Forming an organic-inorganic hybrid solar
cell in solution would lead to low-cost but reasonably efficient photovoltaic devices. Silicon nanocrystal quantum dots are an ideal electron accepting material for inclusion in
such hybrid solar cells as the engineered band gap arising from electron confinement30
is almost optimal at ~1.5 eV. Improving the energy-conversion efficiencies exhibited by
organic solar cells requires a high electron charge carrier yield rate from exciton dissociation in the organic active layer. At the interfaces of materials with different electron
affinities, excitons are dissociated by electric fields intensified by traps introduced from
the engineered presence of “impurities.” Blending conjugated polymers with molecules
that have a high electron affinity, like C60, leads to efficient rapid exciton dissociation in
low-cost bulk-heterojunction solar cells. Bulk-heterojunction solar cells however, have
a low solar energy conversion efficiency31 of about seven percent, but achieving a power
conversion efficiency of ten percent is seen as tenable.32 Currently the most common
polymer-fullerene system is based on a blend called P3HT:PCBM,33 for which power
conversion efficiencies are about 4.5%. The nanomorphology of the P3HT:PCBM blend
is affected by the composition ratio of donor and acceptor materials, solvent materials
and their concentration, molecular weight, and spin coating parameters.34 Due to the
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small physical dimensions of the photoactive layer, absorbing a large range of wavelengths of the solar spectrum is crucial to enhancing the efficiency of organic photovoltaic devices. Since a high electromagnetic field strength exists in the vicinity of excited
surface plasmons, the inclusion of plasmonic metal nanostructures enhances the solar
energy absorption of organic materials. The resonance wavelength depends strongly
on the metal nanostructure’s dimensions, geometry, and dielectric properties. Contact
electrodes represent a high interface barrier and source of contact resistance in organic
solar cells. An organic cell’s film is formed, usually on an indium-tin-oxide anode, either by spin coating or thermal evaporation deposition in a high vacuum. Since the
optimisation of the metal-electrode Schottky barrier with PCBM and P3HT is likely to
improve device performance, whichever process is employed needs to provide an anode
surface that consistently presents a minimal interface barrier to the organic layer. Thermal annealing, solvent annealing, or vapor annealing processes optimize the nanomorphology of the active layer by sharply increasing hole mobility in the P3HT phase.35
The power efficiency of bulk heterojunction devices has seen continuous increases
due to the synthesis of innovative low band-gap semiconducting polymer materials and
morphology enhancement of the photoactive layer. Organic photovoltaic devices now
achieve power conversion efficiencies up to 9.3%. This efficiency however, is still low
compared with inorganic counterparts.
The efficiency of monolithic tandem stacks of solar cells has reached 41.6%. An efficiency of 42.7% has been achieved by partitioning the solar spectrum and doing energy
conversion with five separate cells. Silicon and germanium nanostructures have potential application in photovoltaic devices including all-silicon tandem solar cells and hot
carrier solar cells.
Intermediate-band solar cells have been proposed for achieving energy conversion
efficiencies in monolithic devices comparable to those for tandem solar cell stacks.
There are multiple designs possible with the performance of the low band gap combinations that improve as concentration increases. Intermediate-band solar cells perform
differently under various concentrated spectra due to absorption disparities between
bands. In spectral up-conversion devices infrared solar energy photons are absorbed
and re-emitted photons are energised at the band gap that can be absorbed by a photovoltaic cell.
Concentrating photovoltaics are currently undergoing considerable commercial
development.36 With high concentration of incident solar energy certain types of solar cells exhibit high efficiency resulting in a much smaller cell area per unit output.
High solar concentration is achieved usually by optical systems comprised of mirrors or
lenses or, sometimes, both. At concentration ratios above two, to be effective, all optical
systems must track the Sun’s azimuthal motion. The latter requires moving parts that
incur maintenance and replacement costs that could adversely affect economic viability
or curtail useful system life. Several alternative approaches have therefore been envisaged for high concentration without the need for solar tracking.
Quantum dots can be used for luminescent concentration of diffuse solar energy,37
by choosing quantum dots that absorb in the near infrared to provide a good match
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to the solar spectrum while avoiding significant reabsorption losses.38 Low quantum
yields and optical losses have limited the performance of this type of device.
Concentrating most of the solar spectrum from all incident angles without tracking
may be achievable using a lens fabricated from metamaterials.39 The latter are polymer-based nano/micro structured materials from whose materials and shapes arise;
negative or extremely large electromagnetic permeability, permittivity, and refractive
indices.
The use of multiple differently-oriented layers of materials that can switch from
being transparent to being specularly reflective to form a single solid immobile solar
tracking system.40 The challenge here is to maintain each switched slate without significant use of energy.
In many climates, solar energy devices experience wide variations of ambient temperature on both a daily and annual basis. They are also frequently subject to rain, dust,
snow, high humidity, strong winds, and atmospheric pollutants depending on location.
Devices fail due to manufacturing defects, random accidents, and environmental exposure. The prevalence of each of these over a cell’s life is shown in Figure 5.3.
For laminated photovoltaic cells, the principle exposure failure mechanism is delamination. Damage is usually caused by moisture penetrating through small cracks in
an edge seal or, much more slowly, by water diffusing through front surface materials.41

Figure 5.3. Illustrative Failure Rates Over Time for Photovoltaic Cells. Not to Scale.
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Ethyl Vinyl Acetate (EVA) is the most common encapsulating material. However, thermal expansion and contraction of the EVA with diurnal variations in PV temperature
causes the encapsulation integrity to fail. Without appropriate treatment, EVA can also
discolor with a brown opaqueness due to exposure to the UV component of insolation.
One approach that may prolong device life is to reduce the impact of some of the factors
driving delamination. Delamination behaviors are complex even under controlled laboratory conditions.42 For example, with innovative multi-layer films developed to obviate
the problems inherent in the use of EVA, it has been found that delamination between
the film layers of the same or very similar materials was more likely than delamination
between dissimilar materials. Thermal management techniques are employed to maintain PV closer to ambient temperature to avoid temperature-dependent power output
reductions. Phase change materials43 have been used for this purpose. As a consequence
the amplitude of temperature cycling endured by a PV cell is reduced with less concomitant thermal expansion and contraction. Ultimately the choices regarding system
durability are determined by economic factors. Cost premiums may be associated with
the quality of manufacture, appropriate selection of optimum materials, good design,
exemplary operation, and scheduled maintenance. Periodic system replacement may be
a preferred economic decision over selecting a more expensive system with a considerably longer life. The converse, however, may also be valid. Some PV system operations
are guaranteed some revenue via a feed-in-tariff that pays back the amortised initial
investment and operating costs over a specified time period. For such installations, after
that period, any revenue is profit. In such circumstances long-term durability becomes
very important! There may thus be scenarios where design-for-durability becomes a
strong driver for innovation in PV technology. This may be seen as, an as yet un-investigated, opportunity for nanotechnology applications. For example, nanoparticles
could be used as markers to identify points of local cell failure requiring repair. More
fundamentally, an interesting and relevant question for future research is; is there the
potential to employ nanoscale self-assembly to devise self-repairing PV cells?

5.5. Thermoelectrics
5.5.1. Overview and Motivation
Currently, photovoltaics and wind energy provide about one percent of total world energy. Biomass accounts for about eleven percent, used both in liquid fuels and, primarily, in the form of traditional biomass for cooking and heating in rural regions.44 Most
projections concur that it will take some time before a significant share of our energy is
derived from renewables. More than ninety percent of primary energy is first converted
to heat. Currently only twelve percent of the primary energy consumed in the world
is transformed to end-use applications.45 This is known as exergetic efficiency, a metric
that takes into account the ability of chemical or nuclear energy sources to do useful
work. In other words, one could argue we are wasting eighty-eight percent of the energy in the form of heat. The basic technologies behind our primary energy conversion
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devices (such as internal combustion engines and power plants) have been around for
more than a century. The efficiencies are improving, but more can be done. As we try
to increase energy efficiency and reduce the overall consumption of fossil fuels, we
should explore opportunities to improve conversion of heat into electricity. That said,
it is worth noting that the waste heat mentioned above varies greatly in terms of its potential value. It is notable that there are currently no commercially available large-scale
waste heat recovery systems.
Thermoelectric (TE) power describes a solid-state means of directly converting
energy in the form of heat to electricity and vice versa. If a temperature difference is
maintained between the two ends of a conductor, higher thermal energy carriers will
diffuse to the cold side, creating a potential difference that can be used to power an
external load. This is a simplification of the Seebeck effect, which is the operative principle behind thermocouples. In addition to a large Seebeck coefficient, a high performance thermoelectric generator should minimize parasitic losses (low heat conduction
between hot and cold junctions and low Joule heating as charge carriers move in the
material). The energy conversion efficiency of thermoelectric devices is directly related
to the thermoelectric figure of merit for the subject material, ZT = S2σT/κ, where S is the
Seebeck coefficient, σ is the electrical conductivity, T is the absolute temperature, and
κ the thermal conductivity.46 Abraham Ioffe introduced the concept of the thermoelectric figure-of-merit in the 1940s and developed some of the first thermoelectric generators to power radios during World War II. Since the working fluid is electrons or holes,
thermoelectric devices have many unique advantages over conventional energy conversion systems including: no moving parts or vibration, high reliability and durability,
compactness, and easy control.47
In the 1950s, silicon germanium and lead telluride alloys with ZT ≈ 0.5–1 at 500–
1000°C were developed. This was used to make radioisotrope thermoelectric generators
(RTG) with energy conversion efficiency of four to six percent for deep space satellites
and remote power generation for unmanned systems.48 For satellites that travel far from
the sun (beyond Saturn), solar radiation is too low for photovoltaic cells to be effective.
Deep space missions have been using RTGs to power the imaging and communication
systems. In such applications, efficiency, cost and radiation decay were obviously subordinate concerns to reliability and longevity. The main commercial success of thermoelectric technology has been in Bi2Te3-based Peltier modules to cool electronic and
optoelectronic devices. For such small and localized applications, mechanical compressors do not scale well whereas these modules, operating under the Peltier effect,
with modest coefficient-of-performance but fast responses, have been quite effective.
Thermoelectric coolers are widely used for temperature stabilization of semiconductor
lasers and for sub-ambient cooling of infrared detectors or CCD cameras.49 Recently,
thermoelectric car seat climate control systems have been commercialized50 and applications for picnic beverage cooling is expanding. In the last ten to fifteen years, additional applications such as vehicle exhaust waste heat recovery51 have been actively
studied. In addition to niche applications, there is a huge potential for distributed power
generation in poor countries. There are many communities who cannot afford the cost
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of power plants and an electric grid. A small amount of household electricity produced
by thermoelectric modules in cooking stoves52 or solar thermal systems53 could improve
the quality of life significantly. Consider the availability of reading lights after dusk in
and otherwise “off-grid” community, as one of many examples.
If ZT is greater than three to five, the thermoelectric device can be competitive
with traditional mechanical energy conversion systems. There is no fundamental limit
on how large the thermoelectric figure-of-merit can be. When ZT goes to infinity, the
efficiency of the thermoelectric system converges to the Carnot limit (at zero output
power) or Curzon-Ahlborn limit (efficiency at maximum output power).54 The improvement in the efficiency of thermoelectric energy conversion has been slow because all the
material properties comprising ZT are coupled, and it is extremely difficult to enhance
one property without affecting another. Recent advances in nano-engineered material
properties have enabled breakthroughs for the enhancement of thermoelectric materials beyond ZT ≈ 1. This has been possible since we have a better microscopic understanding of heat and current transport in materials and we have the means to make
artificial material composites with atomic building blocks. In the following we summarize some of the recent advances in this field.

5.5.2. Nanostructured Thermoelectric Material
A major breakthrough was the theoretical prediction of a large ZT enhancement in
quantum wells and wires by Hicks and Dresselhaus in 1993.55 This was based on the
quantum confinement of electrons (or holes) enhancing the Seebeck coefficient and the
electrical conductivity.56 While this has not been demonstrated to improve the efficiency
of thermoelectric generators or the cooling of Peltier modules, Hicks and Dresselhaus’
paper was an important publication as it introduced researchers to the potential of
nanostructuring. There are several reasons why it is hard to improve the thermoelectric
power factor of quantum wells or wire materials.57 We live in a three-dimensional world
and any quantum confined structure should be imbedded in barriers. These barriers
are electrically inactive but they add to thermal heat loss between the hot and the cold
junctions. Sharp features in density-of-states of low dimensional nanostructures also
disappear quickly as soon as there is size non-uniformity in the material.58 Researchers
have revisited the large thermoelectric power factor in extremely small quantum wells
or wires and they point out that the actual improvement in the thermoelectric power
factor “per conduction channel” is only twelve to forty percent.59 This work also derives
a minimum packing density for low dimensional thermoelectric material (even with
ideal infinite barrier confinement) to have any improvement compared to the bulk.
It has also been proposed to use hot electron filtering to enhance the Seebeck coefficient.60 The goal is to have potential barriers that “selectively” scatter cold electrons so
that the contribution of electrons with energies larger than the Fermi level to electrical
conductivity is significantly larger than the ones with energy below the Fermi level. This
creates a metal-like electrical conductor with a large Seebeck coefficient. A similar concept can be applied to holes. The difficulty is in synthesizing metal/semiconductor nanocomposites with appropriate sizes on the order of an electron mean-free-path and with
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adequate barrier height (on the order of the thermal energy, kBT, where kB is the Boltzmann
coefficient and T the absolute temperature) for electrons moving in a three-dimensional
material.61 Based on this concept, microrefrigerators on a chip have been demonstrated
for localized cooling.62 The estimated enhancement in the thermoelectric power factor
(~20%) was offset by the increase in the lattice thermal conductivity.63
The rock salt-structured nitrides, including semiconducting ScN and metallic TiN
and ZrN, have been investigated as a potential system in which energy filtering could be
achieved at high temperatures for power generation applications. As a class, these materials also offer exceptionally high thermal and chemical stability, with melting points
typically above 2500°C and a high degree of oxidation resistance at elevated temperatures. Preliminary study focused on ScN/(Zr,W)N semiconductor/metal superlattices
grown by reactive sputter deposition.64 The room temperature thermal conductivity is
as low as 2W/m-K.65 A high Seebeck coefficient of 840 μV/K has been measured combining the transient I-V measurement and thermal imaging.66 This system has the potential
to reach ZT values higher than two at temperatures above 1000 K.
Most of the recorded ZT values greater than 1.5 in the last ten years have been
achieved by reducing the lattice thermal conductivity by increasing interface and boundary scattering of phonons in the nanostructured materials. For example, select semimetal/semiconductor nanocomposites showed enhanced ZT~1.3 at 800 K due, mainly, to
the increased mid and long-wavelength phonon scattering by a few nm-sized nanoparticles.67 Another recent demonstration showed a large power factor enhancement in
Tl-doped PbTe at high temperatures up to 770 K, and attributed this enhancement to
the distorted density of states by the resonant level inside the valence band of PbTe.68
Other studies pointed out the important of convergence of bands in e.g. PbTe1− xSex and
similar high ZT’s have been achieved.69 At elevated temperatures, near 600 K or higher,
several PbTe-based nanostructured materials showed ZTs as high as 1.5 or even 2.2.70
The material system, AgPbmSbTe2+m, also known as LAST-m, becomes spontaneously
nanostructured when cooled from the melt, which helps reduce the thermal conductivity.71 The strain field created by nano-inclusions in these material systems is believed
to effectively scatter phonons to reduce the thermal conductivity. The (PbSnTe)x(PbS)1-x
system is phase-separated into PbTe-rich and PbS-rich regions, which become coherent nanostructures suppressing the lattice thermal conductivity. A ZT~1.5 at 640 K
was reported for this material system of n-type with x ~ 0.08.72 The n-type La-doped
Ag2Te-PbTe system has nano-scale (50–200 nm) Ag2Te precipitates formed in PbTe, and
showed ZT~1.5 at 775 K.73 Skutterudites and clathrates have complex cage-like crystal
structures with voids in which rattler atoms are inserted to effectively scatter acoustic phonons.74 CoSb3-based filled skutterudites such as p-type LaFe3CoSb12, and n-type
CeFeCoSb12 showed ZT > 1 at 800 K and higher.75 Recently, Czochralski-grown clathrate Ba8Ga16Ge30 showed ZT~1.6 at 1100 K.76 Beyond 1000 K, SiGe has long been known
to be a good thermoelectric material, and its ZT is typically 0.5 ~0.6 at 1100 K. After
nanostructuring by hot pressing and ball milling, the ZT of p-type B-doped SiGe was
improved to 0.7 at 1000 K.77 ZT~1.3 at 1200 K was also reported for nanostructured
n-type SiGe.78 Two-phase SiGe-SiP nanocomposites had ZT > 1 at 1200 K, and this ZT
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enhancement was attributed to the modulation doping effect that enhanced mobility
and thus electrical conductivity.79
Questions have been raised about some of the recently reported experimental results and theoretical concepts. This is expected for a rapidly growing and dynamic field,
especially since accurate thermoelectric characterization techniques for small size samples are being developed concurrently. A major shortcoming for new researchers entering the thermoelectric field is the fact that there are very few papers which clearly
describe major unsolved controversies.

5.5.3. Material Cost and Efficiency
Recently, a paper entitled An Inconvenient Truth about Thermoelectrics made the
claim that “Despite recent advances, thermoelectric energy conversion will never be
as efficient as steam engines. That means thermoelectrics will remain limited to applications served poorly or not at all by existing technology.”80 An analysis of the
potential of thermoelectrics that focuses only on efficiency values is not complete. In
fact, an analysis that considers optimizing the entire TE power generation system cost
could lead to the exact opposite conclusion. While it is true that thermoelectrics are
not likely to replace conventional Rankine cycle steam engines or Stirling engines in
the near future, they could play a big role by enabling direct conversion of heat into
electricity, especially for topping cycle or waste heat recovery applications. This is because the energy cost may be more important than the efficiency of energy conversion
alone. For example, many groups are working on polymer solar cells even though
their efficiency is much smaller than the multi-junction crystalline cells. It becomes a
value judgment and optimization exercise.
A key factor to study with respect to the cost/efficiency trade off in thermoelectric
power generation, is the optimization of the TE module together with the heat source
and the heat sink81 estimated the cost of material in a TE power generation system
($/W) as a function of heat source power density for different material properties, (ZT),
as well as module design, (fractional area coverage of TE elements). It was shown that
the module design plays a key factor in determining the cost of waste heat recovery
thermoelectric systems. It is possible to bring down the material cost from $1–2/W to
$0.01–0.02/W without improving ZT, if a thin film module with 100s of microns thick
elements and low fractional area coverage (5–10%) with small parasitics (such as low
contact resistances) can be developed.82
The thermal disparity between the fuel combustion temperature ~2250 K (adiabatic) and the high pressure steam temperature up to 800–900 K or high temperature
combustion gases, results in a large thermodynamic losses in coal or gas turbine power
plants. While some technologies exist for recuperating a portion of this lost heat, a
solid-state thermoelectric placed on top of a conventional cycle may prove an effective
means of directly producing additional electrical power. By selecting the right materials
for the TE generator for high temperature operation, the overall energy efficiency will
increase. Recent study shows that, for example, the combined TE/steam turbine topping
generator system provides a lower energy cost for any period of operational life.83 This
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study shows that the efficiency of the combined system increases by 10% at an interface
temperature of about 800 K between the two stages for a TE material with ZT ~ 1.

5.6. Nanotechnology in Other Energy Applications
5.6.1. Biofuels
Nanotechnology can underpin biofuel development,84 for example by using the unique
nanoscale properties of biological molecules and surface area to volume ratios to create
energy from agriculture products and waste. Photosynthesis is nature’s example, using
the sun’s energy to convert water into hydrogen ions, electrons, and oxygen. Artificial
photosynthesis is an alternative requiring an antenna (to absorb sunlight) or oxidizing
center (to produce electrons) and a reducing center (to produce fuels). Nanotechnology
is used in the antenna section to increase the surface area to volume ratio for increased
energy absorption and reduce the travel distance of photo-generated minority carriers.85 Graphitic petals86 have recently been produced, providing yet another unique
nanostructure from which to possibly specifically tune the capture of the energy spectrum. In the reducing and oxidizing centers, iron oxide nanoparticles combined with
water,87 nanotube arrays and various other nanostructured materials have been used to
reduce water and CO2 to fuels such as methane and other hydrocarbons.88

5.6.2. Energy Storage Devices
Energy storage and transport90 are critical research areas required to enable mobile and
long term integration of many new energy technologies. Batteries are currently the most
common form of electrical energy storage and nanotechnology has the potential to influence every aspect of current designs (cathode, anode and electrolyte.) Energy density,
currently a barrier to wider adoption of batteries, and stability may benefit the most from
the unique properties of nanotechnology. New electrode materials91 are being developed
with nanostructures including; nanocarbons, alloys, and oxides to provide greater surface
area to volume ratios for increased reaction and faster energy transport. Vanadium pentoxide (V2O5) is being studied for its unique properties and stable form. While controlled
and large scale synthesis of nanostructured materials continues to be a challenge, Parida
et al.92 recently described V2O5 nanoflowers with ferromagnetic and optical properties at
room temperature. Specifically for lithium-ion technology, transitional metal oxides are
reviewed providing high theoretical capacities for conversion reaction.93 Within the battery electrode, nanoparticles are being used to enhance the ionic conductivity and storage
capacity. Nanomaterials are even being considered for the overall structural integrity of
batteries due to their enhanced mechanical characteristics.
Today’s advanced lithium-ion battery technologies have made dramatic inroads in
commercial applications such as portable electronic and rechargeable devices. However, due to cost, weight and other factors, they are not yet considered practical for
electric vehicles or intermittent energy sources, i.e., solar, wind, tidal. Alternative forms
of energy storage are thus in great demand; including biochemical, chemical, or elec89
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trochemical capacitors.94 Nanotechnology is sure to factor in to the development of the
energy storage systems of the future.
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Chapter 6
Biofuel Prospects in an Uncertain World
wALLY tYNER AND Richard A. Simmons

Abstract
Biofuels have grown from almost nothing in the mid-1970s to over 10 percent of gasoline
consumption in some countries. Biofuels are essentially a government created industry
in that when they were introduced, they required government subsidies to compete with
fossil fuels. Governments saw several benefits for biofuels: 1) reducing dependence on
foreign oil and reducing supply disruptions such as those of the 1973 and 1979 oil crises;
2) providing income and employment in rural areas; 3) improving air quality through
lower tailpipe emissions; and 4) reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions because CO2
is sequestered during the production of the feedstock. In some measure, biofuels have
contributed to achieving all these objectives, but questions have been raised regarding the
effectiveness of biofuels in doing so, as well as on unintended consequences of large-scale
biofuel production. We will explore all these issues in this chapter, and our scope will
remain limited to liquid vehicle fuels. First, we provide a brief history of biofuels production. Then we explore the implications of the development of first generation biofuels
with emphasis on corn ethanol in the United States. Most of the chapter is devoted to
second-generation biofuels; that is, biofuels produced from cellulosic feedstocks including
crop residues such as corn stover, dedicated energy crops such as miscanthus and switchgrass, tree plantations such as poplar or willow, and forest residues. The early hope was
that cellulosic biofuels would be developed fairly quickly, and that first generation biofuels
(mainly corn and sugarcane ethanol) would plateau with much of the growth coming
from second-generation biofuels. However, to date there has been almost no commercial
development of cellulosic biofuels. Much has been invested in research, but most of the
development has been at the pilot or demonstration plant level. We will explore five areas
of uncertainty facing potential investors in cellulosic biofuels. Finally, we will summarize
the major challenges and opportunities for cellulosic biofuels.
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6.1. Biofuels History
Biofuels have been a part of the global energy picture since the mid-1970s. Brazil was the
first major producer beginning in 1975 with the launch of its PROALCOOL program,
which provided subsidies for sugarcane ethanol production.1 This policy was mainly
motivated by the 1973 oil crisis, and Brazil saw sugarcane ethanol as a means of becoming more independent from the rest of the world for liquid fuel. Production began in
the United States in the early 1980s, stimulated by the National Energy Conservation
Policy Act of 1978.2 That legislation initially provided a subsidy for ethanol of $0.40 per
gallon, and the subsidy continued at a level between $0.40 and $0.60 per gallon until it
finally expired at the end of 2011. Similarly, European Union countries began biofuel
production supported by government subsidies about the same time.
Over time, as biofuel production grew, governments in all three regions moved
from reliance on subsidies as the major policy instrument to mandates. In Brazil and
the EU, targets are established for blending certain percentages of biofuels in the total
fuel mix. In the US, there is a volumetric mandate known as the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS),3 which sets steadily increasing volume requirements for different types of
biofuels through 2022. By that terminal year, thirty-six billion gallons of ethanol equivalent are prescribed, of which twenty-one billion will need to come from sources other
than grains or corn starch as indicated in Figure 6.1. The EPA has been forced to waive
most of the cellulosic biofuel portion of the RFS every year because the biofuels do not
exist, and will need to continue cellulosic biofuel waivers through 2022, as conversion
facilities could not be developed at the pace of increase included in the RFS. Thus, maintaining the mandated trajectory is in serious doubt.

Figure 6.1. EISA 2007 RFS Mandated Volumes Through 2022.4
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The main difference between a mandate and a subsidy is that the cost of a subsidy is
directly born by the government budget, whereas the cost of a mandate is born by consumers through higher costs of the blended fuels. That is, presumably the mandated product (biofuel in this case) would not be used in the absence of the mandate; otherwise,
there would be no need for the mandate. Thus, the projected higher cost of the biofuel
is passed on to consumers through higher cost of the blended fuel. In a sense the cost is
not visible to consumers, whereas the government budget cost of a subsidy is very visible.
This visibility became more of an issue as the subsidized volumes grew over time. Today
the dominant biofuels policies are mandates and not subsidies. The EU targets were set
in the 2009 directive on mandated use of renewable energy, which requires ten percent of
transportation fuels to be renewable by 2020.5 Most authorities expect the liquid fuels part
of that to be around 5.6 percent, with electric vehicles and other options taking the rest.6
Estimates drawn from a variety of sources indicate that the United States, Brazil and the
European Union account for nearly ninety percent of global biofuels production, which
today remains almost exclusively first generation. Small but increasing quantities of biofuels also have been developed in other regions as indicated in Figure 6.2.

6.2. First Generation Biofuels
Ethanol production capacity has grown substantially in both Brazil and the United
States. For the past decade, most of the automobiles sold in Brazil have been flex-fuel,
meaning that they can consume any blend of ethanol and gasoline. This provides great
flexibility both for consumers and government policy. For example, in a recent year,
there was a poor sugarcane harvest in Brazil, and at the same time world sugar prices
were abnormally high. The Brazilian Government responded by lowering the mandated
ethanol average blend level first from twenty-five to twenty percent and then down to
eighteen percent. The level was subsequently increased again when conditions improved
for sugar supply. Consumers in Brazil can choose whatever percentage of ethanol they
want (above the minimum mandated) because many gasoline stations are equipped

Figure 6.2. Global Share of Biofuels Production, 2010 (Energy Equivalent Basis).
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with what are called blender pumps. Ethanol contains about two-thirds as much energy
as gasoline, so ethanol must be priced no more than sixty-seven percent of gasoline
price to induce consumers to use ethanol blends. If the ethanol price is below that fraction, consumers may opt for high ethanol blends or even pure ethanol. Thus, because
Brazil made a decision to invest in flex-fuel vehicles and flexible fuel dispensing infrastructure a decade ago, their supply chain today is quite flexible.
The US is not in that situation. In the early 1980s, the US decided on a ten percent
ethanol blend as the standard, and it became known as gasohol. All vehicles sold were
required to be able to use the ten percent blend, also known as E10. A second blend of up
to eighty-five percent ethanol (E85) was also developed, and to consume this fuel requires
flex-fuel vehicles. To date very few of the vehicles on the road in the US are flex-fuel (about
11 million out of 250 million). Also, E85 often is not cost competitive with E10 on an
energy basis, which determines mileage, so most ethanol is consumed as E10. This was
not a problem until recently. Today the US consumes about 133 billion gallons of gasoline
type fuel per year. At a ten percent blend, this means the maximum ethanol consumption
would be 13.3 billion gallons. The RFS mandates consumption of fifteen billion gallons of
conventional (corn-based) ethanol per year by 2015, and the US has very nearly that much
ethanol production capacity today. Thus the maximum ethanol consumption given the
E10 blend level (called the blend wall) is less than the existing production capacity.7 The
blend wall is the most important issue faced by the US ethanol industry today. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2012 gave final approval for increasing the blend
limit to fifteen percent, but the approval was only for vehicles built since 2001. About onethird of the US vehicle fleet is older, and is not approved to use the E15 blend. Despite the
fact that the newer vehicles account for a greater proportion of the miles driven, fueling
stations have been reluctant to switch to E15 because they would still lose a significant
fraction of their customer base. Thus, at present, the blend wall is binding, and is a major
impediment to growth of the ethanol industry.
The European biofuels market is largely for biodiesel, not ethanol. Biodiesel can
generally be blended up to twenty percent without adverse effects. With more than
ninety percent of the energy content of petroleum-derived diesel, biodiesel impinges
vehicle range substantially less than bioethanol does in comparison with gasoline. In
this case, the major impediment to biodiesel development is the high cost of the raw
vegetable oil, commonly from rapeseed, soybeans, or palm.
Clearly one of the objectives of government support for biofuels was increasing
farm and rural incomes.8 However, an unintended consequence has been that the
biofuel demand for corn, sugar, and oilseeds has contributed to higher global prices
for these commodities. Biofuels are not the only driver of higher commodity prices,
but they are important.9 Agricultural commodity prices have increased because of increased global demand for commodities due partly to dietary transition especially in
developing countries. As income rises, people demand more animal protein in their
diets, which increases demand for animal feed ingredients. In the decade prior to 2008,
global consumption of agricultural commodities grew faster than global production in
all but one year. That trend meant that global stocks to use ratios were quite low going
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into 2008, the first large commodity price surge. Also, there were regional production
shortfalls that accentuated the shortage. Furthermore, the United States dollar fell sixty-seven percent between 2002 and 2008, which led to increased prices for commodities
sold in that currency. Then, on top of these important drivers, there was an increase in
use particularly of corn for biofuels.
For the biofuels driver, we need to distinguish between biofuels demand driven by
government mandates or subsidies and demand driven by the higher price of crude oil
and gasoline. In 2008, we estimated that the surge in crude oil price actually had been
more important as a driver of increased ethanol demand for corn than had been the
government subsidy.
In 2011, there was another surge in many agricultural commodity prices. Our
analysis then indicated that the major drivers were a concurrent increase in Chinese
demand for soybean imports and a surge in demand for corn for ethanol. Corn and
soybeans are generally grown in the same areas in the US, and the combination of these
two drivers led to a 189% increase in the acreage needed in the US to supply these two
demands between 2005 and 2010. Thus, a big part of the surge in commodity prices in
2011 was this perfect storm of demand surges.
We began 2012 with low stocks, and then were hit by the drought of 2012. The drought
caused agricultural commodity prices, especially corn, to surge again in 2012. This surge
led to calls for reduction or elimination of the US RFS for corn ethanol.10 However, US
policy is no longer a key driver of the corn ethanol industry. While government subsidies,
some of which have now expired, and the RFS were critical to the development of the industry, the economic reality today is that corn ethanol is cheaper per gallon than gasoline,
and blenders today have an economic incentive to continue blending ethanol even in the
absence of government mandates. This is true despite the fact that ethanol is more expensive on an energy basis, as most gasoline is sold as E10, and there is no competition on an
energy basis. Thus, removal or reduction of the RFS in 2012 or 2013 likely would have little
impact on the demand for corn for ethanol, and thus on the corn price.11
There is no doubt that urban consumers are adversely impacted by higher agricultural commodity prices (due to any cause), particularly in developing countries. However, there is another dimension to the higher prices that gets little attention. The higher
commodity prices can help increase rural incomes in developing countries.12 The World
Bank says seventy percent of the world’s poor live in rural areas and derive their primary livelihood from agriculture. To the extent that developing country farmers have
access to the higher commodity prices, their incomes could be increased and poverty
reduced. There is already evidence that cropland area has increased significantly in the
past six years mainly in developing countries with the higher commodity prices.13

6.3. Second Generation Biofuels
Second generation biofuels can be produced from a variety of advanced feedstocks including cellulosic sources, and perhaps eventually algae. Cellulosic feedstocks can be agricultural residues such as corn stover, wheat straw, or forest residues, or they can be dedicated
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energy crops such as miscanthus, switchgrass, poplar, and willow. These feedstocks can
be converted to biofuels via biochemical or thermochemical or hybrid processes. The end
product of biochemical conversion is typically ethanol. Thermochemical or hybrid conversion processes can produce a wide range of biofuels including green diesel, jet fuel, bio-gasoline, and others. Because of the blend wall discussed above and for many other reasons,
there is today much more interest in the conversion of cellulosic feedstocks to drop-in
biofuels that are more compatible with existing infrastructure and fuel supply chains.
Though extremely complicated to measure definitively, two indicative measures
have been used to assess the relative energy and emissions benefits of biofuels as compared with the petroleum fuels they replace. Overall energy ratio represents the ratio of
energy contained in a given quantity of finished fuel to the energy needed to produce
that same quantity of fuel. For example, it is estimated that corn ethanol has an approximate energy ratio in the range of about 1.3 or 1.6 to one,14 whereas estimates for sugarcane ethanol range from about five to one to greater than nine to one.15 The energy ratio
for sugarcane ethanol is favorable, but varies greatly depending on harvesting method
(such as manual vs. mechanized) and how efficiently agricultural residue (bagasse) is
converted to process steam and surplus electricity. Biodiesel produced from soy or rapeseed oil is estimated to have an energy ratio above two to one but below five to one.16
Advanced and cellulosic biofuels produced from a host of new pathways are striving to
exceed the energy ratio of the most energy efficient first generation biofuels, but this is
highly case sensitive and remains to be confirmed at commercial scales. It should be
noted that energy ratios alone do not tell the whole story. The form of energy is critical.
When solid biological feedstocks are converted into liquid fuels, the form of energy
becomes much more useful for the transportation system. Also, any transformation of
energy from one form to another (such as from crude oil to gasoline) involves a loss in
Table 6.1. Renewable Fuel Categories and GHG Thresholds as Defined in the Renewable
Fuels Standard.17
Renewable Fuel
Category

Minimum Lifecycle GHG
Reduction of Subject Biofuel
Category Relative to a Baseline
of Gasoline or Diesel

Conventional
Biofuel

20%

Biomass-Based
Diesel

50%

Cellulosic Biofuel

60%

Other Advanced
Biofuel

50%

Example
Starch feedstocks including
corn, sorghum, wheat
Biodiesel such as from soy
or rapeseed and non-ester
renewable diesel
Any fuel derived from cellulose, hemicellulose or lignin
non-food feedstocks
Any fuel derived from renewable feedstocks including
sugarcane ethanol
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energy. The point is that it becomes more useful energy. Electricity is more useful for
lighting than coal. To a real world marketplace then, it is not so much the joules themselves as the form of those joules that matters.
Another critical measure of a biofuel’s relative performance is reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as compared to gasoline or diesel fuels. This too is a complicated metric to pinpoint, however, in the context of the Renewable Fuels Standard,
the EPA has established key default criteria to help frame objective GHG targets for primary biofuel categories (Table 6.1). It is of note that the GHG emissions improvements
for cellulosic and advanced biofuels must exceed those of first generation biofuels to
qualify toward the US RFS volumetric requirements.
With the billions invested in biofuels research, substantial progress has been made in
advancing feedstock development and conversion processes for second-generation biofuels. In general, the economic reality is that cellulosic biofuels are not competitive with
fossil fuels on a market basis. Some form of government support is needed to elicit private
sector investment in cellulosic biofuels. In addition, there is considerable uncertainty facing potential investors in cellulosic biofuels.18 In the following section, we will examine
five major sources of uncertainty: future oil price, feedstock cost and availability, conversion technology yield and cost, environmental impacts, and government policy.

6.3.1. Oil Price Uncertainty
Anytime an investment is being considered, one must forecast future input and output
product prices to do an economic assessment of project viability. For biofuels, the key
price uncertainty is future oil prices since all the biofuel competing products are derived from crude oil. Furthermore, petroleum represents a major input to agricultural
crop production in the form of diesel fuel and fertilizer, and this impact is thereby manifested in biofuel feedstock costs. Each year, the US Department of Energy (DOE) forecasts future oil prices using a reference case, low oil price case, and high oil price case
(Figure 6.3).19 The DOE crude oil reference forecast for 2040 is $163/bbl. in 2011 dollars.
That value is somewhat less than our estimate of the crude oil price needed to render
cellulosic biofuels economic without government intervention. The low and high price
forecasts for 2040 are $75 and $237 respectively. DOE does not assign probabilities to
the three cases, but clearly the reference case is the one they deem most likely. A potential investor facing this huge range of possible prices and knowing that the breakeven
price is likely a bit higher than the reference case would be unlikely to make the investment. Future oil price uncertainty deters investment in cellulosic biofuels.

6.3.2. Feedstocks Cost and Availability
There are potential issues with both the quantity and cost of cellulosic feedstocks.
The good news, however, is that most of the assessments of feedstock availability have
determined that there is plenty of cellulosic material available in the US to meet and
exceed the RFS.21 The problem is one of cost. A National Research Council report
estimated feedstock costs ranging from $75 to $133 per dry ton.22 Generally, residues,
such as corn stover, wheat straw, and forest residues, had lower costs ($75–$92) than
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Figure 6.3. DOE (Brent) Crude Oil Price Forecasts 2013−2040.20
dedicated energy crops, like miscanthus, switchgrass, and short rotation woody crops
($89–$133). These costs are all much higher than had been expected a few years ago.
The high cost of feedstock is one of the major factors driving the projected higher cost
of biofuels. Current market conditions for certain dedicated crops are also not attractive to farmers, who can realize much greater returns from conventional agricultural
crops. In the near term, increased use of cover crops and agricultural residues for
feedstocks may help mitigate this challenge, as they afford farmers supplementary
profit from currently allocated and revenue-generating land.
Beyond cost, there are also some logistical issues involved in developing the feedstock supply system to biorefineries. For the dedicated energy crops, long term contracts
will be needed, as farmers would not be willing to make the up-front investment required to establish the crops without some assurance of a market for the product. Biorefineries also may want longer term contracts for crop residues as well to assure they have
a locked-in feedstock supply before investing the hundreds of millions of dollars in a
facility. To develop these long term contracts, appropriate risk sharing mechanisms will
have to be designed. In addition, most cellulosic biomass has low bulk density, meaning
its transportation over distances greater than one hundred miles can render biofuel
production economics no longer viable.

6.3.3. Conversion Technology Yield and Cost
Many of the conversion technologies briefly described below and in the accompanying sidebar on Second Generation Biofuel Conversion Technologies, have been shown to
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work in that they produce the desired biofuel. The question again is at what cost. Since
there is very little commercial production, and none without some form of government
support, we do not really know what cellulosic biofuels will cost. Our best estimate is
that using the range of feedstock prices above, biofuels are likely to cost at least $4.50/
gallon of gasoline equivalent. Costs could be considerably higher, or they could be lower
with a major technical breakthrough. This gasoline equivalent level implies crude oil
breakeven price of around $150/barrel.23
Some of the technologies being considered have been around for a very long time.
For example, the Fischer-Tropsch (FT) process of producing synthetic gas, which can
then be converted into a range of hydrocarbon products, was used by Germany during
World War II. At that time, German oil supply was restricted or cut off, and coal was
therefore converted into liquid fuels via the FT process. There are plants today that use
the process with coal or shale as a raw material, and the process has been proven with
biomass. Again, the question is one of cost. Biomass is not as energy dense as coal,
making the economic viability more sensitive to transportation and logistics. What is
more, experience has shown that the end fuel cost is high even using coal as a feedstock,
in part due to the large scale and high capital cost structure typical of a typical FischerTropsch gasification plant.

Second Generation Biofuel Conversion Technologies
As noted, great interest and expectations, but slow and costly development
characterize efforts to commercialize advanced biofuel technologies which rely
on non-food feedstocks and sustainable approaches. Recall that leading sources
of cellulosic biomass may include agricultural residue, wood waste, tree trimmings, switchgrass and miscanthus. An objective of biofuel innovators on this
frontier is to deliver energy balances, energy ratios and GHG reductions approaching or exceeding those typical of sugarcane ethanol, which is considered
an Advanced Biofuel by the EPA. Two leading conversion technologies are being
pursued via substantial public and private investments, and are summarized
briefly below:
Biochemical conversion involves a multi-step process beginning with the pretreatment of biomass with some combination of chemical agents and/or catalysts,
whose function is to begin breaking down the cellular structure of its three primary
constituents: cellulose, hemi-cellulose and lignin. Conditioning and enzymatic hydrolysis typically follow, which balance the pH and help free the sugars of the cellulose and hemi-cellulose. Finally, microorganisms such as yeasts and bacteria are
introduced to biologically convert these sugars into alcohols via fermentation. It
should be noted here that other low temperature, non-biological processing routes,
referred to simply as chemical conversion pathways represent viable technologies as
well. In these, catalytic and mechanical systems are the principle means of producing fuel from the sugars and intermediates in biomass. In the United States, several
demonstration or pre-commercial plants based upon variants of the biochemical
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conversion pathway are scheduled to come online in the 2013–2015 timeframe,
and assist in validating process parameters at scale. Major areas of technical uncertainty and continuing research and development include: feedstock variability, cost
and effectiveness of enzymes, production of enzymes at scale, fermentation processing parameters such as rates and yields, and process integration.24 None alone is
considered insurmountable, but interactions exist which can complicate and delay
technical and economic optimization.
Thermochemical conversion involves heating biomass in the absence of oxygen
or air, followed by extraction of hydrocarbons in either liquid (pyrolysis) or gaseous
(synthesis gas) form. In pyrolysis, the resultant decomposed biomass, or bio-oil can
be treated with chemical agents to fractionate the liquid molecules and be further
refined into an array of bioproducts, sugars, and cellulosic fibers. In gasification,
the resultant syn-gas composed of primarily hydrogen and carbon monoxide, is
reformed, cleaned, and conditioned to form the building blocks of synthetic hydrocarbon molecules. This technology is generally less sensitive to variations in quality
and type of biomass than biochemical pathways. At the same time, thermochemical
processes are extremely capital-intensive, so efficiency and yield are more dependent upon scale and location. Primary technical challenges focus on making use
of the full complement of molecules in the biomass, improving catalysts, and in
upgrading of synthetic hydrocarbons.25 Demonstration and pre-commercial scale
production facilities are pending in both the US and Europe to deliver advanced
biofuels via thermochemical pathways. The well-known Fischer-Tropsch process is
an example of a thermochemical conversion. Not limited to biomass, commercial
FT processes employ gasification to convert both coal and natural gas to liquids
such as CTL and GTL.
In a 2013 report, the IEA identified more than one hundred advanced biofuel
pilot, demonstration or commercial projects being pursued worldwide. Biofuels production from second-generation cellulosic sources in 2011 was estimated
at 137,000 tons, or about 0.15% of all biofuels currently produced. Though the
global output of second-generation biofuels has tripled since 2010, it remains far
below expectations due to project delays, closures, and a host of other technical and non-technical problems. If all known plants either announced or under
construction come to fruition, cellulosic biofuels would still comprise less than
one percent of all biofuels by 2018. Of the seventy projects for which data was
provided, forty-three were biochemical, twenty were thermochemical and seven
were chemical.26

6.3.4. Environmental Issues
First generation biofuels have been characterized as having environmental problems
such as increased soil erosion and chemical runoff due to the higher level of corn production necessary for ethanol production.27 Also, when corn is diverted from current
uses to ethanol production, most current needs, such as feeding animals, must still be
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met. That means corn or some substitute crop area must be increased somewhere in the
world. This increased area can result in deforestation or converting pasture to cropland.
Such land conversion releases greenhouse gases (GHG) rendering corn ethanol (and
other first generation biofuels) less attractive from the perspective of reducing GHGs.
Estimating these induced land use changes is very complicated, is uncertain, and is
controversial.
The environmental picture is somewhat different for second generation biofuels.
The environmental impacts likely differ depending on whether the feedstock is a residue or perennial crop. For residues, the main concern is the possibility of increased soil
erosion and loss of soil organic matter. For example, when corn stover is removed, it is
possible that soil erosion would increase as there would be less residue to hold the soil.
Similarly for organic matter, to the extent that residue added soil organic carbon (still
being debated), removing residue could reduce soil carbon. However, there are no land
use changes associated with residue use for feedstock as the residue is a co-product with
the crop being grown. For dedicated energy crops, we expect a reduction in soil erosion
and chemical runoff. Since the crops remain for ten years or more, they will hold soil
better than an annual crop. Also, little fertilizer is normally applied to the dedicated
crops, so there would be less runoff. In addition, the perennial crops provide wildlife
habitat. There is some concern with possible loss of biodiversity if most of the land surrounding a biorefinery were to be planted in one crop. There could be land use change
if substantial amounts of dedicated crops were used for biofuels, but likely, it would be
less than first generation crops.
It is likely that second-generation feedstocks would cause less of a food-fuel problem than first generation. However, at the end of the day, land is the limiting resource,
so even dedicated crops that are not consumed by humans use land that could be used
for livestock feed.

6.3.5. Government Policy
The final major uncertainty is government policy. In the US, EU, and Brazil, government
policies have changed over time. In Brazil, the required minimum blending level has
changed with evolving economic conditions. In the EU, the biofuel targets and associated
sustainability criteria change over time. Also, in the EU the renewable energy targets are
difficult to enforce, and the private sector cannot be assured they will be enforced.
In the US, the RFS for cellulosic biofuels has an out-clause that permits blenders to
purchase a credit from EPA and another advanced biofuel certificate in lieu of actually
blending the cellulosic biofuel. For example, in 2013 the EPA credit cost is $0.42, and an
advance biofuel blending certificate from sugarcane ethanol is about $0.77. So a blender
could avoid blending a gallon of cellulosic biofuel by paying about $1.19. In May 2013,
the wholesale price of gasoline was about $2.86 per gallon. If cellulosic gasoline is $4.50,
the blender would have to choose between buying the cellulosic gasoline and blending it
at a net cost of $4.50 – 2.86 = $1.64, or paying the $1.19 to avoid blending. Clearly under
these conditions, the blender would choose not to blend. In this case the RFS is not an
iron-clad mandate, and, in fact, turns out not to be a mandate at all. This out-clause in
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the RFS applies to cellulosic biofuels for any year in which EPA waives any part of the
RFS. In reality, EPA will be forced to waive some part of the cellulosic RFS every year
because the RFS grows faster than cellulosic capacity could possibly grow. Thus, there is
no binding cellulosic RFS in the US. With no effective government mandate for cellulosic biofuels, and cellulosic biofuels not yet competitive with fossil fuels on the purely
commercial market, it will be difficult to obtain investment and financing for plants.
Given this reality, what government policy options might get the industry moving?
In the US, the Department of Defense, most notably the Navy and Air Force, are keenly
interested in using renewable jet fuel for a significant fraction of their fleet.28 They are
motivated by both environmental factors and energy security. One policy mechanism
that could be used to help the military procure biofuels is a reverse auction. In a reverse
auction, firms bid for long term contracts to supply a fixed quantity of certified biofuel
to the military. For example, the bid request could specify fifty million gallons per year
delivered to Air Force Base X for the next fifteen years. Bidders would then estimate
their costs of supplying the biofuel and submit bids to the Air Force. The lowest priced
bid wins the contract. This mechanism reduces or eliminates uncertainty in several
ways. First, oil price uncertainty is eliminated because the firm has a fixed price contract regardless of what happens to the oil price. Second, presumably any firm bidding
would know their technology at least well enough to place a bid. Third, bidders would
presumably have provisional contracts with feedstock suppliers before entering a bid, so
they would know their feedstock cost. Thus, many of the uncertainties described above
would be reduced via the reverse auction. Suppose that the projected price of equivalent
fossil fuels over the 15 year period was $4.00 per gallon, and the winning cellulosic fuel
bid was $4.50. That amounts to an implicit subsidy for the biofuel of $0.50 per gallon,
but the subsidy is determined by a market mechanism—the reverse auction process. If
the government wants to get second-generation biofuel plants built, this mechanism
likely would be cost effective because the level of the subsidy is competitively determined in the market.

6.4. Conclusions: Major Challenges and Opportunities
First generation biofuels are now well established in Brazil, the US, and the EU. Sugarcane ethanol is likely to continue growing in Brazil as there are ample land resources
available to expand production even while ensuring the protection of sensitive areas
including the Amazon. In the US, the RFS level of fifteen billion gallons of conventional
corn ethanol is already in place, and the capacity is not expected to grow. This level of
corn ethanol has been one, but certainly not the only, contributor to higher agricultural
commodity prices. However, as corn yields increase over time, the fraction of the total
corn crop going to ethanol will begin to decline, and any price pressure brought on by
biofuels will begin to diminish.
For second-generation biofuels, the technology has been slow to develop. The US
RFS mandated level of cellulosic biofuel for 2013 is one billion gallons, but the EPA has
waived all but fourteen million gallons of that mandate because, by their estimate, only
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that much will be available in 2013 from all the small commercial and demonstration
plants in the US. The five uncertainties described above—oil price, feedstock, technology, environment, and government policy—have impeded investment in the industry.
Absent changes in government policy or significant technical breakthroughs, it is unlikely that we will see large scale development in the near future. There is plenty of biomass feedstock, the technologies are becoming increasingly viable, and environmental
issues can be managed. However, economics will have to improve to entice substantial
capital investment into the sector.
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Chapter 7
A Future for Nuclear Energy?
Lefteri H. Tsoukalas, Rong Gao, and Eugene D. Coyle

Abstract
Nuclear energy is an ultra-concentrated source of energy; one tonne of natural uranium is capable of producing forty-four million kWh of electricity. By comparison, to
produce the same amount of electricity would require twenty thousand tonnes of coal
or 8.5 million cubic meters of natural gas. Nuclear energy is meanwhile controversial in
the public arena, principally due to its related association to atomic weaponry, its operational safety records and the radioactive waste materials it produces. These concerns
have severely undermined the progress of nuclear power over recent decades. It is imperative today that we reevaluate these concerns in view of the emerging global energy
picture. In evaluating today’s energy production options, lifecycle environmental costs
must be equitably factored in. Such determinations may shift the economic feasibility
from conventional sources of energy, not least coal and gas, to other sustainable and renewable energy sources, including hydro, wind and solar energy. The case for including
nuclear power as a prominent aspect of the new energy paradigm has become a legitimate question deserving of analysis and exploration.
In this chapter the story of nuclear energy is explored commencing with an introduction to the essential elements in nuclear power generation followed by a brief historical
recall of nuclear energy, estimates of current generation status, nuclear energy safety,
nuclear accidents and their after impact, and challenges in dealing with nuclear waste
management. The future role for nuclear ‘fission’ energy is discussed with commentary
on the need for public engagement. This is followed by a brief review of research and
development in nuclear ‘fusion’ energy and the case for its future deployment.
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7.1. Introduction: Essentials of Nuclear Energy
Nuclear power is based on a fundamental principle discovered about seventy years ago.
The nucleus of a fissile isotope, such as uranium235 (235U) or plutonium239 (239Pu), becomes an unstable compound after capturing an extra neutron and it will promptly
split into two smaller fragments, releasing enormous amounts of heat in the process.
The heat is carried away by a coolant, typically water, gas or liquid metal, which subsequently converts water into steam that drives a turbine to generate electricity.
As with other material commodities, nuclear fuels experience three phases during
their life cycle: acquisition, utilization and disposal (Figure 7.1).
The diagram simplistically represents a best-case scenario for nuclear fuels in
which total recycling is achieved. In the ideal total recycling closed fuel-cycle scenario,
the generation and disposal of nuclear waste will no longer pose a major problem. In
practice, significant economic, technical and indeed political barriers remain to be addressed and overcome.
Uranium is the major fuel used in nuclear power reactors. Even though uranium
is a rather abundant resource in the earth, the fissile (useful) isotope, 235U, accounts for
only 0.7% of natural uranium; the majority is mostly 238U, a stable isotope. To achieve
the required efficiency to sustain nuclear fissions, commercial nuclear power reactors
use enriched uranium, with a 235U concentration of three percent and above.1 An enrichment process is therefore required to make natural uranium useable in nuclear
power reactors. Transforming natural uranium to nuclear fuel involves three typical
processes: mining, milling, and fabrication.
Uranium is a weakly radioactive element found in the Earth’s crust. It is approximately five hundred times more abundant than gold. Since 2008, the world’s total
identified uranium resources have grown by 12.5%, of which over 30% is located in
Australia. Uranium ore extracted from the earth is usually in the form of a compound
known as triuranium octoxide, U3O8. A leaching process using sulfur acid is needed to
separate uranium from other waste. The final product, generally referred to as yellow
cake, consists of at least eighty percent pure uranium, which is transported to a processing facility where nuclear fuel is fabricated.
Enrichment is necessary in nuclear fuel production owing to the fact that the uranium235 concentration in natural uranium ore is too low to be used in commercial nu-

Acquisition

Disposal

Figure 7.1. A Simplified Nuclear Fuel Cycle.
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clear power plants. Prior to the enrichment process, U3O8 is first converted to a gas form
of uranium, UF6. The objective of enrichment is to separate 235U from 238U, which can
be done by virtue of an obvious physical property: that 235U is slightly lighter than 238U.
In practice, there are two commonly used techniques: gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge. In the gaseous diffusion process, UF6 gas is pumped through layers of special
porous membranes. Since 235U is lighter, it tends to diffuse faster and will thus be separated from 238U at the end of the pipeline. Because the weight difference between these
two isotopes is small, hundreds of filtering membranes are required. The gas centrifuge
approach uses a large number of cylinders rotating at very high speeds. Since gas modules with uranium238 are heavier, the centrifugal force will drive them to the outer part
of the cylinders while uranium235 will remain closer to the center. Again, multiple units
are required to achieve a desirable level of enrichment.
The nuclear fuels used in power generating reactors are arranged in a bundle form
called a fuel assembly comprising hundreds of fuel rods. To produce a fuel rod, uranium
dioxide is first baked into cylinder ceramic pellets at temperatures up to 1400°C and
is then inserted into zirconium metal tubes. The dimensions and arrangements of fuel
rods are characteristic to specific reactor designs.
The working principle for a power generation nuclear reactor was discovered more
than seventy years ago and has remained largely unchanged during that time. As in
a fossil fuel plant, nuclear fuels are burned to produce heat through nuclear fission,
rather than a chemical combustion process. The fission of the uranium235 nucleus produces two smaller fragments, called fission products, of two to three free neutrons and
some gamma rays. The total mass of the fission products is smaller than the mass of the
original uranium nucleus; the loss in the mass appears as kinetic energy of the fission
products, typically 200 MeV (or 3.2 × 10−11 J) per fission event.
If all conditions are favorable, the free neutrons released during the initial (first
generation) fission event may be subsequently captured by other fissile nuclei which in
turn trigger further fissions. If at least one such event happens on average, a sustainable
chain reaction is achieved. Regulating the neutron population is crucial in controlling
the operation of a nuclear reactor. This is achieved primarily through the use of control
rods. Control rods are comprised of material that can absorb neutrons very efficiently,
such as graphite.
As the fission process progresses, fissile materials are continuously consumed and
fission products build up inside the fuels. Some fission products have high neutron absorption capacity and will reduce the number of free neutrons available to the chain
reaction process. This eventually leads to a situation where fission cannot be sustained.
At this point, the reactor has to be shut down and refueled. A burn-up factor is used to
measure the quantity of fuel that has been consumed. The burn-up factor is usually expressed as the total thermal energy generated per unit mass, typically in gigawatt days
per metric ton of enriched uranium (GWd/tU). The average designed burn-up for second-generation reactors is about forty GWd/tU. Later technologies in fuel design have
improved this number upwards to sixty GWd/tU and higher. A higher burn-up allows
longer operation cycles and greatly improves in both cost and safety.

170

Tsoukalas, Gao, and Coyle

Nuclear Fuel Disposal: Once removed from their reactors, nuclear fuels become spent
fuels. They are sometimes incorrectly labeled as waste; but in fact, more than ninety-seven
percent of the fissionable material is still contained within. Nuclear fission chain reactions
cease from the moment of reactor shutdown, however the nuclear fuels remain highly
radioactive. The main radiation comes from two sources: fission products and actinides.
The fission of the uranium nucleus creates two smaller nuclei, called fission products. The resultant nuclei are normally unstable and will undergo beta decay to more
stable nuclei, releasing beta or gamma radiation. One possible reaction is the following:
235

U + n → 236U → 140Xe + 94Sr + 2n

Most of the fission products have very short half-lives. Xenon140 has a half-life of
fourteen seconds and Strontium94 a half-life of seventy-five seconds. Other possible fission products have longer half-lives and are called long-lived fission products (LLFP). For
example, Iodine131 has a half-life of eight days, while Cesium137 and Strontium90 of have
half-life of about thirty years. Long lived fission products pose a bigger environmental
hazard and need to be closely monitored. Nevertheless, most fission products have halflives of less than ninety years, making them relatively easy to handle. In fact, after forty
years, their radioactivity will have reduced to a thousandth of their original level.
Besides the fission products referred to above, nuclear spent fuels also contain actinides such as Plutonium239, Plutonium240, Americium241, Americium243, Curium245,
and Curium246, which are mainly produced by neutron capturing of Uranium238. Most
actinides have very long half-lives, typically thousands or millions of years, presenting
a gigantic challenge for long term storage of nuclear waste.
The existence of long-lived fission products and actinides demands careful handling of nuclear spent fuels. When they are initially discharged from the reactor, the
highly radioactive isotopes in the fuels are still decaying, thus generating enormous
amounts of heat that requires appropriate cooling. Current practice is to submerge the
spent fuels in pools of water. The water serves as both a coolant and as a layer of radiation shielding. After a minimum of one year of cooling inside the pool, the spent fuels
may be removed from the water and inserted into a gas-filled steel cylinder container,
called a cask. Following removal, there are two possible destinies for the spent fuels:
direct disposal or recycling. In the US, direct disposal is the only legal option. The spent
fuels would preferably be transferred to a permanent repository for long-term storage
but such repositories are not currently available.2 Spent fuels are therefore (temporarily)
stored at plant site locations. The direct disposal approach treats spend fuels as waste
and immediately creates a huge challenge for nuclear waste management since these
wastes need to be stored securely for at least one thousand years. Other countries, such
as the United Kingdom and France, have chosen the recycling approach to alleviate
the local waste management problem. The recycling of nuclear spent fuels takes place
in two steps. First, the small amount (three percent) of highly radioactive material is
separated and concentrated into a special glass which is stored securely. The remainder
of the spent fuels, consisting of most of the unused uranium and the newly generated
plutonium, can be reused to fabricate fresh fuel rods.
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7.2. History of Nuclear Engineering
The harnessing of nuclear energy was made possible by the discovery of the nuclear
fission reaction in 1938. German chemists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann observed
that when uranium nuclei are bombarded with neutrons they may split into smaller
fragments. They also estimated that the energy released during the reaction was about
two hundred MeV, which was later confirmed experimentally by Otto Frisch in 1939. In
addition, their research also showed that extra neutrons were created during the fission
process, indicating that a self-sustainable chain reaction might be possible if the newly
created neutrons could trigger further fission reactions.3
The mechanism of nuclear fission was further investigated by other scientists and
in a very short period of time some quite significant discoveries were made. First, it
was found that uranium235 had a better chance for a fission reaction than uranium238.
Second, slow neutrons (or thermal neurons) had higher probability of being captured
by the uranium nuclei than fast neutrons. Since the neutrons released from the fission
process have very high kinetic energy, they need to be slowed down using a moderator
to increase the potential for a chain reaction. Third, natural uranium contained only
0.7% of uranium235 and thus an enrichment process was necessary. These findings were
the base of using nuclear power. At that time, making atomic bombs was the primary
objective as World War II had just began.
However, peaceful utilization of nuclear power had never been overlooked. In fact a
group of scientists in Britain suggested in 1941 that besides building atomic bombs, nuclear fission could be used in a controlled fashion to produce useful heat. Following the
war, this option was pursued with intensified efforts. The first reactor used to produce
electricity was brought online in December 1951 in Idaho in the United States. Other
countries followed quickly. The Soviet Union put into operation the world’s first nuclear
power generator in 1954, a five gigawatt unit. These projects convincingly demonstrated
that peaceful utilization of nuclear power was feasible. The first fully commercial nuclear power plant was designed by Westinghouse in the US and commenced operation
in 1962. The Westinghouse unit was comprised of a pressurized water reactor (PWR)
with a capacity of 250 MWe. Since then nuclear power generation has significantly increased, with growth pattern illustrated in Figure 7.2.

7.3. Current Status of Nuclear Energy
Recent estimates by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reveal that annual generation of nuclear power is currently on a slight downward trend, decreasing 1.8% in 2011 to 2558 TWh. In 2009, nuclear energy accounted for approximately
13.5% of world electricity demand. IAEA reported a significant increase in projected
nuclear generating capacity. In 2009, 130 power reactors with net capacity of 150 GWe
(gigawatt electric) were planned. China is the largest growth country with an expected
fifty gigawatt nuclear installation by 2020. India is also planning a large increase, with
installation of up to twenty reactors by 2020. The contribution of nuclear energy to
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Figure 7.2. Nuclear Power Generation Since 1980.
electricity generation is significant and is likely to grow in terms of percentage contribution to increasing global energy demand. In December 2011, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission granted approval to Toshiba Corporation’s Westinghouse newest
reactor design (type AP1000), clearing the path for a sale of this reactor in the US and
a revival of domestic nuclear power construction. US utilities are seeking permission
to build up to twelve of the new reactors. In Germany, on the other hand, nuclear
power had accounted for twenty-three percent of national electricity consumption,
prior to the permanent shutdown of eight plants in March 2011. German nuclear
power commenced with development of research reactors in the 1950s and 1960s,
resulting in the first commercial plant going online in 1969. It has been high on the
political agenda in recent decades, with continuing debate regarding when the technology should be phased out. The topic received renewed attention due to the political
impact of the Russia-Belarus energy dispute in 2007 and following the Fukushima
nuclear accident in 2011.
According to IAEA, as of 2012, there are 435 nuclear power reactors in operation
with 370,049 MWe installed capacity.
Efficiency in electricity generation is of key importance and nuclear fission is by far
the most efficient source of energy. Nuclear fusion may result in even higher efficiency
than nuclear fission, should fusion prove to be controllable. An energy density logarithmic scale comparison, summarized in Figure 7.3, shows that uranium fuels are many
orders of magnitude higher than other fuels in terms of energy density.
Owing to its fuel energy density, a nuclear power reactor can operate without interruption for up to two years before refueling is required. High energy density also results
in lower fuel cost in energy production. The US Nuclear Energy Institute estimates that
for a coal-fired plant, seventy-eight percent of the cost is fuel, for natural gas eighty-
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Figure 7.3. Energy Densities of Major Fuel Sources.4 Uranium-N and Uranium-R Stand
for Natural Uranium and Reactor-graded Uranium, Respectively.

Enrichment,
$1132, 41%

Figure 7.4. Cost Components of Getting One Kilogram of UO2 in 2011.
nine percent and for nuclear a mere fourteen percent. A study by the World Nuclear
Association suggested that the cost of nuclear fuel to generate one kilowatt of electricity
was about $0.0077 USD in 2011. Their analysis indicated that enrichment of uranium
accounts for about half the cost (Figure 7.4). Lower percentage fuel cost makes nuclear
power largely resistant to market fluctuation.
One of the most significant advantages of nuclear power is that it is carbon emission
free. The commitment to low carbon economics makes the nuclear option cost attractive since other non-carbon free sources, such as coal-fired and gas-fired plants, will
necessitate development of more advanced (and hence more expensive) technologies
in order to achieve a reduced carbon emission footprint. An EIA report (Figure 7.5)
suggests that the nuclear power remains economically competitive among all possible
alternatives.
With low fuel cost and uninterrupted availability nuclear power can be a reliable
and predictable source for base-load electricity. Unlike other types of energy, electricity
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Figure 7.5. Total System Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources, 2016.5

Percentage %

is unique in that it cannot be stored efficiently. Generation and consumption must be
balanced at all times. Base-load power is the minimum requirement to meet this balance. Nuclear power meets the necessary requirements that base-load power be safe,
economically viable and reliable. In some countries nuclear power produces a significant portion of electricity (Figure 7.6). France, for example, generated more than seventy-seven percent of its electricity with nuclear power in 2011.

Figure 7.6. Countries with Nuclear Power Producing More Than 30% of Their Electricity in 2011.6
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7.4. Nuclear Energy Safety
Safety is of paramount concern in the construction and operation of all nuclear power
plants. Safety in careful processing and disposal of nuclear waste is also of critical importance. In this section, we discuss how to achieve these goals in practice. A review of fundamental concepts is made with omission of in-depth technical detail. We also examine how
a masterly engineered system can collapse owing to a series of cascading events.
Nuclear power plants are designed, constructed and operated under very rigorous
internationally agreed safety standards. Through adoption of defense-in-depth design
and operation procedures, protocols are put in place with intent to ensure that serious
malfunction may arise subject only to failure of multiple consecutive and independent
safety measures. Table 7.1 lists five essential levels of protection in plant design and operation, from accident prevention to disaster mitigation. Required measures to achieve
these objectives are also listed.
We shall not attempt to discuss these measures in detail. Instead we propose reducing them down to three basic components: the intrinsic safety feature of a chain
reaction, the control of reactivity, and the residual heat removal mechanism.

7.4.1. Chain Reaction
The chain reaction is central to both nuclear power reactors and atomic energy, in order to
achieve sustainable fission. This parallel has given rise to the misunderstanding that an outof-control nuclear reactor power plant may turn itself into an atomic bomb. This scenario
will never occur as the design of a nuclear power reactor is vastly different than that of a nuclear bomb. Creating a nuclear explosion is physically impossible in a nuclear power reactor.
Table 7.1. Defense-in-depth Concept of a Nuclear Power Plant.
Level
1

Objectives
Failure prevention

2

Failure detection and
control

3

Design basis accident
control

4

Severe accident control

5

Severe accident
mitigation

Measures
Adequate site selection, high quality design, construction and operation to reduce or prevent failures
Control and protection system with built-in surveillance features to detect and manage abnormal
operations before they become significant
Built-in engineering safety feature and accident
response procedures to prevent core damage and
manage abnormal operations before they become
significant
Reactor containments to limit the impact of severe accidents that are not anticipated in the design basis
Off-site emergency plan to mitigate the radiological consequence of significance release of radioactive material
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Almost all currently operating nuclear power reactors are thermal reactors, which
use thermal neutrons to sustain chain reactions. Neutrons initially released from nuclear fission carry very high kinetic energy (~2 MeV), and are termed fast neutrons. As
fast neutrons move at very high speed, they have less probability of being captured by
other fissionable nuclei. By comparison, thermal neutrons have kinetic energy of less
than 1 eV. From a practical viewpoint, slowing fast neutrons down to thermal neutron
speed provides a means for lower enriched uranium to be used as fuel. The material
used to slow down fast neutrons is termed a moderator. The moderator in a thermal
reactor consists of light material such as water. Using water as the moderator introduces
an important safety feature: it provides a negative void coefficient. A common feature
in reactor design is to use water as both moderator and coolant.7 When reactivity levels
rise the moderator/coolant temperature will rise accordingly. As temperature increases,
the density of moderator/coolant decreases, reducing its effectiveness as moderator and
resulting in fewer number of thermal neutrons for fission. This negative feedback mechanism is an inherent stabilizing factor in reactor operation. In an extreme accident scenario, the moderator/coolant will vaporize and effectively stop the chain reaction.

7.4.2. Reactivity Control
The primary control of reactor reactivity is through control rods. Control rods are
made with material that can efficiently absorb neutrons. Reactivity control is achieved
through mechanically changing the position of control rods inside the reactor core.
Moving deeper within the core results in more neutrons being absorbed, thus reducing
reactivity; moving toward core edge has the opposite result. Over ninety-nine percent of
the neutrons (prompt neutrons) are released within a very short time (half-life of 10−22
second) during fission, which is much too quick for mechanical systems to respond.
Therefore, the remaining one percent of the delayed neutrons is crucial for reactor controllability. Reactors are carefully designed to be sub-critical for ninety-nine percent
of the prompt neutrons, ensuring that these neutrons cannot themselves sustain chain
reactions, but may achieve criticality with the addition of the remaining one percent of
delayed neutrons. Control rods are designed to function sufficiently quickly to counter
any power surge and eliminate the possibility of an unwanted criticality.

7.4.3. Residual Heat Removal
The problem of residual heat removal is unique to nuclear power generation. During
normal operation, heat generated from nuclear fission is continuously carried away by
the coolant, maintaining steady- state conditions. Following shutdown, scheduled or
unscheduled, nuclear fission stops but heat generation does not. Fission products generated through nuclear fissions are radioactive and will keep decaying regardless. The
amount of heat generated by decay of the fission product is significant, typically five
percent of the power generated prior to the shutdown. If this heat is not removed efficiently, the reactor core can be heated to thousands of degrees and reach meltdown. In
a worst case scenario, extreme heat can cause structural damage to the reactor containment, resulting in the release of radioactive material to the environment. It is therefore
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vital for a nuclear power plant to maintain residual heat removal capability at all times,
even under that most severe event condition. A major portion of a reactor’s residual heat
removal systems are active systems, which means that they rely on electrical pumps to
produce a constant flow of coolant to circulate the residual heat away from the reactor
core. Systems are designed such that external power is available during an emergency
event. On the other hand, in the event of a natural disaster such as in the event of an
earthquake, local power from the grid infrastructure could be rendered unavailable.
To militate against such an emergency it is a requirement that nuclear power plants be
equipped with onsite backup generators and battery power supplies.

7.5. Nuclear Accidents and Impacts
In ensuring maximal safety, the design, construction and operation of nuclear power
plants are required to conform to very rigorous standards and procedures. The US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) mandates that rector designs must meet a requirement of core damage one in ten thousand years. Most of the current commercial
reactors in the US are designed for one in one hundred thousand year damage compliancy. The intent for next generation plant is to push this figure to one in ten million
years. As with other manmade products these theoretical safety parameters cannot totally eliminate the risk of accidents. Human designed engineering systems, however well
designed, can fail subject to unforeseen circumstantial occurrences. Safety regulations
in the nuclear power industry are particularly stringent as the potential human, physical and psychological impacts of system failure are inordinately great. Over the past
fifty years there have been three major nuclear accidents: Three Mile Island, Chernobyl,
and Fukushima. Upon close examination of nuclear accidents it is customary to discover that a chain of events led to the critical event, including: flawed design, human
error and unexpected events. Learning from previous accidents and making necessary
adjustments to break the chain of events are integral components of nuclear energy
safety culture.

7.5.1. Three Mile Island, 1979
The Three Mile Island nuclear facility is located near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in the
United States. The accident occurred at four in the morning on March 28, 1979. Initially there was a minor malfunction in the secondary cooling system. The malfunction
caused a rise of temperature in the primary reactor coolant and later triggered automatic reactor shutdown sequences. During the shutdown, a pilot operated relief valve
opened to avoid potential over pressure, as per design. However, it failed to close properly as programmed after ten seconds, resulting in lost coolant. Unfortunately there was
no instrumentation in situ to detect the position of the relief valve, thus operators were
not aware of this situation. The built-in safety mechanism detected the loss of coolant
and responded to it by injecting replacement water into the reactor, resulting in a rise of
water level in the pressurizer, a tank designed to maintain proper pressure level in the
reactor. Operators noticed the anomaly in the pressurizer but were unable to properly
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diagnose its root cause: the relief valve. Instead, they were under the impression that the
pressurizer was over-filled. To correct this artificial problem, operators reduced the flow
of replacement water according to operating manual instructions. Without sufficient
coolant, steam formed and caused excessive vibration of the cooling pumps. To avoid
damage resulting from the vibration, operators shut down the pump station, with effect
of worsening the situation. Without coolant, the reactor core overheated and started to
melt. This continued for over two hours before operators finally closed the relief valve
and started to restore the cooling system. It took almost one month for the damaged
reactor to fully shut down (cold shutdown) on April 27.
The Three Mile Island accident was one of the worst case scenarios in terms of reactor core damage. Later inspection revealed forty-five percent of the core had melted.
Fortunately, its consequence was limited since the damaged core was well confined inside the reactor vessel. During the event, the amount of radioactive material released to
the environment was negligible. In a study carried out by the State Health Agency over
a period of eighteen years, no abnormal health issues were reported for the population
of thirty thousand residing in the surrounding locality. The Three Mile Island accident
was thoroughly studied by scientists, engineers and regulatory agency authorities. Additional rigorous safety measures were enforced following the accident.

7.5.2. Chernobyl, 1986
The Chernobyl accident was the most devastatingly destructive in the history of nuclear
power. The chain of events, ironically, starts with an electrical engineering experiment
designed to test a safety feature. In a nuclear power plant, uninterrupted electricity supply is required to drive coolant pumps. In case of total loss of station power, on-site
backup generators are on hand to immediately come on line. At Chernobyl, however,
there was a sixty to seventy-five second gap before the diesel generators were able to
reach full power. To bridge this gap, engineers hypothesized that following the loss of
power the slowing down steam turbine might be able to spin long enough and continue
providing sufficient electricity for the coolant pumps before the backup generators took
over. They needed to verify this idea experimentally and decided to take advantage of
a routine shutdown to perform the test. For some reason, safety officers were not consulted concerning the test, and the required approval was not secured. This lack of communication was of critical import and proved a deadly mistake. In carrying out the test
some major flaws in reactor design were unwittingly unearthed. The Chernobyl reactor
was of graphite-moderated water cooled design. Unlike many other reactor designs,
this one has an important characteristic: a positive void coefficient of reactivity. This
means reactivity increases as coolant temperature increases, the opposite effect to a reactor with negative void coefficient. In normal circumstances a positive void coefficient
(PVC) does not indicate that a reactor is unstable as there are other mechanisms inherently available to stabilize the overall reactivity. However, under certain circumstances,
especially at low power level and with certain fuel configurations, PVC will dominate
and may result in very unstable conditions. The test crew at Chernobyl were not aware
of this potential threat. However, even with this flaw, the test could have been safely
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completed if everything had gone to plan, and the same test had been carried out multiple times previously without incident.
The test was scheduled to finish during the day shift of April 25. However, an unexpected outage at a local power station forced the power grid operator to order that
the Chernobyl reactor remain in service for the duration of the power shortage. This
unexpected development resulted in delaying the test to midnight of April 25, as the test
procedure would require reducing the power output of the reactor. The delay was critical; the night shift crew were less prepared for the test. A number of changes were made,
putting the reactor into a dangerous positive feedback mode. This positive feedback
was successfully compensated for by the automatic control system throughout the test
duration. The disaster started when an emergency shutdown procedure, called SCRAM
(Safety Control Rod Axe Man), was initiated. This standard procedure inserted control
rods into the core to quickly stop the reaction. There was a major flaw in Chernobyl’s
control rod design, with the result that for the first few seconds after the control rods
were inserted, reactivity increased rather than decreased. The combination of positive
void coefficient and a flawed control rod design led to a rapid power surge which destroyed the reactor within seconds. Violent fires and explosions expelled tons of highly
radioactive material into the environment. Two operators were killed in the explosions
and another twenty-eight emergency workers died within three months owing to acute
radiation poisoning. About four thousand cases of radiation-exposure-related thyroid
cancers were diagnosed in the affected population. A much larger number of people
were psychologically affected. The Chernobyl disaster was unique in the sense that its
flawed design was not adopted anywhere in the West. However, the demonstration of a
lax safety culture and poor crisis management during the event resulted in severe damage to the reputation of nuclear power, leading to decades of stagnation in the nuclear
power industry.

7.5.3. Fukushima, 2011
At 2:46 p.m. on March 11, 2011, a major earthquake of magnitude 9.0 hit the east coast
of Japan. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was located about 180 kilometers
south of the epicenter. The nuclear plant had six reactor units. Units 1, 2, and 3 were
operating when the earthquake hit, however all were successfully shut down. Units 4, 5,
and 6 were not in service at the time of the quake. These reactors received no physical
damage from the earthquake, even though its intensity exceeded the plant design limit.
Since the earthquake also disabled the external electricity supply to the power plant,
back up on-site generators, located in the basement of the reactor buildings, started
automatically to operate the residual heat removal system. About fifty minutes after the
earthquake, a major tsunami of up to fifteen meters in height arrived.
All nuclear power plants located along the coastline are required to implement
tsunami countermeasures. However, the one in Daiichi was only able to handle tsunamis of up to 5.7 meters in height. This standard was established in the 1960s based
on limited scientific data regarding the likelihood of super tsunamis and earthquakes.
The tsunami submerged the basements of the plant and caused many critical safety
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components to malfunction, including sea water pumps, diesel power generators, and
batteries. Without heat sinks, the core temperature rose and water vaporized. Emergency workers tried to restore cooling capability but without sufficient power supply
and lacking essential equipment, their efforts were not effective. A few hours later, the
cladding of the fuel elements was damaged due to high heat and the nuclear fuel was
exposed, releasing radioactive substances to the atmosphere. Hot steam interacted with
zirconium cladding and produced hydrogen, igniting hydrogen explosions inside the
containment buildings.
The recovery was a lengthy process: it took months to achieve cool shutdown conditions. No casualties were reported relating to the nuclear accident but radioactive material released to the air and water posed great environmental and health concerns. The
exact impact, however, will not be available until more data has been accumulated. The
Fukushima accident has forced a reconsideration of the required safety standards for
nuclear power plants. Rare events do occur in nature and safety measures and protocol
must be continually updated.

7.6. Challenges in Nuclear Waste Management
Handling the spent fuel (waste) discharged from a nuclear reactor is a rather complicated issue. Highly radioactive material generated from nuclear fissions poses serious
health and environmental threats if not managed properly. A typical 1 GMWe (1,000
MWe) nuclear reactor produces about twenty-seven tonnes of spent fuel annually. From
a technical viewpoint this translates to a relatively small volume of waste material, however political and environmental considerations have had great impact on the problem.
There are two possible options for handling these spent fuels: either through direct
disposal or via recycling. The United States, Canada and a number of other countries

Figure 7.7. Spent Fuel Inventory as of the End of 2007.8

A Future for Nuclear Energy?

181

have chosen the direct disposal approach. Nuclear spent fuels are treated as waste immediately after they are removed from the reactor. Eventually the waste is buried, as
is, deep underground. Other countries, including the UK and France have chosen to
recycle. This is a preferable solution both from an economic and environmental concern
viewpoint. About ninety-seven percent of the material could potentially be recovered
from the spent fuel and reused in the production of fresh fuels. The remaining three
percent of high level waste must be vitrified and permanently buried.
The inventory of nuclear spent fuels will vary depending on the generation capacity
and waste management approach of a particular country. An indication of the global
nuclear spent fuel inventory by country at the end of 2007 is shown in Figure 7.7. The
USA and Canada are the two largest holders of spent fuel.
Multiple layers of protection are designed to safely dispose high level nuclear
waste material. The waste is first solidified in an insoluble matrix such as borosilicate glass and then sealed inside stainless canisters. The canisters are further
surrounded by clay to prevent ground water penetration before they are put into a
deep underground repository site. Although these protective measures should be
adequate in reliably isolating nuclear waste from the environment for a long period of time (typically one hundred thousand to one million years), lack of absolute
confidence in the technology still prevails in the general public persona, resulting
in strong resistance to siting waste repositories in community localities. Proposed
projects are often delayed or abandoned. Thus far, no geological repository has been
licensed for retaining of civilian nuclear wastes. Dry cask storage has often been
implemented as a temporary storage solution, in the hope of a more permanent
solution being agreed upon going forward. Currently, spent fuels are stored in canisters and surrounded by heavy reinforced concrete walls. Dry-cask storage is a relatively inexpensive solution but as the volume of the stockpile increases the security
threat is also augmented accordingly.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act passed by the United States Congress in 19829
required the Department of Energy to identify and construct an underground facility for permanent storage of high level nuclear waste. Initially Yucca Mountain was
selected as one of three candidate sites and the US congress commissioned a thorough evaluation study of the site in 1987. The proposed site is located in Nevada,
120 kilometers northwest of Las Vegas. The Yucca repository is a deep underground
facility, about 350 meters below surface level, with capacity to accommodate more
than 63,000 tonnes of spent fuel. It was scheduled to receive spent fuels by 1998.
In spite of the fact that the Yucca Mountain project was thoroughly studied dating
back to 1978, debates and counter-debates on project efficacy were never successfully resolved or agreed upon. One of the central issues is whether the facility is
environmentally safe and would remain so for up to 1 million years. Following
many delays, the project was officially terminated in 2011. The failure of the Yucca
Mountain project has not just been excessively costly but has also left the US in a
very difficult situation, lacking long term storage for the country’s nuclear waste
into the foreseeable future.
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7.7. Future Role for Nuclear Power
Awareness and understanding of both the historical and contemporary contexts of nuclear power are essential inputs to any attempt to answer questions regarding the future
of nuclear power: will it rebound as an important source of energy or will nuclear energy be gradually phased out? In endeavoring to answer this question a number of variables need to be considered. These include the global future energy outlook, innovation
in nuclear technological developments, and public acceptance or non-acceptance of nuclear energy. These variables are somewhat interdependent and resolution and decision
making is a subjective process. In this section we consider the variables independently.
We also encourage the reader to independently consider the issues and to participate in
a much required public debate on this important topic.
Global Energy Outlook is largely shaped by two parameters: energy security and
climate change. Energy security addresses the availability of resources. Currently fossil
fuels such as oil, gas, and coal comprise about eighty percent of world total energy use,
servicing transportation, electricity generation, industry, and the residential and commercial built environment. As noted in Chapter 1, abundant and easy access to these
resources has supported unprecedented growth rates of human civilization for more
than a century. The presumption that these resources remain abundant has changed
since 2005 when global petroleum production became inelastic with respect to prices,
indicating that conventional oil production had plateaued and will begin to decline. In
“oil’s tipping point has passed” Murray and King argue that the oil market has “tipped
into a new state; production is now inelastic, unable to respond to rising demand, and
leading to wild price swings.”10 The study reveals that while production of crude oil
increased to meet demand between 1988 and 2005, since that time production has been
roughly constant, despite an increase in price of around fifteen percent per year. The
harnessing of available oil reserves is also proving more costly and difficult, contributing to the tail-off in levels of production. Furthermore, nearly seventy percent of the
world’s remaining conventional oil reserves are located in five Persian Gulf countries.
Recent studies also suggest that coal supplies are less abundant than previously believed. Over reliance on fossil fuels, high concentration of resources and declining supply create great concerns in respect of security and availability of energy supply. Energy
Watch indicate that US coal production peaked in 2002 and that world coal production
is projected to peak by 2030.11 Supplies of natural gas are abundant and offer the best
production potential of the fossil-fuels coal, oil and gas. Recent discoveries include significant finds in Israel and Mozambique. Twenty-five percent of electricity generation in
the United States is supplied by natural gas power plants. Although production of conventional natural gas in North America peaked in 2001,12 recent years have seen the rise in
hydraulic fracturing of shale rock as a new means of further exploitation of natural gas,
with significant potential finds both in the US and in many other countries. While fracking offers significant promise in non-conventional natural gas exploration, it also carries
environmental concerns, in particular relating to stress on surface-water and groundwater supplies. Air pollution owing to volatile organic compounds and other hazardous
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compounds are also of environmental concern.13 There is also controversy surrounding
the quantity and abundance of supply required to meet demand going forward.14
Climate change will increasingly factor into the determination of the future role
for nuclear energy in national grids. Accepting that greenhouse gases are a major contributing factor to global warming, in endeavoring to avoid catastrophic consequences
to the ecosystem resulting from warmer climate, it is imperative that enhanced efforts
be made toward limiting the rate and pace of average global temperature increase. As
discussed earlier in this book, the Kyoto Protocol has set goals to limit temperature rise
to not greater than two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels. To achieve this objective an aggressive shift from the use of carbon-emitting resources to generate energy is
required. Whether such a shift is possible through introduction of renewable, non-carbon emitting fuel sources alone, is highly questionable. It is therefore essential that a
wider role for nuclear energy be discussed between nuclear energy scientists, policy
makers and within the broader public domain. Security of energy supply is an equally
challenging and deterministic input to this debate. Energy security arguments suggest
that reductions in fossil-based energy resources, which can require transportation over
several thousand kilometers across land and sea boundaries, could help address overdependence and inefficiency, factors that would have significant economic and social
implications.
Technological innovations in reactor design will be key to the future role for nuclear power. Evolutionary new reactor designs have made nuclear power safer and more
cost-effective to currently operating plants. The adoption of advanced fuel cycle technologies will greatly relieve the pressure of waste disposal and make nuclear power a
virtually sustainable resource.

7.7.1. Advanced Reactors to Improve Safety and Efficiency
Since the introduction of nuclear reactors in the 1950s there have been four generations
of innovation in reactor design. The first generation (I) was the early prototype reactor,
developed during the 1950s and 1960s as a proof of concept design. The majority of
commercial nuclear power reactors that are currently in operation belong to the second-generation (II), designed to be economical and reliable for large scale generation.
Many of these reactors are nearing the end of their operational lives and will be replaced by generation III/III+ reactors, now mature following decades of research and
innovation. By using state-of-the-art technologies through incorporation of over fifty
years of experience, the new generation of reactors offers a major upgrade in terms
of energy efficiency and operational safety. The new reactor plants are certified to operate for sixty years. Older power reactors were designed to operate for forty years.15
The new generation reactors will possess higher thermal efficiency as they operate at
higher temperatures. The new reactors also feature standardized and modular designs,
a major improvement which will be beneficial in expediting licensing procedures and
reducing construction costs. Advanced reactors are more robust and less complicated in
structure, with fewer components facilitating operation and maintenance. Most appealingly, a feature of some new reactors is the adoption of passive safety systems and other
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inherent safety features, representing a major leap over the old reactors that rely on
active residual heat removal systems. New designs use passive safety features such as
gravity, providing natural circulation which helps to stabilize reactors and to keep them
intact in the event of an emergency for an extended period of time (up to seventy-two
hours), during which external resources can be arranged and put into operation. With
such passive safety systems in place, a catastrophic event such as the Fukushima accident could be avoided.
These emerging generation reactors may also be used to produce hydrogen economically. This will be of particular benefit as a transportation fuel, an industry which
currently consumes more than forty percent of global petroleum supplies. If hydrogen
can replace petroleum in transportation, reliance on petroleum will be greatly reduced.
This will in turn enable significant reductions in greenhouse gases emissions. A further
attractive feature of some generation IV reactors is that they operate a closed fuel cycle:
they can burn nuclear waste. Nuclear waste produced from generation II/III reactors
can be fed as fuel to generation IV reactors, reducing the burden on waste management.

7.7.2. Closed Fuel Cycle to Increase Uranium Utilization and
Reduce Uranium Proliferation Risk
The simple once-through fuel cycle utilizes less than one percent of available uranium;
proposed advanced once-through systems will utilize less than two percent uranium.
This severe underutilization of uranium gives rise to two major problems: cost efficiency
and waste management. Sources of uranium, like petroleum, are limited on earth. If
uranium continues to be used with such poor efficiency, the current known sources will
be depleted within one hundred years. Although further exploration may result in the
discovery of new resources, a more reliable and desirable solution would be to improve
utilization efficiency. Underutilization also leads to higher volumes of nuclear waste
which requires treatment and safe storage. Some radioactive actinides have very long
half-lives and need to be safely stored for over ten thousand years. Finding a place for
this purpose is extremely difficult, as we have learned from the Yucca Mountain Project.
Scientists and engineers are working on a more promising and preferable solution,
that of nuclear waste recycling. Recycling could solve two problems at once, through
achieving much higher utilization efficiency and producing significantly less quantities
of radioactive waste to be disposed. The most mature recycling technique currently
available is through using fast reactors. Fast reactors use fast neutrons rather than thermal neutrons to sustain chain reactions. Using fast neutrons presents a great technical
challenge in reactor design since fast neutrons are difficult to capture by fissionable
nuclei. Construction costs are also high making them an unattractive economic proposition at the current time. However, should scientists and engineers succeed in mastering the technological challenges while reducing implementation costs, fast reactors
will be very attractive, possessing a number of unique features. Fast neutrons have the
ability to split the problematic long-lived actinides and transmute them to isotopes with
manageable half-lives of typically hundreds, rather than millions of years. A further
advantageous feature of fast reactors is that they can become breeder reactors; they can
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be used to produce fuel while generating power. Through incorporation of these features, closed fuel cycle reactors would be achievable, with many generation IV reactors
operating as fast reactors.

7.8. Social Engagement
Public acceptance is vitally important for successful deployment of new technologies in
the energy and industrial processing sectors. In respect of nuclear power acceptance is
of even greater import. For technologies such as coal, wind and solar, risks and benefits
have been well aired and are quite well understood, with mixed reaction and public acceptance. A consensus does not exist regarding the risks associated with nuclear power,
there is widespread public anxiety relating to radiation risk and to the management of
nuclear waste. Building on this chapter’s earlier discussion about nuclear accidents, it
is understandable that concerns can have an overriding bearing on acceptance of nuclear energy, adding to the complexity in development and implementation of required
solutions.

7.8.1. Radiation Risk
Fear of radiation in the public mindset is well founded, not least as a result of the dramatic effects of nuclear radiation which resulted from the bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki at the end of World War II. Radiation can kill cells and can incur inadvertent
changes to DNA structure. The degree of damage to the human body relates on the dose
the body has been subjected to. The effective dose received by a human being is measured using the Sievert (Sv) unit. Exposure to high a dose of radiation (more than three
Sievert) over a short period of time can result in acute radiation sickness and can indeed
be fatal. In the 1986 Chernobyl accident, 134 emergency workers were subjected to an
extremely high radiation dose (between 800 and 16,000 milliSievert). Twenty-eight of
these workers died from radiation sickness within months of the accident. These losses
could have been significantly reduced had the radiation measurement equipment been
operational. False readings from the faulty equipment had misled the emergency workers into believing the reactor was intact and the plant safe.
Potential long-term health problems resulting from low-level radiation include cancers and other heritable diseases. The International Commission on Radiation Protection suggests that the chance of developing a cancer increases by 5.5% for every Sievert
(Sv) exposure and by 0.2% for heritable effects. These figures have been extrapolated
from high-level dose observations and their validity to low-level dose equivalence may
not have direct correlation. It is believed that less than 100 mSv over a long period of
several years poses no measurable health effects. For a period of twenty years (1986–
2005) following the Chernobyl accident, more than five million people lived in the contaminated area, and were subject to doses of ten to fifty mSv. Citizen health status was
closely monitored by international agency organizations during this time. The Chernobyl Forum, organized by agencies including IAEA, WHO, and the UN, and with input from three countries directly affected by the Chernobyl disaster, Belarus, Ukraine,
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and Russia, published their most recent findings in 2005. They concluded that no measurable increase was found in incidence of radiation-induced leukemia or solid cancers, other than thyroid cancer. The thyroid gland accumulates radioactive ioline-131
from the food stream, making it vulnerable to radiation exposure. Fortunately, thyroid
cancer is a treatable disease. Following the recent Fukushima accident, a preliminary
report published by WHO in 2012 estimated that people residing in the contaminated
zone received radiation doses of between ten to fifty mSv. The long term health effects
resulting from this exposure may or may not be observable but will necessitate a long
time frame to carry out observations, analyses, and publication of consequential results. Health effects resulting from low-level dose radiation exposure can be difficult
to measure owing to many interrelated concurring factors. For example, about forty
percent of the general population will eventually develop cancers regardless of exposure
to radiation during their lifetime. Small percentages of radiation-related superimposed
cancers, if any, can therefore be difficult to measure and quantify. It is also important
to note that the human body has its own defense system that may repair some minor
damage caused by low level radiation, thus minimizing and masking its effect. More
scientific data is needed in order to establish a guideline for low level radiation risk.
Such studies are imperative to building public confidence and to establishing proper
evacuation zones should accidents happen.
It is also important to point out that the above figures typify worst case scenarios.
On average, if one happens to reside in the near vicinity of a nuclear power plant, resulting radiation doses of typically less than 0.1 mSv per annum will add to the 2.4 mSv
dose accruing as a result of natural sources, and is not considered a sizable increase.

7.8.2. Change of Nuclear Energy Culture
The nuclear power community also bears responsibility for lack of public acceptance of
nuclear energy. Failure to engage with the public in providing relevant information can
result in failure, no matter how technically sound and safe a new innovation may be.
The Yucca Mountain Project is a typical example where technical decisions were overruled by political expediency, due to lack of sufficient public support. A thorough study
of the Yucca Mountain project was carried out and the project was highly commended
from a technical viewpoint. However, a lack of strong support from local residents and
state government, combined with political and financial uncertainties, made project
survival very difficult. In contrast, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in the state
of New Mexico, a geologic repository for military radioactive waste, was successfully
received by the local community. This was achieved through committed public engagement, resulting in strong support from all sectors. This example indicates that through
appropriate engagement and information viewpoint exchange, public opinion can sway
in favor of high priority energy installations.
Unfortunately transparency and openness has not always been the hallmark, and
this invariably has damaged the reputation and credibility of nuclear power. The general public in the Soviet Union was not informed of the Chernobyl accident until two
days post the initial plant disaster. Evacuation of the nearby city of Pripyat did not
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commence until thirty-six hours after the accident. Evacuees were informed that the
clean-up would last only a few days. Poor management of the crisis and the release of
false information resulted in severe damage to public confidence in nuclear power, both
regionally and throughout the world.
Initiating change in nuclear culture toward a more open forum of engagement and
discussion is complex owing to the necessity of striking a balance to the need for securing sensitive and confidential information. Information which may be shared and that
which may not can form sensitive boundaries, with decisions which can have significant consequence. At Fukushima, initially some vital plant information was not available to the emergency work force, because the utility deemed it sensitive. The lack of
information delayed the rescue efforts and was one of factors which contributed to the
escalation of the tragic event.
An important question remains: what is the financial outlay for a nuclear reactor?
Costing nuclear power comprises four major components: construction, operation, waste
disposal, and plant decommission. Waste disposal and decommission costs are normally
calculated into the generation cost, comprising only a small fraction of the total when
compared to construction cost. The real cost of constructing a new nuclear plant is a hot
topic of debate. Various estimates in overall cost invariably arise and have a tendency
to change rapidly over time. The estimated overall per unit construction cost in the US
in 2003 was approximately $2,000/kWe. This increased to $4,000/kWe by 2009. Based
on these numbers, the overall cost of nuclear power today has increased to $84/MWh,
exceeding that of coal ($62/MWh) and gas ($65/MWh). At first glance, in terms of cost
analysis the future looks pessimistic for nuclear power. However, a closer examination
will reveal that the majority of the cost surge is the result of regulation changes, on account of public resistance and political intervention. For example, the next generation
French reactor, Flamanville 3, experienced repeated delays with resulting cost increase
of more than two billion euro. Much of the additional costs incurred are a result of design modifications requested to comply with stricter safety regulations which have been
stipulated post the Fukushima accident. The Shoreham nuclear power plant located in
Long Island, New York, is another example of how nuclear power can become expensive.
Construction commenced in 1973 and was projected for completion in 1979. The initial
cost was estimated at $217 million. During construction however additional regulation
requirements were established, necessitating significant design changes which resulted
in ensuing project delay. The plant construction was finally completed in 1984. Unfortunately the most costly delays were just about to begin. The Three Mile Island accident in
1979 and the Chernobyl accident in 1986 altered public opinion to nuclear power, making
it very difficult for the newly built plant to obtain an operating license. As a result the
Shoreham plant never came into operation and the project was finally abandoned in 1989.
The final cost exceeded six billion US dollars. This constituted excessive and unnecessary
cost inflation, and ultimate waste of public and private funding. Such waste may be mitigated going forward by movement to modular plant design and construction.
In evaluating the future potential for nuclear power it is also necessary to consider
the competing technologies. In order to replace conventional coal, oil and natural gas,

188

Tsoukalas, Gao, and Coyle

the principal competitors to nuclear energy are hydro, wind and solar. Hydro is capable of providing clean, reliable base-load energy; however its availability is confined
by location. Solar is currently expensive and may not be feasible for widespread utilization in the near future. Wind power is relatively cheap, estimated at between $70/
KWh and $120/KWh, which is on par with nuclear power. Cost will continue to drop
as technology improves and the industry matures. However, important as wind, solar
and other alternative renewable energy sources are, owing to intermittency and scale
it is unlikely they will succeed as base-load providers. In maintaining balance between
generation and consumption, power grids rely on certainty of supply. A small amount
of uncertainty can be offset by other reliable resources, such as through use of coal and
natural gas. Should the share of wind power increase to significant levels, some major
innovations must be introduced to the power grid in order to handle the associated
uncertainty of supply.
Risk is an intrinsic parameter in characterizing a particular option. Using nuclear
power presents a risk. Risk also presents if opting to abandon deployment of nuclear
energy. We may consider recent developments in Germany by way of example. Shortly
after the Fukushima disaster, Germany announced the abandonment of its nuclear programs, with immediate shutdown of eight reactors and the phased shutdown of the
remaining nine reactors by 2022. The share of nuclear generated electricity dropped
from twenty-three to seventeen percent while renewables increased from twenty to
twenty-five percent. A consequence of this motion is that consumers will be required to
pay €250 per household to sponsor cleaner energy. Over thirty billion euros of investment is also needed over the next two decades to build more power lines to transmit
and deliver the electricity generated from renewables, such as offshore wind turbines.
However, wind is an intermittent resource, and thus the construction of a new supplementary power plant will be required to meet the power deficit requirement. This will
present challenges to the country in its ability to cut carbon emissions by forty percent
of 1990 levels by 2020, however Germany has shown innovation and has been an exemplar country in renewable technology development and grid connection. Neighboring
countries to Germany, in particular France and the Czech Republic generate a major
portion of their electricity from nuclear power, hence buying and selling between countries may require import of nuclear sourced energy. This fact introduces some complex
dynamics into energy and climate policy with respect to national vs. economic trading
bloc priorities.

7.9. Future for Nuclear Fusion
The atomic reaction in nuclear fusion is different from nuclear fission; in fusion two light
atomic nuclei fuse to form a heavier nucleus and in so doing a large amount of energy
is released. Research in fusion is the domain of plasma physics and is sometimes considered a holy grail in the search for future energy provision. From early twentieth century scientific experimentations to the present day, research has continued to endeavor
to perfect the capture of energy transfer via nuclear fusion. A Tokamak, devised by
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Russian physicists Igor Tamm and Andrei Sakharov in the 1950s, is a magnetic device
that contains a plasma in the shape of a torus, and which remains central to research
in nuclear plasma physics to this day. Today, the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project is comprised of an international research consortium
with objective to build the world’s largest experimental tokamak nuclear fusion reactor.
In the process fusion between deuterium and tritium (D-T) will produce one helium
nucleus, one neutron and excess energy. The aim is to complete the transition from
experimental studies in plasma physics to electricity generating fusion power plants.
The timeline toward achieving these goals however remains relatively long term;
the first demonstration of electricity production is not expected for thirty years. In addition, as with current day fission power generation, safety and waste management will
be of paramount importance to nuclear fusion power generation. It is important that
support is maintained for ITER and related research projects in the expectation that
experimental physics, material science and engineering practice will combine to enable
development of a mature and reliable fusion energy future.16
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Part 3
energy distribution and use

Chapter 8
Taking Emerging Renewable Technologies to Market
Melissa Dark, Jenny Daugherty,
Peter Campbell, and William Grimson

Abstract
This chapter sets out to demonstrate that introducing renewable energy sources into an
existing market is a complex socio-techno-economic challenge. The important role that
competition plays is reviewed in the context of demand and the number of suppliers:
too few can result in the market being difficult to penetrate. The cost of switching technologies is very relevant to taking advantage of renewable energy sources; for example
the electrical supply networks would need considerable augmentation. The role of regulatory frameworks, the distinction between inducements and mandates are discussed
and consideration is given to the type of political systems in place where renewable
technologies are being adopted. The nature of the social dimension is stressed where it
is noted that different countries react in different ways to the promotion of new technologies. A key concept, levelized cost, is used to compare the economics of a range of
energy sources. Levelized costs take into account the cost of a kilowatt-hour (kWhr) in
terms of both initial construction of the system and the recurring operating costs over
its financial life. The question of reliability and maintainability is stressed, in particular
with respect to offshore wind energy systems where costs are currently relatively high.
However the technical learning that comes with exploiting offshore wave energy is, over
time, expected to moderate the levelized costs. In turn, this is seen as a driver to various initiatives by which governments seek to promote such technologies and encourage
much needed venture capital.
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8.1. Introduction
This chapter provides a brief overview of various economic, political, social, and maintainability factors that influence bringing technologies to market. In order to illustrate
the interactions among social, technical, and economic systems, a few salient aspects of
these systems are elaborated as a way of laying a foundation for a more detailed account
focused on wave energy. Furthermore, all factors are endogenous, meaning that 1) these
factors are all a part of the environment or system in which a technology is brought to
market, and 2) the value of these factors is determined by the states of other variables in
the system. The multiple interactions and impacts of these factors on bringing a technology to market are beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead of an exhaustive treatment, we offer a few critical ideas with illustrations in hopes that we provide sufficient
grounding for readers to extend their thinking with regard to the topic.

8.2. Economic Factors
All technologies encounter prevailing market conditions, which influence whether or
not the technology comes to market, how, when, by whom, and where. Prevailing market conditions are factors such as the number of competitors, the nature and intensity of
competitiveness, the market’s growth rate, and so on. The competitors within a market
are the persons or firms that offer a similar product or service. Competition in a market
is generally viewed as socially desirable because it requires companies to make efficient
use of their resources in order to reduce costs.
All markets can be said to have a competitive structure that affects bringing a new
technology to market. The competitive structure of a market refers to the current state
of the market with regard to several interrelated factors: 1) the number of competitors
in the market; 2) the relative strength of these competitors; 3) the level of demand for
the technology and the existing supply; and 4) the ease of entry into the market. There
are several known obstacles that can make it difficult to enter a market with a new
technology, and the more barriers to entry there are, the stronger the position for the
incumbents. For example, a market that is occupied by a couple of dominant firms that
have economy of scale advantages can be difficult to penetrate. Incumbent firms usually
have favorable access to resources, existing supply and distribution chains, and “know
how” that positions them strongly for holding onto and growing market share. Another
barrier to entry is capital (equipment, buildings, or raw materials) investment. Generally speaking, as the needed investment in capital increases, it becomes more difficult
to take a new technology to market. A third barrier to entry is strong brand recognition and customer loyalty among the existing competitors. A product or service that is
established in the market and known to provide a given value for the price paid has a
distinct advantage over a new product whose price-value proposition is uncertain.
A fourth possible barrier to entering a market with a new technology is switching
costs. Switching costs are the costs incurred with switching from one product to the
next. For instance, the potential costs to switch from gasoline powered to electric ve-
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hicles (EVs) would include producing an infrastructure of charging stations to support
the fleet of EVs. As with many new technologies, there is the familiar chicken-or-theegg phenomenon. The market needs to produce more charging stations in order to encourage more drivers to drive EVs. At the same time, the market needs to see more EVs
on the road in order to build more charging stations. Switching costs can go beyond
installation and startup costs to include search costs, that is, the costs associated with
searching for and learning about the new technology, as well as fees to exit a market, for
instance, the costs to disassemble the infrastructure built to sell gasoline for cars. A fifth
potential barrier to entering a market is network effects. Network effects arise in cases
where the value of a product increases as the number of users increase. This is often
the case with information technology products and services where the value an individual derives from a product arises both from their own personal use as well as from
the usage of others. In cases of network effects, consumers are reluctant to switch one
product because of the consequent effects on the other products/services in the network
that they enjoy and rely on. Finally, tariffs and government regulations can prevent or
delay entry into a market by protecting the existing technology or failing to incentivize
the development and/or adoption of the new technology, which we discuss again in the
section on social factors.
The competitive intensity of a market has been characterized by Porter as including
five factors.1 While many of these factors are similar to the barriers to entry already mentioned, Porter offers elaboration that is useful and worth repeating. These are: 1) the threat
of substitute products or services; 2) the threat of established rivals; 3) the threat for new
entrants; 4) the bargaining power of suppliers; and 5) the bargaining power of consumers.
The threats to substitute products that prohibit or constrain bringing a new technology
to market arise from buyers’ propensity to substitute products, the relative price of the
substitute to the incumbent product/service, the number of substitute products, the ease
of substitution, associated switching costs, and perceived differentiation. The threat of
established rivals refers to the competitive struggle for market share among firms in an industry where increased rivalry among established firms leads to stronger threats to profitability. The strength of rivalry among established firms within an industry stems from
the extent of exit barriers, the amount of fixed costs, the presence of global customers, the
growth rate of the industry, the demand for the new product, and the possible absence of
switching costs. The threat for new entries comprises the risk to the entrant to get into
a market and includes patents (which essentially block new entries for a time period),
brand equity and customer loyalty, switching costs, sunk costs and capital requirements,
access to distribution, and absolute cost. The bargaining power of consumers is the ability
of consumers to exert pressure, often through price, on the firm(s) attempting to enter
with new technology. Several factors influence consumer bargaining power including the
ratio of buyer concentration to firm concentration, buyer switching costs relative to firm
switching costs, buyer information availability, price sensitivity among buyers, and the
availability of substitute products with differential advantage. The fifth and final threat
category in the Porter model is the bargaining power of the suppliers. Suppliers can increase the cost of inputs to the product/service; the presence of substitute inputs will affect
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the bargaining power of suppliers, as will the differentiation of the inputs. If the inputs
from a given supplier are more costly, but result in a differential product that consumers
will buy, such that switching costs are also justified, entry of the technology into the market is more likely.

8.3. Political Factors
Intersecting the myriad of economic factors, political factors also influence bringing
a new technology to market and the deployment of technology in the market. We can
think about these political factors as having direct and/or enabling (or disabling as the
case may be) effects. A full treatment of how political factors affect bringing a technology to market is beyond the scope of this chapter and book; we will focus on describing
two factors with examples that illustrate how the factor affects marketization. The two
political factors we address are 1) issues that deal with the structure or affairs of government, and 2) particular policies, laws, or regulations. Both political structure and the
policies and laws enacted by a government can lead to either an enabling or constraining environment. And political structures have implications for the types of policies
and laws that may be enacted.
What do we mean by a political structure? Political structure refers to groups, such
as political parties, lobbying groups, and institutions; it includes the presence or absence
of, and nature of: the judicial, legislative, and executive systems. Political structure also
refers to the relation of these groups to each other, and their patterns of interaction
within the political system. These factors will vary across different political structures,
their relation to each other, and their patterns of interaction over time influence the
laws, regulations, and norms present in the political system. These variations matter in
bringing technologies to market and in enacting policies and laws that enable or constrain bringing technologies to market.
One very clear example of different groups and their relation to each other is
non-federalist versus federalist governments. The two primary types of non-federalist
political structures are unitary political systems and confederate political systems. A
unitary system is a system of political organization in which most or all of the governing power resides in a centralized government, which delegates authority to subnational
units and channels policy decisions down to them for implementation. There are many
examples of unitary political systems, including Bolivia, Chile, Egypt, Ireland, France,
the People’s Republic of China, and Vietnam. And while there are several nation states
that have unitary political systems, they vary greatly.
A confederate government is the type of government where the power rests with
the local entities, which dictates directives to the national government; the confederate government can only do what the confederation allows it to do. In this system,
there is little central political control and power is very diffuse. Confederate government powers are often in the areas of defense and foreign commerce. Two current
day examples of confederate political systems are Canada and the European Union.
Energy policy in Canada’s confederation is interesting and illustrative. Jurisdiction
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over energy resources is divided between the federal, provincial, and territorial governments. Canada’s national government has authority regarding the regulation of
inter-provincial and international trade and commerce, which has implications for
energy, as well as the management of non-renewable resources on federal lands. The
provinces control the exploration, development, conservation, and management of
non-renewable resources, as well as the generation and production of electricity. As a
result, Canada’s national government must coordinate its energy policies with those
of the provincial governments without any guarantee of success and little power to
issue mandates. A case in point is Canada’s participation in the Kyoto Protocol. While
the national government of Canada had the authority to sign the Kyoto Protocol, the
brunt of implementing the legislation fell to the provinces given their control over
energy resources and consumption. The greenhouse gas reduction targets for Canada
in the treaty remained an unrealized dream due in large part to Canada’s confederate
political structure. The national government in Canada reduced funding for Canada’s
climate change plan and cut most of Canada’s climate change programs, including
successful programs like the Wind Power Production Incentive, which subsidizes
the installation of wind power, and Energuide for Houses, which gives incentives for
Canadians to make their homes more energy efficient.
In a federalist political structure, the powers of government are divided between
the national (federal) government and state and local governments. Certain powers are
delegated to the national government, and all other powers are reserved by the states or
the people. A case in point is the US system, which is federalist; a fact that has significant implications on our views toward and use of energy both regionally and nationally.
In the US, the states rather than the federal government hold important authority for
planning energy system expansions, siting energy facilities and regulating energy facilities and transmission. States control important policy decisions that affect bringing
energy technologies to markets. A supplier looking to bring a new technology to market
may have to deal with fifty different state positions. The complexity of this for a supplier
should be fairly obvious. Furthermore, it should be noted that such a company is facing
several other possible barriers to entry described in the previous section. The states’
role in energy policy in the United States is particularly important for wind power. According to Wilson and Stephens, state-level authority has had huge implications when
it comes to bringing wind technology to market. Sixty-five percent of all turbines installed in 2008 were in just six states (TX, CA, IA, MN, WA, and OR), yet the Great
Plains states (ND, SD, and NE) have both some of the nation’s greatest wind resource
potential and installed wind power capacity of only four percent of the national total.2
In a unitary system, the policies would be enacted at the national level and passed down
to the local level for implementation.
Within similar political systems, policy development, implementation and outcomes can vary greatly for numerous reasons. Some of the factors that shape the policy
agenda, which in turn affects bringing technologies to market include: the nature of
relationships and the patterns of interaction among the institutions (federal, state, local), government stability, public trust in government, consumerism, and the political
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agenda toward the market economy. What is important to keep in mind is that while
societies are complex and dynamic systems, and no two are identical, the structure of
the government will impact policy, which in turn will impact if and how energy technologies are brought to market. In a recent analysis, Shobe and Burtraw found that
“the design and implementation of climate policy in a federal union will diverge in
important ways from policy design in a unitary government. National climate policies
built on the assumption of a unitary model of governance are unlikely to achieve the
expected outcome because of interactions with policy choices made at the sub-national
level.”3 These interactions could be many. For example, whereas a unitary government
is better positioned to enact international agreements, a federalist system is argued to
be closer to people, the locus of their needs, and therefore more responsive and unique
in solutions for attacking social, economic, and political problems.
All political structures, regardless of type, create policy instruments (laws and regulations) to tackle social problems. The political structure impacts the types of policy
instruments that are realized, which in turn impacts if and how new technologies are
brought to market. Successful policies are successful in a context, that is, a political
structure. Policies that lead to increased energy security, growth of domestic economic
activity, and environmental benefits in one context, may lead to high energy prices,
perverse incentives, and public dissatisfaction with renewable energy technologies in
another context. This satisfaction and dissatisfaction impacts bringing the technology
to market. While there are several types of policy instruments, we are only addressing
the two most common policy instruments: inducements and mandates.
Inducements are some sort of incentive that helps bring about an action or a desired result, such as tax breaks, subsidies, and rebates. Inducements are conditional
grants of money and are often accompanied by rules to ensure that the money is used
consistently with policymakers’ intent. Any inducement, regardless of its nature or
intended objective, is comprised of three main parts: (1) the inducement giver, or the
person or party offering the incentive; (2) the inducement receiver, who is the target,
or the individual or entity being offered the inducement; and (3) the inducement or
incentive itself. Inducements rely on the power of persuasion as opposed to force. And
while inducements are frequently used policy instruments, their complexity must be
acknowledged. As policy instruments, the efficacy of inducements is dependent on
the following factors: 1) the extent that the inducer is willing and able to make good
on its promise; 2) the degree to which the inducement that is actually provided reflects what was offered; and 3) the extent to which the inducement receiver complies
with responsibilities and obligations present in the agreement made with the inducer.
Inducements are not really suited to modify behavior in a single episode. Instead, the
goal of most inducements is to secure ongoing compliance with overarching, longrange policy goals, and this assumes that the inducement giver is willing and able
to monitor the inducement receiver over time. Inducements to develop innovations
often come in the form of a research grant to create the new technology and supply
the needed resources to do so. Other forms of inducements aimed at stimulating supply are loans, loan guarantees, tax breaks, free land, etc. Because innovations rarely
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find ready-made markets, it is often necessary to stimulate or create a market, that
is, stimulate demand. For example, in the United States, HUD (Housing and Urban
Development) has several multi-faceted programs that offer incentives to citizens to
utilize energy-savings techniques. Using a tax break as the inducement, a citizen may
get a tax break for implementing an energy saving technique, thereby aiming to create
demand in the market for the technology.
Inducements can be negative as well as positive. Sanctions or fines can be used to
deter undesired behavior. When the inducement receiver fails to modify the undesired
behavior, the inducement giver must be willing and able to impose the sanction or punishment, else the inducement will be ineffective. The cost to enforce the inducement has
to be carefully considered; it is not socially advantageous when it costs more to enforce
a sanction than is gained by the diffusion of the technology. However, it is often very
difficult to quantify these costs and trade-offs.
Mandates are official rules that specify actions to be taken in specific situations or
contexts, as opposed to incentives (or disincentives) that attempt to stimulate behavior.
Mandates state that one will do something, whereas incentives ask whether one would
like to. Regulatory mandates and incentives can produce similar results, but mandates
generally require no loss of revenue by the government. Generally speaking, mandates
can be efficient in terms of expenditures; the primary costs of mandates are enforcement costs. Mandates can operate on individual people, organizations, collectives, or
governments. A few examples of mandates that affect bringing energy technologies to
market in the United States include: 1) state renewable portfolio standards (RPS) for
renewable electricity, which require the increased production of energy from renewable
energy sources, such as wind, solar, biomass, and geothermal; 2) the federal Renewable
Fuel Standard (RFS), which is a program that requires transportation fuel sold in the US
to contain a minimum volume of renewable fuels; and 3) California’s Low Carbon Fuel
Standard regulation that mandates use of an increasing amount of fuels with lowered
GHG emissions each year in the state. In much the same way as incentives, mandates
aim to affect supply and demand in bringing a new technology to market.

8.4. Social Factors
Technology can be seen as being influenced and shaped by the societal context within
which it resides.4 A given technology being adopted by society is not necessarily a predictable occurrence; the result of a linear process that moves from research and development to a commercialized product. The best or most inventive technology does not
necessarily translate into a technology that is adopted and used by society. A technology’s success in the market is not based solely on the technology’s merits or capabilities,
but is contingent on several factors including the preferences and choices of individuals,
as well as societal values and norms. Often there is a right time and right place for a
technology to be picked up by the majority of people within a society. For example, in
2004, David Cohen’s idea for a social network using mobile phones seemed innovative
and viable enough for investors so that he could found his company iContact. However,
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after eighteen months of trying, he was unable to convince phone carriers that his software was the next best thing that consumers would be clamoring for; not until Apple’s
iPhone’s app store hit the market in 2008 would this trend be manifested.5
The social context (the time and place) in which a technology emerges is important
to its adoption and diffusion. Adoption and diffusion are two concepts that are often
used to examine the social factors involved in emerging technologies moving from concept to market. The adoption and diffusion of technology is an explanation of how, why,
and at what time a technology spreads. These terms stem from Rogers’ book entitled
The Diffusion of Innovations, in which he described diffusion as the process by which
an innovation develops over time and spreads through a social system.6 Adoption is the
process an individual undergoes from first hearing about a technology to the point of
deciding to accept it. The diffusion process, on the other hand, explains group behavior,
in how an innovation spreads among consumers; how a technology ends up in factories,
homes, schools, offices, and so on. Essentially, the diffusion process encompasses the
adoption process of several individuals over time.
The factors that affect adoption and diffusion often reside within a society’s culture. A way to understand a society’s culture is through its social institutions. A society
structures and reproduces itself overtime through institutions such as its government,
family, language, and legal systems. These are developed by people and fulfil certain
roles over generations. For example, the family as a social institution has become the
primary site of reproduction and initial socialization; it is where individuals first learn
about the norms and values of their larger social group. Because of this socialization
process, it is often difficult to see social institutions as being constructed by people as
they have typically existed for generations and generations. They are taken for granted
by the individuals within a society and become essentially invisible to them. Technology’s development is subject to these social institutions and, in particular, the political
and economic arrangements of the society. The power dynamics within these institutions impact the priorities that are established, the investments that are made, and the
projects that are funded that lead to technological innovations.
The importance of social institutions on emerging technologies is evident when
comparing nations.7 Differences exist in how technologies are adopted even among
countries with similar technological and economic infrastructures. For example, the
United States and Great Britain could be said to be similar in many regards, but the
adoption and diffusion of certain technologies has varied greatly. Take, for example, the
adoption of genetically modified food; Great Britain and other European countries have
instituted stricter regulations than the United States thus slowing the diffusion of these
types of foods in the market. This has been attributed to differences in their cultures in
regulating risk; the United States has become less restrictive in this regard.8 The societal institutions and individuals acting within those societies affect how a technology
emerges. In other words, technological adoption results from the choices of individuals
who operate within social institutions. Social institutions, including governmental policies and societal values, in a sense, define the rules of the game or define the right time
and right place for a specific technology within a specific society.
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Diffusion, or how individuals learn about a new technology, is a function of the
social system and the interconnected nature of its institutions. Rogers provided a
framework for understanding the role of individuals within a society in spreading the
knowledge and behaviors associated with an innovation. Generally, change agents bring
the innovations to a society, typically through the gatekeepers and opinion leaders of
that society. The gatekeepers and opinion leaders are those individuals who have the
expertise and power to impact societal behaviors and values. In terms of their influence,
individuals within that society can be categorized across five different rates of adoption.
These categories are innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards. Innovators are the risk-takers who are willing to be first to adopt an innovation.
Early adopters are more discreet in their adoption choices but are typically quick to try
new innovations. Their opinions carry the most weight among the other adopter categories. The early majority tends to adopt after some time and once the success of the
innovation is more predictable. The late majority adopts after the average member of the
society does and are typically skeptical about innovation. Laggards are last to adopt, if
they ever do.
Beyond diffusion, however, the acceptance or resistance of a new technology can be
impacted by how individuals make decisions and calculate their own costs and benefits.
Do the benefits outweigh the costs (not only financial costs but also other potential costs
such as to their health, time, and so on) for the individual? This cost-benefit analysis
changes depending on its impact over time, such as long-term environmental impacts
and impacts on others. Some argue that individuals are willing to assume more risk or
costs for others than for themselves. The acronym NIMBY, which stands for the phrase
“not in my back yard,” is used to describe this resistance to a particular technology.
If the individual incurs disproportionate costs or experiences adverse impacts, then
resistance can be higher than otherwise. For example, even though proponents note
the environmental and economic benefits of wind energy, an often-cited opposition to
wind turbines is from individuals in communities where projects have been proposed
because their large structures negatively impact the landscape. This occurred on the
east coast of the United States where several residents opposed the construction of Cape
Wind, an offshore wind farm in Nantucket Sound, on the grounds that the wind turbines would obstruct their oceanfront views. Wind farms are a good idea in theory, but
perhaps less so when they are in one’s own back yard.
Another complaint about wind turbines is the noise they produce. Some have argued that the sounds produced by the turbines can cause insomnia, dizziness, and
headaches. For example, Jim Cummings of the Acoustic Ecology Institute, an online
clearinghouse for sound-related environmental issues, has said that about a dozen or so
of the 250 new wind farms have generated significant noise complaints.9 This issue has
been researched by several groups and the findings indicate that there is no evidence
that wind turbine noise poses any health risks. While there is no evidence to support
such claims, this issue is dependent on context. For example, a previously quiet setting
“is more likely to produce irritated neighbors than, say, a mixed-use suburban setting
where ambient noise is already the norm.”10 Again, right time, right place.
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8.5. Maintainability Factors
The final set of factors is more narrowly focused on the technology itself and its design.
Maintainability factors are considered during the design and installation of technological products and systems. Maintainability is defined as the probability that when
maintenance is necessary, a failed technology will be restored to its operational effectiveness within a specified time.11 Operational effectiveness is the ability of a technology
to perform as expected when operated. Maintainability is related to the reliability-failure propensity of a given technology. Reliability is a measure of the ability of a technology to avoid failure. Failure includes lost performance, compromised safety, and
the need for restorative actions such as diagnosis, repair, spare part replenishment, or
maintenance. The ease and economy of restorative actions that are necessary to restore
a failed product is a function of its maintainability. Restoration involves isolating the
source of failure, correcting the problem, and testing. For a technology to be maintainable, the design should not be too complex; equipment should be easy to access, remove,
and replace; component parts should be uniform or standardized; and there should be
minimal specialized parts or tools.
Maintainability is an important factor when considering offshore wind turbines as
a solution to wind energy technology. Offshore wind farms are increasing due to the
demand for renewable and environmentally friendly energy and the social and political
concerns over onshore wind farms as already discussed. However, offshore wind energy
production faces other issues including the design, installation, and maintenance of the
turbines. Research has been undertaken to inform the design of wind turbines in a marine environment and the related logistical and accessibility issues. One of the primary
challenges is the operation and maintenance of the offshore turbines including their
accessibility, corrosion, and related costs. For example, the type of vessels needed to install and maintain the turbines is but one factor that must be determined. One approach
is to develop ways to ensure the reliability of the wind farm as a whole by implementing a more standardized reliability system within the industry.12 Many industries have
implemented similar standardized reliability and maintenance approaches to improve
cost-effectiveness, control, and safety. If offshore wind turbines are to emerge as a primary energy sources, the reliability and maintainability factors will have to be resolved.

8.6. Economics of Energy
When you consider the worst or near-worst climate change scenarios there seems to be
little point in arguing about the relative costs of alternative sources of energy versus fossil fuel based energy, such as oil, gas, and coal. In a variation of Pascal’s wager, the best
bet appears to be to assume that climate change is real and that without appropriate action highly undesirable and very costly outcomes will occur. One such action is to drastically reduce our dependence on fossil fuels and in turn control or even reduce carbon
dioxide levels in the atmosphere, and in such a course of action the high cost would be
more than offset by the avoidance of a highly changed climate. If the assumption turns
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out to be invalid the consequence is that money will have been wasted on the search
for alternative energy sources. It is, really, in a rational world, a choice of how two very
different consequences should guide or even dictate our actions with respect to energy.
But we live in a world of competing rationalities and undoubtedly one ground on which
there are multiple views concerns the economics of energy. The following section of this
chapter deals with some of these economic data.
The economics of alternative energy, just like any other energy source, are difficult
to establish to the point that all interested parties accept the conclusions. Furthermore,
when it comes to comparing, say, the cost of wind with nuclear power generation various conclusions can be generated depending on the assumptions made. For example,
is the cost of an additional standby plant factored in to the wind side of the equation to
account for downtime when there is no wind? Is there a figure allocated to environmental costs associated with uranium ore extraction and nuclear waste disposal, or the costs
of related security aspects? How might the sequestering of CO2 on very large scale be
factored into estimates of the cost of energy in the event that such a course of action is
required? In spite of such problems, some overview of the relative costs associated with
diverse energy sources is at the least informative.
For tidal and wave energy the first piece of data that needs to be gathered is how
much energy is there and how much of it is available at an affordable cost. A State of
the Industry Report for the UK reports that “globally, it is estimated that there are 180
TWh of economically accessible tidal energy and over 500 TWh of economically accessible wave energy available annually.”13 Now, both tidal and wave energies depend
on local physical characteristics of the surrounding sea and seabed, and it turns out
the UK, despite its small size, has a disproportionate share of this globally accessible
energy. “It has been estimated that UK waters contain around 15 per cent of the world’s
economically accessible tidal resource and over 10 per cent of the world’s economically
accessible wave resource. This tidal resource is estimated at 29 TWh, and wave is 50
TWh.”14 To put these figures in context, in 2011 the total UK overall primary energy
consumption in primary energy terms was approximately two hundred million tonnes
of oil equivalent. In units of watt-hour this amounts to 2.36 TWh. In terms of electricity
consumption the wave energy could contribute up to about fifteen percent of the UK’s
needs. Clearly then there is an case on the basis of availability, especially in the UK, that
marine energy should be exploited.
The second piece of economic data that needs to be considered is the cost of producing energy and making measured comparisons across a sweep of technologies. Two
sets of estimates are presented, with the first set comparing levelized costs for a range of
both dispatchable and non-dispatchable sources in the United States. The second set of
estimates deal with tidal and wave generation based on data assembled in the UK with
specific reference to Scotland. A close reading of both reports is required if conclusions
are to be drawn as between the United States and the UK; but that is not the intention
here, rather conclusions are only reached with respect to each jurisdiction but which
are nevertheless possibly valid globally with respect to the various technologies. A final
point—the actual amount of costs estimated are of less importance than the relative
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costs across technology domains, so the year on which costs are estimated is of no great
significance with respect to the conclusions drawn later.
The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) in a recent report presents the
average levelized costs for a diverse range of generating technologies.15 The report defines levelized cost as the per-kilowatthour cost of both building and operating a generating plant over an assumed financial life and duty cycle. Factors in calculating the
estimated levelized costs include “fuel costs, fixed and variable operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, financing costs, and an assumed utilization rate for each plant
type.”16 It is worth noting that financial incentives are not factored into the estimated
levelised costs. A few points can be made in reference to Table 8.1 in the EIA report,
presented here for convenience.
Some of the points that emerge are:
• The network investment for non-dispatchable technologies is approximately
three hundred percent above that of dispatchable technologies.17
• The capital cost of offshore wind is 275% above that of on-land wind.
• The levelized capital cost of Natural Gas-fired Conventional Combined Cycle
is 17.4 (near the lowest among dispatchable technologies), compared to 83.4 for
Advanced Nuclear and 193.4 for Offshore Wind.
What is immediately clear is that the economic data favor, in terms of cost, the
use of dispatchable technologies over the non-dispatchable ones. The issue that the
electricity network or grid is unsuitable currently, say, for the large scale introduction
of alternative energy systems is simply a reflection that high capacity transmission
does not exist to and from much of the coastal regions where wave, tidal and wind
generation could be sited. But addressing this problem would not represent a recurring cost, so in that sense the investment cost is not overly serious. The acceptance of
large transmission systems in areas often of outstanding beauty would certainly be
considered problematic. However the issue of the emissions downside to the use of
fossil fuel remains.
Focusing now on the relative costs of wave and tidal where the data in the following
table is taken from a report prepared for the Scottish Government.18
The report asserts that the diminishing costs in time are due to global deployment
of the technologies and, as a consequence, the expected impact on learning and knowledge accumulation in the marine business; , the advantage that would come with an
expected increased level of deployment (scale); and a declining rate of increase in the
underlying costs. Overall, Tidal Stream appears to have the initial advantage but Wave
technology is predicted to have, in the longer term, the lowest levelized cost.

8.7. Some Challenges for Emerging Wave Energy Technologies
This section provides an illustration of how economic, political, social, and maintainability factors influence wave energy technologies’ route to market in the UK. It opens
with an exploration of an oil embargo in the Middle East, an area not renowned for its
abundance of water or waves.
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Table 8.1. Estimated Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources, 2018.
US average levelized costs (2011 $/megawatthour) for plants entering service in 2018
Plant type

Capacity Levelized
factor (%) capital cost

Fixed
O&M

Variable
O&M
(w/ fuel)

Transmission Total system
investment levelized cost

Dispatchable Technologies
Conventional
Coal

85

65.7

4.1

29.2

1.2

100.1

Advanced
Coal

85

84.4

6.8

30.7

1.2

123.0

Advanced Coal
with CCS

85

88.4

8.8

37.2

1.2

135.5

Conventional
Combined
Cycle

87

15.8

1.7

48.4

1.2

67.1

Advanced
Combined
Cycle

87

17.4

2.0

45.0

1.2

65.6

Advanced CC
with CCS

87

34.0

4.1

54.1

1.2

93.4

Conventional
Combustion
Turbine

30

44.2

2.7

80.0

3.4

130.3

Advanced
Combustion
Turbine

30

30.4

2.6

68.2

3.4

104.6

Advanced
Nuclear

90

83.4

11.6

12.3

1.1

108.4

Geothermal

92

76.2

12.0

0.0

1.4

89.6

Biomass

83

53.2

14.3

42.3

1.2

111.0

Natural Gas-Fired

Non-Dispatchable Technologies
Wind

34

70.3

13.1

0.0

3.2

86.6

Wind-Offshore

37

193.4

22.4

0.0

5.7

221.5

Solar PV1

25

130.4

9.9

0.0

4.0

144.3

Solar Thermal

20

214.2

41.4

0.0

5.9

261.5

Hydro2

52

78.1

4.1

6.1

2.0

90.3

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed in 1960
in order to create a system that stabilized the price of oil and in turn, the world’s energy markets. This aim was achieved successfully for many years by coordinating the
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Table 8.2. Summary of Levelized Costs (in January 2010 Terms). Case (£/MWhr).
Technology
Wave

Tidal Range

Tidal Stream
(shallow)
Tidal Stream
(deep)

Cost scenario
High
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Low

2020
253
214
177
349
279
205
211
173
141
250
203
166

2035
142
118
97
323
258
190
199
166
134
159
126
102

2050
105
86
71
286
229
168
166
138
111
129
102
82

policies of the member states, thereby protecting their mutual economic interest. In its
early days OPEC was not a political organization. In 1973, however, some OPEC members sent a strong political signal to the West by using a tool of economic warfare, the
embargo.19
In 1972 the price for a barrel of crude oil was around three dollars. This price had
quadrupled to over twelve dollars by the end of 1974. Western economies were given
the rare chance of a ride in a time machine and saw what the world would be like when
there was no longer an endless supply of cheap oil.20 The UK government began to assess
a wide range of possible energy options to ensure security of energy supplies.
One possible energy option was to develop the indigenous oil reserves held under
the UK’s North Sea. With extreme waves of up to thirty meters high, not to mention
long term effects of erosion and corrosion, it was clear that any development in this
harsh environment would not be without its technological and economic challenges.
It was estimated that overall, the development and production investment required
for an oilfield in the North Sea was in the region of £1200–£1500 per barrel per day.21
This significant capital investment posed a potential barrier. However, following the
events of the oil embargo, the oil was becoming so expensive that the North Sea was
viewed as being economically viable to exploit on a large scale, and consequently a high
level of investment took place. Investment in oil and gas extraction accounted for six
to eight percent of all UK fixed investment from 1975 to 1983.22 What made these prospects even more attractive was the fact that the North Sea was surrounded by politically
stable states, and possession of an indigenous source of oil and gas increased energy
security of supply.
In 1975, the required infrastructure of connecting pipelines and terminal facilities
were completed and the first oil from the Argyle field was brought ashore. This was followed soon after by oil from BP’s massive Forties field. Discoveries and production from
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the region grew as the UK sold leases on sectors in the North Sea to British, European,
and American companies.
Throughout this period of early oil industry development, the UK was still assessing
a wide range of energy options. Aware of the available resource lapping on the shores of
the UK and perhaps buoyed by offshore development possibilities being demonstrated
in the North Sea, government advisers advocated an urgent research program into the
potential of harnessing the UK’s wave resource. As a result, the Department of Energy
provided inducements to support innovation, funding wave energy research from 1974
to 1983 under its Wave Energy Programme. The program objectives were twofold: first
to establish the feasibility of extracting energy from ocean waves and second, to estimate the cost of energy if used on a large scale to supply UK requirements.
A large number of devices were considered during the program but were found
to be uneconomic. With hindsight, industry experts felt that the program’s objectives
were over ambitious resulting in massive devices, with corresponding high capital and
generating costs.23
By the early 1980s the UK was a net exporter of oil and as the energy crisis subsided, so did the interest in wave energy. A period of consolidated research followed
before a resurgence of interest during the mid 1990s, concurrent with a widespread
public recognition of both climate change issues and the finite nature of fossil and
nuclear energy sources.
As part of its commitment to tackle climate change, the UK is legally committed to
delivering fifteen percent of its energy demand from renewable sources by 2020, contributing to its energy security and decarbonization objectives.24 A policy framework
has been put in place to ensure that the wave energy industry can grow and help to meet
this clear mandate and encourage wave energy technology development.
When considering the progress of the wind energy industry since the 1970s, it has
been shown that the turbine industries have established themselves in countries such
as Denmark, where there have been suitable framework conditions in place providing
a stable domestic market.25 The innovators and early adopters now hold a significant
market share of the multi-billion-pound wind turbine market; in 2008 the combined
global market share of Denmark’s two largest wind turbine manufacturers was just
over twenty-seven percent.26 To date the UK’s policy framework is working to promote
a stable domestic market for the wave industry. As a result a large proportion of the
world’s marine energy device developers are either based in the UK or conducting tests
in UK waters.27
An important element of the UK’s framework is funding. To support the deployment of early wave energy technologies, short term capital funding is required. In the
recent economic downturn, a realization of technology risk and the long time to market
of early-stage wave energy technologies has led to a shift away from reliance on venture
capital money to fund the early stage of the industry. In order to fill the gap, public
funding has increased via initiatives such as the Marine Energy Array Demonstrator
(MEAD) fund, and some major industrial companies and utilities have taken equity
stakes in technology companies.
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Longer term funding streams are also essential. These provide certainty to investors
and an enhanced revenue stream for the first commercial projects. They are also vital
to encourage long-term investments by supply chain companies and offshore operations and maintenance contractors, key when considering maintainability. At present
this funding is provided through the Renewables Obligation (RO), the main market
support mechanism for renewable electricity projects in the UK. It places an obligation
on licensed electricity suppliers in the UK to source a proportion of their supply to customers from eligible renewable sources. It is monitored through Renewables Obligation
Certificates (ROCs); with suppliers required to acquire a certain number of ROCs per
MWh of electricity supplied to customers.28 Through a system banding within the RO,
there are incentives in place to create demand in the market for nascent technologies.
Under current banding, a wave energy installation receives five ROCs for each MWh
produced while an onshore wind installation receives one.29
While the funding streams available provide confidence, social factors require a
decrease in reliance on such policy instruments, paid for through levies on consumers.
The industry needs to demonstrate that considerable wave resource can be accessed,
converted to a useful form and delivered at a cost effectively in comparison with other
methods of energy generation (shown in Table 8.1).
Future reductions in wave energy’s levelized costs of energy (LCoE) lie through
programmes of Research and Development (R&D) combined with learning through
knowledge accumulation with deployment of technologies. As stated earlier, inducements to develop innovations often come in the form of research grants. In 2011,
around forty universities were identified globally which were focused on research
into marine renewable devices, with over a quarter of these based in the UK.30 This
research base is supported by high capital infrastructure required for testing. The
National Renewable Energy Centre (NaREC) and the European Marine Energy Centre
(EMEC) currently provide facilities in the UK to test components and deploy full
scale devices respectively.
When considering significant offshore operations, such as the deployment of a full
scale wave device, the nascent wave industry in the UK is able to leverage the learning
and knowledge that has been accumulated in the oil industry over the previous four
decades. The rapid development of the North Sea’s oil industry was aided by the strong
competition and investment, which lead to the development of new technology that was
at the forefront of the industry’s major achievements. Technologies such as dynamically
positioned vessels and geophysical survey tools used to develop oil reserves are now
being effectively used in the development of offshore renewables.
As stated in the Economics of Energy section, decreased levelized costs are expected to come as a result of an increased scale of deployment of technology. To date,
forty-one wave and tidal sites have been leased from the Crown Estate, which owns or
has vested interests in almost the entirety of the seabed to twelve nautical miles around
the UK. With a total potential installed capacity of approximately two GW, this is the
largest development pipeline of wave and tidal projects in the world, effectively creating
demand by providing a route to market for developing technologies.31
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The majority of these leased areas are in an early development phase, seeking regulatory permissions from the consenting authorities before the implementation of the
project. As part of any consent application, and depending on the scale of the proposed
project, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) may be required under legislation.
The International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) defines an EIA as “the
process of identifying, predicting, evaluating and mitigating the biophysical, social, and
other relevant effects of development proposals prior to major decisions being taken
and commitments made.”32 The process ensures that all likely impacts, both positive
and negative, are fully appraised before the project is allowed to proceed. For any proposed wave development this appraisal would include consideration of the effects of
proposed project infrastructure upon the landscape and seascape.
The process ensures that all likely impacts, both positive and negative, are fully appraised before the project is allowed to proceed. For any proposed wave development, this
appraisal would include consideration of the visual impact on the landscape and seascape,
as well as a range of other environmental factors. Grid infrastructure upgrades required
to meet any increased generation capacity would also be appraised through this process.
As with most forms of renewable resources, wave energy is unevenly distributed.
With exposure to the prevailing westerly wind direction and the long Atlantic fetch, the
far north and west (and least populous) areas of the UK, tend to have the most energetic
wind and wave climates. In order to help to meet renewable energy targets, the UK has
an opportunity to generate energy from its far-flung periphery.
The grid network was designed to transmit and distribute electricity from big, central power stations to our cities, towns and onwards, through ever thinner wires, to
remote regions of the UK. Akin to the infrastructure of connecting pipelines and terminal facilities required for the successful development of the North Sea oil industry,
appropriate grid infrastructure is essential for wave technologies to succeed in the UK.

8.8. Conclusion
Introducing renewable energy sources into an existing market is a complex socio-technoeconomic challenge, which requires many agencies to align their objectives if a successful outcome is to be achieved. Because of the economics of delivering energy to the
consumer, which favors traditional sources, the commitment to embark on a heavy
cycle of investment in renewable energy systems is contingent on governments accepting the need to manage environmental impacts and address climate change (for example by controlling CO2 and other gases in the atmosphere). Governments are the
agents of society; thus individuals as part of the community have a clear role to play.
To date a balanced debate between all stakeholders has been marked by its absence
and special interest groups with their particular agenda have dominated the debate. As
ever with such complex situations a well-informed understanding of what is involved
is critical if sound decisions on the future of energy are to be made. And that process
of being informed and informing should not be confined to technologists, economists,
and engineers. Society in general has a role especially bearing in mind that the choices
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involved are difficult ones to make. And perhaps we do not have the tools available to
make such choices. The introduction of additional power transmission networks (grids)
and devices in areas of often great beauty has to be balanced against the advantages of
curtailing climate change. How are citizens to make such choices with such diverse and
competing factors at play?
The debate is not simply terrestrial. Andre Bryans has noted that “the installation
of Tidal Energy Devices will result in the earth moon distance increasing at a rate
of approximately 1 cm per year per 1 TW year extracted.”33 The point here is not so
much the increase in orbit of the moon but rather the complexity of systems by which
the unexpected, to some, can result. We are undoubtedly at the beginning of a long
learning curve.
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Chapter 9
Transportation and Energy
Richard A. Simmons, Shaun McFadden,
David Kennedy, and Mary Johnson

Abstract
The role of transportation in society and commerce today is undoubtedly more far-reaching than at any prior time in history. This chapter explores both the literal and figurative
prime movers that have defined more than a century of innovation in transportation. In
section one we commence with an overview of transportation energy and its links with the
environment, consumers and related policies. Particular attention to the implications of
the sector’s reliance on petroleum is given. Gasoline and diesel fuel have proven extremely
well suited in providing ample energy, in a dense, portable and low cost manner. We review basic thermochemistry behind the combustion of liquid petroleum fuels in setting
the stage to compare strategies aimed at reducing environmental impacts sector-wide.
Sections two and three explore recent developments and case studies focused on
electric and hybrid vehicles, and aviation respectively. Historical trends, key policies
and global interactions are also discussed along with noteworthy actions taken by lead
nations. For both ground transport and aviation, priority is being given to efficiency, as
economic paybacks are attractive and environmental benefits can be felt immediately.
Next and equally critical, are focused efforts to develop and commercialize alternative
fuels, advanced vehicles and technologies over the mid to longer term. A brief overview
of fuel cells is also provided. Environmental impacts and sector emissions are discussed
as increasingly imperative, but not exclusive, inputs to energy transitions in transport.
A more coordinated overall approach is suggested to help achieve secure and sustainable economic, environmental and social objectives in the coming decades. Prompt
execution of definitive actions, largely known today, can be critical in stimulating what
many experts believe are necessary reduction trends. Through the overviews, case studies, and policy analysis, the authors suggest that near term steps will heavily influence
the composition of automotive and aviation fleets and their fuel supplies by 2030.
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9.1. Transportation Energy Overview
9.1.1. Introduction
As we shift gears to consider energy for transportation, it quickly becomes apparent
that the sector’s Achilles heel is its disproportionate reliance on oil. From one’s daily
commute, to the family vacation, and even the laptop shipped from overseas—chances
are that transportation, fueled by petroleum, has made it possible. This has significant
geopolitical, economic, and environmental consequences, none of which are easily navigated in the near term. While the oil dependency of major consuming countries varies,
the United States is not unique with a transportation sector that accounts for nearly
thirty percent of total domestic energy consumption and a similar percentage of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.1 Strides have been made in the United States and elsewhere
to ensure that electricity needs for stationary power can be met by a diverse suite of
domestically sourced coal, natural gas, nuclear, hydro and a host of emerging renewable
resources. By contrast, the US remains reliant on petroleum for about ninety percent of
transportation needs.2 And the US is not alone.
For many countries, including the US and many European states, oil is often the
single most significant imported item, accounting for ever-increasing shares of GDP
and driving trade deficits. Even oil rich nations face concerns including inefficient
domestic use, wasteful national subsidies, air quality, and capacity management in
the face of volatile global markets. It is estimated that there are nearly one billion vehicles on the road today, with expectations that the global fleet will exceed 1.3 billion
by 2020.3 In China alone, the vehicle fleet grew ten-fold from about two million in
1980 to twenty million by 2005.4 In 2012, more than eighteen million new light duty
vehicles entered the Chinese market, a tally that led the world in units produced and
surpassed sales in the US (fourteen million) and Europe (sixteen million).5 Any discussion seeking to advance an understanding of the global energy crisis must include
an analysis of the transportation sector and the central role played by oil. It must also
consider some of the challenges, opportunities, technologies, and policies associated
with replacing petroleum and developing more sustainable forms of energy for the
transit of people and goods.
Experts agree that substantial reductions in oil consumption and emissions can
be achieved through a combination of measures over near, intermediate, and long
term horizons. With regard to ground transportation, improvements to vehicle efficiency, diversification of alternative fuel supplies, and realistic scale up of hybrid,
electric, and advanced vehicles over the long term constitute key strategic developments. An eventual transition to hydrogen as an alternative fuel may also become
technically and economically viable in the long term, though many significant challenges loom. In addition to passenger cars, transportation segments such as aviation,
rail and maritime represent areas of considerable opportunity for reducing reliance
on traditional petroleum fuels and reducing the sector’s carbon footprint. Technology
deployment will be the driving force behind this strategy, but this will take time and
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impose significant costs. Successful implementation would help mitigate national security, environmental and trade concerns, but expectations should remain realistic.
Resource diversification can pay double dividends by not only curbing demand, but
also by redirecting significant quantities of oil to higher value purposes with fewer alternatives such as aviation, fertilizer, plastic, and chemical production. And yet even
successful conservation and optimization initiatives in developed regions like the US
and Europe, may do little to change global oil consumption as the developing world
grows and competes for scarce supplies.

9.1.2. Efficiency and Vehicle Technology
Efficiency enabled by vehicle technology is the single most effective tool for reducing oil
use in the near term. Higher oil prices combined with aggressive new rules by the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for increasing Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards are expected to result in higher efficiency internal combustion
engines and reductions in vehicle weight. In 1973 during the oil embargo, cars in the US
averaged fourteen miles per gallon (mpg). Five years later, CAFE standards were introduced for passenger vehicles at a level of eighteen mpg. This was increased gradually to
27.5 mpg by 1990, where it remained unchanged until 2011. The recent EPA rulemaking
sets a goal of 35.5 mpg to be met by 2016, followed by a five percent annual increase for
nine years to an equivalent fuel economy of 54.5 mpg by 2025. Many experts indicate
that fuel economies in the 40 mpg range are achievable within ten years from technologies under development today. To achieve interim CAFE targets within this decade,
recent estimates predict that technology upgrades will result in cost premiums in the
range of $1500–$4500 per vehicle at production scales.6 Many believe that these investments are justified, given that they will be offset or exceeded by fuel savings; though
given the variability of gasoline and diesel prices, it proves difficult to predict benefit/
cost ratios with certainty. Despite this, there is reason to have confidence in selected
near-term estimates, as the technology under development is largely identified. Though
not exhaustive, key technological innovations include the following:
• Weight Savings (while maintaining safety and crash worthiness)
ȎȎ Advanced materials (composites and alloys)
ȎȎ Removal of excess payload
ȎȎ Downsizing within classification footprints
• Improvements to Internal Combustion Engine (ICE)
ȎȎ Higher thermal efficiencies
ȎȎ Increased use and optimization of turbochargers, reduction in displacement at constant performance
ȎȎ Improved combustion (higher compression, variable valve actuation, advanced sensors, optimized control)
ȎȎ Selective cylinder de-activation
• Improvements to Vehicle
ȎȎ Regenerative braking and idle-off (stop-start) modes
ȎȎ Improved transmissions (increased number of discrete gears)
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ȎȎ Higher voltage systems (reduced resistive losses)
ȎȎ Reduced aerodynamic drag, rolling resistance, and friction
ȎȎ Improved air conditioning systems, including lower impact refrigerants
Looking further down the road, a marked point of diminishing economic returns on increased fuel economy at affordable premiums may potentially occur in
the 2020–2030 timeframe and above fifty mpg. Actual viability of ultra-efficient vehicles clearly depends on the future price of oil, a very difficult commodity to predict
even one year ahead, let alone ten to fifteen. Reaching 54.5 mpg for the fleet target average, meaning essentially half of new vehicles sold (including light duty vehicles and
light trucks) should exceed this value, will only be possible by significantly growing
the market share of hybrid/electric, fuel-cell, and advanced alternative vehicle technologies. However, this technology remains extremely expensive and may require
additional infrastructure. These technologies, and their associated cost estimates,
are less evolutionary by nature, and risk factors are therefore higher. In addition, for
grid-recharged electric vehicles, the impact on GHG emissions is highly dependent
on the source of electricity used. Studies indicate that the lifecycle environmental
impact and emissions of an electric vehicle recharged with coal-derived electricity
may not, in fact, be better than an equivalent vehicle with a gasoline powered internal combustion engine. If natural gas, renewables, or nuclear power is used for
recharging, then the net lifecycle emissions impact is superior. To quantify this, one
study projects that by 2015, a fully electrified Nissan Leaf would emit twenty grams
of CO2 per kilometer in France, where much of the electricity comes from nuclear
power, but 114 g/km in the UK, where there is a greater reliance on coal. In heavily
coal-dependent countries such as Poland or Luxembourg, estimated emissions are
135 g/km.7 Thus, while one overarching objective is to reduce oil consumption, a
parallel objective is to reduce the environmental footprint by increasing the use of
lower carbon sources. Experts urge caution against unrealistic expectations for the
growth rate of purely electric vehicles, noting that market share in a decade could
remain in the single digits.
Challenges notwithstanding, consumer demand for vehicles with a reduced impact on energy resources and the environment has increased, and products showcasing many of the aforementioned technologies are beginning to satisfy that market
trend. Vehicle efficiency standards (such as CAFE) which encourage the introduction
of such advanced technologies, taken along with advanced alternative fuels could together help reduce oil consumption on the order of thirteen to forty percent by 2035.8
These levels of reduction can only be realized if efficiency gains are cashed in directly to reduce oil consumption, rather than being traded for increased performance,
weight, or additional use (known as the rebound effect). This trade-out phenomenon
characterized the Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs) and sports cars of the 1990s and early
2000s, as engine power, vehicle capacity, and weight increased dramatically, while
fuel economy remained relatively flat. Looking forward, oil reductions in transportation that are not displaced by coal-electricity should reduce the associated GHG
emissions proportionately.
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9.1.3. Alternative Fuels and Diversity at the Pump: Biofuels, Natural Gas, and Hydrogen
Alongside aggressive efficiency improvements, alternative fuels have the potential to offer
considerable near-term promise in campaigns to reduce oil and emissions. It should be
noted that alternative fuel availability and adoption are highly regionally dependent. Conventional biofuels currently account for an impressive ten percent of US gasoline supply
(or about seven percent of US liquid transport fuels at nearly thirteen billion gallons per
year or 600,000 boe/d), primarily in the form of corn-based ethanol blended gasoline.
By 2022, US policy calls for twenty-one of the predicted thirty-six billion gallons of renewable fuels to come from advanced non-food sources such as cellulosic biomass and
algae, more than doubling current biofuels penetration. There is increasing concern that
renewable fuel targets will be missed, as significant technical and economic challenges
have delayed the commercialization of advanced fuels. Other infrastructure, storage and
delivery aspects of higher alternative fuel blend percentages will also require attention.
Despite this, research indicates that ethanol can reduce GHG emissions as compared to
gasoline. Reductions vary depending upon the process and feedstock, for example: corn
ethanol reduces emissions by twenty percent; sugarcane ethanol by sixty percent; and
cellulosic ethanol by sixty to ninety percent. Several US companies are bringing pilot facilities online in 2013 and 2014, with projected full-scale production of cellulosic ethanol
within five years. On January 1, 2012, Congress allowed fiscal support and import tariffs
for conventional ethanol to expire. Legislation and support policies that would re-direct
future tax incentives or loan guarantees toward advanced biofuels and infrastructure upgrades have been introduced, but have not been adopted as law.
The United States and Brazil (with bioethanol from corn and sugarcane) and Europe
(with biodiesel from rapeseed and waste cooking oil) account for more than ninety percent of the world’s biofuel production. The commercial availability of flex-fuel vehicles,
beginning in the early 2000s, has enabled higher blends of biofuels with conventional
petroleum fuels. So-called first generation biofuels dominate the biofuels market, owing
to their simple conversions from established crops, such as corn, sugarcane, rapeseed,
and soybeans. Increasing attention to land-use and environmental impacts has resulted
in constructive national and international dialogues over ways to ensure the sustainable
production of biofuels. Scale-up of advanced biofuels will require the utilization of low
cost, non-food feedstocks, such as agricultural residue, municipal solid waste, woody
and cellulosic biomass, and potentially algae.
Natural gas currently comprises less than one percent of transport fuel, but demonstrates remarkable potential for growth—particularly with urban fleets of buses, delivery vehicles, taxis, and other mass transit vehicles. Heavy duty and long haul transport
offer additional segments where natural gas could serve as a key transport fuel. Abundant supplies of low cost natural gas and developed infrastructure in both centralized
urban and residential locations could make this fuel a competitive alternative in the
medium term. Gaseous fuels include Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), Dimethyl Ether (DME), Bio-Gas, and Hydrogen; all have the potential
to emit cleaner air than liquid petroleum transport fuels. Atomised gas fueled (AGF)-powered vehicles for instance perform significantly better than their conventional
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counterparts in terms of NOx and PM emissions. They have reduced CO2 emissions over
gasoline and diesel, and uptake of AGF could constitute a step in the transition toward
a hydrogen-based road transport system. Propane (LPG) has a higher energy density
than gasoline, burns cleaner, and results in less fouling of plugs and contamination of
oil.9 As a result, it is broadly used in industry for factory applications, as a fuel for forklifts and maintenance vehicles.
Natural gas engine technology and infrastructure upgrades are currently expensive,
and few consumers are willing to pay an estimated $2000–$4500, or more, to switch a
light duty vehicle over from gasoline. However, a sustained fuel price spread with oil due
to the shale gas revolution improves the prospects, reducing payback periods and resulting in a more compelling overall value proposition for natural gas. While US natural gas
prices have recently decoupled from global crude oil, they are predicted to rise modestly
in the coming years, particularly if the United States embarks on an export strategy or
substantially accelerates the transition from coal powered electricity. Studies suggest that
CNG has the potential to displace 180 million barrels of crude oil per day between 2025
and 2040, particularly if it can be phased in for fleet applications that rely heavily on diesel.
A gradual conversion and replacement of transit, delivery and heavy-duty vehicles could
result in a five to ten percent reduction in diesel demand, and yield significant benefits
by improving energy security and fuel price stability while reducing carbon emissions.10
Public and private research in alternative fuels continues at an aggressive pace.
Many vehicles can be converted to run on hydrogen as a green alternative to gasoline,
however research is addressing concerns related to storage, safety, infrastructure and
sourcing. These, and other economic constraints, will have to be resolved before hydrogen and hydrogen fuel cells can achieve appreciable market share. Meanwhile, the
Vehicle Technologies Program of the Department of Energy funds and coordinates a
portfolio of vehicle research into such areas as hybrids, energy storage, advanced combustion engines, and advanced materials. Similarly, the European Union has launched
the European Green Cars Initiative, involving “research on a broad range of technologies and smart energy infrastructures essential to achieve a breakthrough in the use
of renewable and non-polluting energy sources.”11 Both US and European initiatives
focus on mid to long-term R&D and emphasize the importance of aligned approaches
between industry and policy makers.

9.1.4. Combustion Overview and Primary Transport Emissions
When fossil fuels burn, hydrocarbons combine with oxygen (or air) to produce carbon
dioxide, water and heat. The amount of heat produced is a function of the chemical energy
potential of the fuel and the efficiency of the process. The energy content, or so-called higher-heating value or calorific value of a fuel is the quantity of heat produced by its combustion under standard conditions (that is, at a temperature of 0°C and a constant pressure of
1,013 mbar). On a mass basis, the calorific values of diesel and gasoline (petrol) are comparable at 45.5 MJ/kg and 45.8 MJ/kg, respectively. Diesel fuel is, however, more dense
than gasoline and contains approximately ten percent more energy by volume (roughly
36.9 MJ/liter compared to 33.7 MJ/liter). Diesel engines operate at a higher thermody-
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namic efficiency than gasoline counterparts. These facts help explain why diesel powered vehicles can generally achieve better efficiencies than gasoline powered vehicles.
Just as energy content determines heat output, the amount of carbon produced by a
combustion reaction depends largely on the carbon intensity of the fuel. A rough rule of
thumb suggests that for equivalent units of energy produced, natural gas emits about half
and petroleum fuels about three-quarters of the carbon dioxide produced by coal. The emissions from a four-stroke Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) depend on the ratio of air to fuel
as they enter the cylinder during the intake stroke. The combustion of octane, a key component of gasoline, with the theoretical or “stoichiometric” amount of air is shown below.12
C8H18 + 12.5(O2 + 3.76 N2) → 8CO2 + 9H2O + 47N2
With less air than the theoretical amount, the mixture is rich, forming some Carbon
monoxide (CO) and unburned hydrocarbons (HC). This may inhibit the production of
nitrous oxides (NOx) due to lower combustion temperatures. With a higher proportion
of air, fuel becomes the limiting reactant, and this lean mixture generally results in the
formation of fewer unwanted products of combustion. If, however, the mixture becomes
excessively lean, misfire can occur, resulting in emissions of unburned hydrocarbons
(HC). Diesel engines operate with a lean mixture and emissions of HCs and COs are
low, but NOx emissions are high due to high operating temperatures. Diesel engines also
emit soot particles (or black carbon), and as a result have been known to pose health and
respiratory risks. Led by a core group of national governments, the multi-phase/multiyear implementation of stringent environmental regulations on gaseous and particulate
matter (PM) from diesel engines has helped mitigate such risks considerably.
Catalytic converters serve the purpose of reducing emissions of the main pollutants
(CO, HC, and NOx) that result from the incomplete combustion of transport fuels. Operating at elevated temperatures with specialized materials, the converters oxidize HCs
and COs to CO2; as well as reducing NOx to N2, nitrogen gas, a benign agent comprising
seventy-eight percent of the earth’s atmosphere.
As noted, fuels differ in the amount of carbon and energy they contain and this
has implications for fuel economy and greenhouse emissions. To quantify one potential
comparison, a car fueled by gasoline emitting 148 g CO2/km would emit 130 g CO2/km
if fueled on LPG. Despite its lower energy density by volume, a twelve percent net reduction in emissions on a per kilometer basis would result. It should be noted that the proportion of tailpipe versus upstream GHG emmissions comprising the total CO2eq/km
for gasoline, LPG, and other fuels can vary substantially. Table 9.1 shows typical
amounts of CO2 emitted from the combustion of three primary transport fuels.
Table 9.1 Typical CO2 Tailpipe Emissions Per Volume of Fuel Consumed.13
Fuel Type
Gasoline/Petrol
Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG)
Diesel

CO2 Emissions
Kg/Liter of Fuel
2.3 kg/L
1.6 kg/L
2.7 kg/L

CO2 Emissions
Lbs/Gallon of Fuel
19.4 lbs/gal
12.7 lbs/gal
22.2 lbs/gal
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Figure 9.1. Example of CO2 Emissions (Tonnes) from Production and Use Over Vehicle
Lifespan.
In the production process of a vehicle it is estimated that 720 kg of CO2e is produced
for every €1,000 of purchase price (about 1220 lbs CO2e per $1000). The production of
a medium car therefore can generate up to 17 tonnes of CO2e and a typical gasoline fueled car produces approximately 1.8 metric tonnes of CO2 for every 10,000 km driven.
Figure 9.1 charts the combined CO2 emissions profile for an average vehicle including
production and use, projected for a vehicle’s operating life.14

9.1.5. Regulating Emissions from the Transportation Sector
As noted earlier, the Kyoto Protocol is generally seen as an important first step toward
a global emission reduction regime aimed at stabilizing GHG emissions, and providing
essential architecture for future international agreement on climate change. This has
significant implications for transport emissions, which account for about twenty-five
percent of the total from fossil fuel combustion worldwide, and grew forty-five percent
between 1990 and 2007.15 Regulation on vehicle fuel economy (as in the United States)
or fuel consumption (such as in Europe) for new vehicles has been the primary policy
mechanism aimed at curbing emissions in the sector. As noted above, aggressive fuel
economy targets have been established via CAFE standards through 2025, with similar
initiatives in place for Europe. The prevalence of gasoline and diesel in transport means
that there is, at present, a tight correlation between fuel consumption (or fuel economy)
and vehicle emissions. For example, 54.5 mpg is roughly equivalent to about seventy to
eighty grams of CO2 equivalent per kilometer driven. The existing CAFE policies combine fuel economy and emission regulations into one standard. More precisely, while
the Department of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) sets fuel economy specifications directly, EPA regulations specify emission
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targets which can be correlated to effective fuel economy targets based upon vehicle size
(or footprint) classification.
The European Commission imposes standards on GHG emissions for new vehicles
explicitly. In 2010, the approximate level of CO2 equivalent emitted per km from new
cars sold in Europe was 143 grams, having fallen from 167 grams in 2002. Currently,
the EU has in place a target of 130 grams by 2015, and a proposed target of 95 grams
for 2020. By 2030, a range of 50 grams CO2/km and 70 grams CO2/km (depending on
vehicle technology) is targeted for cars, and a range between 75 grams CO2/km and 105
grams CO2/km applies to vans. These targets are seen as credible but challenging by
industry, and they are consistent with the EU goal of ensuring that average emissions of
new car and vans are near-zero at the tailpipe by 2040.

9.1.6. Consumer Behavior and Intelligent Transit
Clearly, consumers play a critical role in long term strategies to reduce oil use. In the absence of a price on carbon, persuading consumers to reduce their energy footprint will
remain challenging. However, higher gasoline prices have already initiated a market-induced behavioral shift. Increasing availability of affordable lower carbon fuels and efficient vehicle options will continue this trend. Reduction in vehicle miles traveled (VMT)
via carpooling, teleworking, real-time route optimizations, and expanded use of mass
transit will further reduce oil consumption. At the vehicle and system level, it will be
increasingly possible to leverage powerful data acquisition and network resources to
inform driving behavior and enhance overall efficiency. As transportation represents
the second highest expense in most American household budgets, consumers stand to
directly benefit from reduced dependence on and volatility of oil. Complemented by
coordinated policies at the state and municipal levels, consumer behavioral change has
the potential to contribute to double digit reductions in oil used for transport.
An important aspect of consumer behavior is clearly product selection. An individual’s
decision to purchase a given vehicle is a complex matter of personal need and preference,
value judgment, budget, and a critical assessment of major attributes. Yet, it is certainly a
topic to which a wide audience can relate, and potentially, an opportunity to examine a host
of theories and research findings. Much has been written on this by a range of experts in
business, academia, and government; and a thorough discussion of this topic is beyond the
scope of this book. However, energy transitions in the context of transportation technology
and policy can be illuminated by a brief glance at fundamental operating costs of existing
and emerging vehicles. Consider a hypothetical comparison of 6 selected vehicles, using a
variety of fuel sources and technologies, all subjected to the same real world conditions. Table 9.2 summarizes first order results from one such thought experiment. It is by no means
exhaustive, and while many assumptions must be made, such an exercise can begin to help
quantify relative operating costs and impact on emissions for various vehicle architectures.16
The purpose of such a thought experiment is not to “advocate” for any particular
option, nor to suggest that any specific vehicle, technology or company is best. Instead,
it is meant to introduce the notion that numerous factors can be significant in a vehicle
decision, and economic and environmental implications must be balanced against other

224

Simmons, McFadden, Kennedy, and Johnson

Table 9.2 Comparison of Vehicle Operating Cost and Emissions for Various Vehicle
Architectures.16
Vehicle
Energy
Source

Vehicle Make/
Model and
Driving Mode

2013
MSRP

Operating
Cost
Scenario 1
($/mile)

Operating
Cost
Scenario 2
($/mile)

Total Est.
Emissions
(t CO2)

Fuel
Economy
(mpg or
mpge)

Gasoline

Ford Focus
(All Gasoline)

$16,200

$0.365

$0.462

30.0

31

Diesel

VW Jetta TDI
(All Diesel)

$22,990

$0.462

$0.538

31.8

34

Hybrid
Gasoline

Toyota Prius
(Hybrid
Gasoline)

$24,200

$0.427

$0.487

18.6

50

Nissan Leaf
(Electricity
Mix A)

$28,800

$0.445

$0.455

16.8

115

Nissan Leaf
(Electricity
Mix B)

$28,800

$0.445

$0.455

6.7

115

Nissan Leaf
(With Subsidy)

$21,300

$0.339

$0.349

6.7–19.3

115

Chevy Volt
(All Electric,
Mix A)

$39,145

$0.600

$0.611

18.9

98

Chevy Volt (All
$39,145
Gasoline)

$0.668

$0.749

23.5

37

Chevy Volt
(80/20 EV Gas,
Mix A)

$39,145

$0.612

$0.639

19.2

74

Chevy Volt
(80/20 EV Gas,
Mix B)

$39,145

$0.613

$0.639

9.7

74

Chevy Volt
(All Electric,
with Subsidy)

$31,645

$0.494

$0.504

9.7–20.4

98

Chevy Volt
(All Gasoline,
with Subsidy)

$31,645

$0.561

$0.634

23.5

37

Honda Civic
NG

$27,255

$0.488

$0.569

29.1

31

Electric
Vehicle
(EV)

Plug-in
Hybrid EV
(PHEV)

Compressed
Natural
Gas (CNG)
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criteria and preferences, including safety and styling. That said, a more analytical assessment of comparative options may help inform the interdependent development of technology and policy, while meeting long term consumer and social objectives. The reader is
thus encouraged to consider how the rubber literally meets the road as personal values and
preferences are put increasingly into a greater social and global energy/climate context.

9.1.7. Policy Overview
The enactment of robust policies is essential to ensuring successful outcomes, as policies
experience rapid iteration to varying degrees of success. Transport policy in particular is
essential to achieve successful reduction of CO2 emissions. Some policies are aimed at taxing fuel or creating market-based mechanisms for trading emissions and/or carbon credits.
Others are encouraging, by subsidy, regulation or mandate, greater adoption of cleaner
fuels, energy efficiency, and alternative energy sources. Economic uncertainty and broad
differences of opinion among voters and their elected officials have made consensus on energy and climate policy difficult to achieve. State and local authorities often have more flexibility to execute energy policy measures than large national governments. In the United
States as of 2013, for example, a clean energy standard (CES) has been controversial at the
Federal level, yet at least half of the fifty states have passed legislation such as a renewable
portfolio standard (RPS) specifying certain amounts of renewable energy.17 In addition,
many US states mandate the use of ethanol blended fuel (E10), and some impose additional
requirements on renewable fuels, as in the case of the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard. The implementation of local, state, or regional policies may benefit from coordination
with neighboring efforts, as policy effectiveness can be sensitive to scale. In addition, automakers generally prefer a consistent policy and regulatory context to facilitate standardization in design and manufacturing. Flexible and comprehensive policies that accommodate
technological, economic, and social considerations can help relieve geopolitical and global
economic stress and reduce emissions while helping to normalize trade balances. Thus,
rectifying an overdependence on crude oil becomes a tremendous opportunity, with triple-bottom-line benefits. As the industry adapts and pursues a more sustainable future, the
visionary spirit of Henry Ford, Thomas Edison, and the Wright brothers is alive and well
today. This is welcome indeed, because a new journey of a thousand miles has begun.

9.2. Electric and Hybrid Vehicles
9.2.1. Introduction
Today’s ground vehicles represent over a century of sustained technological progress
and provide mobility and access that quite literally open doors to new worlds. They are
seemingly ubiquitous; some eighty-one million were produced in 2011 alone. Figure 9.2
shows global vehicle production between 1997 and 2011.18
It is well-known that the Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) Vehicle has dominated
the industry over the last century, and effectively powers the vast majority of the world’s
estimated one billion vehicles. As noted in the previous section, ensuring a sustainable
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Figure 9.2: Global Vehicle Production Figures for Recent Years.
future for ground transportation will require solutions that help wean the world from
petroleum-derived fuels and reduce emissions. In 2011, seventy-one percent of the petroleum supplied to all sectors in the United States found its way to the fuel tanks of
the nation’s boats, planes, trains, and predominantly, ground vehicles.19 The market is
not yet diverse, as Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs) accounted for 3% of total vehicles
sales in the US in 2012, Electric Vehicles (EVs) just 0.3%, and Compressed Natural Gas,
0.008%.20 The remainder of new car sales in the US (96.7%) are safely assumed to be
conventional ICE vehicles operating with gasoline or diesel fuel. Recent annual growth
trends for HEVs are noteworthy, and the US has more HEVs than any other county having recently surpassed the one million mark, but change progresses slowly. While the
market share of many alternatives is growing, diversification is still a relatively recent
development. Despite that newer vehicles account for a greater share of the miles driven,
the estimated fleet turnover ratio in the US is about fifteen to twenty years, implying
the overall US fleet remains comprised of nearly ninety-nine percent gasoline or diesel
powered vehicles.21 The composition of national fleets in other countries is not substantially different, though the ratio of gasoline to diesel engines can vary considerably.

9.2.2. Challenges Faced by Transportation
The challenges to the transportation sector are as clear as they are significant, and while
they may not be unique to this sector, they are certainly felt more acutely. The most important challenges are the threat of oil depletion, greenhouse gas emissions, and other
tailpipe pollutants.
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Predictions about peak oil abound, but since 1983, global production of oil has exceeded global oil discoveries. Unconventional and deep offshore resources are coming
online, but shortfalls and gaps between production and reserves have been known to result in higher prices. In turn, this may justify the use of new and unproven technologies
and greater risks to extract oil that has previously been deemed uneconomic. Even with
potentially expensive and unconventional supplies, crude oil is clearly a finite resource
and its depletion is a legitimate concern.
The products of combustion of a petroleum derived fuel burned in oxygen include water (H2O) and carbon dioxide (CO2). Both emissions were once thought of as
benign, non-polluting substances that could be safely released into the atmosphere.
However, it has become clear that increasing levels of greenhouse gases, notably CO2,
contribute to global warming and climate change. In 2009, transportation accounted
for twenty-three percent of global CO2 emissions, ranking second among all sectors
behind electricity.22
In the past, vehicles burned lower quality fuels in less efficient engines, resulting in
high levels of air pollution concentrated in urban centers. Modern vehicles have significantly reduced air pollutants such as NOx and SOx (gases comprising either nitrogen
and oxygen or sulfur and oxygen). However, tailpipe emissions such as particulate matter from diesel exhaust can still cause health and respiratory conditions. With increasing urbanization and vehicle use, localized air pollution poses a significant problem.
This is particularly true for developing nations where vehicle fleets may be older or
non-compliant with modern emissions standards.

9.2.3. The Role of Technology
From a global and social perspective we may consider a quantity of interest to be dependent on multiple related factors namely: population size (P), affluence (A), technology
(T), and end-user usage (U). A dimensional analysis illustrates how the resultant quantity of interest can be expressed as the product of the disaggregated factors:
Quantity � of
� Interest = P � × � A × T � × U

For example, consider global CO2 emissions from transport in terms of appropriate
factors.

 km
 Vehicles   CO2  
year 
CO2 � emissions
� per � year = ( Population ) × 
×
×
 People   km   Vehicle 



The CO2 emissions per year (on a mass basis) depends on population size, the ratio
of vehicles to people (affluence factor), the average mass of CO2 produced per kilometer
of travel (technology factor), and the average number of kilometers traveled per year per
vehicle (usage factor).
It may be difficult to calculate the factors individually but the effects of a change in
any given factor are evident. The global population is about seven billion, and growing
steadily. Similarly, vehicle ownership per capita is on an increasing trajectory worldwide.
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Therefore, in order to reduce the level of CO2 emissions, we must look at reducing the
remaining disaggregated factors: improvements in the technology to reduce the average
mass of CO2 emitted per km, or reductions in vehicle usage in a given year.
Direct comparisons of CO2 emissions for ICE and EVs are complicated. CO2 estimates for ICE vehicles are based on combustion chemistry of standardized and well-understood fuels. As noted in the previous section, the ideal combustion of one liter of
octane produces approximately 2.3 kg of CO2 (Please see Table 9.1). The technology factor is estimated by multiplying the carbon intensity by the fuel economy: 2.3 × (L/km).
Slight variances may apply for different fuel types or blends, but the approach and order
of magnitude remain valid. This methodology is called a tank-to-wheel (T2W) analysis.
On the other hand, EVs have no direct tailpipe emissions and we may assume that the
corresponding technology factor is zero CO2/Km. However, if we extend the analysis to
include the primary electricity source we find that the CO2 emissions and CO2 intensity
per kWh vary greatly and are dependent upon the source of electricity. For EVs this
approach for calculating CO2 emissions is called a well-to-wheel (W2W) analysis.
Similar thought exercises, as just described, may be performed on petroleum consumption or tailpipe emissions in transportation by changing the technology factor.
For petroleum consumption the technology factor is changed to fuel economy (L/km).
For tailpipe emissions (such as NOx) the technology factor is changed to units of mass
of unwanted emissions per km (for example, NOx/km). The role of technology is clear—
improvements in technology can reduce petroleum consumption, CO2 emissions, and
other tailpipe emissions.
Recently, much discussion has revolved around the electrification of vehicle drivelines and the benefits conferred by these new technologies. Two distinct modes of electric vehicles have come to the fore, namely, the Electric Vehicle (EV) and the Hybrid
Electric Vehicle (HEV). New electric mobility technologies are emerging as both viable
competitors and complementary systems to the internal combustion engine.

9.2.4. A Brief Automotive Journey Through Time
It is a mistake to consider vehicle electrification as a new technology, and the historical
record is instructive as we look forward to a new era in transportation. The electric vehicle has its own long-established history, enjoying a significant share of the vehicle market during the industry’s early years (1895–1905). In the year 1900, for example, 4200
vehicles were sold in the United States, of which forty percent were steam driven, thirty-eight percent were EV, and twenty-two percent were ICE vehicles.23 Following early
steam-powered vehicles by Cugnot (1769) and Trevithick (1801), Thomas Davenport
developed one of the first DC electric motors and demonstrated its use on a small model
vehicle in the 1830s. Shortly afterward, Robert Anderson developed a non-rechargeable
Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) which was followed by the invention of a rechargeable
battery by Gaston Planté in the 1860s. Camille Faure (1881) improved this technology
for use in BEVs.
Most of the initial EV designs were little more than a battery box and motor on
a 4-wheel frame, using simple chain drive transmission systems. On a full charge,
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the range from the lead acid battery cell was typically fifty miles with a top speed of
thirty mph. The battery was charged in between uses by a stationary generator. In
the early days of distributed electricity, slow and frequent recharging plagued the
growth of the EV. However, 1897 would bring some milestone developments: in the
US, Oldsmobile was formed to manufacture electric vehicles; in the UK, the London
Electric Cab Company was launched; and in France, M. A. Darracq demonstrated
regenerative braking technology.24 Regenerative braking converts a vehicle’s inertia
back into stored electrical potential by using the electric motor as a generator. Despite
this, the expense, short life, slow speed and limited range coupled with the large mass
of chemical required to store electrical energy made early electric vehicles obsolete.
Conversely, gasoline/petrol/diesel vehicles overcame most of these shortcomings
very early and grew quickly in appeal. Karl Benz is credited with developing the first
ICE vehicle in 1885. By the early 20th century ICE vehicles were beginning to replace
BEVs. Three major factors were responsible for the domination of the ICE vehicle over
the BEV in the early years of the automobile:
1. BEV’s limited driving range compared to the ICE vehicle;
2. Advent of the Ford Model T production assembly line; and
3. Invention of the starter motor for the ICE.25
The BEV’s limited range was largely due to the low energy density of the battery technology of the day, which failed to mature sufficiently to compete with the energy stored in
liquid fuels. While only gasoline, diesel, and some alcohols were available as liquid fuels
in the early years, early batteries were far inferior to today’s NiMH and LiIon variants.
Henry Ford introduced the ICE-based Model T Ford in 1909, successfully pioneering the principles of mass production to place motor vehicles within financial reach of
many in society. Unable to capitalize on economies of scale for reasons of both supply
and demand, BEVs remained relatively expensive.
The early ICE vehicles (including the Model T) had one major drawback: the need
for a crank start. This meant that the vehicle operator had to step out of the vehicle and
manually turn the engine crank shaft via an external handle until the engine started. This
operation required great effort and could be dangerous. In 1911, Charles Kettering solved
this problem by connecting an electric starter motor to the engine’s crank shaft enabling
the operator to easily start the ICE without exiting the vehicle. It seems ironic that batteries and electric motors played a major role in the early conquest of the ICE over the BEV!
The first hybrid electric vehicles (HEV) came about in the early years too. Beginning in 1897, hybrid electric vehicles operating with natural gas or gasoline were introduced by Entz, Porsche, Jenatzy, the Electric Vehicle Company, Baker, and Owen, the
latest of which was in production from 1915 to 1922.
It was not until the 1970s and the Arab oil embargo that concerns about oil supply
resurfaced, renewing interest in electric vehicles. In the US, the Electric Vehicle Act of
1976 was introduced while Victor Wouk, the so-called “godfather of the hybrid,” developed the concept of the HEV based on a Buick Skylark from General Motors. After
testing by the EPA, Wouk’s prototype was verified to consume half the fuel and emit
just nine percent of the emissions of the stock version.26
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Meanwhile, significant improvements in ICEs and reformulated gasoline took
place as well, constantly raising the bar for competitive technologies. Many had a
positive and lasting impact, such as the introduction of the catalytic converter, the
phase-out of lead, the commercialization of biofuels, fuel injection, and sophisticated
combustion controls.
More recently, modern EV and HEV have enjoyed a surge in attention through
invigorated research and development. A pivotal moment came when General Motors
launched the EV1 and, between 1996 and 1999, became the first to mass produce
electric vehicles in the modern era. Ford quickly followed in 1998 with an all-electric
pickup truck, the Ranger Electric, marketed primarily as a limited-use service vehicle
to parks, couriers and utilities. The HEV entered the modern era to stay when Toyota released the Prius to the Japanese market in 1997 and later worldwide, making it
the first mass-produced HEV. Since these pivotal launches, HEVs have enjoyed greater
market share than their EV counterparts. In 2012, the Society of Automotive Engineers
listed twelve major original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) with production hybrid
vehicles on the market. A few OEMs have brought EVs to market, such as Nissan with
its Leaf. The Chevy Volt is classified as an extended range EV, and if driven less than
forty miles per day and recharged every night, could theoretically never require gasoline. By combining power plants and energy sources, the Volt functions as a plug-in
hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV). Though difficult to generalize and sensitive to electricity
sources, one study suggests that an electric car can actually have a higher W2W carbon
footprint than a gasoline vehicle until it has exceeded 130,000 km.27 This is partly due
to the carbon emissions generated in the mining of materials such as lithium, copper
and rare earth metals, and in the production of batteries for electric cars. Though not
yet mainstream, fuel cell vehicles are also entering the mix, suggesting that our roads
could be characterized by a great deal more technical diversity in the future, as noted in
a market simulation performed by IEA shown in Figure 9.3.

Figure 9.3. IEA Scenarios of Light Duty Vehicle (LDV) Market Share Through 2050.28
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9.2.5. Modern Vehicle Configurations
A vehicle may be classified by the technology used in its propulsion system. From an
energy perspective, we consider how the energy is stored within the vehicle and how it
is converted to kinetic energy. Hence, there are two distinct subsystems to consider: the
Energy Storage (ES) system and the Driveline (DL) configuration.
From a thermodynamic viewpoint, we consider the system boundary around the energy system (dashed lines in Figure 9.4). We categorize vehicle energy systems as open or
closed. In an open system, matter flows into and out of the system boundaries, such as air,
fuel and exhaust. In closed systems, no matter crosses the thermodynamic system boundary. Figure 9.4 shows the thermodynamic principles of open and closed systems applied
to the automotive context.
In both open and closed systems, energy may pass the system boundary in the form
of electrical energy, mechanical work, chemical potential, or heat. The law of conservation of energy applies to both systems. Note that in some systems (such as b) regenerative energy from the braking system may pass from the DL to ES device. In the open
system, the law of conservation of matter applies; the matter that crosses into the system
boundary must either be stored within or passed through the system boundary. The
overall efficiency of the propulsion system is evaluated by dividing the useful kinetic
energy by the total stored energy in the system. The effectiveness of a vehicle propulsion
system can be assessed in view of three competencies:
1. The energy stored and made available at the wheel (total capacity to do work).
2. The power available at the wheel through the propulsion system (work performed in a given time).
3. The rate and capacity to replenish the energy stored (ease of refueling or recharging).
Competency 1, the energy at the
wheels, determines the potential range
of the vehicle. It is a function of the capacity of the ES system and the overall
efficiency of the propulsion system.
Competency 2, the power available at the wheels, is effectively the
rate of conversion of energy from the
ES to the drive train. It is a function
of the overall efficiency of the propulsion system, and the capacity of the
ES to deliver power to the DL system
over time. Competency 2 differs from
Competency 1 in that it represents
the ability to extract stored energy at
a sufficient rate to meet driving demands. Hence, the power available at
the wheels determines vehicle driving Figure 9.4. Open and Closed Thermodynamic
performance.
Systems.
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Figure 9.5. Series Drivelines: (a) ICE Driveline, (b) BEV Driveline with Transaxle (c)
BEV with In-Hub Motors; Hybrid Electric Drivelines: (d) Series Hybrid, (e) Parallel
Hybrid, (f) Series-Parallel Hybrid; Complex Hybrid Drivelines (g) Two Wheel Drive,
(h) Four Wheel Drive. FT: Fuel Tank; B: Battery; M: Motor; G: Generator.
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Competency 3, the capacity to replenish the ES, is a measure of how readily energy removed from the vehicle can be replaced, for example by refueling or recharging. It is purely a matter of end-user convenience and includes considerations of time
and availability of energy infrastructure, such as fueling or charging stations, to replenish the ES device.
The following sections highlight key points of ICE, EV, and HEV technology, but
are not meant to be exhaustive.29

9.2.5.1. Internal Combustion Engine Vehicles
In an ICE vehicle, the ES system is a fuel tank where liquid fuel is stored in chemical
form. The fuel is pumped to the engine on demand where it is mixed with air from the
atmosphere and combusted within the engine. As noted in the preceding section, this
process converts chemical potential to thermal energy which, in turn, imparts kinetic
energy through the engine mechanism to a rotating shaft. The mechanical DL transmits
this rotational kinetic energy via a system of gears, couplings, and driveshafts and delivers energy to the wheels, thus imparting kinetic energy to the vehicle. All of the energy
conversion processes in this propulsion system occur in series. Diagram a in Figure 9.5
shows a schematic of this driveline with the direction of energy flow.
The ICE vehicle is an open thermodynamic system. Fuel and air are the system inputs that enter the system boundary at the fuel tank throat and air intakes respectively;
and the products of combustion, such as exhaust gases, exit the system boundary at the
tailpipe. From this, it follows that a vehicle’s overall system efficiency can be defined as
the useful work performed divided by the total value of the energy input.
Consider gasoline, which has a specific higher calorific value of approximately 46
MJ/kg or in volumetric terms 34 MJ/L. For a full 50 liter (13.2 gal) tank of gasoline, the
chemical potential (ES) is 1700 MJ (475 kWh). Since the energy available at the wheels
is dependent on the overall efficiency, then stored energy available at the wheels, given
a typical overall efficiency of twenty percent, is 340 MJ (or 95 kWh).
The distance a vehicle can travel on 50 L of fuel (or 340 MJ of energy at the wheel)
depends on vehicle performance, driver inputs, and driving conditions. Using average
fuel economy values, a typical modern gasoline ICE vehicle with an engine size of 1.6
L is 6.6 L/100 km and a fifty-liter fuel tank would, on average, permit 757 kilometers
of driving. This exercise demonstrates that an ICE vehicle, even with its low overall
efficiency, converts a modest amount of fuel into ample energy at the wheels, and by
extension, range to the vehicle.
Next, consider the rate of conversion of energy, or power, for such a vehicle. Imagine that a particular driving condition requires 20 kW of power at the wheels. Again
assuming a twenty percent overall efficiency, 100 kW of energy are required through the
propulsion system from the tank; this is referred to as fuel power. Knowing the energy
content is 46 MJ/kg, a fuel power of 100 kW would require 2.17 g/s of fuel to be pumped
into the engine and injected into the cylinders for combustion. Again, we note that even
in this low efficiency system, small amounts of fuel (on the order to grams per second)
are required to deliver the specified instantaneous power.
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A refill of a fifty-liter fuel tank typically takes less than five minutes to complete.
Hence, with respect to all three competencies, we see that gasoline is a dense, powerful, and convenient source of energy. Its overall suitability as a source of energy to
an open thermodynamic system helps to explain the dominance of the ICE vehicle in
everyday use.
That said, ICE vehicles are actually quite inefficient in their use of energy. Because
of the open thermodynamic system, undesirable exhaust gases are steadily emitted.
The required range of engine performance must match a wide range of driving conditions: take off from a standstill, repeated stop-and-go, high-speed cruising, accelerating at high speed, and hill climbing. To achieve this, the DL must have different
gear ratios to help match the engine’s torque-speed characteristic to those required
where the wheels meet the road. Hence, the DL, with its gearboxes and drive shafts,
is bulky and adds considerable weight to the vehicle. A great deal of the energy input
for many vehicles is consumed in simply conveying the vehicle itself. In addition, the
engine cannot provide a stall torque, or a torque without rotation, which means the
engine has to be running as the vehicle takes off from a standing start. Historically,
this has meant that in urban driving when the vehicle is waiting in traffic, the engine
is consuming fuel to keep it idling, but produces no useful kinetic energy. Under
this condition, the overall efficiency is effectively zero percent. Even though OEMs
have begun addressing such inefficiencies (for example by applying selective cylinder
shut-off or idle-off control schemes), the incredible convenience and suitability of
petroleum fuels in the ICE has created inherent shortcomings that leave much room
for improvement.

9.2.5.2. Electric Vehicles
The Electric Vehicle (EV), or Full Electric Vehicle (FEV), is one where the only energy
source on the vehicle is an electrical one. The Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) is an example of a Full Electric Vehicle. Since the battery must be charged by an external source,
the term Plug-In Electric Vehicle (PEV) is sometimes used.
Figures 9.5(b) and 9.5(c) show two possible architectures for a BEV. Both versions of
EV drivelines shown are examples of series architecture. Figure 9.5(b) shows a version
with a single motor, which means that a transaxle with a differential gear system is required to divide and direct the drive torque to the wheels, not unlike a conventional ICE
drivetrain. Figure 9.5(c) demonstrates the flexibility of the EV architecture, where two
motors may be used: one to drive each wheel. The electric motor can act as a generator
in reverse, thus regenerative braking is readily achievable with little additional cost. For
this reason the power flow from the wheels to the motor to the battery is shown as being
bi-directional.
EV performance under Competency 1 is determined by the capacity of the ES and
the overall efficiency of the propulsion system. Typically, EV drivelines exhibit very
high overall efficiencies, on the order of ninety percent. However, the energy densities of
modern batteries are a significant constraint on the ES capacity and hence vehicle range.
State-of-the-art battery technologies are based on Nickel-Metal Hydride (Ni-MH) and
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Lithium Ion (Li-ion) chemistry. Practical values for the specific energies of these technologies are 270 kJ/kg for Ni-MH and 648 kJ/kg for Li-ion.30 Lithium-ion technology,
popularized in cell phones and laptop applications, is becoming the preferred choice
for EV architectures. However, the specific energy values should be compared to the
calorific value of petroleum fuels, 46 MJ/kg, up to two orders of magnitude greater. At
the system level, we can compare the ICE vehicle’s 95 kWh of energy content from its
50L fuel tank with the EV and PHEV shown in Table 9.2, which have battery capacities
of 24 kWh and 16.5 kWh respectively.
EV performance under Competency 2 is also limited by the ES and the battery technology. Typical specific power values for modern batteries vary widely and range from
5 to 400 W/kg,31 or about 25 kWh per charge for the EV and PHEV vehicles shown in
Table 9.2. Furthermore, a technology tradeoff exists in modern batteries between specific power and specific energy. In other words, most batteries are optimized to either
deliver low levels of continuous power over extended periods (like a laptop), or surges
of peak power for brief periods (like a cordless drill). Today’s vehicles frequently require
both in sufficient quantity on any given trip. Studies of various battery technologies
demonstrate that maximum specific power is achieved with a significant reduction in
specific energy and vice versa.32
Also under Competency 2, acceleration performance can be excellent for vehicles
propelled with an electric motor, as full torque is available throughout the speed range.
This provides for a quicker response from start and smoother transitions between
speeds at greatly enhanced efficiencies, as compared to ICE vehicles that require discrete gears and sub-optimal engine power matching.
EV performance under Competency 3 has three major considerations: the time to
fully recharge at one sitting, the availability of charging points in a recharging infrastructure, and the number of recharges permitted during the lifetime of the battery.
Typically recharging a battery takes much longer than filling a fuel tank (even in socalled “quick charge” high voltage modes). Vehicle charging stations are increasing in
number in many urban centers, but are not inexpensive and lag significantly behind
the number of conventional refueling stations. A related consideration is that in many
urban centers where EV uptake is targeted, many consumers lack a garage or a reserved
parking space to reliably recharge overnight. Batteries have lifecycles in the range of
150–1500 recharge cycles.33 Li-ion batteries in particular have issues with electrolyte
decomposition and the formation of oxide films on the battery terminals that affect the
life of the battery.

9.2.5.3. Hybrid Electric Vehicles
The Hybrid Electric Vehicle, or HEV, is used to describe a vehicle that has at least two
onboard Energy Storage systems, where the energy from each storage systems is used
to propel the vehicle either directly or indirectly. The purpose of the HEV architecture
is to exploit the benefits of two energy storage technologies. Possible combinations include, but are not limited to ICE with an electric motor powered by a battery, capacitor
or flywheel, or an electric motor powered by a fuel cell and a battery or a capacitor. Our
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focus will be on the most common hybrid combination on the market, namely, ICE
paired with a battery-powered electric motor.
Figure 9.5(d) shows the simplest hybrid driveline, called a series hybrid. As with the
previous series architectures the energy conversion processes may be logically considered to occur one after another. This architecture can enjoy the benefits of regenerative
braking. Two particular advantages of this architecture include reduced demand for
the ICE and optimization of operating speed for the ICE as its sole purpose is to run
the generator. Figure 9.5(e) shows an alternative architecture called the parallel hybrid.
Here, two power streams interface at a suitable point in the driveline, delivering their
combined effort through a customized mechanism. Figure 9.5(f) shows a series-parallel
hybrid driveline. This driveline leverages two control methodologies- one that exploits
the presence of the generator to improve engine efficiency and a second that provides
for operation in a more conventional direct gasoline mode. The drive from the ICE may
be used to directly drive the axle or generate electricity to recharge the battery. The
trade-off for this type of architecture is that it requires a sophisticated Engine Control
Unit (ECU).
Even more sophisticated complex hybrid drivelines have reached the market. Figure
9.5(g) shows a two-wheel drive version of a complex hybrid driveline which is found
on the latest Toyota Prius. In this architecture the generator may be used in motoring
mode to add additional drive to the axle. Figure 9.5(h) shows a four-wheel drive version
of a complex hybrid driveline, which is found on the Lexus RX450h. Parallel-series
drive is provided to one axle via the combined efforts of the ICE and motor. A second
motor supplies drive to the second axle in isolation. Coordinated control for such architectures is critical.
Each HEV has specific advantages and disadvantages. However, in general HEV
performance under Competency 1 is an improvement over EV and ICE vehicles. Overall efficiencies are on the order of thirty-five percent, which is not as good as EVs that
can reach sixty percent, but considerably better than the twenty to twenty-five percent
range typical of ICE vehicles. Caution is advised here when comparing vehicle system
efficiencies that are purely tank-to-wheels (T2W). A well-to-wheels measurement would
capture electricity efficiency, oil mining, and refining, which could narrow significantly
the margin in overall efficiency between EV and gasoline vehicles. Because petroleum
fuel is used as the primary on-board energy source, the ES storage capacity is high.
Ni-Mh storage capacity is typically sufficient for HEV. HEV vehicles currently have the
greatest stored energy available to the wheels and hence the longest driving ranges.
HEV performance under Competency 2 is generally comparable to other vehicle
technologies. The combination of stored energy in the fuel tank and the battery can be
made available to the wheels at the required power level by using either by the motor,
the engine, or both. One drawback impacting performance is the additional mass (due
the larger battery pack and sophisticated DL) as compared to the ICE vehicle’s conventional DL.
HEV performance under Competency 3 is directly comparable to the ICE Vehicle.
This is because petroleum-based fuel is the primary energy source to be replenished.
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Some HEV architectures, such as plug-in HEV or PHEV, have been designed to tap into
cheaper electrical energy available from the grid. As mentioned, the Chevy Volt is an
example of PHEV architecture.
As discussed, the power density of electric batteries is much lower than that of
gasoline, meaning electric cars require more space to store that power in batteries,
adding energy-sapping weight. The engines of electric cars are generally smaller than
gasoline or diesel engines, but the size and mass of the batteries offsets any net advantage. In addition, the user is effectively paying for multiple drivetrains which indeed improve efficiency, but at a cost premium. The main performance advantage of
the electric car is its low energy consumption when accelerating from start and at
lower speeds, enabled by precision control. Hybrid cars take advantage of the electric
drivetrain in acceleration at low speeds and then switch automatically to gasoline for
higher speeds requiring sustained power. This enables HEVs to get the best of both
worlds. When the engine runs on gasoline, it automatically charges the battery of the
electric engine.

9.2.6. Government Policies and Initiatives for Change in the Automobile Market
It is clear that ICE is the dominant and mature technology in the automotive sector.
Because of evolving longer term sustainability concerns with ICE (high CO2, unwanted
gaseous and particulate emissions, low efficiency, and oil dependence) competing technologies will increasingly replace the ICE over time. In the short and medium terms,
improvements in ICE technologies are expected to further improve the performance of
the ICE, as noted in the previous section.
Presently, the technology closest to matching the performance of the ICE is the electric motor. However, just as the Achilles heel of ICE is oil dependence, the Achilles heel of
the EV sector is low energy density and the high cost of battery technology. The EV revolution will not happen overnight, nor will it happen in the short term. It could also incur
large system costs, beyond the traditional purchase price of the vehicle itself. Some cost
premiums may be justified, but more data will be required in the coming years.
Currently, there is a major political drive to deploy a diverse array of new vehicle
technologies including hybrid, electric, and future alternatives that substitute batteries,
fuel cells, or even hydrogen for traditional fuels.
Though not exhaustive, Table 9.3 provides a few examples of areas where specific
policies are being enacted across themes and regions.
Governments could use a feebate system (McKinsey Report), where revenue from
high taxes and penalties on poor performers could be used to provide the fiscal incentives to support a growing market share for electric vehicles.34
A real objective of policymakers is to reduce oil consumption and emissions, but
achieving market share for EV and HEV technologies has become a proxy for these goals.
Economists warn that solutions be market-based and realistic. Table 9.4 provides a snapshot of targets worldwide. This list is not exhaustive and is subject to change in policy.
At the municipal level, many cities and large urban centers have introduced local
initiatives and policies for promoting the use of EV technologies. Short commuting
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Table 9.3. Policy Themes Being Enacted Worldwide.
Policy Theme

Embodiment

Example
Country or Region

Fuel Economy

Numeric standards and targets
in the form of mpg or L/100 km

United States, Japan,
Canada, Australia,
Taiwan, South Korea

Emission Standards

Emission targets for new vehicles
to market

European Union,
United States (California & Federal level)

Fuel Taxes

Tax fuel sales to reduce fuel
consumption.

European Union,
Japan

Fiscal Incentives

Give tax relief based on engine
size, efficiency, CO2 emissions.
Provide subsidies for new
cleaner technologies

European Union,
Japan

Fiscal Penalties

Penalise poor performers: low
efficiency vehicles operators and
high polluters

Paris (Ban on SUVs)

Research and
Development

Promote private and public sector research for cleaner energy
technology and alternative fuels

European Union,
Japan, United States,
others

Traffic Control
Measures

Allow lane privileges to EV and
HEV vehicles

United States, Norway

Change Consumer
Behavior

Educational programs on EV
technology

Government Fleet
Procurement

EV technology in public service
fleets via public and public-private procurement

Market Share Targets

Set mandates to introduce new
technology targets

See Table 9.4.

distances within urban centers will suit the current performance characteristics of EV.
The OECD and IEA have jointly published the EV City Casebook, providing a review of
the global electric vehicle movement in sixteen urban centers across the United States,
Europe, China and Japan.36 IEA has also launched an international effort, the Electric Vehicle Initiative (EVI), in which more than a dozen countries are collaborating to
remove hurdles and speed adoption via policies, standards, infrastructure, and information sharing. EVI has recently published the “Global EV Outlook,” with a detailed
summary of the EV landscape through 2020.37
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Table 9.4 Electric or Advanced Vehicle Targets by Region.35
Country/Region
United States
China
Japan
Canada
Europe
Denmark
France
Germany
Ireland
The Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
India

Target
1,000,000
5,000,000
20% “Next-generation” autos
100% “Next-generation” autos
500,000
15,000,000
200,000
2,000,000
1,000,000
350,000
40% market share
10,000 in Amsterdam
200,000 in Amsterdam
1,000,000
600,000
1,200,000 BEV; 350,000 PHEV
3,300,000 BEV; 7,900,000 PHEV
100,000

Target Date
2015
2020
2020
2050
2018
2025
2020
2020
2020
2020
2030
2015
2040
2014
2020
2020
2030
2020

Policymakers will play an important role in the gradual adoption of EV technology to the market. A joint approach with a full range of stakeholder views should
inform policy decisions. Stakeholders include auto manufacturers and suppliers, fuel
and energy providers, government agency and public sector authorities, and consumers. Policymakers must balance the need for quick action on climate change and
energy security with the pitfalls of economic hardship arising from bad policy decisions. It is important that policy works at the pace of technology maturation. Sound
policy will in turn expedite and encourage technology development and maturation
in key areas, thus, providing consumer confidence and an increased market share for
clean technologies.

9.3. Aviation Fuels and Regulation
A predominant reliance on petroleum may be a significant issue for cars, trucks, and
ground transportation, but it is felt even more acutely in aviation; as yet, little compares
in delivering the necessary energy density, availability, and cost. A century-old industry, air transport has been built around fossil fuels- arguably been made possible by
them; and the technological and financial barriers to entry are among the greatest of
any industry. Debates ensue about whether such demanding specifications justify the
complex conversion of limited biomass to jet fuel. And yet, an interesting journey has
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Fuel Cells
Much basic research has been allocated to the development of hydrogen fuel cells.
While this technology is by no means commercially viable as yet, it may eventually help resolve some of the range, power, and emission concerns prevalent today.
In addition to potential cost barriers, hydrogen sourcing and infrastructure loom
large as key challenges. That said, it is important that a robust vehicle diversification
strategy include a range of options. Fuel cell energy storage for future generation
vehicles may equal or indeed surpass advanced battery systems. If so, they will certainly help satisfy some of the longer term objectives in the drive toward sustainable
transportation.
A basic fuel cell operates by conversion rather than combustion and is based on
an electrochemical cell. Fuel cells contain an anode and cathode, separated by an
electrolyte. The anode receives hydrogen (H2) from a supply at low pressure while the
cathode receives oxygen or filtered air. At the anode, hydrogen molecules split into
protons and electrons. If the anode and cathode are then connected via an electrical
conductor, the protons from the anode move through the electrolyte toward the cathode. The electrons move through the conductor to the cathode and can supply electric
curent to a moter or other appliance load. At the cathode, protons and electrons react
to form water with the supplied oxygen. In the long term, hydrogen fuel cells may
become suitable green car technology with the potential to offer the power and range
of a conventional gasoline engine with water as the only byproduct.
Fuel cells have relatively few moving parts, so recurring maintenance costs are
lower, helping reduce overall lifetime cost. They are comparatively efficient—some
technologies can convert more than fifty per cent of the energy content of the hydrogen to electrical power. Notwithstanding the tank-to-wheel (T2W) uncertainty of the
fuel supply, however, fuel cells are more efficient than diesel generators. Due to their
modular design, additional cells can be added to the system, increasing the amount
of power produced without replacing the whole system. Fuel cells are generally distinguished by their electrolyte and brief description of major technologies follows.
Alkaline fuel cells were among the first to be developed, and use an alkaline
electrolyte such as potassium hydroxide. Catalysts include a variety of non-precious
metals, but their main drawback is poisoning of the cell by carbon dioxide.
Direct methanol fuel cells use a polymer membrane as the electrolyte but are
differentiated in their fuel type, which is pure methanol.
Proton exchange membrane or polymer electrolyte membrane (PEM) fuel cells
use a polymeric membrane as the electrolyte, with carbon electrodes and a platinum catalyst. Their high power density and fast start-up time make them the most
suitable fuel cell for transport applications.
Phosphoric acid fuel cells use liquid phosphoric acid as an electrolyte and porous carbon electrodes containing a platinum catalyst. This is one of the most mature fuel cell technologies and is mainly deployed in stationary power applications.
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Molten carbonate fuel cells (MCFCs) are high temperature fuel cells in which a
molten salt mixture is suspended in a ceramic matrix. They can reach much higher
efficiencies and are currently being developed for electrical applications in natural
gas and coal power plants. Durability is a primary disadvantage due to corrosion
resulting from high temperature operation.
Solid oxide fuel cells (SOFCs) operate at extremely high temperatures and as
a result are projected to have extremely high efficiencies. SOFCs can utilize less
expensive catalyst materials and a greater variety of fuel sources. Slow start up and
durability may limit their use in mobile applications, yet development is underway
to optimize performance at lower temperatures.
begun as leading aviation stakeholders are engaged in the pursuit of sustainable economic and environmental solutions.

9.3.1. The Global Aviation Industry
The goal of the aviation industry is to provide quick, safe, and affordable transportation of passengers and cargo to destinations all over the globe. Air transportation is
the only viable means of transport between many areas of the world, as other means of
travel such as by ship, automobile or train are impractical or are unavailable. Aviation
provides social benefits as well, for example by providing access to distant or remote
locales and relief during in times of disaster. The Air Transport Action Group projects
that aviation accounts for 56.6 million jobs worldwide and $2.2 trillion in GDP.38 Yet
the economic engine that is aviation does not run without burning fuel and producing
emissions. Therefore, efforts to reduce energy consumption and emissions in aviation
are vital to the long-term sustainability of the industry. As noted in Chapter 2, a pivotal
US policy developed to improve energy independence while reducing emissions is the
Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007. This law identifies specific goals
for improved efficiency standards for fuel economy, appliances, lighting and buildings;
as well as increased production of biofuels.39
The transportation sector accounts for about 28.1% of US energy consumption.40 In
2012, US jet fuel consumption was 22 billion gallons (512 million barrels), or about eight
percent of total US petroleum use. Commercial air carrier operations accounted for the
majority of this total, with domestic flights out-consuming US-originated international
flights by nearly two to one.41 Aviation gasoline accounts for about one percent of US
aviation fuels, with a consumption of about 221 million gallons (5 million barrels). In
comparison, 192 billion gallons (4.6 billion barrels) of gasoline and diesel were used in
ground transportation, a sector that accounts for more than seventy percent of total US
petroleum consumption.42 Annual worldwide jet fuel consumption for the aviation industry is around 63 billion gallons (1500 million barrels) as estimated by the Air Transport Action Group.43
In 2012, 2.9 billion passengers flew over 5.3 trillion kilometers. The International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is projecting an annual growth rate of 4.9% through
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2030, meaning that passenger traffic and total flight kilometers would more than double
in the next twenty years. Such growth will put extraordinary demands on fuel supply
with significant environmental implications. Of particular importance is the impact of
air transportation on CO2 emissions, which are expected to increase at an annual rate
of two to three percent, up to three percent of the global total from all sources by 2050.44
Numerous initiatives are aimed at reducing the carbon footprint of aviation on both
national and international levels. As we delve further into this, it becomes apparent how
the future of the aviation industry is inextricably linked to its energy source.

9.3.2. Aviation Fuels Overview
In addition to creating propulsive power, fuel serves several other important functions
in aircraft. In jet aircraft, heat is generated by the combustion of fuel and by friction
between aircraft surfaces and surrounding air at operating speeds. Aircraft designers
use the heat absorbing capacity of fuel to dissipate heat and help cool the aircraft. The
lubricity of fuel is a critical property in the engine and fuel system of the aircraft. Fuel
can also be used as the working fluid in hydraulic systems and for load balancing.
Most commercial and private aircraft use one of three fuels: aviation gasoline (avgas), jet fuel of various types (such as Jet A, Jet A-1, Jet B, or JP-8), and diesel. Diesel is
used in small quantities for ground operations and in a limited number of flight applications; hence the principal focus here will be on the other two primary aviation fuels.
Avgas represents the last leaded transportation fuel permitted in the US, and current
efforts are focused on replacing lead in this fuel by 2018. For jet fuel, the current focus
is on petroleum alternatives and managing the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and
other GHGs. Particulate matter emissions are gaining in importance as well, particularly because some alternative jet fuels emit smaller particulate matter and health impacts are believed to increase with decreasing particle size.
In 2012, fuel costs comprised thirty-three percent of airline operating expenses,
and represented the largest portion of airline costs. This is in dramatic contrast to their
fourteen percent share in 2003. Due to a strong correlation between fuel and operating
expenses, the industry is eager to reduce fuel consumption on economic grounds. Enduring technical focus on efficiency, weight reductions, and flight optimization techniques have resulted in significant fuel savings in recent decades. Figure 9.6 documents
these trends in aircraft energy intensity during the past fifty years.
Air carriers have significantly increased overal net efficiency (the number of aircraft
miles flown per gallon of fuel). This metric incorporates both operational and technological efficiency gains. Table 9.5 uses data from the US Department of Transportation
to calculate percent improvement, indicating that aircraft miles flown per gallon for
domestic air operations has increased sixty-seven percent from 0.32 in 1990 to 0.54 in
2011. A forty-one percent increase has been estimated for international operations. It
should be noted that “aircraft miles per gallon” are lower for international flights owing
to the use of larger aircraft with increased weight. However, such flights typically carry
more passengers than domestic flights, meaning the energy efficiency per passenger
mile is actually comparable to shorter flights.
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Figure 9.6. Energy Intensity in Aviation.45 Note: Energy Intensity (vertical-axis) is Defined as Megajoules Per Passenger Kilometer Traveled (MJ/p-km); 1.4 MJ/p-km Equals
Approximately 49 Passenger-miles Per US Gallon; 1.0 MJ/p-km ~ = 70mpg.
Despite these promising trends linking sustained innovation to reduced energy use,
the recent volatility of fuel prices has made it difficult for airlines to forecast key operating costs and has impacted profitability. During the past decade, many global air
carriers have been required to restructure their businesses, and many have faced bankruptcy. While a variety of factors may have contributed to this situation, financial stress
in aviation has been exacerbated by vulnerability and risk associated with fuel costs.
Continuing to reduce fuel usage is therefore crucial in order to help the sector achieve
economic, environmental and social sustainability. Accordingly, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) has set a goal to “improve the National Airspace System (NAS)
energy efficiency by at least two percent per year, and develop and deploy alternative jet
fuels for commercial aviation.”47
Today’s aviation fuels are almost exclusively petroleum derived. To an even greater
extent than ground transport, the capital-intensive aviation sector developed around petroleum fuels due to their unique combination of operating characteristics, energy density,
availability, and reasonable cost. Engines and aircraft systems are extremely expensive
Table 9.5. Aircraft Miles Flown Per Gallon.46
Year
Domestic
Improvement
Operation
from 1990
1990
0.32
1995
0.36
11%
2000
0.38
17%
2005
0.48
48%
2010
0.53
64%
2011
0.54
67%

International
Operations
0.19
0.22
0.23
0.26
0.28
0.27

Improvement
from 1990
15%
21%
33%
45%
41%
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and therefore designed for long life through a rigorous product development schedule
where ten years is not atypical. Fleet turnovers are commensurately slow, on the order of
twenty-five years. This is easily understood when one considers that a Boeing B737–800
can cost $89 million; a B787–8, $206 million; and an Airbus A380 reportedly costs $375
million.48 Taken along with entrenched support infrastructure, it is important to note that
major changes of any kind can be costly, long term propositions in the aviation business.

9.3.3. Alternative Aviation Fuels and Emissions
Despite the complexity of introducing alternatives to petroleum jet fuel, the potential
benefits of improved price stability, supply diversity, and reduced environmental impacts are broadly supported. Renewable fuels are alone among viable petroleum fuel
replacements in aviation, as neither batteries, fuel cells, nor any other low carbon
technologies can yet deliver on the overall requirements. An important constraint on
potential new fuels is the requirement they be “drop-in,” meaning operationally indistinguishable from petroleum-based fuels. If fuels are not drop-in, then the required
modifications to aircraft, engines, and aviation infrastructure for the transportation,
storage and delivery of aviation fuels would make alternative fuels cost-prohibitive and
operationally difficult. Should an alternative fuel necessitate changes to the aircraft system, the aircraft would be required to undergo extensive testing and evaluation and be
certified (or type-certificated) to use that fuel.
Under the drop-in caveat, significant strides have been made including the certification of two alternative fuel specifications which have been tested on a myriad of military and commercial test flights. Blends of petroleum-based Jet A/A-1 with up to fifty
percent alternative fuels are accepted for aviation turbine engine use if compliant with
jet fuel specifications ASTM D1655 and ASTM D7566. Because neat (one hundred percent) biofuels have certain characteristics that fall outside of jet fuel requirements such
as low aromatic content or higher freezing points, the fifty percent blending allowance
permits mixtures to comply with specifications. There is no currently approved alternative fuel for aviation gasoline, but research efforts are underway to produce an unleaded
aviation gasoline that performs as well as 100-octane leaded avgas (100LL) and meets
the same specifications (ASTM D910 and ASTM D6227).
Liquid drop-in alternative jet fuels can be produced by the conversion of feedstocks
(such as coal, natural gas, or biomass) through a variety of technical pathways. The
two ASTM-approved methods are the Fischer-Tropsch method, which converts solids
to synthesis gases and then liquid fuels, and the Hydrotreated Esters and Fatty Acids
(HEFA) method, which converts oil-based biomass into hydrocarbon molecules similar
to kerosene. Pathways that utilize non-food feedstocks are preferable, as they do not
compete for conventional agricultural land. Certified fuels must satisfy alternative jet
fuel production methods and jet fuel specifications. A summary of primary conversion
pathways is provided in Table 9.6.
In addition to alternative fuel technologies, research in aircraft propulsion is also a
growing area of development. While the energy density of electric power is a barrier for
transport category electric aircraft, significant advances in unmanned and personal-use
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aircraft have been achieved. Comparative Aircraft Flight Efficiency’s CAFE Foundation
conducts annual electric aircraft symposia to usher in the “age of electric flight.” The
CAFE Foundation hosts a Green Flight Challenge Program incentivizing the development of sustainable, ultra-quiet and emission-free flight.50 Solar powered aircraft and
hybrid aircraft are being developed for selected applications as well. In addition to reducing fuel consumption, the aviation industry is endeavoring to reduce greenhouse
gas and particulate emissions; yet without successfully introducing some quantity of
renewable alternatives, the aviation sector has few options to meaningfully reduce its
carbon footprint. The primary emissions of jet fuel combustion are carbon dioxide, water vapor, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter. Petroleum-based fuels contain sulfur
and emit trace quantities of sulfur oxides, whereas bio-derived jet fuels have little or no
sulfur. An important difference between aviation and other industries is that emissions
are delivered to the atmosphere not only locally, but also in the atmosphere at altitude.
Comparison of alternative to petroleum-based fuels are made on a life cycle basis
from well-to-wake, or from the origin of the inputs through point of use in the aircraft.
The well-to-wake method offers a more complete environmental and cost impact analysis than that of a wheel-to-wake approach. A new fuel may appear environmentally
attractive based on the wheel-to-wake process, but may be characterized by greater environmental impacts during its conversion than petroleum-based fuels. Improper land
use change or inefficient collection/conversion methods might explain why total life
cycle analysis (LCA) could become less favorable for a biofuel. Agreement on metrics
Table 9.6 Summary of Alternative Jet Fuel Conversion Pathways, 2013.49
ASTM Specification

Status

Description

Typical Feedstocks

D1655–99

Approved, June 1999

Petroleum Jet Fuel

Crude Oil

D7566-Annex A1

Approved, Sept. 2009 Fischer Tropsch (FT)

Coal, Natural Gas,
Biomass

D7566-Annex A2

Approved, July 2011

Hydroprocessed
Esters & Fatty Acids
(HEFA)

Plant oils, animal
fats, algae

D7566-Future
Annexes

Under Review

Alcohol-to-Jet
(ATJ) Fuel

Ethanol, Butanol,
Methanol

D7566-Future
Annexes

Under Review

Direct Sugar to Hydrocarbons (DSHC)

Sugar cane, Cellosic
Biomass

D7566-Future
Annexes

Under Review

Hydrotreated Depolymerized Cellulosic
Jet (HDCJ)

Cellulosic Biomass,
Ag. Residue

D7566-Future
Annexes

Under Review

Catalytic Hydrothermolysis (CH) or
Pyrolysis

Plant oils, other
renewable oils

D7566-Future
Annexes

Under Review

Catalytic Conversion
of Sugar

Sugar cane, Corn
Stover, Biomass
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and methods for LCA are inherently complicated, yet are being discussed within governments, organizations, and ICAO. Thankfully, the aviation community can draw
from a wide body of existing literature and research regarding environmental impacts
of biofuels in general.

9.3.4. Policy Frameworks and Initiatives for Greening the Aviation Industry
The simultaneous challenges of expanding aviation while reducing its environmental impact clearly requires the implementation of practical and coordinated policies
on both national and international levels. International aviation is excluded from the
Kyoto Protocol, and instead the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is
charged with the development of policies and standards that will reduce GHG emissions in aviation.51
ICAO is a United Nations specialized agency that provides a forum for UN nations
to collaborate on standards and regulations, and is charged with promoting global aviation safety, security, environmental protection, and sustainable development of air transportation. ICAO supports policies for market-based emission reduction and sustainable
alternative fuel.52 Due to the expected climatic impact of aviation, ICAO alternative fuels
efforts fall under its environmental protection mission. ICAO created the Global Framework for Alternative Aviation Fuels (GFAAF) to highlight and communicate goals and
progress in the development and use of alternative aviation fuels. GFAAF facilitates fora
to harmonize definitions, standards, methodologies, and financial incentives.
The ICAO Committee on Aviation and Environmental Protection (CAEP) seeks to
develop an international carbon dioxide emissions standard that will include life cycle
and emissions impacts of alternative fuels and technologies. The ICAO Aircraft Engine
Emissions Databank contains information on exhaust emissions for production aircraft
engines with rated output exceeding 26.7kN (6000 lbs). Emissions data is provided by
engine manufacturers using ICAO approved procedures and is currently available for
Jet A/A-1 petroleum-based fuels. The standards limit the emissions of smoke, unburned
hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and oxides of nitrogen from turbojet and turbofan
aircraft engines.53 Studies by NASA, including the Alternative Aviation Fuel Experiment (AAFEX II) and the Alternative Fuel Effects on Contrails and Cruise Emissions
(ACCESS), are being conducted on the ground and at altitude to quantify the effects of
alternative fuels on aircraft and exhaust emissions.54
To promote awareness and aid passengers and airlines in carbon offset efforts,
ICAO has developed a Carbon Calculator which is accessible on their website.55 The
Carbon Calculator estimates the carbon dioxide and fuel consumed per passenger
between destinations worldwide using route specific data. The calculator takes in to
account cargo carried, number of passengers on board, aircraft type and other route
data. For example, an economy class passenger traveling the 11,822 km roundtrip from
Dublin to Dubai is estimated to have a carbon footprint of approximately 846 kg of
CO2; an economy class passenger traveling the 3,186 km roundtrip from Birmingham,
England to Budapest is estimated to have a carbon footprint of approximately 323 kg
of CO2.56
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The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) are the US and EU government agencies charged with regulatory
oversight for alternative fuels and emissions reduction in aviation. The FAA’s strategic planning document, Destination 2025, sets several energy and environment-related
performance metrics to be achieved by 2018, including:
• one billion gallons of alternative jet fuel consumed by 2018,
• a replacement for leaded aviation gasoline,
• a two percent annual improvement in energy efficiency (fuel consumed per
miles flown),
• a fifty percent reduction in health impacts from emissions, and
• the establishment of a trajectory for carbon neutral commercial aviation growth
based on a 2005 baseline.57
Other FAA initiatives have set similarly ambitious goals by 2018 such as reductions
in overall aviation fuel consumption by thirty-three percent, noise by thirty-two decibels, and NOx emissions by sixty percent, as described in the Continuous Lower Energy,
Emissions and Noise (CLEEN) program.58
In order to provide demand assurance for industry and FAA aspirational goals,
the service branches of the US Department of Defense have announced a range of
goals to increase the utilization of renewable energy over the next decade. According
to the US Department of Defense, “any alternative fuels for DOD operational use must:
be ‘drop-in’; that is, requiring no modification to existing engines; be cost-competitive
with conventional petroleum fuels; be derived from a non-food crop feedstock; and
have lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions less than or equal to conventional petroleum
fuels.”59 The Air Force has more specific goals “to test and certify all aircraft and systems on a 50:50 alternative fuel blend by 2012, and to be prepared to acquire 50% of the
Air Force’s domestic aviation fuel as an alternative fuel blend by 2016.”60 While the Air
Force has met the 2012 goal, it may be worth noting that “being prepared to acquire”
and “actually acquiring commercially competitive quantities” by 2016 are quite different matters. Cost remains a major challenge.
The European Aviation Safety Agency’s Flightpath 2050 also seeks carbon neutral
aviation growth using a 2005 baseline, and a fifty percent reduction in emissions by
2050.61 Sustainable Way for Alternative Fuels and Energy for Aviation (SWAFEA) is a
study commissioned by the European Commission’s Directorate General for Transport and Energy. Covering multiple disciplines and interests in the well-to-wake
lifecycle, the SWAFEA team includes representation from twenty European and international organizations that are studying the feasibility and impact of the use of
alternative fuels in aviation.62 International collaborators within the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) have set goals aimed at improving global fuel
efficiency by two percent annually and seeking funding for the broader development
of sustainable aviation fuels.63
While the aviation industry and regulatory agencies agree on the need to reduce emissions, there is disagreement over the best approaches to accomplish such far-reaching
goals. Market-based incentives, fuel taxes, and voluntary offsets are just a few of the
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ways that use of alternative fuels may be promoted. Using a market-based mechanism
known as cap-and-trade, the European Commission via its Emissions Trading System
(ETS) sets a limit on CO2 emissions for certain emission-intensive industries. In January
2012, the Commission included the aviation industry in the ETS and initially set an
emissions cap for flights taking off or landing at European Union airports. For the purposes of fiscal and environmental accounting, the EU ETS estimates the CO2 based on
the amount of fuel consumed during flights to or from an EU city. The ETS is intended
to incentivize and accelerate the reduction of CO2 through reduced fuel consumption
and improvements in aircraft operation. Non-EU countries have protested the implementation of the EU ETS as a unilateral tax. The EU does not view the ETS as a fuel
tax or charge that violates any international agreement. However, it does have some
unintended consequences. For instance, some cargo carriers responded by re-routing
long haul cargo flights around the EU. The cargo still found its way to the EU destination or departed from EU airports, but the cargo airlines added stops to previously
non-stop long haul flights to significantly reduce the impact of the flight on their ETS
assessments. Adding a stop actually adds to the net emissions, but saves on the ETS
assessments. As a result of controversy over the ETS policy and its implementation for
aviation, the ETS was postponed in 2013 for international flights in anticipation of a
pending multi-lateral agreement through ICAO.64
The Commercial Alternative Aviation Fuels Initiative (CAAFI) is a multi-stakeholder endeavor which aims to promote the development of alternative jet fuel in the
context of the industry’s energy and sustainability challenges. CAAFI includes members from the aviation and aerospace industries, academia, and government.65
IATA’s policy is to reduce the environmental impact of aviation, and is supporting
sustainable biofuels as a means of achieving carbon dioxide reductions throughout the
well-to-wake lifecycle. While IATA obviously does not control the price of fuel, IATA
policies are aimed at indirect measures of managing fuel costs, for example by increasing the availability and diversity of supply, and the reliability of certified fuels.66

9.3.5. Conclusion
While aggressive national and international policies and performance goals can be
useful in developing the assurances that industry stakeholders require, it should be
reiterated that major transformations in technology and infrastructure are costly,
time-consuming, and complex. While fuel efficiency in air transit has increased dramatically, the implementation of market-based carbon emissions regulatory programs
at both national and international levels appears non-trivial. History has often demonstrated that policy and technology must progress in a coordinated manner in order to
deliver optimal results. Given its involved regulatory framework, expensive and technically advanced capital equipment, and international reach, this may be even more relevant with respect to the aviation sector. At the same time, it is clear that alternative fuels
and reduced emissions are enabling priorities for the future of aviation. A robust policy
discourse and international cooperation can be essential in facilitating the deployment
and commercialization of emerging technologies.
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Chapter 10
Policy Challenges for the Built Environment:
The Dilemma of the Existing Building Stock
Mark Shaurette

Abstract
The built environment accounts for approximately forty percent of the total energy consumption in developed countries. Because buildings have a long life, the greatest opportunity for energy reduction in the built environment will come from energy conservation
in the existing building stock. An overview of the policy challenges presented by the built
environment, with an emphasis on existing facilities, is accompanied by a discussion of
specific technologies that may have the potential to reduce energy use. To illustrate the
degree of complexity associated with shifts to new technologies, lighting, a major consumer of electric energy in the built environment, is described in an expanded narrative
by Kevin Kelly. The chapter concludes with a discussion of recent policy schemes that
have been employed in the United States and the European Union to promote energy
conservation in the built environment. Both voluntary and public policy programs are
included, along with an examination of resultant successes and failures. Based on this
discussion, a series of recommendations and opportunities for future solutions is provided for each of the challenge areas presented earlier in the chapter.

10.1. Introduction
Energy use in the built environment comprises approximately forty percent of the energy consumed in developed countries. In 2004, the emissions resulting from direct
energy use in the built environment were about 8.6 Gt of CO2 per year. Through the use
of mature technologies, building energy use can be reduced substantially. Due to the
long life of buildings, energy policy aimed at promoting building energy conservation
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in existing buildings is confronted by significant technical challenges. New construction produces substantially more efficient structures, but there are obvious limits to the
rapid replacement of inefficient buildings. In addition, the complexity of design and
construction required for the multitude of unique structures makes a one-size-fits-all
solution impossible.1 These and other barriers make public policy and the integration of
energy conservation measures in the built environment an interesting and challenging
area of study. The intersection of technology and public policy in reducing energy use
and environmental impact of buildings necessitates integrated thinking by technologists, designers, managers, the business community as well as those who control and
influence public policy.
The Urban Land Institute (ULI), a nonprofit research and education organization
in the United States, examined some of the complex issues surrounding climate change,
energy use, and the way leaders working in real estate and the built environment are
challenged in this complex area. The authors emphasize the fact that “Even at the peak
of recent building cycles, only 2 percent of the total existing floor space annually is
added by new commercial building construction. In the years ahead, this portion is
likely to remain below 1 percent. . . . It is the balance of buildings—the overwhelming
majority of the existing building stock—that remains the dominant untapped market
opportunity to invest in energy efficiency.”2
The sheer size of this challenge can be appreciated by examining an identifiable
segment of the built environment. In 2003, a total of nearly 4.9 million commercial
buildings in the United States, comprising more than 71.6 billion square feet of floor
space, consumed more than 6,500 trillion Btu of energy.3 The critical portion of existing
commercial buildings is the considerable inventory of structures constructed during
the years between World War II and the late 1970s (about forty percent of the total commercial space). These structures were built prior to the energy use reduction efforts that
became more common through changes in design, materials, and construction practice
brought about by increasing energy costs in the mid to late 1970s. Most of the buildings
from this era are reaching the end of their designed economic life (forty to sixty years in
the US) and are prime candidates for retrofit or reconstruction.
Residential buildings also contribute significantly to the energy crisis. In addition
to the challenge of replacement over an extended time period, homes also present
complications due to the variety of owners and occupants. The type and degree of
challenges can also vary by climate, age of the structures, and ownership patterns.
This is a global challenge. For example, in 2006 more than fifty percent of Ireland’s
existing domestic buildings were built before the first thermal energy insulation standards were put in place. As a result Irish homes consume thirty-one percent more
energy per dwelling than the EU-15 average and thirty-six percent above the EU27 average. Since residential structures represent twenty-three percent of total final
energy consumption in Ireland, improvements in residential energy efficiency holds
significant potential for reducing overall energy use.4 This is a major concern because
Ireland has relied on imported energy for approximately ninety percent of its total
energy needs between 2001 and 2011.5
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While the pursuit of technological solutions to the energy crisis through renewable
energy production has long-term merit, a more immediate step is to minimize building
operational energy consumption. The US National Academy of Sciences concluded that
well-designed policies by nations and states can result in substantial energy savings.6
What remains is for nations and states to reach agreement on the best combination of
standards, design, research, financing, incentives, and education as well as the optimal
combination of technologies needed to maximize energy conservation efforts in the
built environment.

10.2. Energy Conserving Building Retrofit Technologies
A thorough discussion of the technological options available for energy conserving retrofit of existing buildings is beyond the scope of this book. Nevertheless, some basic
understanding of the options available is necessary as an introduction to policy discussion. This section is devoted to basic details about several categories of technology for
building energy conservation. The complicating factors of human behavioral impact on
technology performance are excluded to simplify the discussion. Readers should review
this material with the understanding that consumer decisions to adopt or not adopt energy conserving technologies are not always rational and may be influenced by factors
other than cost and benefit evaluations.7

10.2.1. Temperature, Ventilation, and Humidity
10.2.1.1. Insulation
One of the most universal categories of energy conserving technologies is the use of
insulating products to reduce the thermal losses through the exterior structure of a
building. Insulation can range from very simple to install to very complex. Material
and labor costs also vary widely. This variability is intensified by the diversity of building types and the inaccessibility of the space within the walls and ceilings of existing
buildings where insulation is typically installed. In addition, a significant lack of understanding of the building science behind the performance of insulating products by
building trades often leads to inefficiency or even damage due to condensation resulting
from improper installation.
Insulation of existing structures may require damage repair or replacement of interior or exterior finish surfaces. In addition, there is a very wide range of choice and
performance of insulating products that can be confusing for contractors and consumers.
Fortunately, insulation products have a long life. Any existing building insulation project
should strive to maximize the insulation level achieved. This will avoid the need for future disruptions and a repeat of surface finish damage caused by attempts to increase the
insulating value at a later date. Under the appropriate conditions, a properly implemented
addition of insulation is an important component of any energy conserving building retrofit. In addition to the reduced energy loss and elimination of thermal bridges that can
result, occupants can expect increased comfort when insulation is properly installed.

258

Shaurette

10.2.1.2. Air Sealing
An often overlooked but critical component of any attempt to reduce building energy consumption is air sealing the structure. Although there are many reasons that buildings need
to be ventilated, the ventilation process is more effective and efficient if outside air is introduced in a controlled manner. The penalty for uncontrolled building ventilation in cold
climates can be as high as, or higher than, the energy lost from heat conducted through the
building structure. As buildings become more highly insulated, the energy cost penalty for
air leakage becomes an even higher percentage of the building operating energy load. Ventilation as part of the heating and cooling strategy for the structure is preferable to letting
the building breathe through uncontrolled air infiltration and exfiltration.
Techniques for air sealing are typically low-technology caulks, tapes, and air barriers. A critical component of air sealing is assuring that the tradesmen completing the air
sealing understand how to apply the appropriate technology, as well as quality control of
the final installation. An understanding of building science principles can help mitigate
the potential for moisture problems that may be created by extensive air sealing. Unsealed
forced-air heating and cooling ductwork located outside of the heated and cooled portion
of the structure is a common source of air leakage. Inaccessible ductwork can be a challenge to seal. Recent advances in the use of adhesive coated particles sprayed into leaky
ductwork to seal leaking joints shows promise for commercial application.

10.2.1.3. Heating and Cooling Systems
Systems for heating and cooling a structure use different technologies based on climate,
location, available energy sources, building type, cultural norms, regulatory standards,
contractor experience, or even regional availability of system components. Systems can
be serviced by centralized heating and cooling plants that supply a district of buildings or all occupancies of a single large building. Alternatively systems are available to
serve a single occupancy independent of others in a building or district. District systems offer efficiencies of scale but may suffer from distribution losses. District systems
typically utilize steam or water to distribute heating or cooling to buildings being supplied. Increasing boiler or chiller efficiency, distribution efficiency or advanced control
systems are key retrofit opportunities in these distributed systems. Advanced technical
solutions for district systems include efforts to maximize the output from fossil fuel
consumption, for example by simultaneously extracting both heat and energy. The consistent temperature deep in the ground can also be used as a heat energy source or heat
sink for cooling to increase system efficiency.
Heating and cooling systems for single occupancies typically use forced air circulation or water circulation to heat or cool the occupied space. Many of these systems burn
fossil fuels in a central furnace or boiler. Burning biomass is an alternative. The thermal
efficiency of new equipment can exceed ninety-five percent. The fact that older equipment operates at sixty percent efficiency or less can be justification for the replacement
of currently operational equipment. Increasing the efficiency of forced air or hydronic
(water) distribution systems is often limited by restricted access to the distribution system. Nevertheless, fan motor upgrades, variable fan speed control, pump replacements,
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insulation of distribution ducts or pipes, and sealing duct leakage all offer energy efficient retrofit opportunities.
Heating by electricity is also used in single occupancy systems. The simplest systems are inexpensive, easy to control, and capable of supplying heat directly to any
space through electrically heated elements. Unfortunately these basic systems suffer
from distribution losses inherent with electricity. As a result they have high operating
costs and impose significant loads on electric grids. Heat pumps, which use compressed
gas as a means to transfer energy from the outside air to the inside air (or the reverse for
air conditioning), are an alternative employed to reduce energy use in electric systems.
Heat pump systems are capable of utilizing energy from outside air until the outside
air temperature drops well below the freezing point of water. The efficiency of energy
capture for a heat pump will fall as the outside temperature decreases, making them impractical in extremely cold climates. Heat pumps can also be installed as ground source
heat pumps that use the warmer and more consistent deep ground temperature rather
than the outside air as the energy source. Heat pump systems are desirable where fossil
fuels are hard to supply to the building. As a retrofit option, heat pumps have limitations
because they require the installation of a distribution system, usually using forced air,
for occupancies that contain multiple rooms.

10.2.1.4. Control Systems
Control of temperature, ventilation, and humidity are typical features of modern heating and cooling systems. Opportunities for control retrofits are presented as a separate
category to emphasize their unique importance. Temperature control in older buildings is usually limited to maintaining a set temperature. Because many spaces are only
occupied for a portion of the day, retrofit opportunities exist in control systems with
automatic temperature set-point adjustments that maintain the most comfortable conditions only when needed. Ventilation, a requirement for human habitation and health,
is best controlled through automatic mechanical systems that capture the heat available
in the exhaust air and use it to warm the incoming ventilation air. Heat recovery ventilation systems can capture as much as eighty percent of the exhaust heat. Adequate
humidity control is important for occupant comfort. Humans prefer relative humidity
in the forty to sixty percent range. When humidity is maintained in this comfort range,
energy savings can be obtained because occupants are usually satisfied with cooler air
temperatures in the winter and warmer air temperatures in the summer. In addition,
adequate humidity control can help prevent building damage from excess moisture that
can accumulate in well insulated and sealed structures.

10.2.2. Windows
The thermal performance of windows has improved substantially through the use of
multiple layers of glass, inert gases sealed between the glass layers, low emissivity glass
coatings, thermal break spacers between the glass layers, thermal break window frames,
and improved gasketing on operable window sashes. Window replacement is often part
of building retrofit strategies, but high cost can limit the viability of window replacement.

260

Shaurette

Window replacement may also be limited by architectural requirements in historic buildings. When cost or the desire to maintain the original appearance of a window is a concern,
window repair using double glazing or the use of a separate storm sash can be considered.
Because some older windows do not have adequate thickness to accept double glazing, the
addition of a storm sash may be needed. An internally mounted storm sash can provide
substantial energy loss reduction and improved occupant comfort by raising the interior
surface temperature of the glass. The benefits of a storm sash can be maximized when the
storm sash glazing has a hard coat low emissivity (Low E) coating.
Windows are also impacted by radiant energy that passes through the glass. Radiant energy passes through the window glass, striking interior surfaces where it is converted to heat energy. This may be beneficial in winter months but detrimental during
summer time. Shading strategies can be employed to maximize the passive solar heat
gain in the winter but shade the windows in the summer when the heat gain would be
undesirable. Existing buildings may be limited in the ability to effectively capture passive solar heating because window locations are fixed and horizontal shading may be
difficult to add architecturally. Window coverings and tinted or reflective glass coatings
are an option in these cases. Advanced technologies which darken the window glazing
based on an applied electric current, change in temperature or light intensity are available but have limited commercial availability.

10.2.3. Domestic Hot Water
Hot water production for domestic use is a significant component of energy use in
residential buildings as well as in commercial buildings that require hot water for
washing or industrial processes. The most beneficial hot water retrofits reduce both
energy and water quantity demand through improved washing machines, dishwashers, and process equipment. Additional savings can come from more efficient production and storage of hot water. Hot water use tends to be intermittent. To meet the
fluctuating demand, water heaters typically use a storage tank to maintain a ready
supply of hot water. Heavily insulating the storage tank is often a simple and inexpensive retrofit option. Efficient natural gas water heaters are available for replacement of older electric water heaters. Other alternatives are tank-less water heaters
which avoid the standby tank losses but may have limitations in hot water capacity
under heavy demand. When an electric water heater is the only option, a heat pump
water heater can be used. Heat pump water heaters can utilize the heat obtained
from the central heating heat pump or from a stand-alone heat pump which extracts
energy from its surroundings to heat the water. Stand-alone heat pump water heaters
which operate within the building enclosure provide some limited air conditioning
for the occupants.

10.2.4. Lighting
Lighting is often the largest consumer of electricity in a commercial building and
can also be a significant energy draw for a residential dwelling. Long reliance on incandescent lighting in residences allows easy retrofit to more efficient compact fluo-
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rescent lighting (CFL) systems. In commercial buildings ,more efficient fluorescent
fixtures have been used for years. Unfortunately the T-12 fluorescent fixtures with
magnetic ballasts that were installed in the past are no longer a reasonable choice.
Easily obtained T-8 or T-5 high efficiency fixtures with electronic ballasts can be used
to reduce energy consumption by as much as fifty percent. Use of natural lighting
for illumination (day-lighting) in combination with task lighting, proper levels of
background illumination, and sensor controlled supplemental lighting can be useful
in reducing energy consumption when windows are available. Exterior lighting and
areas not used continuously can benefit from timer controls or occupancy sensors
to turn off lighting when not needed. Retrofit using high efficiency light emitting
diode (LED) lighting has recently become available (see sidebar on the next page for
expanded lighting discussion).

10.2.5. Additional Options
Improvemetns in energy efficiency can be obtained via additional means such as replacement or retrofit of commercial refrigeration systems, home appliances, passive design principles, passive cooling techniques, the introduction of thermal mass, impacts
of building orientation or vegetation, as well as building operations and maintenance
improvements.
It is appropriate to emphasize the importance of retro-commissioning. Commissioning is the terminology used to describe the process of quality assurance for new
systems to ensure they are operating at design parameters and in turn at their highest
efficiency level. Older systems frequently become misadjusted over time and therefore
require retro-commissioning. Retro-commissioning can be applied to most if not all of
the non-passive energy related technologies in a building. Occupant training should be
a part of this process. Occupant behavior has a major impact on energy consumption.
Even if the original occupant understood the most efficient operation of the building
systems, it is very likely that over time retraining will become necessary as occupants
change. Retro-comission of heating and cooling systems, for example, should always be
completed as part of any building retrofit

10.3. Complexity of Energy Efficiency Retrofit Strategies
A host of issues influence and complicate decisions regarding how, when and where to implement energy efficiency retrofits, including a wide array of non-technical factors. These
factors relate to building characteristics as well as to the impact on owners, occupants,
and stakeholders involved in the retrofit process. Even a well-planned community-wide
retrofit scheme may entail extensive examination or nearly every building as an individualized custom project. This requires understanding, environmental focus, and monetary
incentives linking yearly energy savigns to investment in green and efficient technologies.
The choice of which technologies to utilize is highly dependent on climate and the
physical characteristics of the structure. Even residential structures built using standardized materials and designs are prone to modification through their lifetime. The
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Energy Saving Developments in Lighting
Kevin Kelly
Recent developments in artificial lighting design, lamp technology and control options provide potential for significant energy savings going forward. Historically,
equal illuminance across the whole working plane was the goal of lighting designers, however this is now considered wasteful of energy. For example, in an office
setting the working plane was interpreted as the whole plan area of the room at desk
height; 300 to 500 lux was specified, depending on whether work was mainly PC
based or paper based. This resulted in arrays of lights that provided high levels of
lighting throughout the space, whether needed or not, and often for periods extending beyond the working day, as evidenced in large cities where empty office blocks
had lights switched on well into night hours. This criterion of near equal illuminance across a working plane also tended to lead to rather boring and monotonous
interiors. Today such energy inefficiency is unacceptable. LED lamp development
also provides potential for energy savings as these lamps replace less efficient lamps.
New recommendations, such as those specified in the SLL Code for Lighting
2012,8 offer pragmatic design advice to ensure adequate and efficient lighting while
maintaining balance in financial outlay (purchase, energy cost, and end-of-life disposal) and environmental impact (electricity load, chemical pollution, and light
pollution at night). The code is based on quantitative recommendations that meet
minimum lighting requirements but also acknowledges that there is a need to target
lighting more carefully and address quality issues. For example, modelling of people in offices to ensure good visual interaction becomes important and good quality
lighting and energy efficiency are now as important as quantitative specifications
about light levels.
Good quality and efficient lighting in buildings starts with the need to maximize daylight penetration. Maximizing daylight offers opportunities to lift the
spirit with natural light and so daylight must be carefully designed into a building
in tandem with the artificial electric lighting and controls to create good quality
efficient lighting in the space. Human beings have a preference for natural light
over artificial light and side lit interiors often automatically offer good modelling by
providing a strong cross vector of light. This means that people can see other people
more easily as light falls on their faces from the side windows. More recently, the
need to maximize daylight is also driven by the necessity to reduce energy used
by electric lighting. Maximizing daylight and minimizing energy used by electric
lighting must take place in a way which minimizes overall energy consumption in
the building. It is counterproductive to maximize daylight in order to reduce light
energy consumption if thermal energy requirements increase due to the need for
extra heating or cooling. It should be noted that extra glazing will increase heating
load in winter and cooling load in summer, whilst electric lighting can also contribute significantly to building cooling load requirements. A balance needs to be
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sought with building type, method of construction, orientation, and occupation,
usage and location.
Daylight availability charts can be used to conclude that there is an external illuminance of in excess of 10,000 lux for seventy percent of the office working day in London.9 This suggests that a room with a five percent daylight factor
would have an average illuminance of 500 lux minimum for seventy percent of
the working day. The artificial lighting in a space with this level of daylight might
be turned off or at least dimmed without any significant disadvantage to work
efficiency in such an area. A room with this level of daylight factor (above five
percent) would merit consideration of daylight detection. This should be incorporated into an automatic control system. Experience to date indicates that without
such an automatic control system, the potential energy saving benefit of daylight
is unlikely to be fully realized. Ensuring user satisfaction throughout the working
day would require integration of the lighting control system in an acceptable way
to ensure lights are on when needed and off or dimmed at appropriate times. It
is important that clients and facilities managers are adequately briefed about the
operation of the automatic control system, in order to ensure optimal operation
while realizing effective energy savings.
While standards, demands, and design methodologies change, major change is
also underway in lamp technology. It is notable that the development of solid state
lamp technology is revolutionizing the lighting industry. As with many revolutionary step changes in development and use of new technologies, there has been collateral damage to early adaptors of poor-quality light emitting diode (LED) lamps.
However, the pace of growth of this technology is exponential and it is still at an
early stage in development. In a study by Philips Lighting it is estimated that while
only six percent of lighting was solid state in 2010, seventy-five percent of lighting
is expected to be LED lighting by 2020.10 At present the biggest applications of LED
lighting are for stage, external lighting, architectural lighting, retail, cold rooms,
transport, and hospitality. Going forward, LED lamp technology is expected to impact office and general interior lighting, but what is the current status? Exaggerated
performance of LEDs by some newly emerging companies has resulted in disappointment among clients who have expressed growing skepticism. Lighting designers complain that there are not sufficient and reliable specifications underpinning
LEDs, which places risk on the designers who specify them and the contractors who
install them. Lighting manufacturers respond that the technology is evolving at
such a fast rate that it is pointless to create specifications that are out of date as soon
as they are printed. They also point out that it is impossible to reliably guarantee
and measure lamp life-cycle; LED lamps should typically last in excess of eleven
years (up to 100,000 hours) of constant use. At present, measurements are recorded
over a time period of 9000 hours and life expectancy results are based not on lamp
failure but on an accepted minimum level of lux depreciation, with data extrapolated for longer periods of time.
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Present development of LED technology suggests that the efficacy of these
lamps is soon to surpass even the most efficient fluorescent lamps; in the near
future it is also likely to surpass the monochromatic Low Pressure Sodium (SOX)
lamp used on motorways and in similar applications. McKinsey estimates that
global revenue for LED lighting will be €65 billion by 2020 and LED usage will be
over sixty percent of the entire market.11 This is consistent with similar forecasts
by Philips above. It is proposed there will be a focus shift from lamp replacement
to fixture replacement. With fluorescent lamps, the luminaire is likely to last for a
couple of decades and lamps will be replaced very cheaply every couple of years.
LEDS on the other hand come hand in hand with the luminaire and if one needs
replacing, usually the other does also. This raises questions about life cycle and
replacement cost considerations. When replacing the whole luminaire, it is unlikely the same unit will still be manufactured due to the rapid developments in
this area. This will mean that all luminaires in a space must be replaced once
lamps begin to fail or their output drops markedly. The question must also be
raised as to why one would replace a highly efficient fluorescent luminaire, whose
lamps are providing in excess of 100 lumens per watt, with a much more expensive LED luminaire with lamps of a similar efficacy, especially when they are so
expensive to buy at present. Interior lighting relies on inter reflected lighting to
create an acceptable visual ambiance. Considerable light falls on walls and ceilings through reflection. However, some direct application of light onto an object
or surface can create a more visually appealing and stimulating environment. At
present it is this directional light characteristic of LEDs, providing color variation
and visual stimuli, which provides great potential for indoor use. However, as
previously mentioned, poor quality, relatively cheap LED lamps have fallen short
of expectations to date. Poor heat dissipation has also been a limitation. Low-cost,
modern T5 fluorescent lamps provide 100 lumens per watt, with very good color
rendering and a variety of color temperatures. The long history and successful
application of these fluorescent luminaire lamps enables them to retain the pole
position for the general interior lighting market at present.
The cooler color temperature of many LED lamps is deemed unacceptable by
many home owners and other users. The generally more appealing warmer color
LEDs are available but are usually much more expensive. The present high cost
of good quality LED lamps and luminaires along with the above may delay their
widespread use for interior lighting. LEDs may be the future for interior lighting but they are not yet the optimal choice. However, owing to their directional
accuracy, LEDs may be more suitable for many applications including outdoor
use. There is a lack of reliable research in this area at present, and this needs to be
addressed going forward. LEDs may also form a useful alternative to traditional
lighting in future indoor applications particularly as the tendency to flood light
onto a general working plane is replaced by more individual targeting of light on
a specific set of task areas.
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This is an exciting and challenging time for the lighting industry with good
potential for LED lighting and improved lighting controls generally. The challenge is to provide robust solutions that will maximize the benefits of new technologies whilst protecting clients from poor quality products and installations.
A further goal will be to maximize light quality and minimize energy use by
integrating daylight with appropriate artificial light in a way that lifts the spirit
of those using the space with easy facilitation to operate and override automatic
lighting controls when required. Product reliability and integrated standards will
be required in order to leverage the benefits of new technologies and in so doing
help reduce energy use, improve upon energy efficiency, and contribute to reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
resulting variation from structure to structure limits one-size-fits-all solutions. In addition, the selection of one technology can impact the performance or specification
of a completely separate part of a whole-building retrofit strategy. An example of this
phenomenon is the influence of the level of insulation on the design and performance
of mechanical heating and cooling systems. Increasing the insulation level reduces the
required capacity of a building’s heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC)
system. Installing an oversized HVAC system can negatively impact the system’s efficiency, equipment life and occupant comfort. The timing or staging of installation can
introduce additional complexities and potentially lead to inefficient choices. Failing to
increase insulation levels at the same time the HVAC equipment is replaced results in
equipment that does not match the actual heating and cooling needs of the building.
The best retrofit technology upgrade strategies seek to implement all possible technologies on a whole-building basis.
Goals and expectations of owners, occupants, policy makers and taxpayers, who
may subsidize or incentivize retrofit activity, can vary. What level of occupant comfort
is expected? To what degree are energy use, CO2 emissions, and property value important? Are project costs justified by cash flow, payback period, investment return or
carbon reduction goals? How are the interests of those who own a rented building, and
presumably pay for the retrofit, cost balanced with the interests of occupants who will
benefit from the reduced cost of energy used? The answer to each of these questions is
probably different depending on which stakeholder group is questioned. Some useful
guidance for policy makers in examining the cost vs. benefit impacts on various stakeholders in building energy efficiency programs is provided by the US Environmental
Protection Agency, which offers five principal approaches to guide public utility commissions, city councils, and utilities. They are careful to state that “there is no single
best test for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of energy efficiency.” If a single cost-effectiveness measure is used it may not balance the costs and benefits of all stakeholders.12
In addition to payback or cost vs. benefit considerations, the source of funds
can influence retrofit decisions. Grants to promote energy conservation typically
require some form of decision oversight by the funding agency in order to maintain
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adequate control over the appropriate use of the funds. Funding agencies often lack
sufficient understanding of the complex technologies involved in energy related retrofits to adequately provide oversight. This can lead to rigid guidance which may not
meet the specific conditions of every structure. The use of partial funding through
tax incentives, rebates or bank loans can permit greater flexibility for more building-specific solutions.
Regardless of the source of funds, the fragmented nature of construction contracting for residential and small commercial buildings provides challenges to successful
energy conserving retrofits. Building contractors typically do not have a thorough understanding of all available technology solutions or the underlying science. Even when
trained designers, such as architects or engineers are involved, retrofits intended to reduce air leakage often result in problems with elevated moisture levels in the structure.
The challenge is complicated by the fact that building contractors typically hire an assortment of subcontractors to work with the specialized crafts involved. Each of these
crafts lack an understanding of how their use of technology interacts with the work
performed by other subcontractors. An outside party to supervise technical specification and quality control may be needed.
The strategies described to this point have concentrated on the reduction of energy
use during the occupancy of the building, or the use phase. Although a significantly
smaller component of the lifetime environmental impact of the building, many experts
advocate that the energy associated with the building’s construction phase be included
in energy efficiency decision making. This embodied energy represents the sum of all
the energy required to construct the building, including energy consumed to mine raw
materials, create the building materials, construct the building, and to demolish and
dispose of the building itself at the end of its life. By including embodied energy, the
cost vs. benefit considerations can encompass the full life cycle cost of the building.
Currently the availability of data required to accurately calculate embodied energy for
complex buildings is limited, but the body of knowledge for life cycle cost analysis is
developing rapidly.

10.4. Policy Challenges to Energy Efficiency Retrofit Success
The multi-dimensional and complex influences on energy retrofit decisions create many
barriers to the creation and implementation of policies designed to promote and facilitate building energy efficiency. In 2010 the US Department of Energy (DOE) published
a report from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) titled Summary of
Gaps and Barriers for Implementing Residential Building Energy Efficiency Strategies.
The report’s authors outline barriers and opportunities for market transformation for
future reduction in building energy use.13 Some of the significant challenges for residential energy conservation include:
• Limited training and certification for contractors,
• Difficulty in evaluating the quality or quantity of benefits other than simply
by cost,
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Complexity created by regulations and incentives intended to promote conservation,
• Lack of reliable energy savings information to build stakeholder confidence,
• The disconnect between cost and building value created by energy conserving
interventions,
• The need to verify performance based on sound building science principles,
• Incomplete understanding of homeowner motivation for energy conservation
investments,
• Limited energy conservation knowledge of those who influence residential investment, and
• Lack of standardization in technologies and building standards.
A follow-up report published by DOE in 2011 provides additional detail, especially
on the relationship between technical and non-technical barriers. The report points
out that the building science behind whole-building energy performance is complex,
requiring extensive education for homeowners, contractors, regulators, appraisers, real
estate agents, material suppliers, architects, engineers, program managers, lawmakers
and those involved with financing.14
Commercial buildings have many of the same barriers to energy retrofit as residential buildings with the addition of greater scale and complexity. Not only are the
buildings more variable in design and material use, but additional non-technical factors
must be considered. The US Zero Energy Commercial Buildings Consortium (CBC), a
voluntary group of professionals from the commercial real estate industry formed at
the request of the DOE, compiled a report in 2011 that outlines many of the challenges
they face in working toward significant energy use reduction in commercial buildings.15
In addition to the impediments identified by NREL for residential buildings, the CBC
report highlights the following:
• Conflicting retrofit costs and benefits for building owners and occupants,
• Lack of individual tenant utility metering,
• Significant impact of occupant plug loads,
• Disincentive created by energy upgrades that trigger added upgrades to meet
minimum codes,
• Frequent failure to maintain equipment at originally installed efficiency,
• Traditional design and construction practice does not promote whole-building
efficiency,
• No facility for accurate low-cost performance comparison between similar
buildings,
• Lack of accountability for energy performance and consistency of performance,
• Utility profits and pricing linked to energy sales, limiting utility incentives for
energy reduction,
• Competition for owner’s capital to be made available for energy conservation
investment, and
• Energy cost savings often have limited impact on the financial position of the
building asset.
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These reports make it clear that the process involved with planning, implementing
and assuring performance of energy related building improvement requires significant
management. To begin the process, a thorough understanding of the science involved
with building energy performance must become commonplace to architects, engineers,
contractors, subcontractors, equipment and material suppliers as well as building facilities managers, purchasing agents and maintenance personnel.
By examining the simple example of adding insulation to an existing structure, the
potential for unintended consequences becomes clear. In Figures 10.1 and 10.2, simplified brick masonry wall diagrams before and after insulation is added, are shown.
The previously uninsulated brick wall normally absorbs moisture from the exterior.
In Figure 10.1 moisture in vapor form is free to pass in and out of the wall either from
the interior or the exterior surface because all of the building materials used allow the
passage of moisture by diffusion. This unrestricted moisture flow allows the wall to
dry to the interior in the winter. In Figure 10.2 a thin layer of insulation was added to
the interior. A thin layer was chosen to avoid losing valuable useable floor space while
reducing the heat flow through the wall. The insulation layer reduces heating energy
consumption and increases occupant comfort by raising the surface temperature of the
interior wall during cold winter days. A common insulation choice for this purpose is a
product with a high resistance to heat flow per unit thickness that maximizes the thermal performance. These insulating products are frequently made from foam materials
that do not allow the passage of moisture to the interior through diffusion.
With the addition of internal
wall insulation, the internal wall
temperature is cold because it is no
longer heated from within the building. Figure 10.2 shows the resulting
condensation of water on the inside
of the masonry when exterior temperatures are low enough to reach
the dew point or when warm moist
air (typically above thirty percent
relative humidity) leaks into the wall.
The dew point is the temperature at
which moisture will condense for a
given level of moisture in the air. The
two conditions previously described
have a dew point of 3°C (37°F) or
below, a common winter condition
in much of the world. The moisture
absorbed in the masonry by the upgraded wall now does not dry to the
Figure 10.1. Uninsulated Masonry Wall Dries to interior as necessary to avoid deterioration as it once did.
Both Interior and Exterior.

Policy Challenges for the Built Environment

269

In addition to possible liquid
moisture flowing into the structure, Figure 10.3 shows the result
of the brick masonry wall reaching
sub-freezing temperatures. The
now consistently moist masonry
suffers from wintertime formation
of ice crystals within the brick,
causing the expanding frost to deteriorate the exterior surface of the
brick.
Over and above the universal education needed to promote
the desired performance in design,
there is a significant need for education and enforcement in implementation of energy retrofit. The
fragmentation of the construction
contracting and procurement process compounds the problems that
result from poor understanding by Figure 10.2. Potential for Condensation Resulting
those responsible for retrofit design. from Addition of Interior Wall Insulation.

Figure 10.3. Surface Deterioration from Sub-freezing Consistently Moist Brick.
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Unfortunately, program management of policy schemes put in place to promote and incentivize energy improvement can also add to the disconnect between science based decisions
and achievement of successful retrofit in practice. The best executed design will fail if the
procurement and construction process is not properly managed. Choice of retrofit measures or materials which are inappropriate for the building’s characteristics, poor availability of a trained workforce and/or construction management by unqualified energy services
providers will all add to the uncertainty of energy saving outcomes. It is easy to understand
the limited willingness of building owners to invest in energy improvements.
Even when technical and implementation challenges of energy services contracting
are solved, there are still barriers to funding the retrofit work. Curtin and Maguire in
a report for the Institute of International and European Affairs note that in Ireland
there is a lack of attractive loan offerings for homeowners to finance residential retrofits.
Homeowners are also hesitant to invest in energy improvements because of the risk of
inadequate performance to justify the investment.16 This observation is not unique to
Ireland. Low participation rates and performance uncertainty have stymied financial
innovation. For commercial building owners there is a divergence in strategic planning
between the capital costs needed to implement retrofits and the resulting operating cost
reduction. Owners frequently take a short-term view of return on investment while
energy upgrades are a long-term investment. Long-term investments typically require
financing. Lenders have not been able to agree on the method needed to value the effect
that improvements in energy performance have on a building’s marketability.17 Without
an increase in value, lenders are hesitant to provide vehicles for energy services lending.
Utility company participation is often suggested, but utilities need encouragement to
make changes in the revenue/profit structure of their business to justify investments
that effectively result in reduced sales of their service.
There also appears to be an incomplete understanding of the most effective methods to market energy conserving retrofits. There is little agreement on the approach or
message that is likely to cause differing groups to take action. Foremost in this discussion is the manner in which costs and benefits are considered. Payback (the time threshold for energy savings to repay retrofit costs), Return on Investment (the investment
analysis common to business investment), Net Present Value (analysis using time value
of money to compare projected energy savings to retrofit costs in current dollars) and
Internal Rate of Return (discount rate that makes the net present value of all retrofit cash
flows equal to zero) can be logically applied to investments in energy conserving retrofit
projects, but may lead to different conclusions for different project characteristics. Payback is commonly used because of its simplicity, but is it the most appropriate? Benefits
to society are also appropriate in marketing messages to stakeholders. What should
the priorities be? Carbon reduction, economic development outcomes, job growth, new
business development, advancement of redevelopment/regeneration can all result from
energy related retrofit activities. In the final analysis, difficulty in determining the best
approach to take stems from a lack of agreement on how to value the benefits.
The discussion which has been presented to this point revolves around use of existing technologies to improve the energy performance of buildings. There is some ad-
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vocacy for advancement of new technologies to provide simple solutions that either
dramatically reduce energy consumption or provide low-cost renewable sources of energy for building operations. While there are promising developments in many new
products, barriers to their widespread use exist. To an even greater extent than the automotive sector, the built environment has a great deal of inertia. Thus the status quo
represents one of the industry’s greatest barriers to rapidly adopting new technology.
Substantial investment is required on many levels to change the way things are done.
The complexity of interactions and the many players involved with the manufacture,
distribution, adoption and implementation of new technologies leads to challenges for
any new building technology. Often what is lacking is cooperation between researchers,
energy laboratories, manufacturers and end-users to help promote technology transfer
through planning, assessment and trial implementations that provide the needed outreach to building owners and contractors.
Despite the potential for both direct cost savings and long-term societal benefits,
the end-user is frequently a barrier to wide acceptance of energy related upgrades.
Personal values can play a strong role in homeowner reluctance to upgrades. Conflicting values can range from resistance to potential changes that impact the appearance
of the residence to concerns about the quality of workmanship and the perceived
value of improvements. In some cases the inconvenience of workers being present
in an occupied home or the need to clear out an attic space used as storage to make
room for increased insulation can become a deterrent. As a result, there is a clear need
to understand the priorities, values and long-term goals of homeowners when policy
toward energy retrofit is considered. In the commercial building sector, additional
end-user challenges exist because of the split incentives between building owners
and tenants. Some experts have suggested that because of the many barriers, market
forces alone are not adequate to motivate a significant increase in energy efficiency
even with escalating energy prices. Based on the results of a multi-year simulation
study focusing on the six markets of Brazil, China, Europe, India, Japan and the US
sponsored by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD),
the WBCSD advocates for a broad set of interventions by industry, governments, and
building owners to make meaningful market transformation a reality. The WBCSD
conclusions are noteworthy because their study area represents nearly two-thirds of
the world’s energy consumption.18
To achieve the market transformation needed to move beyond these barriers,
programs with government support may be needed. The development of government
programs must avoid creating barriers that further prevent wide acceptance of energy
related retrofit as a result of program design or management. Program and regulatory
barriers can come from both unexpected and anticipated program consequences. Incentive program design problems can arise from incentives that are too small to change
behavior or too complicated to manage either by program managers or potential recipients. Regulatory restrictions based on conflicting social concerns such as building conservation or historic preservation planning constraints must be carefully considered to
avoid significantly diminishing the program outcomes.
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10.5. Building Energy Reduction Programs
Recently Employed in the US and EU
Attempts have been made to devise programs which reduce the operating energy consumption of the built environment. As was noted in the previous section, participation
in building energy reduction programs has often been lower than expected, even when
they involved limited financial investment by the building owner. This fact reflects recognition of the many non-monetary costs of building energy retrofits that complicate
technical and non-technical barriers. Policy commentary has exposed the substantial
conflict between programs that base energy reduction investments solely on the monetary energy cost saving for the existing building owner and the longer-term societal
imperative imposed by the global energy crisis.
For the European Union, the societal obligations created by the global energy crisis
were recognized in the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD), first implemented in 2002. The EPBD was updated in 2010 with more ambitious provisions
creating obligations for EU countries to implement programs that achieve the requirements for building certification, inspections, and training with the ultimate goal to
improved energy performance. While these directives are creating future obligations
for EU countries, solutions will come only from transformation of markets which in
many ways are localized. A large body of public policy commentary and research has
been devoted to program design. Brenda Boardman, in a policy framework for the UK
titled Achieving Zero: Delivering future-friendly buildings, makes many suggestions for
the future based on successes and failures of programs implemented in the UK.19 Many
of the policy schemes presented by Boardman are useful for stimulating creative public
policy discussion, but cannot be applied without careful consideration for the conditions specific to the market where the policy will be put to work. The following sections
provide a small sample of past attempts to reduce energy consumption in buildings.

10.5.1. Voluntary Schemes to Promote Reduced Energy Consumption
Numerous voluntary schemes to promote energy reduction in the built environment
have been offered on a local level. These voluntary programs have for the most part been
targeted to owners of domestic buildings. While having the advantage of easy contact
with local conditions and end-users, these programs have limitations in their ability to
influence wide market transformation. Program incentives of many types are used with
the ‘reward’ for participation as variable as the program sponsors.
Some programs simply provide ratings or labels in an attempt to enhance the recognition of value for the building owner created by the energy conserving investment.
Enhanced ratings can be based on established standards such as construction specifications that are beyond code or when buildings achieve certified levels for recognized
sustainability programs. Schemes based on sustainable building ratings such as Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED), the BRE Environmental Assessment Method (BREEAM) and Green Globes provide a framework for best practice in
energy conservation as well as additional areas of environmental sustainability. Rating
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programs specific to building energy use such as Energy Star developed and promoted
by the US government, Passivhaus which is a rigorous standard for low energy building
first developed in Germany and the Home Energy Rating System (HERS) developed by
Residential Energy Services Network (RESNET), a group of US energy professionals,
offer a more energy conservation targeted evaluation.
Utility companies have developed programs to promote energy use reduction
through rebates that reward owners who upgrade to appliances, water heaters or heating
and cooling systems that operate at a high efficiency. Tax reduction is also a common
form of reward for voluntary programs. The tax reward may be a credit against income
tax due or an abatement of real estate property tax increases that might otherwise result
from energy related building improvements. A type of reward for voluntary participation that often targets low income owners takes the form of a grant. Subsidized loans
to complete the work have been suggested for higher income owners, but as described
in a later section, lack of certainty that the energy savings will be adequate to repay the
loan limits their use.
Overall, participation in voluntary programs has not been overwhelming. Demonstration programs that bring the potential for energy use reduction to the attention of
building owners have been one approach to increase participation. The US Department of
Energy has launced a program called the Better Buildings Challenge which works in coordination with communities, community based organizations, education providers and
corporate partners to demonstrate residential, commercial and industrial projects that are
successful in dramatically reducing energy use. Prior programs sought to achieve a similar outcome and future programs will be needed to provide adequate market penetration.
Education is also an area where governments both local and national play a role. In the US
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Department of Energy (DOE) provide
building energy related educational materials through the Energy Star program and the
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) program. These educational programs
are supported by the research efforts of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), the
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
(LBNL) and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The laboratories are located in diverse regions of the US which allows them to concentrate on energy research
specific to differing climates.

10.5.2. Public Policy Schemes Recently Employed and Proposed
A review of some national or regional schemes to promote building energy use reduction
through public policy intervention is informative. An example of a regulatory mandate
is the EU requirement for member nations to institute a national building energy performance assessment scheme. The impetus for universal building energy rating is to develop
a publicly available uniform measure of the energy performance for every building. These
ratings, typically referred to as asset ratings, are based on the theoretical performance of
the building under a specified set of environmental conditions. Although asset ratings
do not reflect the actual energy consumed by a building, they are preferable to collecting
past utility use data because asset ratings eliminate the influence of occupant behavior.
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Through the uniform collection of building ratings, consumers can compare buildings
based on energy performance. Ratings can also provide a basis for building values assessments that reflect investments in energy performance. Some compare building energy
performance ratings to miles-per-gallon ratings for automobiles.
In 1997 the first national building energy rating program was put into effect in
Denmark. In 2002 the EU enacted the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive
(EPBD). As part of the EPBD, member states were required to implement a national
building energy rating and disclosure program beginning in 2009. In recent years Brazil,
China and Australia have instituted national building rating schemes, although China’s
program is only mandatory for government owned or funded buildings. The US has not
yet developed mandatory state or national level building rating programs, but several
major cities have mandatory rating and disclosure programs underway.
Building rating and disclosure is not without its challenges. Some argue that the
simulated energy use developed for the asset ratings is not an adequate reflection of
the building energy consumption and is subject to lack of uniformity based on the accuracy of the building data which is used to generate the rating. Enactment of universal building ratings in the US has been hampered by disagreement on a standardized
methodology for collecting building data. In an article published by the Bureau of
National Affairs in 2011, the authors describe a consensus standard being developed
by the American Society for Testing and Materials International (ASTM) which may
provide the uniformity needed in the US for collecting and analyzing building performance information for regulatory compliance.20 In addition to quality control in the
data collection and analysis, many issues remain to be resolved. Rating programs must
make performance data easy to understand yet meaningful, translate the performance
data into building valuation information for lending and investment decision makers,
preserve the privacy of sensitive building data while permitting adequate public disclosure of building energy performance as well as maintaining and updating the large
database required to assure that ratings remain consistent over time.
A recently introduced program called the Green Deal is a more market or investment
driven concept. The Green Deal, authorized by the UK Energy Act 2011, is an attempt
to seamlessly combine energy company obligations to support building energy use improvements along with a financing mechanism. Upgrades for buildings under the Green
Deal must meet the Golden Rule. The basic concept of the Golden Rule is that all energy
improvement investments must produce savings that equal or exceed the cost of the improvements. In addition, the time period required for repayment of the improvement cost
must not exceed the expected life of the improvement. Repayment is to be administered
through the energy utility billing process. The regulatory complexity of the Green Deal
is beyond the scope of this chapter, but several of the program management issues are
noteworthy. For instance if this market driven program is to be successful, Green Deal
Providers must be able to negotiate the complexity of program guidelines, obtain sufficient financial backing for up-front costs, work with energy companies to facility loan
payback and implement energy conserving retrofits that apply appropriate building science and energy cost saving analysis to assure a quality retrofit that meets the Golden Rule
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payback requirements. A tall order based on the barriers previously introduced. Who will
bear the cost if Green Deal Providers fail to adequately plan or implement their retrofits?
What risks do Green Deal Providers accept by making the upfront investments needed to
become a viable Provider if several years into the program the Green Deal is determined
to be too costly for the UK government to maintain?

10.5.3. Program Successes and Failures
Descriptions of successful building energy programs are common in the mass media, but
how success is defined can radically change the assessment of a program. Many programs
describe their success by providing details of work accomplished or percentage reduction in
energy consumption for a group of buildings. While these accomplishments are noteworthy
in demonstrating the potential for reduction in energy use and carbon production, the magnitude of the problem truly requires many millions of structures to be retrofit every year.
The UK has committed that zero carbon emissions will be associated with all buildings in
the entire country by the year 2050. While zero carbon emission does not mean zero energy use, it does mean that most if not all of the twenty-six million homes and two million
business structures must undergo some form of energy retrofit by 2050. Simple math tell us
that for success in the UK alone several hundred thousand retrofits per year will be required
immediately, growing to a million or more per year over time.
Failures are easier to identify because they are characterized by lack of participation. A
notable example is in the area of financing building energy improvements. Energy upgrades
require funds to complete the work, so financing is critical. Energy efficiency financing programs have failed to attract participation from both lenders and borrowers. Neither is willing
to take the risk that the energy performance will justify the debt. Some have suggested that
energy improvement loans should be tied to the real estate through on-bill financing that is
paid for by current owners as well as future owners if the expected life of the improvement
exceeds average years of ownership. While this may solve some owner concerns, lenders and
investors continue to worry about the loan risk because the increase in building value resulting from the energy improvement may not adequately reflect the improvement cost. Energy
Services Companies (ESCO) have been successful in reducing risk for entities with large portfolios of buildings by providing up-front capital in return for a share in the energy savings.
This process can reduce building owner risk. A US government program issuing Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) to ESCOs aims to achieve extensive recuctions in energy use, emissions, and cost in large installations where economies of scale can be leveraged.
However, in its current form the ESCO process is not well suited to small projects. Nearly all
of the ESCO projects to date have been for public projects or very large scale private projects.
Another notable failure is that the incremental learning that takes place with every
new program is seldom passed on to future stakeholders. This lack of continuity of
knowledge as programs expire is just one example of challenges to policy making. Limits on the life of a program also limit the possibility of sustained success. Energy retrofits
are complex and require training for many levels of stakeholder. Many of the stakeholders who participate in the process are small business entities that depend on a financial return for continued existence. Will the large number of small and medium size
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businesses needed to carry out the energy improvements invest the time and resources
needed for a program with an uncertain future? Will the lessons learned from previous short-lived programs be available to them as preparation? How do energy retrofit
services become a trusted process implemented by proven entities without continuity?
Will an efficient low-cost material and equipment supply chain capable of meeting high
volume demands develop without continuity?

10.6. Recommendations and Opportunities for Future Solutions
While no single solution or ideal combination of recommendations will provide an answer to the challenge of excess energy consumption by the built environment, a number
of opportunities for improvement exist. The following is an amalgamation of suggestions from current literature on the subject grouped by related topic.

10.6.1. Education, Motivation, and Marketing
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Use demonstration projects open to the public to make building owners aware
of energy conserving retrofit potential. Include government owned buildings in
the demonstration.
To increase confidence in the potential energy savings, make simplified kitchentable discussion information about energy conserving retrofit available to
building owners.
Work toward branding of energy retrofit solutions based on sound building science.
Create education programs for builders, developers, architects, engineers, lenders and appraisers.
Education programs should include building science in addition to standard
practice so that designers and builders fully understand the technical ramifications of their retrofit decisions.
Home improvement contractors drive adoption of technologies. Use educated
service providers to promote energy retrofit to improve participation rates.
Experiment with new measures and messengers to inform and engage people
toward an energy-aware culture.
Develop mechanisms that make energy performance improvement visible to
guests, friends, and neighbors.
Help building owners distinguish between dubious and real energy savings claims.
Develop marketing to promote energy retrofit whenever any renovation activity is considered to take advantage of the economies available at the time.
Market all benefits of energy conserving retrofit including improved occupant
comfort, safety, indoor air quality, and overall environmental quality.
Target populations need to be exposed to energy conserving retrofit communication and marketing three or more times before showing recognition of the message.
Promote the value of energy audits.
Educate the building construction industry about the pending growth opportunities in energy services contracting.
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Utilize workforce re-education funding to support education of needed energy
services workers and managers.
Develop building science elementary and secondary school curriculum to aid
in understanding of building energy performance for future building owners
and occupants.

10.6.2. Technology, Building Codes, and Implementation
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Support government funded research to develop and commercialize energy
conserving technologies.
Expand and strengthen support for energy improvement contractors that promote integrated design through whole-building retrofit options.
Include technologies with longer payback periods such as energy recovery ventilation and triple glazed windows to achieve ambitious building energy use
reduction goals.
National building codes and enforcement need to be strengthened to improve
building energy performance.
Eliminate disincentives to energy conserving retrofits created by code triggers
that require other code compliance upgrades when energy retrofits are completed.
Combine building energy performance codes and renewable energy regulations to help promote whole-building performance analysis.
Develop standardized practices when possible to streamline decision making
and completion of energy services work.
Encourage integrated design approaches and innovations.
Develop standardized green lease agreements that help sort the split incentives
between building owners who pay for energy conserving retrofits and renters.
Develop simple to use energy retrofit quality criteria and checklists.
Develop standardized energy audit procedures, tools and reports.
Increase indoor air quality research to develop mechanical ventilation requirements for buildings retrofits that dramatically reduce building air leakage.
Encourage the development of very low-capacity high-efficiency heating and
cooling equipment that will be needed for high performance homes.
Simplify the complexity of programmable thermostats.
Promote community or district wide volume purchases of materials for energy
related retrofits.
Promote one-stop-shop business models that combine design, financing and
contracting for energy conserving retrofit.

10.6.3. Building Performance Rating and Labeling
•
•

Based on a national asset rating assessment standard, implement building ratings and labels that are uniform, simple to understand, normalized to eliminate
inconsistencies and adequately reflect value related to building marketability.
Rating and labeling programs should adopt mechanisms to assure that label
information remains current and accessible to the public.
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•
•
•
•

Research is needed to ascertain the market value impact of building energy
performance labels.
Develop simplified energy performance simulation tools that don’t require extensive knowledge or training for use by building owners and managers interested in building energy upgrades.
Life Cycle Energy Consumption is beyond the scope of near-term comparisons,
but work should continue to perfect the analysis for future building energy performance comparisons.
Create simple benchmarking and goal setting tools to assist commercial building owners in making energy performance decisions thru comparison to similar high performance buildings.

10.6.4. Financing
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Concentrate efforts on those most in need of financing.
Align monthly repayment cost to energy savings to avoid net increase in
monthly cost.
Allow the financing of non-energy upgrades to promote energy conserving retrofit at the same time as other improvements.
Loan terms in excess of five to seven years will be needed to promote comprehensive whole-building retrofits.
Enable lending tied to the asset such as on-bill financing repaid through utility
billing systems or municipal financing funded through bond sales that are repaid through real estate taxes.
Develop and mandate standardized building appraisal procedures that reflect
building energy performance for use in risk analysis for energy improvement
mortgages.
Create protocols for reporting of building energy use that can be used during
commercial real estate due diligence and underwriting for building loans.
Investigate turn-key practices which combine financing and performance
guarantees or shared savings through contracts with ESCOs.

10.6.5. Program Design
•
•
•
•
•

Programs and policies should strive for integrated market transformation targeting barriers and contextual challenges specific to a target population in a
community or region.
Programs should employ rigorous assessment including measurement and verification of the installed energy savings measures to validate program goals.
Program assessment and validation data collection should begin immediately
so that mid-program corrections can be made.
Consider action research that collects and builds on programs so that lessons
learned from past programs are not lost as new programs are developed.
Subsidies may be required for demonstration and roll-out support to implement residential programs.
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•

Design incentive programs where the cost of access does not exceed the value
of the benefit.
• Incentive programs should provide increasing benefit levels for more aggressive
whole-building retrofits.
• Consider tax incentives such as reduced real estate taxes for owners completing
energy retrofit.
• To increase the scale and scope of utility sponsored programs, decouple the
connection between reduced sales resulting from energy conservation and utility revenue.
• Develop certification programs to help assure the efficacy of installed energy
savings measures.
• Design residential retrofit programs that align with and take into account personal values and decisions of homeowners. Design programs around people not
buildings.
• Design programs around specific communities, contexts and populations.
• Partner with and showcase renovation and regeneration contractors with adequate training and proven performance that will include energy retrofit at the
same time as other building improvements.
• Provide low-risk entry points for building contractors interested in business
development for energy services contracting.
• Utilize trusted third parties such as non-profits, charities, religious institutions,
schools, or community organizations as referral agents for retrofit programs.
• Programs should be kept in place for a decade or more to avoid the reluctance of
business participants fearful of developing new practices for short-lived programs.
Obviously, not all of these suggestions can be adopted in every situation. Some
are even in conflict with others. Policy must adapt to the community and context in
which it is implemented. For new construction and developing countries policy should
concentrate on new construction codes and code enforcement. In the developed world
more complex solutions will be necessary.

Discussion Problem
In Happy Hills, a planned community of approximately 250,000 that serves a bedroom community to a nearby major city, the residents live in predominantly multifamily housing which is comprised of buildings with twenty to forty living units in
buildings three to four stories in height. Residents enjoy a good standard of living
and can commute by rail to jobs in the nearby major city.
The multifamily residential buildings are privately owned and most residents
rent their apartments paying monthly rent to a wide diversity of landlords. The
buildings were constructed in the 1960s and most of the residents have been living
in their homes for many years. Because of a lack of new construction in the area
and the excellent physical condition of the existing buildings, the majority of the
residents would like to remain in their current apartments.
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Happy Hills operates a local utility that supplies both electricity and natural gas to
the community. Community leaders are well aware of the challenges of the global energy crisis and the local impacts of the crisis because of their position as a public utility.
Utility operators have noted that on a per capita basis Happy Hill residents use substantially more energy than the average based on national statistics. Because the local
buildings were metered for energy consumption by the building or grouping of buildings when they were constructed, the utility managers have no easy method to track
individual apartment energy use. The local government would like to establish policies
and programs that promote improved residential energy conservation in Happy Hills.
What public policy or program recommendations would you recommend?
As you make your recommendations be sure to consider energy conserving technology selection and integration, program standards and implementation, financing
for incentives or grants, building owner acceptance, building occupant reaction, and
how to monitor program success and metrics. After you have your initial recommendations, consider the following questions: What would be different if the apartments
were owned individually by the occupants? What would be different if the residences
were detached from each other rather than in a multiple occupancy building?
This problem is likely to have a multitude of solutions, none of which would be
ideal due to the complex interaction involved. The case example should stimulate
thought and discussion about the range of issues encountered at the nexus of technology and a common set of circumstances with both private and public implications. The best solution will integrate the concerns of the stakeholders resulting in
measurable reductions in building operating energy as an outcome.
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“Energy and persistence conquer all things”
Benjamin Franklin

Epilogue: Reflections on Our Path Forward
What do the trajectories of energy supply and demand, population growth, and climate change suggest about the future? Can sustainable, practical, affordable solutions
be brought to bear upon these challenges? As we deepen our understanding of the questions, we come to realize that the solutions will not be easy ones at all. These are wicked
problems that will require trade-offs and tough decisions. They will lead to new questions, some more complicated yet. As we noted in Part I, it is unlikely a single technology or a single country will swing the needle entirely by itself. Nor will any single policy,
however robust and timely. Lasting solutions will rely on creative interdisciplinary collaboration, and not just within academia but from the furthest reaches of the public and
private sectors as well. They will involve more active participation from consumers and
civil society, be accompanied by a growing social consciousness, and demand further
technological innovation and coordinated policy dialogue.
When considering tomorrow’s energy supply and demand trends, it is important
to recognize that compelling market factors will continue to heavily influence these.
In the near term, if one expects that consensus opinion will overwhelmingly embrace
large price premiums in return for low carbon energy, then one has not fully considered the adaptability and market efficiency of today’s current energy matrix. That said,
with increasing concern over resource scarcity and environmental impacts, it is now
more widely appreciated that existing energy resources, natural gas and nuclear power
as examples, can represent a viable bridge to a more diverse, sustainable, and lower
carbon energy future. This will not happen by accident, nor will the bridge have any
value if it does not have an opposite shore on which to land. Thus, technology, policy
and consumer response must become more synchronized and flexible to spawn robust
energy and climate strategies in the face of changing variables, evolving economies and
electorates, and new scientific data and discoveries.
With world population having reached seven billion in late 2011, “medium band”
projections indicate a world population of approximately nine billion by 2050, increasing relatively modestly to ten billion by 2100. Thus, by 2050 the planet will be home to
thirty percent more people than it is today. Asia is the most populated continent today
with 4.3 billion inhabitants (sixty percent of world population), largely comprised of the
combined populations of China and India. Africa hosts one billion inhabitants. These
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statistics confirm the growing life force of the planet and global energy requirements
will continue to increase accordingly. And while expansion of developing regions often
welcomes a rising middle class, nations must thoughtfully grapple with the resource
implications of broader economic prosperity. Challenges in meeting the social, economic, and technological requirements for a larger emerging world force are therefore
considerable, not least owing to the fact that the world is struggling today with oil prices
in excess of $100 per barrel, coupled with an awareness of the historic dependence of
global economic growth on oil production.
On climate, it is widely considered that a global temperature increase in excess of
2°C will result in considerable variation to habitats, which in turn will affect food production and livelihood for populations in many regions of the world. Impact predictions are well beyond the scope of this book, however experts note that a number of
geographical locations including the United States, Australia, and Africa may be increasingly susceptible to drought. Other regions are expected to experience increasing
levels of rainfall, including Asia, parts of Europe and the US. Some regions will suffer
on account of crop failure while others may benefit through warmer weather pattern
shift from southern to northern regions.
Part II of our book has laid a strong foundation from which we can draw some salient observations about prospects for energy production and conversion technologies.
Carbonaceous fossil fuels—principally coal, oil, and gas—remain the major constituents fueling our growing energy demands as the search for new and unconventional resources, once considered beyond reach, gains pace via new and unprecedented mining
and extraction technologies. The debates relating to developments in carbon capture
and storage (CCS) and extraction of natural gas from shale continue to gather pace,
while coal is expected to continue providing significant baseload power in many countries. A serious conundrum remains that national climate objectives cannot be achieved
without the effective demonstration and implementation of CCS, which is not expected
to be achievable at sufficient scale prior to 2030.
Natural gas can be viewed as a microcosm of the types of issues that may increasingly accompany the world’s energy future. Consider that the tremendous quantities
of low cost natural gas from shale formations via new hydrofracking techniques have
been made possible by innovative technologies pioneered over the past several decades,
with both government and private support. From 2005 to 2013, the share of US natural
gas from shale formations has increased from about four percent to more than thirty
percent and will continue to climb. Estimates of gas quantities that may be recoverable through hydrofracking vary; some analysts suggest that up to forty trillion cubic
meters is attainable in the US alone. This, if achievable, could satisfy a large portion of
energy demand for upwards to one hundred years at about half the emissions of coal.
The increase in emissions to Earth’s atmosphere through greater deployment of gas will
nevertheless be substantial; there is no room for complacency in assuming natural gas
will be a solution to a warming atmosphere and climate change.
And yet while some see unconventional natural gas as the solution to national if
not global energy problems, public opinion is divided on the subject. Critics fear en-
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vironmental damage may result through widespread exploitation of gas by hydraulic
fracturing and are concerned about the effectiveness and standardization of regulatory
frameworks. There is credible concern of a significant increase in carbon footprint owing to venting and leakage of both carbon dioxide and methane during mining, and
through the combustion of natural gas to produce energy following extraction and processing. A further point of controversy relating to fracking comes from concerns about
increased pressure that underground fluid injection can exert on seismic faults, thus
making them more likely to slip. Reports by seismologists in the US note a number of
small quakes which have been triggered by far off larger earthquakes; it is apparent that
wastewater injection critically loads local faults, placing them on the verge of rupture.
Amid these challenges stand great opportunities for technologists, policy makers, and
informed consumers to collectively balance the trade-offs and adopt lasting strategies
with regard to natural gas.
Additional challenges and opportunities surround the deployment of renewable
energy resources as well. The European Wind Energy Association is intent on achieving
a target of twenty percent total EU electricity consumption powered by wind, while the
United States claimed the number one spot in wind connectivity from China for 2012.
Combining with a very strong year in Europe, the annual world market grew by ten
percent, equivalent to forty-five gigawatts, and with total combined global wind installation of 282.5 GW. Other regions of the world are seriously engaged in wind energy
development and installation as well, including Latin America, Africa and Asia. Policy
at the national level is a critical factor in driving both domestic and regional markets.
Having greatly incentivized record US installations in 2012, the US Federal Renewable
Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC) was extended for one year on 1 January 2013.
The message is clear that wind energy is growing and that renewable energy technologies can indeed be deployed into existing markets at scale. However intermittency,
grid integration and paybacks without subsidy support remain key hurdles to overcome
going forward.
Throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century solar photovoltaic energy
(PV) has been the fastest growing renewable energy technology globally. The cumulative total reached 100 GW by the end of 2012, of which seventy-five percent was installed
since 2009. Concentrated solar power (CSP) which generates heat and electricity, is also
gaining in popularity, particularly in the United States and in Spain. IEA estimates that
solar energy could provide up to one-third of the world’s energy demand after 2060.
Though optimistic, it signals the potential for growth in what is perhaps the most natural energy available to planet Earth. Costs have fallen and in sunny countries, solar
thermal energy (STE) and solar photovoltaic electricity (PV) are competitive against
oil-fueled electricity generation, and are very effective in helping meet demand peaks.
Rooftop solar water heating has soared in China, and IEA believes that rooftop PV in
sunny countries could be a way forward in meeting local generation requirements. The
tough reality is that further support by way of feed-in tariffs, including market-based
reverse auction mechanisms, will be required for some time before the industry can
stand on its own and eventually sustain itself. It is worth noting that solar power has
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been accompanied by certain unintended consequences over the past decade, for
example by guaranteeing artificially high electricity rates. The hope is that these growing pains and lessons learned help make utilities, investors and policy makers more
effective at commercializing renewable energy.
Hydro remains the world’s largest source of renewable electricity. It was second
to wind power in new installations between 2005 and 2010. Although more suited to
some countries than others based on geography and natural resources, there is room
for significant growth in the decades ahead. In pumped storage hydroelectricity, Japan
has successfully pioneered a seawater energy storage facility at Kunigama, Okinawa,
a non-trivial challenge due to corrosion considerations. A consortium in Ireland has
proposed development of a large-scale pumped storage scheme which, coupled with
wind turbines whose energy pumps seawater to upper storage lakes, could provide the
majority of the country’s electricity needs. Energy storage remains a strategic need that
can enable renewable energy generated from intermittent sources, and one where innovation, investment and multi-stakeholder dialogues are in great demand.
While Ocean Energy developments, including tidal power, tidal marine currents,
wave power, gradients of temperature and salinity, are at an early stage, there is promise
that breakthroughs will enable deployment, particularly in island and remote locations.
An array of proposed, planned and operational wave and tidal energy projects and marine test sites in Europe, span the continent from Norway to the northern coasts of
Africa. Technological advances will be critical in demonstrating the viability of this
resource. Similarly, there is also potential for a scaled increase in the global production
of geothermal heat and electricity outwards to 2050. IEA estimates that geothermal
energy can comprise 3.5% of global electricity and 4% of heat energy by 2050, perhaps
optimistic, but again indicative of what technology appropriately deployed may be capable of achieving.
Biofuels are similar to shale gas, in that they represent another intriguing microcosm
of the interplay between technologies and policies with regard to economic and environmentally sustainable energy solutions. As we graduate from first generation to second,
agricultural land area, second-generation conversion technologies, environmental promises, and practical policies are all central to the evolving debate. Sustainable deployment
of high-impact, second-generation biofuels will undoubtedly require balanced policy
measures and an improvement in the economics of advanced biofuel production. With
experience as our guide, active participation and compromise from engineers, scientists,
economists, law makers, and consumers can also be expected to figure in.
With regard to the future of nuclear energy, we again see that a delicate balance
is imperative to address the social and political complexities associated with sensitive
technology. Societal concerns and the consequential realities of nuclear accidents continue to reappear at Fukushima, following the March 2011 nuclear accident. Among
these were concerns relating to recorded radiation levels in sea water near the power
plant. Strategies to address these issues remain ongoing, and represent another area
in which the technological and policy communities must cooperate and counsel each
other to facilitate best possible outcomes. Another takeaway from this ongoing dilemma
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is the reality that although accidents at nuclear power plant are rare, the resulting consequences can be far reaching. This adds to public disquiet and mistrust of nuclear
energy and factors into societal acceptance of regional nuclear plant construction. Yet
for many countries, strategic national targets call for meaningful contributions from
nuclear power to help meet key CO2 reduction goals by mid-century.
As with energy production where the easy oil has been consumed, and decisions
have become much more complex and interconnected, future energy use will present
some equally difficult challenges. The world has grown accustomed to a cheap and
readily available supply, creating a behavior on the consumption side that is as predictable as it is unsustainable. Perspectives drawn from Part III speak to the future of
energy consumption.
We have seen that the introduction of renewable energy sources into existing
markets is a complex socio-techno-economic challenge that depends upon alignment
of stakeholder objectives in order to truly succeed. Thus far, complete alignment has
generally proven elusive. While the economics of energy distribution and use currently favors traditional sources, growing government and private sector investment
in renewable energy systems is reflecting broader awareness and acceptance of the
need to address fossil fuel dependence and climate change. A key takeaway is that
civil society, and more specifically the individuals that comprise it, have important
roles to play. The best renewable technology under the most appropriate policy must
still be met by a market where individuals advocate and engage in its adoption and
use. Timing and communication among the stakeholders are tantamount to the technology and policy themselves.
The broad categories of transportation and buildings collectively account for about
seventy percent of global energy consumption. While each is unique, some common
trends apply including near-term efforts aimed at improving energy efficiency. Admittedly, this may not sound as exciting or cutting edge as other emerging technologies, but
energy efficiency may in fact be among the most critical near-term means of reducing
energy demand and emissions in relatively immediate and affordable ways. The technologies largely exist, there is substantial policy and regulatory precedent, and consumers can see the direct economic benefits from their investments. More efficient vehicles,
including optimization of internal combustion engines and aggressive national fuel
economy standards have combined to accelerate efficiency efforts in transportation. Implemented effectively, this will have the effect of dramatically reduced oil demand and
emissions from the sector. New technologies including hybrid and electric vehicles, and
advanced fuels will increase in market share, but their commercial viability will depend
on development, validation and production costs. Fleet turnover will be gradual, but
new technologies in automotive and aviation show great promise and have done well to
ensure alignment within industry and government entities, to streamline the eventual
policy rollout.
In the built environment, insulation, lighting, controls, heating/cooling, and other
conservation and efficiency improvements from off-the shelf technologies are contributing to dramatic gains in energy savings and reduced environmental impact. This is

288

epilogue

a success story in real time whose value should not be understated. For new buildings,
the outlook is promising and will increase compliance to stringent standards. That said,
older buildings comprise a dominant share of the stock, exceeding ninety percent in
many regions. This dilemma means assessing the benefits and costs associated with
upgrades becomes more difficult. Longer term solutions are case dependent, and will
likely involve innovation related to more intelligent design and use of HVAC, lighting,
water, and advanced building materials, among others. An exciting aspect of built environment energy analysis is the more clearly defined interaction of the consumer with
energy decisions. Though more data-informed and rational responses are desirable in
consumer decisions, lessons learned from this sector may have far reaching application
to others, and provide avenues for more proactive energy involvement by lay society.
We hear you saying, “I want to make a difference.” Consider three closing themes as
we conclude our reflections on the path forward.
For the future of energy supply, diversity in the energy matrix is imperative. By
all means, there is room to scale-up renewable technologies, but it will happen alongside
efforts to optimize conventional and fossil resources. This means that wind, biofuels,
solar, and other clean alternatives will become truly competitive; and it also means the
momentum in natural gas and nuclear must be leveraged in order to reduce the environmental impact. It means managing the tough realities of coal and oil. For now, all
cost effective kilowatt-hours (and BTUs) will find a market; and in the very near future,
there will be an ever-increasing demand for the clean ones.
For the future of energy consumption, efficiency and conservation must not be
overlooked. In the next decade, these areas will potentially do more to reduce energy
costs, use, and emissions than even the cleanest new energy sources. While the innovation may look different from R&D on new conversion technology, it will be no less
impactful. This is about a relentless focus to extract the most value from every watt.
Intelligent controls, advanced materials, cutting edge optimization technologies for
mature industries, and more informed and proactive consumers—these will become
the agents of change.
For the next generation of energy leaders, social awareness and technological
innovation must go hand in hand. Grand global challenges like energy and climate
demand that problem solvers interact across boundaries, and outside of comfort zones.
Tomorrow’s policy makers, for instance, must more deeply appreciate the complexity
of engineering and economic challenges. Tomorrow’s scientists and engineers must not
only be aware of social implications, but conversant enough to speak candidly and affect them favorably. The world is in need of better data to be sure. But equally critical are
educated experts willing to interpret data and communicate complex issues throughout
the world.
We have not found a perfect source of energy. Nor have we resolved the difficult
issues of consumption. For the foreseeable future, we thus have some compromises to
make. Since the first man-made fire, draft animals, steam engines, jet airplanes, personal computers, and smart phones we have opted to leverage our natural resources to
reduce our physical burden, improve our quality of life, and accelerate our journey in
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this world. A world that is an organism, of which we are a critical and wonderful part.
We have pioneered great achievements and witnessed many natural and man-made disasters. Yet we adapt, learn, innovate, and try to improve. Taking on board all this new
data affects everyone differently—some retreat, many carry on as usual, others take up
action. In crisis, action is often needed; the engine does not run itself, so to speak. And
yet, even action alone may not guarantee positive change. The action must be informed,
coordinated, flexible; it must be backed by a critical mass; and it must leverage the best
of technology and policy, of science and the human heart. The physical laws and data
that describe our world to us are impersonal and without conscience. Not so for us. And
therein lies perhaps our greatest challenge and our greatest opportunity.
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